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## MPC – MIGRATION POLICY CENTRE

Co-financed by the European Union

### *Assessment of the situation of the Syrian refugees in Kurdistan region Iraq*

Mohamed Salman

MPC Research Report 2012/15



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**EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE**  
**ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES**  
**MIGRATION POLICY CENTRE (MPC)**

**Assessment of the situation of the Syrian refugees in Kurdistan region  
Iraq\***

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**RESEARCH REPORT, MPC RESEARCH REPORT 2012/15**  
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## **The Migration Policy Centre (MPC)**

### Mission statement

The Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute, Florence, conducts advanced research on global migration to serve migration governance needs at European level, from developing, implementing and monitoring migration-related policies to assessing their impact on the wider economy and society.

### Rationale

Migration represents both an opportunity and a challenge. While well-managed migration may foster progress and welfare in origin- as well as destination countries, its mismanagement may put social cohesion, security and national sovereignty at risk. Sound policy-making on migration and related matters must be based on knowledge, but the construction of knowledge must in turn address policy priorities. Because migration is rapidly evolving, knowledge thereof needs to be constantly updated. Given that migration links each individual country with the rest of the world, its study requires innovative cooperation between scholars around the world.

The MPC conducts field as well as archival research, both of which are scientifically robust and policy-relevant, not only at European level, but also globally, targeting policy-makers as well as politicians. This research provides tools for addressing migration challenges, by: 1) producing policy-oriented research on aspects of migration, asylum and mobility in Europe and in countries located along migration routes to Europe, that are regarded as priorities; 2) bridging research with action by providing policy-makers and other stakeholders with results required by evidence-based policy-making, as well as necessary methodologies that address migration governance needs; 3) pooling scholars, experts, policy makers, and influential thinkers in order to identify problems, research their causes and consequences, and devise policy solutions.

The MPC's research includes a core programme and several projects, most of them co-financed by the European Union.

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## 1. Introduction

During the Arab Spring, some of the Arab peoples decided to take a stand against their leaders as a result of many factors that accumulated over decades. These reactions and uprisings occurred from Tunisia in December 2010, followed by Egypt, Yemen and Libya, and originally started in peaceful civilian protests against their governments and some led to widespread violence and civil war. Likewise, in Syria, there is a continuation of these trends. In the Syrian context, however, the nature of the struggle against the regime and its leadership is complicated by the fact that the opposition is backed from abroad and exploited by Islamists, and the regime continues to act with full force against these fighters and its own citizens. Fighting and destruction continues to this day, prompting the Syrians to flee at home or resorting to flee to neighboring countries to escape the oppression and the effects of the fighting.

Signs of the impending movements of Syrian asylum seekers to the Kurdistan Region started from March of 2011, and have continued day after day since then for these reasons and others. The total number of Syrian refugees registered within Iraq was most recently counted at 45,849 individuals (by 31 October 2012) and the vast majority (28,790 individuals) was registered in the Duhok governate of the Kurdistan region.<sup>1</sup> Within the Kurdistan region, the majority of Syrian refugees reside in Duhok governate (28,790)- particularly within the Domiz camp with approximately 15,000 individuals registered by 24 October 2012<sup>2</sup> - while smaller numbers have also sought shelter within Erbil (6,857 individuals) and Sulaymaniyah (1,784 individuals). This places the total number of registered Syrians within the Kurdistan region at 37,431 (31 October 2012).<sup>3</sup>

Most of these Syrians have fled in order to survive and escape the effects of battles between the opponents of the regime (Free Syrian Army) and the regular army, but also for other reasons such as economic reasons, to escape conscription into the Syrian army, and other things related to the general situation in Syria. According to Syrians who fled to the Kurdistan region, those interviewed indicated that the situation in Syria was stable in the beginning, when demonstrations began, and that the daily lives continued for those who had been living in the countryside or worked there, or for those living in the big cities and working for the state or the private sector.

As the violence increased, the Syrian young men (especially Kurds living in the Syrian cities with large non-Kurdish populations like Damascus, Homs, Aleppo and others) also increasingly became under pressure. The reasons young Syrian men especially became under pressure were: the claims that demonstrators against the regime were subjected to harassment or even arrest; the government was obliging young and able men to join the army and carrying weapons to strike the opposition forces and the Free Syrian Army; pressure to become Baathists (and thereby members of the regime obliged to carry weapons in the face of opposition); the possibility of being used by the government as a human shield while attacking opposition forces; or the need to protect female family members or friends as the regime started assaulting girls and women, psychologically and physically.

This study is important for several reasons. First, this study looks at the Syrian refugee status quo in different ways than other reports, as it has directly accessed and interviewed the Syrians within the Kurdistan region without prejudice or ulterior motives other than to assess their situation. Secondly, the study presents the possibility of finding a way out and adoption of mechanisms and programs that contribute to reducing the suffering of the Syrian people. Thirdly, the study attempts to provide

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<sup>1</sup> UNHCR. UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response – Iraq. Retrieved from <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=103>

<sup>2</sup> UNHCR. Syria Situation Weekly Update No. 23 18-24 October 2012. Retrieved from: <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=103>

<sup>3</sup> UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response – Iraq. Retrieved from <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=103>

information so that ways of providing support, whether of Syrian refugees in countries of asylum, or to the countries that have absorbed these refugees, can be improved upon. The study also becomes important for the Syrian refugees living in the Kurdistan region as it highlights that: the situation is difficult for Syrian refugees spread throughout Kurdistan; and that the Kurdistan authorities have limited experience in dealing with waves of refugees, and it has become increasingly difficult to bear the burden of providing services to them and to meet their needs.

With these points as reference, this study aims to provide an account of the situation of Syrian refugees in the region in many ways, especially in Duhok Domiz camp. It will provide an assessment of the performance of the region in dealing with the crisis, and its existing and future needs in dealing with the needs of the refugees, and to assess the possibility of developing those possibilities and capabilities. Furthermore, it will address the potential effects of Syrian refugees on the region

In conclusion, it will place the findings of the study in front of decision makers in the region, as well as international actors, in order to support the efforts of the region to develop its capabilities - financial and material - and management in this area, as well as provide help and assistance to the refugees.

## **2. Methodology**

Spatially, the scope of this study includes the Kurdistan region of Iraq, with a focus on the Syrian refugees in the Duhok Domiz camp. Information was compiled between 20 September 2012 and 10 October 2012, and the literature on this area, including publications issued by the organizations of the United Nations or from the relevant authorities, was evaluated. Formal interviews with Syrian refugees at Domiz camp form the basis for this study, and seminars with groups of refugees were conducted. Such interview and discussion groups represented: groups of singles in the youth group; and a group male head of households; a group of women and girls; and a group of families that have members with special needs. All interviews were arranged via the Questionnaire form (Appendix), and questions and discussions mostly revolved around the situation in the camp and the situation in Syria.

A total of 80 questionnaires were randomly distributed to residents in Camp Domiz, including families as well as singles, although only 71 were adopted as nine forms were excluded either for inaccuracies in packaging of the returned form. The total number of people included in the study is 305 persons. The results of the questionnaires are accessible through the answers of the respondents and cannot be generalized to the refugee community as a whole, even for those who in the Domiz camp, but it can give a glimpse into the refugee status quo.

## **3. Survey data and the situation of Syrian refugees in Domiz camp**

### **3.1 Survey data**

#### *3.1.1 Biographical data*

Most survey respondents are male (75% of the respondents) because they are either the heads of households; are singles; or are single because their families did not accompany them to Iraq. The remaining percentage of respondents is female (25%). As it turns out, young people are the biggest component of the Syrian refugee respondents in the Domiz camp, accounting for 93%, and the remaining 7% belong to those exceeding forty years of age. This shows the high proportion of young people within the camp, and this could be due to either the young being ones most targeted by the Syrian regime and the army (compulsory military service, or the taking up of arms to defend the regime) or by the Free Syrian Army (to join the Free Syrian Army's ranks) or because they have

nothing to lose by leaving Syria and therefore exit the country to live in safer situation, find business opportunities, or a obtain a better position.

With regard to the birth place of the respondents, the surveys found that 65% of them had been born in rural villages (58% had been living and working in cities), and the bulk of those departing for Kurdistan are Syrian Kurds (94%), and the rest are Syrian Arabs who either lived in villages adjacent to the borders of the Kurdistan Region - Iraq, or they are a residents of Syrian cities and villages and sought refuge in the region in conjunction with the Syrian Kurdish refugees. Most of the respondents are married (85% of the total respondents), while singles accounted for 15%.

Also, all of these were Muslims, which indicates that the Christians of Syria, who live in the city of Damascus in particular, either did not leave their places, or they have gone to other neighboring countries or to European countries nearby. Most of the respondents are either those who did not get a chance for education as a result of poverty and the need to work (14%), or who those who have received basic and secondary education and were employed with limited income (65%). Those who have received a university education have been accounted for 21%.

Most families consist of two to five people, equivalent to 80% of the total respondents, while the rest ranged from one person to 13 people. Families vary in size, with the proportion of families that have one boy or one girl constitute the majority (64% and 53% respectively); the proportion of families with two sons or two daughters were 19% and 19% respectively; and the proportion of households that have 4 boys or 4 girls were 9% and 14% respectively. The families indicated that there was a burden placed on the head of the household in order to secure the requirements of daily life, and that there was a difficulty of keeping them safe due to fighting. There was also psychological pressure on families with a number of sons shows as these families feared that the sons could join the Syrian army or the opposition, or be swept up for prosecution by the regime. Families also feared for female members as they experienced for themselves or feared the possibility of exposure to all kinds of violence including sexual assaults (harassment or rape).

In Syria, most of the respondents were employed and were able to generate income to support their families. However, as a result of the fighting and subsequent flight from Syria, they lost work and the source of income mentioned, which led to the need for aid and assistance. The ratio of employed was 76%, and those who did not have work either were students, or they were housewives or women who worked with family members. For those employed, the majority worked in the private sector (57%, indicating the role played by the Syrian private sector and the extent it was affected by internal clashes), followed by the self-employed which could be working in the field or farm-owners or work in the professions and crafts and porters, or loading at 33%, and finally the number of public sector jobs at 9%.

Among respondents, the proportion of those who have fixed assets in Syria amounted to 63%, while the remainder indicated they did not have any assets in Syria. Such fixed assets that were owned and left behind when they left Syria were mostly buildings used for rent or for trading (accounting for 24% of the total answers respondents for their property), followed by owning farmland, cars and trucks by 9% of the total answers, and the rest owning other assets. (Tables 1 - 11, Supplement No. 3).

### *3.1.2 Flight to Kurdistan*

All of the respondents escaped from Syria to Kurdistan region via the land route. The respondents adopted various means to escape, and the majority fled by walking on foot (48%), followed the use of private cars or taxis at a rate of 39%, and then the use of trucks together with other families at a rate of 10%, and finally the use of tractors 3%. It is clear that most of the families fled with all members of the family (79%). Out of the remaining percentage which did not flee with all of their family members (21%), sixty percent expressed the wish to bring the remaining members of the family, while 40% did not desire to bring the remaining family members.



The respondents gave varying reasons for their flight from Syria. Reasons included the fear of physical violence (25%); the fear of being used as a human shield (25%); the fear of rape (24%); the fear of forced military service (22%); and other reasons in different proportions.

Reasons for choosing to flee to the Kurdistan Region and to Dohuk governate include: the security and stability of the region (21%); the shared ethnic, religious and linguistic affinities (17%); and the presence of better livelihood opportunities (16%), along with other reasons (see Tables 12 - 18, Supplement No. 3). Only 7% of the respondents left the Kurdistan region to return to Syria. The respondents noted that they left for one-time reasons, but did not mention what these reasons were (these were perhaps to reunite with family members left behind, or for economic reasons).

In regards to the relationship between the people of Dohuk and the Syrian refugees, the people of Dohuk have been hospitable and have welcomed the refugees. The respondents also noted that they did not experience any problems in the camp or outside the camp, or with the people of the region, service providers, the administrators of the camp, or with local and international organizations. It is also expected that there will be no future concerns in this area, and that most of the displaced are of Kurdish nationality and have close social and economic ties to Dohuk. In this sense, it can be expected that the Syrian refugees in Dohuk will: be able to exercise their lives and various rituals, cultural and religious beliefs freely; become gradually integrated within the Dohuk community; the women will be less likely to have their rights violated or to be exploited.

### *3.1.3 The case of the Domiz camp: shelter, services, and employment*

This section focuses on the services in the Dohuk camp, focusing on the various services provided and available in the camp. There were various opinions on the adequacy of the camp where according to the initial plan the camp was only prepared to receive and accommodate 10,000 people, but the number rose larger than expected and planned, and the camp has had to absorb almost triple this amount.

Regarding the adequacy of space within the camp to accommodate this volume of refugees, approximately 31% of respondents agreed that the space was adequate to accommodate this volume of refugees, while 52% did not agree that the space on was adequate, and 17% of others were impartial. Most of the respondents were living in temporary tents (73%, while the remainder of the respondents (27%) received housing units (construction of bricks and cement).

The majority of respondents (59%) noted that the housing units were not appropriate because housing is mostly tents that have been distributed and only some units have concrete walls. The remainder agreed that the housing units were sufficient enough, but commented that they were generally did not conform to standards accredited to the UNHCR.

The majority of respondents said that the Domiz camp is safe in all respects (56%), while 13% did not express that the camp was safe due to the possibility of entry and exit of residents without follow-up. The remaining (31%) did not indicate their exact sentiment in regards to the safety of the camp. (Tables 19 - 24, Supplement No. 3) As for the answers of respondents about the efficient management of the camp, there were 52% whom said there was efficient management of the camp compared with 48% who did not think the camp was run efficiently. (Tables 25 - 32, Supplement No. 3).

Almost 55% of surveyed refugees assured that the municipal services are available in the camp and there is no lack, at the same time 23% of them agreed that those services are not available in the camp, but the rest ratio 23% stay neutral. The largest proportion of respondents (90%) said that despite the presence of municipal services in the camp, the level and quality was confirmed at being mid-level or poor, while only 13% confirmed that services were offered at a good level.

Regarding educational services in the camp, out of the families that have children only 24% registered them in school, while 76% have not yet enrolled their children in school. Respondents said that the reason for not enrolling their children in school was due to the need to work (35%) (i.e. the

need to send their children to work, even if they find none), while other reasons included the cost of study (as they may prefer to send their children to private institutions) and the fact that some families did not possess documents that confirmed the child's grade as a reason or hindrance for enrolling study at a rate of 24% each, and for other reasons.

In regards to medical services, among respondents who need medical services, these people answered that they accessed services by the health center located in the camp with a rate of 68%, while 32% have not accessed such services but are in need. Among respondents, there were 77% that said services and medicines were provided free of charge, while 23% said that they paid for those services and medicine. This may mean that drugs and services are provided outside the government health centers. There were also some respondents (31%) whom stated that they are suffering from a chronic disease, and some needed special health care.

The importance of drinking water was also noted by the respondents, especially as the camp's water infrastructure has not been completed. According to the respondents, there were 69% whom had access to available drinking water in the camp because the camp administration is distributing water on average of 15 liters per capita per day (in addition to providing chlorine pills to disinfect the water, and water tanks for each family by the organization Kandil), while 31% that they have access but confirmed that distribution is poor and there is favoritism and selective distribution.

In regards to other services, the respondents indicated that there are not enough bathrooms (68%), while the remaining had adequate access (32%). Electricity was available and continuous daily according to 82% of the respondents continuously every day, while 18% said that it was not. While respondents supported the availability of communication as being available to everyone with a rate of 55%, the remaining 45% claimed that of communication was not available.

The UNHCR and the Kurdish government offer rations to the refugees of some dry items of food (oil, sugar, rice, flour, beans and milk), but the refugees disagree that the rations are comprehensive (as in not including all items and they are not sufficient). Aid has been received by 82%, while 18% stated that they did not receive any aid. Various reasons for not receiving aid include failure to adopt the date of registration present in the camp, random distribution, and not taking into account the different situation of each family or individual. Among the providers of aid, the UN organizations came in first place in the provision of aid to the respondents (29%), followed by the Kurdistan Regional Government in close cooperation with UN organizations which amounts to 25.00%, and other provincial organizations (14%). This assistance included: groceries (38%); blankets (20%), and medical materials and medicines (20%), and distributed the rest to financial aid (7 %), durable goods (4%), clothing (9%), and other (2%).

Many respondents reported that the aid received in the camp does not cover all of their needs, and therefore 83% are buying their requirements and the requirements of their families from the market, while 17% are not buying these requirements from the market due to not having enough money. The answers varied respondents about their vulnerability to exploitation by the owners of shops and vendors in Duhok markets, and 51% of the respondents claimed they were being exploited by the owners of shops and vendors and the introduction of different services, while 49% said they were not.

In regards to employment, 68% of the respondents said that they do not have work, while 32% are working. Of those working, 78% are working with the private sector in Dohuk; 17% of them they are working for themselves (whether to sell some goods, or work as porters, or open a small restaurant inside the camp), while others work for the government 4%. Of those not working, 81% expressed a desire to work if there is such an opportunity, while 19% of those do not gave desire to work even if there is an opportunity (due to old age, inability to work, or husbands who do not want to or cannot leave their wives and children on their own).

The local government has appointed some of the nurses from the Syrian in the clinic, which was held in the camp pay the provincial government wages, as well as the appointment of some teachers in the school, which has set up in the camp and pay Organization (UNHCR) wages of 300 dollars per teacher.

There is also resort to working in the black market, especially among the youth, and this helps to support some individuals and families. This market includes trading of certain kinds of goods (especially arms, gold and precious materials). There are no restrictions on the entry of these goods and there is freedom of movement, which may encourage smuggling as a means of obtaining money to meet their desires.

In order to rehabilitate the unskilled and those who do not have work the following question was directed to those not working: Do you wish to participate in the training course? And their answers showed that interest in participation in a training course that gives them some information that will help them to get jobs accounted for the vast majority of unemployed respondents (85%), while those who rejected the idea of participating in a training course accounted for 15%.

In order to access the intensity of the desire to work among the unemployed, respondents were asked a question that asked if they would prefer to rely on spending their savings or aid, there were 72% whom preferred to get a job in order to obtain their needs, while 28% of them said they would spend their savings and wait for any assistance as opposed working. (Tables 35-43 - B-2, Supplement No. 3)

### *3.1.4 The situation of refugee women*

The groups of women and girls that have been interviewed (20 individuals) confirmed that the situation of women refugees in the camp is good and is similar completely to the situation with others in the camp (men and women) without diminution of their rights, or their participation in access to housing or other materials, in treatment, or movement and the possibility of working.

There were no officially registered cases of assault on women up until the preparation of this report, whether by the Syrian refugees themselves or by people of the province, as well as whether in the camp or outside. This does not mean that there are no concerns, as women face the challenges of daily life in the camp (food, shelter, health, income, etc.) and exposure to verbal harassment. Women fear also that if they register this harassment they could harm their reputation or their situation.

There was also a fear regarding the early marriages of girls, particularly in low-income and poor families, whereby families marry-off daughters to either rid themselves of the 'burden' or to get money for their marriages.

Women are subject to harassment during crises, and this subject was discussed during the interviews. The answers showed that 13% of women who responded are subjected to harassment (but as mentioned women are afraid to report such events, and therefore the incidents could be much higher than reported). To determine who was behind the harassment of the 13% of women above, it has been demonstrated that these harassment came from several parties, as women were harassed from people present in markets and public places with a rate of 47%; from young people from outside the camp (32%); and/or by young Syrians who are in the camp at a rate of 21%.

Women also mentioned their exposure to domestic violence while in the camp which 14% experienced. For those that experienced violence, the surveys showed that women who have experienced domestic violence have been subjected to violence from more than one source. First, women reported violence from their husbands (74%) which was traced to the lack of money for the husband and the many needs of the family; secondly, violence from the father or brothers (19% each); and thirdly, violence from others (uncles and/or their children) by 13%, and the violence from children or the husband's family at 6% each.

In regards to certain exploitations of women, women are exploited by earning lower wages than those granted to men (32%) and other forms of exploitation - set forth in the table in the proportions- amounted to 16% (Tables 44 - 46 - A, Supplement No. 3).

### *3.1.5 The possibilities for return and for asylum or immigration to a third country*

Regarding the choice to return to Syria, the respondents had differing views about the return to Syria after a lull of the situation and a return to stability. The majority in the Domiz camp desired to return to their lives in Syria after the situation settles, especially if the Assad Baath regime breaks down (59%). On the other hand, there were 41% who rejected that they desired to return to Syria because it is not their belief that the situation will stabilize in the short term, and therefore they wish either to stay in Kurdistan or depart to a third country, under any immigration or asylum system.

For those wishing to return, many expressed fears and concerns that the country would be destabilized for period of time. Their concerns focused around:

- The extent to which the civil war would be prolonged, and when or if Assad and the Baath party would fall;
- The extent the Syrian situation improves;
- The possibility for multiparty rule in politics and the state administration;
- The possibility for a working democracy and the application of its principles;
- The possibility for creating a functioning economy with greater transparency.

As for options to stay and live in the Kurdistan Region - Iraq, several respondents who did not wish to return to Syria said that they want to stay in the province of Kurdistan which together constituted the ratio 93% of the answers. This fact could be a burden on the provincial government to continue to provide support. The remainder (7%) of the subjects stated that they wanted to apply for asylum or immigration to a third country, namely for the following reasons:

- The possibility of the continuation of the Assad and Baath regime;
- Lack of access to safety and permanent housing;
- The lack of jobs and livelihoods, and poverty is widespread;
- The desire to live in dignity, and to secure the future of their children;
- Some of them carrying Stays in European countries especially France, and if given them the opportunity, they would leave for France;
- The desire to complete some of their studies in the third country (Europe, or Canada and the United States of America).

## **4. The political aspects<sup>4</sup>**

At the provincial level, the decision to accept the arrival of the Syrian refugees has been taken by the provincial government represented by the Kurdistan Democratic Party, which is the main political power in the province, and the acceptance on the territory of the province is until the situation improves in Syria. The camp administrators did not notice any political activity of the Kurdish refugees in Domiz camp.

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<sup>4</sup> The information for this section was obtained through personal interviews with: telephone conversation with the governor of the Duhok Province (Ramadan Khujor) on 25/09/2012. An interview with the Director of the Directorate of Displacement and Migration (Yassin Yassin), in the Ministry of the Interior, the Kurdistan Regional Government - Iraq, on 24/09/2012; an interview with director of Domiz camp (Niaz Nouri), the Kurdistan Regional Government - Iraq on 25 - 26/09/2012.

At the national level, there are no clear reactions for or against the position of accepting refugees in Kurdistan (although the government announced the allocation of \$50 million for aid to the Syrian refugees in Iraq).

On the international level, the Kurdistan region did not notice any international moves from other countries to strengthen the position of the Kurdistan Region in accepting refugees. It only received words of thanks from European countries with respect to the good reception Syrian refugees. Most of the international funding has gone to Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan and Kurdistan has received little of the overall assistance.

The respondents shown that Kurdistan region accepted them as refugees was for political reasons with a rate of 58% of their answers, while 42% of them refused that the political reasons was beyond that acceptance. As evidenced by the answers of respondents they're rejecting the idea of exploiting the camp for various purposes and mixed with a rate of answers amounted to 77%, while 23% of them assured the possibility of exploiting the camp for any purpose.

## **5. Views of partners and stakeholders<sup>5</sup>**

Statements of the partners and stakeholders on issues related to Syrian refugees can be divided several themes, as follows:

### *5.1.1 The existing situation and the possibility of its development*

Stakeholders have mentioned that the current situation is problematic for the following reasons:

- The number of refugees continues to increase, this situation is unpredictable, and the camp can only support so many refugees. The Domiz camp is able to receive 40 to 50 refugees maximum per day, but the number reached between 300 to 700 refugees, and sometimes reached number up to 1,200 refugees a day.
- The large number of daily total refugees places pressure on the camp and there is difficulty in meeting all the needs of those seeking shelter (for example, the provision of daily rations and livelihood support; distribution of tents; distribution of household needs; pressures on sanitation, especially with the existence of pregnant women and people with special needs; and others).
- The limited capacities of the region (technical, financial and logistical), and its limited experience in dealing with waves of refugees, despite persistent attempts to do the preparations and build the infrastructure to cope with a stream of immigrants from any place or country.
- The instability near the Domiz camp from the Syrian border, which can be influenced by medium-range missiles either ground or air.
- Limited or weak external support from other countries or international organizations (eg financial support from the U.S. for Syrian refugees to Iraqi Kurdistan was presented on the basis that the number would be between 5,000 to 15,000 refugees, while the number of refugees numbers are much higher).
- The need to address the potential mental and neurological needs of the refugees due to the impacts of flight, loss of loved ones, loss and losing their money, or physical wounds, especially children and the elderly to their exposure to drought and lack of minerals and vitamins, and others.

The situation can also worsen if the flows of Syrian refugees continues at the pace of current displacement as the Domiz camp was only planned to absorb 10,000 people – at the time of writing,

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

the figure has almost tripled, and this is what caused additional pressure on the management of the camp, the local government, and the provincial government and partners to accelerate the provision of services and caused delayed provision of some services (reception, registration, and grant requirements to live, etc.).

The situation becomes even more problematic as the administrators of the crisis within the region are unable to open a new camp because of the lack of the required human, financial, material and logistical needs, and because the federal Iraqi government has not responded to requests from the provincial government for support and assistance. The provincial government has therefore had to focus most its attention on expanding the camp and improving existing conditions and services and to accelerate the completion of the camp requirements before the winter.

### *5.1.2 Administrative dimensions*

The Kurdistan region currently holds the vast majority of the Syrian refugees within Iraq (approximately 77%), and this places a larger burden on the administration in Kurdistan. Their concerns include:

- Providing decent housing and integrated services (water and electricity connections);
- The need to sewage;
- The need to pave the streets;
- Construction of schools, health centers, and offices of communication and transport services;
- Garbage collection and transfer of garbage bags from the camp;
- Registration of refugees, and provision of temporary residence documents;
- Other services

### *5.1.3 Economic dimensions*

The waves of Syrian refugees have generated multifaceted effects in an economic sense in the opinion of the stakeholders, and their economic concerns are based around the following issues even though it seems that the refugee movements have not been placing large demands on the market.

As the local government (in Dohuk), in coordination with the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), distributes food to families and individuals, there has not been any pressures or lack of supply side. Likewise, most durable goods are distributed (refrigerators, freezers, etc.) by the Directorate of Displacement and Migration (Ministry of Interior - the region) and the University of Dohuk and Muslim League, so this has also not generated any pressure on the market, although some families have not received these items.

As a result of the growing number of refugees and the presence of the camp, the government has increased spending, in addition to the amount allocated in the general budget for the Bureau of Immigration and Immigrants, and the Kurdistan Regional Government has allocated \$ 10 million extra to keep up with the growing number of refugees and try to meet their requirements. If the pace continues the same displacement, the economy of the region could be impacted by: the possibility of importing more to meet the inability of domestic production; and the possibility of price changes, generally upward, and thus influence the purchasing power of the citizens of the province on the one hand, and displaced Syrians on the other hand.

Other concerns include: the possible impact on employment opportunities for Iraqi citizens as Syrian labour may be cheaper, because they possess higher levels of skills, or because they may work longer hours; the possible demand for housing that may even result in rising rents costs and rising land prices; and also the possible effect on service provision to Iraqi citizens in the governorate as government spending may need to be adjusted to take into account the requirements of the camp and the displaced.

#### *5.1.4 Current requirements and future needs*

Given the above situation, stakeholders made a number of observations regarding the current and future needs of the situation. The requirements can be identified as follows:

Administrative and technical realm:

- The presence of a professional management cadre for the refugee camps, and in the area of refugee reception and accommodating their needs;
- Training of local staff - within government institutions, institutions of civil society, and the training of the governmental leaders - in how to assess the situation and the decision-making process in everything related to the camps and the refugees;
- The presence of hardware and software that facilitate the registration and follow-up matters of refugees, as well as in the preparation of studies related to the development of mechanisms of action and overcome the imbalances and bottlenecks, as well as in the statement of needs and planning for the future.
- The delivery of municipal services in particular (garbage and waste, and sanitation, and the supply of water and electricity, and paving the streets).

Financial realm:

- The need to allocate a special budget to refugee camps (for the establishment and maintenance of camps, all components of the administrative units and health centers, schools and residential units, roads, streets and connections of water and electricity, sanitation and so on, and camp management, training and staff development, and training of refugees, etc.);
- The need for a special budget allocated for the provision of funds distributed to the refugees who are unable to work, or who are not finding work;
- The need for a budget allocated for the purchase of relief supplies (motor vehicles, tents and cabins, hardware and software, etc.);
- The need for the establishment of the necessary infrastructure for the reception of refugees.

Material realm:

- The availability of camps ready integrated facilities and services are able to receive refugees;
- The availability of equipment and computers and software, and telecommunications and informatics;
- The availability of cars, tankers and containers (especially water);
- The availability of equipment and supplies of tents, blankets and basic household equipment;
- The availability of dry food and baby milk.

Logistical realm:

- The establishment of ongoing training workshops to train refugees some income-generating trades even when They can not work outside the camps;
- Ensure the best protection of the camp (camp), which is already a believer is excellent, but the intention here from home insurance (inside Syria to establish a buffer zone);
- Secure Transport and Communications;
- Building a database full of possibilities and the current and future needs.

### *5.1.5 The expected response from the international community, inclusive of the European Union*

According to the interviews with the stakeholders (noted in footnote 4), the international community, including the European Union, is expected to respond to the injustices against the Syrian people inside Syria and in refugee camps in neighboring countries, including the province through:

- Confirm the denunciation and condemnation of the Assad regime's practices of using brutal repression against unarmed citizens;
- Emphasis on persecution of offenders of crimes against humanity;
- The establishment of a buffer zone inside Syria to reduce the exodus out of Syria on the one hand, and to minimize the human and financial costs as a result of their displacement from their own country and provide them with appropriate camps;
- Provide financial and technical support for the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq to support them in providing for the refugees who are in the province;
- Coordination and cooperation between the European Union and the provincial government to provide aid and support for the refugees;
- Training for decision-makers on crisis management associated with the displacement and asylum, as well as in the training of administrative staff working in the camps;
- Help the Kurdistan Region with the various aspects camp construction.

## **6. Conclusions and Proposals**

1. Granting refugees temporary residence and give them freedom of movement, residence and work anywhere inside the Kurdistan region of Iraq in order to reduce the cost and management efforts, and distributing the risk may raise by refugees.
2. The international community can:
  - a. Coordinate and cooperate with Iraq's Kurdistan region in receiving, registering, safe assuring and protecting refugees, and to promote its capabilities in the management of mass exodus.
  - b. Technical, financial and material, and logistical support to the region to help absorb the large size of the refugees on the one hand, and enhancing its capabilities in the establishment integrated camps, also trained with the relationship, whether they are decision makers, or administrators of the camps, or other staff.
3. The international community in particular the European Union to secure suitable cabins for the accommodation of refugees in the camp.
4. Securing the fuel needed to face the winter cold, ensuring the necessary infrastructure of the camp, and they can have direct contributions (in kind or cash).
5. Securing food and baby milk for the refugees by quantities and qualities appropriate for their situation, including school feeding.
6. Securing specialist doctors from the international community for special cases, chronic diseases, and epidemiologist, also securing them with medications.
7. The refugees generated a greater burden on the economy, as well as boost unemployment and competition for jobs already limited, so must secure certain amounts paid in financial assistance directly to the heads of households, disabled and unable to work, the elderly, unemployed, orphaned children, people with special needs, and women widows and non-working girls.
8. Building schools for people with special needs and to furnish all necessary.
9. Granted greater attention to the defenceless Syrian people, and wider attention to get them out of the difficult situation in which they live every day inside and outside Syria.



## Appendix

Table 1. The Gender of the Respondents

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Male	53	75
Female	18	25
Total	71	%100

Table 2. The age of the Respondents

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Less than 30 years	50	70
30- 39	16	23
40- 49	3	4
50 or more	2	3
Total	71	%100

Table 3. The place of birth and living of the respondents

Place of birth	Frequency	Percentage	Place of living	Frequency	Percentage
City	41	58	City	25	35
Village	30	42	Village	46	65
Total	71	%100	Total	71	100

Table 4. Nationality and the religion of the respondents

Nationality	Frequency	Percentage	Religion	Frequency	Percentage
Kurdish	67	94	Muslim	71	100.00
Arabic	4	6	Christian	0	0.00
Others	0	0.00	Others	0	0.00
Total	71	100	total	71	%100

Table 5. Marital Status of Respondents

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Single	11	15
Married	60	85
Divorced	0	0.00
Widow	0	0.00
Total	71	%100

**Table 6. The education level of the respondents**

Category	Frequency	Percent
<b>Illiterate</b>	10	14
<b>Essential</b>	27	38
<b>secondary</b>	19	27
<b>Diploma</b>	7	10
<b>Bachelor</b>	8	11
<b>Post Graduate</b>	0	0.00
<b>Total</b>	71	%100

**Table 7. Volume of the families and number of male and female children**

Volume of the family	Frequency	Percent	No., of Male children	Frequency	Percentage	No., of Female children	Frequency	Percentage
1	4	6	1	30	1	1	4	52
2	13	18	2	9	2	2	13	19
3	9	13	3	2	3	3	9	7
4	19	28	4	4	4	4	19	15
5	10	14	5	1	5	5	10	5
6	6	8	6	1	6	6	6	0.00
7	3	4	7	0	7	7	3	2
8	4	6	8	0	8	8	4	0.00
9	0	0.00	9	0	9	9	0	0.00
10	1	1	10	0	10	10	1	0.00
11	1	1	11	0	11	11	1	0.00
12	0	0.00	12	0	12	12	0	0.00
13	1	1	13	0	13	13	1	0.00
<b>Total</b>	71	%100	<b>Total</b>	47	<b>%100</b>	<b>Total</b>	71	<b>%100</b>

**Table 8. The opportunity to work in Syria**

Opportunity of work	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Yes</b>	54	76
<b>No</b>	17	24
<b>Total</b>	71	%100

**Table 9. Working for**

Category	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Government</b>	5	9
<b>Private sector</b>	31	58
<b>Entrepreneur</b>	18	32
<b>Others</b>	0	0.00
<b>Total</b>	54	%100

**Table 10. Owning Fixed Assets in Syria**

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	45	63
No	26	37
<b>Total</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>%100</b>

**Table 11. The Kind of Fixed assets Been Owned in Syria**

Category	Frequency	Percentage
House	26	38
Tradable Building	16	24
Furniture	8	12
Land (Plot)	3	4
Agricultural Land	6	9
Factory, Machines	1	1
Car, Truck	6	9
Livestock	2	3
Other	0	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>%100</b>

**Second: The Routes of Escaping and Resorting to Kurdistan****Table 12. The Route used to escape from Syria**

Route	Frequency	Percentage
Overland	71	100.00
Air	0	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>%100</b>

**Table 13. The Means Used to Escape from Syria**

The Means	Frequency	Percentage
Private/ Hired Car	28	39
Tractor	2	3
Truck- Accompany with others	7	10
Airplane	0	0.00
Others (Walking by Feet)	34	48
<b>Total</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>%100</b>

**Table 14. Accompanying Family Members When to Flee and the Possibility of Bringing the Remaining in Syria**

Accompanying Family			Willing to bring the rest Family Members			Whole Family Accompanying		
	Frequency	Percentage		Frequency	Percentage		Frequency	Percentage
Yes	56	79	Yes	51	91	Yes	9	60.00
No	15	21	No	5	9	No	6	40.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>%100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>%100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>%100</b>

**Table 15. Reason to flee from Syria and resorting to the Kurdistan Region**

Reason to Flee	Frequency/ Yes	Percentage
The fear of enrollment for military service	43	22
The fear of use as human shields	49	25
The fear of physical assault	50	25
Fear of rape of women	47	24
Economic situation	6	3
Stopped the University study & Exams	2	1
<b>Total</b>	197	% 100

**Table 16. Borders (Ports) of Entry to Kurdistan Region**

Ports	Frequency	Percentage
Ibrahim Al Khalil- Feshkhaboor	8	11
Rabiaa+ Qamishloo	31	44
Airports	0	0.00
Other (To sneak across the border villages)	32	45
<b>Total</b>	71	% 100

**Table 17. The reason beyond choosing the Kurdistan Region as a haven for asylum fleeing Syria**

Reason beyond choosing the Kurdistan Region	Frequency	Percentage
Near the region and the province of Dohuk to the Syrian border	28	11
The presence of family ties with the people of the province in particular	20	8
The presence of relatives and friends in the province	15	6
The fact that people of the province of the same nationality and religion and using the same language	43	17
safety and stability enjoyed by the province and the province	53	22
A better livelihood opportunities	41	16
there are better job opportunities and higher wages	23	9
Access to municipal services and better health and education	25	10
Other (specify)	2	1
<b>Total</b>	250	% 100

**Table 18. The departure of refugees to the territory of Kurdistan**

Willingness to leave the region (Camp Dumez)	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Yes</b>	5	7
<b>No</b>	66	93
<b>Total</b>	71	% 100

**Third: Camp of Domez****Table 19. The adequacy of the space camp Domez registered refugees**

adequacy of the space camp Domez	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Yes</b>	22	31
<b>No</b>	37	52
<b>No Idea</b>	12	17
<b>Total</b>	71	%100

**Table 20. The availability of healthy and sufficient housing units in Camp Domez - Dohuk**

Availability of healthy and sufficient housing units	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Yes</b>	27	38
<b>No</b>	42	59
<b>No Idea</b>	2	3
<b>Total</b>	71	%100

**Table 21. The availability of municipal services in the camp Domez**

Availability of municipal services in the camp	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Yes</b>	39	54
<b>No</b>	16	23
<b>No Idea</b>	16	23
<b>Total</b>	71	100

**Table 21 a. Quality and level of municipal services provided to camp**

Quality and level of municipal services	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Good</b>	9	13
<b>Intermediate</b>	45	63
<b>Bad (Not good)</b>	17	24
<b>Total</b>	71	100

**Table 22. Availability infrastructure in the camp**

Availability infrastructure	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Yes</b>	18	25
<b>No</b>	17	24
<b>No idea</b>	36	51
<b>Total</b>	71	%100

**Table 22 a. Situation of infrastructure available in the camp**

Situation of infrastructure	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Good</b>	10	14
<b>Intermediate</b>	29	41
<b>Bad (Not good)</b>	32	45.
<b>Total</b>	71	%100

**Table 23. Camp administration understand the refugees status and requirements**

The administration understand the status and requirements	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	43	60
No	21	30
May be	7	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>%100</b>

**Table 24. The extent to which the camp safe**

The camp is safe	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	40	56
No	9	13
May be	22	31
<b>Total</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>%100</b>

**Forth: Refugees requirement and Administrative****Table 25. The extent of receiving housing unit**

Received housing unit	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	19	27
No	52	73
<b>Total</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>100</b>

**Table 26. Availability of service institutions in the camp**

The service institutions are available	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	62	87
No	9	13
<b>Total</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>%100</b>

**Table 27. Benefit from the education service offering in the camp schools**

I have children must be enrolled in school	Frequency	Percentage	The Study began in the camp	Frequency	Percentage	The kids started their study in the camp	Frequency	Percentage
	Yes	17		24	Yes		12	71
No	54	76	No	5	29	No	7	41
<b>Total</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>%100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>%100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>%100</b>

**Table 27 a. Reason beyond not attending school**

<b>Reason beyond not attending school</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
<b>Bear the cost of study</b>	4	23
<b>The need to work</b>	6	35
<b>Limited schools and classrooms</b>	3	18
<b>Not possess documents that confirm grade</b>	4	24
<b>Unwillingness child study</b>	0	0.00
<b>Care for disabled family members or patients</b>	0	0.00
<b>Total</b>	17	%100

**Table 28. The need for medical centers and services**

need for medical services and medicines			Availa- bility of those services in the camp			Provide medical services and medicines and materials for free		
	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>		<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>		<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
<b>Yes</b>	48	68	<b>Yes</b>	25	35	<b>Yes</b>	55	77
<b>No</b>	23	32	<b>No</b>	46	65	<b>No</b>	16	23
<b>Total</b>	71	%100	<b>Total</b>	71	%100	<b>Total</b>	71	%100

**Table 28 a. Health status of the refugees**

<b>Do you suffer from a chronic illness or need special care?</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
<b>Yes</b>	22	31
<b>No</b>	49	69
<b>Total</b>	71	%100

**Table 29. The availability of drinking water at the camp**

<b>Drinking water available in sufficient quantity</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
<b>Yes</b>	49	69
<b>No</b>	22	31
<b>Total</b>	71	%100

**Table 30. The availability of other services in the camp**

Category	The answer					
	Yes		No		Total	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
The availability of bathrooms with sufficient number	23	32	48	68	71	%100
The availability of WC's in sufficient number	22	31	49	69	71	%100
Available of paved streets	30	42	41	58	71	%100
Electricity is available and continuing	58	82	13	18	71	%100
Transport facilitated and available	54	76	17	24	71	%100
Communication available and cheap	39	55	32	45	71	%100

**Table 31. The camp administration is qualified and efficient**

Efficient and eligibility of the administration	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Yes</b>	37	52
<b>No</b>	34	48
<b>Total</b>	71	%100

**Fifth: Political Issues****Table 32. Reasons behind the admission of Syrian refugees to the region**

Accept the Syrian refugees was for political reasons	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Yes</b>	41	58
<b>No</b>	30	42
<b>Total</b>	71	%100

**Table 32 a. Does the camp been exploited by refugees?**

The extent of exploitation	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Yes</b>	16	23
<b>No</b>	55	77
<b>Total</b>	71	%100



**Table 32 b. Purposes that the camp could be used for**

Exploits the camp for the purpose of	Frequency	Percentage
Form a cell (refugees themselves) opposition to the Syrian regime in the camp, trying to carry out cross-border operations and return to the camp, which operates a negative impact on the reality of the region.	11	26
Can be absorbed by the terrorist groups and the negative psychological impact, and their use in the implementation of the agendas of those terrorist groups	9	21
Hostile acts (Genesis gangs) when not getting a better position or even when they do not have better services within the camp or within the region.	8	19
Possibility of the formation of groups to smuggle weapons, drugs and contraband across the border either for profit, or to provide the opposition parties to which they belong	9	22
Reorganization of belonging to the opposition parties, and the possibility of holding regular meetings of certain people who belong to these parties, and even the possibility of the outbreak of fighting, including due to differing political affiliation	5	12
<b>Total</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>%100</b>

**Sixth: Economic issues****Table 33. The extent of receiving the aids by respondents**

Extent of receiving the aids	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Yes</b>	58	82
<b>No</b>	13	18
<b>Total</b>	71	%100

**Table 34. The aid provider and the quality of aid**

Provider	Frequency	Percentage	Kind of aids	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Individuals</b>	17	16	<b>Financial</b>	12	7
<b>The regional government</b>	27	25	<b>Foodstuffs</b>	63	38
<b>NGO's</b>	18	17	<b>Durable goods</b>	7	4
<b>Regional organizations</b>	15	14	<b>Clothes</b>	14	9
<b>UN organizations</b>	31	29	<b>Medical materials and medicines</b>	32	20
<b>Total</b>	108	%100	<b>Blankets</b>	33	20
			<b>Other</b>	3	2
			<b>Total</b>	164	% 100

**Table 35. Does the respondents receive a fixed, comprehensive and adequate ration**

Receive the ration	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	33	46
No	38	54
<b>Total</b>	71	%100

**Table 36. Receiving milk and basic nutrition for children**

Receive the children milk and basic nutrition	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	25	35
No	46	65
<b>Total</b>	71	%100

**Table 37. Does the respondents purchase their requirements?**

purchase the requirements	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	59	83
No	12	17
<b>Total</b>	71	%100

**Table 38. The price levels in the region (Dohuk)**

The prices level	Frequency	Percentage
High	42	59
Moderate	19	27
Regular	10	14
<b>Total</b>	71	%100

**Table 39. The respondents exposure to exploitation**

Exposure to exploitation	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	36	51
No	35	49
<b>Total</b>	71	%100

**Table 40. Do present camp monopoly or smuggling**

Monopoly or smuggling	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	14	20
No idea	28	39
No	29	41
<b>Total</b>	71	%100

**Table 41. Have a business opportunity**

Business opportunity	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	23	32
No	48	68
<b>Total</b>	71	%100

**Table 41 a. The institutions which working for**

Working for:	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Government</b>	1	5
<b>Private sector</b>	18	78
<b>Free works</b>	4	17
<b>Total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>%100</b>

**Table 41 b. Desire to work**

Have the desire to work	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Yes</b>	39	81
<b>No</b>	9	19
<b>Total</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>%100</b>

**Table 41 b.1. Have the desire to attend a training course**

Have the desire	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Yes</b>	33	85
<b>No</b>	6	15
<b>Total</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>%100</b>

**Table 41 b.2. Reliance on savings and aids**

Have the desire	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Yes</b>	11	28
<b>No</b>	28	72
<b>Total</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>%100</b>

**Seventh: The women situation****Table 42. The vulnerability of women to harassment**

Women are subjected to harassment	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Yes</b>	9	13
<b>No</b>	62	87
<b>Total</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>%100</b>

**Table 42 a. Source of harassment of women who in Camp Dumez**

Women are subjected to harassment by	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Young refugees</b>	4	21
<b>Young people coming from outside the camp</b>	6	32
<b>People in markets and public places</b>	9	47
<b>Total</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>%100</b>

**Table 43. Women's exposure to domestic (Family) violence**

Women are subjected to violence	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Yes</b>	10	14
<b>No</b>	61	86
<b>Total</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>%100</b>

**Table 43 a. Source of domestic violence against women**

Women are subjected to violence by their	Frequency	Percentage
Fathers	3	19
Sons	1	6
Brothers	3	19
Husband	6	37
Husband's family	1	6
Other (Uncle ...)	2	13
<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>%100</b>

**Table 44. Exploitation of women during the work**

Women are exploited during the work	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	9	13
No	62	87
<b>Total</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>%100</b>

**Table 44 a. Type of exploitation suffered by women during the work**

Women are subjected to violence by their	Frequency	Percentage
Granted lower wages than men	8	29
Work more hours	4	6
Mandate for further work, along with its main work	5	19
Attempt sexual exploitation	4	38
Defamation and extortion	4	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>13</b>

**Eighth: Possibility of return back, stay and migration to a third country****Table 45. Choices to return back to Syria**

Thinking return back to Syria	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	42	59
No	29	41
<b>Total</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>%100</b>

**Table 46. Reasons for not desire return back to Syria**

Reasons not to think about return	Frequency	Percentage
Stay in Kurdistan and to obtain permanent residency	22	55
Waiting for the fully clarity of the situation	10	25
Immigration or asylum to a third country	3	7
Instability on one opinion and wait for the reactions of others	5	13
<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>%100</b>









