Communicating Technical Evidence

Supporting people making decisions about shelter after disasters

Technical evidence after disasters: a review of documents from Haiti, Peru and Pakistan

21st March 2013

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UCL ARUP care Defending dignity. Fighting poverty. HIF Humanitarian INNOVATION FUND

Evaluating the technical evidence

Is it user-friendly?

Clarity:
- Number of pages
- Document type (purpose and audience;)

Timeliness:
- How long before/after the event was it available?

Scale of focus:
- What are the photos showing?
- What is the level of detail of maps?

Strategic Analysis
- existing processes?
- appropriate processes?
- acceptable processes?

Is it relevant?

Humanitarian Priorities:
- Who is affected,
- Where are the affected and
- How much need/how many people
- Why were people affected?

Shelter Processes:
- Counting,
- Describing,
- Diagnosing,
- Strategically interpreting: different damage for different people/places

Documents produced or used by:	Document Focus: subject of images included						
	No Images	ground photo (people)	ground photo (emergency shelter)	ground photo (damage)	ground photo (house)	ground photo (group of houses, settlement)	aerial image
Humanitarian Shelter Organisations							
Researchers engineers, government or development banks and the international private sector							
Case Evidence							


Documents produced or used by:
Scale of Maps included in the Document
1
10
100
1,000
10,000
100,000
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10,000,000
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Humanitarian Shelter Organisations
Humanitarian Needs Assessments
Strategy or planning documents
Process Evaluations
Impact Evaluations
Researchers, engineers, gov't, private sector
Damage Assessments
Hazard or Risk Assessments
Diagnostic or Advisory Engineering Reports
Exploratory/Experimental Engineering Reports
Cases
Compilation of Case Studies (general sector)
Project Case Studies

Comparing document samples from Haiti and Peru

Evidence on Humanitarian Priorities

- Who?
- Where?
- How many people/how much need?
- How/why such damage?

Evidence on Housing and Shelter Process:

- Count damage
- Describe damage
- Diagnose damage (social and physical factors)
- Interpret impacts on different people or places
- Interpretation then informs response





Recommendations: gaps, marriage, synthesis

Filling Gaps: do more thinking ahead of time… let's consolidate experiences of post-disaster repair and retrofit and alternative approaches for rented, informal, traditional or vernacular types of housing

Marriage: do the same thinking in the aftermath but do it together… let's put our information together to try to answer with technical ministries and disaster-affected communities

Synthesis: think in new ways… let's develop techniques to **synthesise and interpret technical evidence** to understand the context of the shelter process.

UCL ARUP care Defending dignity. Fighting poverty. HIF Humanitarian INNOVATION FUND

Did we manage to communicate technical evidence?!

http://www.humanitarianinnovation.org/projects/small-grants/UCL

UCL ARUP care Defending dignity. Fighting poverty. HIF Humanitarian INNOVATION FUND

Documents produced or used by:	Who, Where, How much/how many, how/why "diagnosis" questions			
	Who	Where	How many/how much	How/why damage
Humanitarian Shelter Organisations				
Researchers, engineers, gov't, private sector				
Case Evidence				



How and why "diagnosis" questions by Case Study

	No counting, diagnosis or interpretation	No strategic interpretation	Strategic interpretation of scale	Strategic interpretation of physical causes	Strategic interpretation of physical and social causes	Strategic interpretation of scale and physical causes	Strategic interpretation of scale, physical AND social causes	Link analysis to response and recovery
Haiti								
Peru								
Pakistan								



Images or Photographs
(standalone)



Maps
(standalone)

Who and where?
Numbers, displacement, vulnerabilities



How much?
Meeting Shelter Needs





How come?
Context, risks, damage





Damage Assessments



Hazard or Risk Assessments

Diagnostic or Advisory Engineering



Exploratory or Experimental Engineering

Evaluation of CARE International's response to the Afghan Crisis Page 3

Executive summary

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Commune	IDPS in CHART (March 2002)	OWNED can read	OWNED can not read	Tenant	NA	Estimation of total need of shelter
Carrefour	1	1	1	1	1	1
Cite Soleil	1	1	1	1	1	1
Croix des Bouquets	1	1	1	1	1	1
Delmas	1	1	1	1	1	1
Grand Goâve	1	1	1	1	1	1
Jacmel	1	1	1	1	1	1
Jeremie	1	1	1	1	1	1
Kenscoff	1	1	1	1	1	1
Petit Goâve	1	1	1	1	1	1
Port au Prince	1	1	1	1	1	1
Tabarre	1	1	1	1	1	1
Thomazeau	1	1	1	1	1	1
Total	1	1	1	1	1	1

Table 3. Estimated of total needs of Shelters (T-Shelters and/or permanent houses)

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

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Figure 6: Accélération maximale du sol (PGA, 5pp pour 2 % de probabilité de dépassement en 50 ans, sans site de référence (Giardini GSHAP)

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IStructE

UCL



Humanitarian Needs Assessments



Strategic or Planning Documents



Process Evaluations



Impact Evaluations

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



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Context

¶3 September 11th found CARE Afghanistan with a good quality project portfolio that was professionally managed by a relatively large number of dedicated national staff working together with three international staff. CARE was clearly recognized as one of the leading NGOs working in Afghanistan and had a reputation amongst donors, government and NGOs for high quality implementation. Prior to September 11th, the total budget had increased due to drought programs to approximately 10M USD in cash and 4M in kind. As the Taliban extended their control to 80% of the country, CARE found itself working exclusively in Taliban controlled areas.

¶4 The previous Country Director had departed in August 2001 and the Assistant Country Director (Program) was acting in his stead. The ACD (Program) had six years of experience in a CARE National office but only two years of field experience and no field emergency experience. The only other senior international staff member in the Afghanistan Country Office was the Assistant Country Director (Program Support), who had only recently been promoted to this position.

¶5 After September 11th CARE suspended most of their projects in Afghanistan. International staff were evacuated, first to Pakistan and then to Bangkok, and returned to Pakistan in late September. Many national staff joined their families in Pakistan, while a few maintained a skeleton presence in Kabul.

¶6 A large scale refugee influx into Pakistan was anticipated. CARE Afghanistan remained focused on the program inside Afghanistan even though CARE members favoured a rapid scaling up to meet the possible refugee influx. While CARE Afghanistan clearly articulated the Country Office policy from an early stage, CARE USA did not clearly articulate a wider policy for CARE International until nearly a month after the crisis.

Draft Report V2 Pt 22 July 2002 CARE Afghanistan



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Procedural Guidelines

Assessment Guidelines







Compilation of Case Studies



Individual Case Study





Structural Design Parameters

Building Codes



General Design Brief



General Construction Principles





Building Instruction Manual

Standard Design

Design Options Catalogue