

Strategic citywide spatial planning

A situational analysis of metropolitan Port-au-Prince, Haiti



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All photos by Åsa Forsman and Remy Sietchiping © UN-HABITAT

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Editing and layout: Robert Wagner

Sponsors: Norwegian Government, Swedish International Development Cooperation and the Government of Haiti

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2009

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Abbreviations

ASEC	Assemblée de la Section Communale
CAMEP	Centrale Autonome Métropolitaine d'Eau Potable
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CASEC	Conseil Administratif de la Section Communale
CBO	Community Based Organization
CDS	City Development Strategy
CNRA	Commission Nationale à la Réforme Administrative
DGI	Direction Générale des Impôts
DSNCRP	Document de Stratégie Nationale pour la Croissance et pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté
EDH	Électricité d'Haïti
EPPLS	Entreprise Publique de Promotion des Logements Sociaux
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GTIH	Groupement Technologie Intermédiaire d'Haïti
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
IHSI	Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d'Informatique
INARA	Institut National de la Réforme Agraire
I-PRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
ME	Ministère de l'Environnement
MEF	Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances
MICT	Ministère de l'Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales
MINUSTAH	Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation de Haïti
MPCE	Ministère de la Planification et la Coopération Externe
MTPTC	Ministère de Travaux Public, Transport et Communications
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
ONACA	Office National du Cadastre
PESTLE	Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal and Environmental factors
PPP	Purchasing power parity
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SNEP	Service National d'Eau Potable
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme

Executive summary

Introduction

This situational analysis of metropolitan Port-au-Prince gives a thorough background to the city's situation in terms of urban development and planning, and presents a way forward for future planning of the metropolitan area. It argues that the main stakeholder for any urban development intervention should be the state, more precisely the municipalities. The municipalities in Port-au-Prince need support in planning and delivering basic services. Institutional capacity building is vital for alleviating the current lack of service delivery to urban residents. Community involvement and the coordination of different stakeholders are key components for sustainable results. Any interventions must be planned on a long-term basis, yet still deliver short-term gains so that the necessary support can be harnessed.

Rationale for the study

The Haitian Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation, MPCE, in cooperation with UN-HABITAT, initiated an intervention in Port-au-Prince on land related citywide strategic planning. This situational analysis constitutes the first phase of the intervention and will, if funding allows, be followed by technical assistance for the stakeholders in metropolitan Port-au-Prince, assistance in coordinating a development partners group of land, and ultimately the development and implementation of a strategic spatial citywide plan in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan region. The final design of the intervention will be informed by this situational analysis, as well as by discussions and negotiations with Haitian stakeholders and the donor community.

Scope and outputs of the study

The situational analysis of metropolitan Port-au-Prince, an area that encompasses eight municipalities¹, focuses on citywide planning with an urban land perspective. The term “citywide” in this case embraces the whole metropolitan region. The situational analysis also covers the wider aspects of housing, urban infrastructure and the socio-economic situation. The challenges and opportunities for a decent urban livelihood in Port-au-Prince have been analysed, and are followed by recommendations on the most effective type of spatial planning and/or land related interventions. The situational analysis aims to provide MPCE and other stakeholders with the necessary background information and hands-on recommendations to initiate a citywide planning process in metropolitan Port-au-Prince.

The second part of the situational analysis develops generic draft

¹ The 8 municipalities are: Carrefour, Cité Soleil, Croix-des-Bouquets, Delmas, Kenscoff, Pétion-Ville, Port-au-Prince and Tabarre

guidelines for citywide strategic planning. Most planning in developing country cities is focused on either formal or informal areas, rarely on the whole city. In an attempt to overcome the problems of piece-meal, isolated and segregating interventions, UN-HABITAT is developing citywide strategic planning as a more holistic approach. This situational analysis and the draft guidelines on citywide strategic planning will be one of many sources of information and experience feeding into UN-HABITAT's approach to citywide strategic planning.

The draft guidelines are informed by the authors experience in Port-au-Prince, as well as by other sources in order not to be biased towards one specific city. UN-HABITAT will continue to develop and revise them as necessary.

Findings

One part of this study is devoted to describing the urban situation in metropolitan Port-au-Prince. Data and information from numerous sources have been put together to give a broad picture of living conditions, livelihoods, patterns of land tenure, legal frameworks for land and planning, the institutional setting, and other fields that shape the city and its inhabitants. It is concluded that Port-au-Prince is in many ways a malfunctioning and badly governed city that lacks the ability to provide its residents with the most basic urban services such as water and sanitation, safe and affordable land and housing, access roads and a suitable transport system.

Tenure

Metropolitan Port-au-Prince houses around 2.7 million inhabitants, most of whom live in informal settlements. It is not only the poorer sections of the population that are affected by insecure tenure; since property and land information systems are almost non-existing (or in the best cases overlapping and erroneous) very few people have secure access to land and housing.

Housing quality

Despite the lack of security, overall housing quality is quite high. Residents in the metropolitan area are not threatened by evictions and therefore invest in their homes. Most houses, even many in dilapidated slum areas, are built with permanent materials such as a cement floor, concrete blocks and wooden doors. The lack of enforcement of building regulation and planning standards is however both a blessing and a curse for residents; it allows residents to stay informally (normally cheaply) and securely in their houses, but also increases the environmental and safety risks associated with unplanned settlements.

Public services

The derelict state of basic services is in stark contrast to the neat houses, and has a severe impact on the residents' health, livelihoods and safety. The waste management situation is almost out of control and very few people have access to safe water and sanitation. Water sources are not protected and many are contaminated by wastewater from encroaching informal settlements. Only half of the metropolitan area's residents have access to latrines, and even these are not always disposing of the waste in a safe manner.

Environmental setting

Metropolitan Port-au-Prince is shaped like an amphitheatre. The low plain facing the coast is surrounded on three sides by densely populated mountains. Both solid and liquid waste is disposed of in gullies or streams, which flow into the sea. The solid waste clogs up channels and streams, exacerbating the flooding in the lower parts of the city. Worst affected are some slum areas by the sea, built directly on piles of garbage in an effort to keep the houses above sea level.

The frequent torrential rains damage settlements by the sea, which experience flooding even after normal showers, as well as settlements on the hillsides, which are at risk from landslides. Other natural disasters, such as storms and hurricanes, have a similar impact on these high-risk settlements. The climatic instability and rising sea levels caused by climate change will increase the threat faced by the growing majority who settle in high risk areas. Land use plans and zoning regulations that could hinder this type of development are rare and do not cover the whole metropolitan area. Furthermore, enforcement of planning and building regulations is practically non-existent.

Transport infrastructure

The road system is under dimensioned and traffic congestion intensifies year by year as the number of motor vehicles increases without a corresponding improvement in the road network. Walking is still the most common means of transportation, but the infrastructure is not planned for pedestrians.

Institutional context

In addition to these physical problems, Port-au-Prince faces considerable institutional challenges. The Haitian state and the city authorities do not have the capacity to plan and manage metropolitan Port-au-Prince. In addition to a lack of financial resources, other more important obstacles prevent effective urban management. Metropolitan Port-au-Prince's eight municipalities share the responsibility of the city's management with numerous central government bodies, with unclear and overlapping mandates and responsibilities, and no system for coordination.

Municipalities (and, to a lesser extent, national authorities) suffer from a lack of educated and trained staff. Many educated Haitians emigrate due to low salaries and limited opportunities for professional advancement. The brain drain is aggravated by the employment opportunities offered by the many NGOs, donors and international companies, with salaries on a substantially higher level than in the state system. The recurrent (and often violent) political crises in Haiti have caused an influx of temporary and well paid emergency jobs that has distorted the labour market for the educated personnel that central and local authorities are in such need of.

Previous interventions

Over the years, different government bodies have, with the support of donors or NGOs, developed a number of urban plans for the whole of Port-au-Prince, as well as for targeted sections of the city. Most of these plans have not been implemented. Lack of coordination between the implementing agencies has been one major reason, but the lack of public participation, weak accountability and transparency, low staff capacity and the centralised system have contributed to the inertia.

In the last few years many donors have started to abandon their short-term interventions for more long-term partnerships with the Haitian Government. There is also an increasing interest in urban development and good local governance by both the Government of Haiti and development partners – issues that have long been ignored due to more pressing security concerns.

Future prospects

The new Government has recently revived the decentralisation process, and even though it will take time to transform today's very centralised system, it is nevertheless a sign that Haiti is getting ready for long-term strategic interventions in the realm of good governance and local democracy.

Haiti is both one of the poorest and one of the least urbanised countries in the Caribbean. Declining agriculture and deteriorating living conditions in the countryside will most probably lead to a continued and even increasing rate of urbanisation in the decades to come. This study shows that urban planning is an overlooked area where relatively small changes could lead to major benefits for large sections of the population.

Recommendations

From the description of living conditions and institutional settings in metropolitan Port-au-Prince, it follows that more coordinated planning and management of the city must be at heart of any intervention aimed at improving the lives of its residents. Due to institutional weakness, state fragility, lack of resources and weak capacity, this study does not prescribe that metropolitan Port-au-Prince should embrace the whole

process of citywide strategic planning, but rather that it implement certain activities that in the longer term could lead to the development of such a plan. Instead of continuing to use rigid planning methods, such as Master Plans or other traditional plans, metropolitan Port-au-Prince should opt for strategic, inclusive, integrated and participatory planning.

Initial steps – securing an enabling environment

It is proposed that a metropolitan strategic framework be developed, which is not as detailed or comprehensive as a citywide strategic plan, but that will provide a structure for stakeholders to work with, ensuring that all development efforts for metropolitan Port-au-Prince head in the same direction.

For this metropolitan strategic framework to be developed and implemented, a number of issues must be addressed. While there is little that can be done at this level regarding state fragility and low overall capacity, targeted interventions can nevertheless contribute to a more stable and enabling environment for strategic urban planning and management. Capacity building of relevant staff, strengthening and coordinating key institutions and a gradual increase in municipalities' responsibilities are all factors that will assist the strategic framework process.

Apart from securing support at the highest political level for developing and implementing the metropolitan strategic framework, all stakeholders, including the general public, must be informed and consulted. A so-called urban pact, which is a formal agreement between the major stakeholders, can be established to ensure continuing commitment and involvement.

Intervention opportunities

The incremental development of the citywide strategic planning that is recommended for metropolitan Port-au-Prince could briefly be described through the following three main avenues:

- 1. Establishment of a metropolitan agency** responsible for: coordinating all bodies with a stake in urban planning and development in metropolitan Port-au-Prince; developing planning policy, regulations and legal frameworks; delegating implementation to the lowest appropriate level; and ensuring an efficient execution of the metropolitan strategic framework.
- 2. Development of a metropolitan strategic framework** with major planning principles, enabling and controlling rules, regulations and tools for urban management (e.g. guidelines on land use, zoning, construction, sustainable environment) that will set the agenda for spatial, social and economic development in the capital.
- 3. Strengthening the municipalities.** The municipalities will be at the centre of all metropolitan development and need to be

strengthened institutionally and the capacity of their staff improved. The municipalities would benefit from gradually increased responsibilities coupled with increased assistance for capacity building and institutional strengthening. The municipalities would also benefit from carrying out demonstration projects in line with the strategic framework, to develop their implementation capacity and to produce quick results that will preserve the interest of other stakeholders and the general public.

To support strategic planning, coordination between different stakeholders and capacity building at the local level is a cost effective means of ensuring that metropolitan Port-au-Prince provides decent livelihoods for its current and future populations.

1. Historical backdrop

1.1 General background on Haiti

Haiti is situated in the Caribbean, on the island of Hispaniola, which it shares with the Dominican Republic to the east. The two countries have formally been separate entities since 1697, when Hispaniola was divided between France and Spain, and have experienced very different developments from that time onwards. For the last thirty years Haiti has been regarded as the dark side of the island because of its troubled political and economic situation.

The country's 9 million inhabitants speak Haitian Creole. French is the official language, but much less used by ordinary people. Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti, is situated on the bay of Port-au-Prince in the southern part of the country. Other important cities are Gonaïve, Cap-Haïtien and Jacmel.



Figure 1. Map of Haiti

Source: Geology care

1.1.1 History and politics²

Haiti gained independence from France in 1804, after a long slave revolt. Independence did not resolve the inequalities in land ownership that Haiti had inherited from its colonial period. The minority mixed-race upper class, called *mulâtre* up to this day, kept its privileges even after the colonists left.

² Information from the following sources has been used: Sletten, P & Egset, W (2004), The Economist Intelligence Unit (2007), The Economist Intelligence Unit (August 2007), World Bank (2006), www.wikipedia.org.

The political history of Haiti after independence is one of incessant revolts, coup d'états and uprising. In 1957 Dr Francois Duvalier, who was known as "Papa Doc", was elected president but soon turned the democratic state into a dictatorship. His oppressive rule marked the beginning of the emigration wave, especially to the US. At his death in 1971 his son Jean-Claude, called "Baby Doc", took over the presidency. After mounting pressure both from within the country and internationally, the regime collapsed in 1986 and was followed by a number of military governments.

Elections were finally held in late 1990, and saw the young priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide secure a convincing victory. Aristide wanted to implement major reforms, e.g. separating the police from the army, reorganising the agricultural sector, redistributing land and fighting corruption. This infuriated the army and another military coup was carried out in 1991. The military rule was ruthless, especially on Aristide's supporters of which around 5.000 were killed.

International sanctions were imposed, but it was not until the US deployed its military and threatened an invasion that Aristide could be reinstated as president in 1994. The US forces left the country and were replaced by UN troops responsible for keeping the situation stable. In 1995 democratic elections were held and René Préval, backed by Aristide, was elected.

The next elections were held in 2000, when Aristide once again won, however after a boycott of the elections by the opposition. The weak condition of the government led to intensified violence, which lasted for several years. In 2004 Aristide left Haiti, whether forced by the US or voluntarily is still disputed. The UN intervened with mainly US and French troops to try to keep the fragile peace. After a few months, these soldiers were replaced by the UN peacekeeping mission, commanded by Brazil.

Many of the slum areas in Port-au-Prince were strongholds of Aristide and intense fighting happened between the slum dwellers and the Haitian police. The gangs in the slums, which were originally more of a political force, transformed into criminal gangs who specialised in robbery and kidnappings.

In this fragile situation, new elections were held in 2006. They were considered fair overall and saw the return of René Préval as president. Since then the security situation on the whole has improved but there are still outbreaks of violence, especially in the informal settlements of Port-au-Prince. The UN has a peace-keeping force of more than 7.000 soldiers in Haiti and their presence in Port-au-Prince is obvious.

1.1.2 Poverty and Economy

The reasons for Haiti's poverty are numerous. The combination of political insecurity, corrupt leaders, natural disasters, migration of academics and skilled workers, unfavourable trade agreements and poor administration together form an explanation that is a first step to understanding the situation.

Haiti is the poorest country in the western hemisphere and ranks amongst the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). For the majority of the Haitians the situation is worse than bleak. The country has had a declining economy for decades, with a negative or no growth in GDP since 1965. Between 1985 and 1995 the GDP decreased 5% (Republic of Haiti (2003). The total decline in GDP between 1975 and 2005 was 2.2%.³ The political instability has caused human suffering and capital destruction on an elevated level, and although this situation for the moment has abated, the political future is still uncertain.

Not only are Haitians generally poor, they also have low access to vital public services such as water and sanitation, education and health care. The low service delivery by the Haitian national and local authorities has created a country where only half of the population is literate⁴, where infrastructure in practice has collapsed and where almost half of the population is undernourished. Lack of access to basic infrastructure and health care and education is more or less chronic. The situation has only improved slightly in recent decades. For those who *have* access to services, the quality and consistency of these still vary enormously between different areas and different income groups.

Haiti has the highest incidence of HIV/AIDS in Latin America and the Caribbean with 5.6% prevalence rate according to the World Health Organization. Other organizations say the rate is as high as 12% for the urban population and 5% for the rural (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006). The consequences of the disease are worsened by the widespread malnourishment and low access to water, sanitation and basic health care.

Haiti is one of the world's most unequal societies. The richest 10% has almost 50% of the country's total income, whereas the poorest 10% only has 0.7% of the income.⁵ Most of Haiti's poor households are way below the poverty line, with an average income of 0.44USD per day (Republic of Haiti, 2006). Due to this inequality, increased economic growth will not have a substantial impact on poverty reduction, so other means are necessary to reduce poverty.

Poverty in Haiti is more concentrated and deeper in rural areas; according to one estimation up to 75% of the extremely poor live in the countryside (Sletten, P & Egset, W 2004). One explanation is that agriculture is in decline. A growing share of the nation's food is being imported as local farmers can only sustain their own family. The agriculture sector, the main source of income for well over half of Haiti's population, comprises less than a quarter of its GDP (The Economist Intelligence Unit (2006), as most of what is grown is subsistence.

The informal sector is dominant in the country, employing around

3 Human Development Report, <http://hdrstats.undp.org>

4 School enrolment rate is as low as 55% for children aged 6-12 years and according to a World Bank study the main reason for children not to attend school is the high cost of schooling.

5 Human Development Report, <http://hdrstats.undp.org>

70% of the total workforce, mostly in agriculture (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006). Unemployment is extensive, especially amongst young people. Almost 50% of the inhabitants in metropolitan Port-au-Prince are reportedly unemployed (World Bank 2006). More women than men are unemployed and girls are also more likely than boys not to attend school or to leave school prematurely.

Remittances count for more than one fourth of the total GDP in Haiti, principally coming from Haitians living outside the country (Sletten & Egset 2004), but also from migrant workers who get employment in the major cities. However, the poorest groups in Haiti do not even have access to the internal remittances, and even fewer get money sent to them from abroad.⁶

1.1.3 Demography and urbanisation

Haiti is one of the most densely populated countries in Latin America, with 310 inhabitants per square kilometre (World Bank, 2006). Calculated per square kilometre of arable land, to get an idea of the population pressure, the inhabitants are at least 925 (Université de Quisqueya, 2000), which is similar to Bangladesh and gives an insight to Haiti's fast urbanisation.

The urbanisation rate in Haiti has been substantial since the 1950s and is projected to continue to increase. Haiti has not yet reached the same levels of urbanisation as the rest of the Caribbean. With only 40% of its population living in urban areas in 2007, Haiti is far below its nearest neighbours: Dominican Republic (66%), Puerto Rico (98%), Jamaica (60%) and Cuba (75%) (www.unfpa.org). In Latin America and the Caribbean together, almost three quarters of the population live in urban areas. With Haiti's weak agricultural and other rural production, the urban population is sure to increase.

While many Haitians are dependent on family and friends working abroad, the large-scale emigration has led to brain drain, in particular in areas such as health care, law and education. The emigration from Haiti started early, in the beginning of last century when well-educated Haitians went to France seeking economic opportunity. In the nineteen fifties Haitians started to move to the US in greater numbers, particularly after "Papa Doc" Duvalier gained power in 1957. Since then there has been a mass departure from Haiti due to political oppression and the harsh economic situation.

The Haitian middle class has in practice disappeared from the island, through migration but also fifty years' lack of a policy to decrease the income gap. Today, Haiti consists of a vast poor population and a tiny rich minority. The problem with the disappearing middle class is both the loss of citizens that consume more than the poor and thus revitalise the economy, and the loss of well-educated people, which is probably more serious for Haiti's future.

⁶ 30% of all households in the whole of the country and 44% of the households in metropolitan Port-au-Prince receive remittances. World Bank, 2006

1.1.4 Governance and decentralisation

According to the World Bank's Governance Indicators,⁷ Haiti has during the last ten years witnessed a slight decline in most of the indicators from an already very low level. Haiti is ranked among the bottom five out of 212 countries. It performs just as badly in Transparency International's ranking for 2007, where it is placed as the 177th out of 179 countries.⁸

The following quote from the Economist Intelligence Unit (2006) gives an insight to the status of Haiti's public institutions:

"Haiti's political, judicial and security institutions have been riven by dictatorship, military intervention and instability, and remain extremely weak. Political structures are prey to personal ambition and factionalism among politicians, while the judicial system suffers from inadequate resources, inefficiency and corruption."

In Haiti's constitution, which was ratified in 1987, it was stated that there should be a clear separation of the state's powers through a division between the legislative, judicial and executive systems. In reality this has not been executed. Likewise, despite the constitution's strong emphasis on decentralisation and devolution, very little has happened on the ground. One reason is that the constitution does not fully define the legal framework for the decentralisation and there is plenty room for confusion and disagreement.⁹

The 2006 elections and the resulting stability since have at least created the necessary prerequisites to implement the constitution. Decentralisation is now the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior and Local and Regional Authorities, (MICT). However, few practical changes have taken place so far and there are still many political and economic interests that divert the process in other directions. The central government does not appear to be ready to devolve power and resources to lower levels.

According to the constitution's politico-administrative division, there should be three main local and regional authorities (*collectivités territoriales*) once the decentralisation is implemented:

- Department (*département*)
- Municipality (*commune*)
- Community ward (*section communale*)¹⁰

In reality, two additional levels, *arrondissement* and *quartier*, still exist and are in some cases more functional than the new levels.

At each of the three *collectivités territoriales* there will be Councils

7 World Bank's Governance Indicators, which measure voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and corruption http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_country.asp

8 Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index for 2007, www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi

9 Republic of Haiti & UNDP (February 2005)

10 There is no exact equivalent term in English; section communale can denote ward, neighbourhood or district, and will in this document be called community ward or only ward.

and Assemblies, where the first have an executive role and the latter a deliberative and consultative role. In reality, almost no Assemblies have been established, but the Councils are in place at most local authorities, and are working reasonably well at municipal and community ward level, especially considering their difficult financial situation.

According to the reading of the constitution by the National Commission for Administrative Reform, the department should take the political role, the municipalities should have operational responsibilities and the community ward should represent and defend the citizen's interests (Republic of Haiti & UNDP 2005).

Table 1. Administrative structures in Haiti

Name of level (English)	Name of level (French)	No.	Status: CT*	Main functions
Department	Département	10	Yes	The Delegates supervise the lower level CTs on the state's behalf. The Departments host departmental levels of national Ministries. Department Council and Department Assembly are in most cases not in place.
Arrondissement	Arrondissement	41	No	The Vice Delegates represents the Delegate
Municipality	Commune	140	Yes	Responsible for certain tax collection, Peace Tribunals, some decentralised task from the line Ministries. Municipal Council and Mayor exist in most municipalities and are normally operational, but the Municipal Assembly, which should include representatives from the Community wards, is in most cases not put in place.
Neighbourhood	Quartier		No	Peace Tribunals
Community ward	Section communale	568	Yes	The Community ward Council (CASEC) exists in many wards, but mostly as an informal arbitrator for local conflicts and not for maintaining local infrastructure and lead local development, as was foreseen in the constitution. The Community ward Assembly (ASEC) has not been put in place.

* CT= collectivité territoriale

The Municipal Councils in Haiti have in many cases, despite unclear mandate and scarce resources, managed to do something when it comes to local public administration. As the constitution is not fully operational, most of the "normal" responsibilities for municipalities, such as provision of water and sanitation, waste management, spatial planning and traffic management, remain at national level. Instead, the main responsibilities for the municipalities are to:

- clean the streets.
- maintain the markets, slaughter houses, public spaces, parking lots, sports grounds, cemeteries and waste dumps.
- manage the public schools (in some cases).

The tasks may change between different municipalities according to the capacity of the Council and the Mayor, and depending on their

resources, but in general the above represents their few responsibilities. In metropolitan Port-au-Prince most municipalities have a planning department, but mostly it is not very active due to lack of capacity and mandate.

Most of the municipalities in metropolitan Port-au-Prince – Carrefour, Cité Soleil, Croix-des-Bouquets, Delmas, Kenscoff, Pétion-Ville, Port-au-Prince and Tabarre – are larger than in the rest of the country and have more resources. They all have a similar organization, but with different number of staff and in some areas different tasks due to circumstances and capacities. Figure 2 shows the general organization:




Figure 2. General organogram for municipalities in metropolitan Port-au-Prince. Source: Mairie de Carrefour (all terms are in French)

In 2005, the total state revenue only represented 9 percent of GDP (compared with an average of 18 percent for other low-income countries) and not even 2 percent of this revenue originated from taxes on income, profits or capital.¹¹ Depending on the level of donor support available, the state has spent between 9 and 16 percent of GDP for its expenditure the last years. This volatility in the state budget has influenced the stability of the state as a whole, both at national and local level.

The municipalities are financially subsidised by the state, with varying amount and varying regularity in payment, but are also obligated to advance the property tax and other municipal taxes that they collect together with the Direction Générale des Impôts. In addition the municipalities collect fees for advertising, parking, cemeteries etc. but the control of these charges is weak and corruption is common. All in all, the tax and fees revenues from the municipalities do not even represent three percent of the state income (Republic of Haiti & UNDP 2005). The financial contribution from the municipalities in metropolitan Port-au-Prince is slightly better than the average but still not enough for extending the municipal services.

Despite limited funds at local level, many municipalities have been active and have tried to implement what little they can with scarce resources. In metropolitan Port-au-Prince several of the eight municipalities (see figure 3) have taken steps towards assuming greater

¹¹ World Bank (27 April 2006)

responsibilities for their areas. They have also initiated an informal coordination group for metropolitan Port-au-Prince, but not many meetings have been held and the group needs to be strengthened.



Figure 3. The locations of the eight municipalities in metropolitan Port-au-Prince
Source: National Centre for Geospatial Information

1.2 Current development strategies in Haiti

As in many other countries in the world, Haiti's development agenda is guided by the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. After years of interim strategies and weak and shifting political will in the field of development, Haiti has started to work more methodically with development issues while trying to attain more long-term relationships with the major donors.

1.2.1 Poverty Reduction Strategy

With the new, democratically elected Government, a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, PRSP¹², for 2007-2010 was developed (Republic of Haiti 2007).

The three main pillars of development in the PRSP are:

1. Economic growth (agriculture, tourism and infrastructure),
2. Human development (education, health, water and sanitation, handicapped people, poor children, young people, people with HIV/AIDS and gender equality), and
3. Democratic governance (justice system, security, modernisation of the state, land use planning, including decentralisation and macro economics).¹³

Decentralisation is not at the fore in the Strategy, but a few of the objectives under the subchapter on modernisation of the state

¹² In Haiti the PRSP is called DSNCRP: Document de Stratégie Nationale pour la Croissance et pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté

¹³ in a regional and spatial sense; "aménagement du territoire" in French.

are aimed at achieving decentralisation. Urban development has a subchapter in the PRSP, with its own objectives. In brief, the main points are that the municipalities and local authorities need to be strengthened in methodology and in cooperation with other local partners; in order for them to deliver better basic services. Another objective is to develop a national encompassing strategy for urban development, including slum upgrading. An innovative financing opportunity is also presented: tax from Haitian diaspora remittances is proposed to go to urban interventions. In other parts of the PRSP, urban issues are also mainstreamed under other headings, such as water and sanitation, public services and infrastructure.

Land use planning has a subchapter as well, where land use planning will serve as an anchor point for the implementation of the decentralisation process. To be able to realise this agenda, the Ministry of Planning and External Relations will be reorganized and decentralised down to the level of arrondissements. The administrative borders will be revised to ensure better land use planning and a national master plan for land use and land management will be developed. The objectives for land use planning are far-reaching and ambitious, however implementation depends on securing funding and also on the political will from all levels of Government.

Even though the Haitian PRSP tries to cover all possible themes and subjects, it nevertheless gives strong emphasis on urban development and urban land.

1.2.2 Donor relations

The relations between the development partners and Haiti's quickly changing governments have over the years mostly been tense. Political crises, weak institutions and a high level of corruption have in the past made the donors reluctant to commit for longer terms. Aid volatility has therefore been the order of the day and has contributed towards the instability in the public administration.

Political unrest between 1991 and 1994 and between 2001 and 2004 disrupted major donor funding. After the latest suspension of funds, the donors have not yet started to give funds directly through the Government, but prefer to channel money through national and international NGOs.

Two years after the general elections of 2006 there seems to be a turning point and donors have shown more interest in long-term commitment with the Government. However the food riots and dismissal of the Government in April 2008 and the following political uncertainty could still make donors shy away from Haiti once more.

1.2.3 Interventions in the urban development sector in Haiti

Very few donors focus on comprehensive urban development programmes in Haiti, but most of the major donors have at least one isolated slum project, dealing with urban violence, HIV/AIDS prevention, water and sanitation or income generating activities. As

there is no coordinating body amongst the donors and/or NGOs, duplications are a fact and few lessons learnt are being shared. Apart from the small-scale projects, most of which are carried out on a very practical level with no policy-influencing objectives, there are two new initiatives that could be of importance for an eventual citywide strategic planning in metropolitan Port-au-Prince.

Firstly, the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Interior have approached the Cities Alliance¹⁴ about funding for slum upgrading activities. In short the proposal involves capacity development, coordination and planning for slum upgrading activities. At least four interventions in different informal settlements in Port-au-Prince are also planned to be implemented, and experiences should be used to inform national policies as well as local level governance. The Cities Alliance reviewed the proposal, suggested a few strategic changes and advised Haiti to revise and resubmit it. If funding is secured, the project will include establishing an “*Agence Urbaine Métropolitaine à Port-au-Prince*” and developing a City Development Strategy for the capitol.¹⁵

Secondly, there is a newly inaugurated twinning project that is of strategic importance. The municipalities of Port-au-Prince and Montreal in Canada started to cooperate in 1995. Due to the insecure political situation in Haiti the cooperation stalled in the late nineties, but was revitalised in 2007 with an official contract being signed in December 2007 for the years 2008-2013. The two municipalities have jointly set up an action plan with five major axes for cooperation:¹⁶

1. Good local governance and institutional strengthening
2. Equality between men and women
3. Urban planning and slum upgrading
4. Capacity building
5. Infrastructure rehabilitation

In December 2007 representatives from the city of Montreal visited Port-au-Prince and held a seminar on strategic urban planning, after which the municipality of Port-au-Prince created a working group responsible for initiating strategic planning, but after that no work has been done. In April the Mayor of Montreal and some municipal staff visited Port-au-Prince, so perhaps the strategic planning process has started again.

14 See www.citiesalliance.org

15 The City Development Strategy is a planning method used by Cities Alliance's partners to define visions and strategies for their city and prioritise interventions. It has several points in common with citywide strategic planning, see section 1.3 below.

16 Ville de Montréal & Ville de Port-au-Prince (December 2007)

1.3 Citywide strategic planning

Citywide strategic planning refers to a more holistic, inclusive and integrated planning approach; one that takes the whole city into consideration and where a pro-poor focus, good local governance and gender equity are important foundations.

In most developing countries, conventional urban planning approaches are inadequate. The reasons are many, ranging from the exaggerated exactitude of many of these planning approaches to the situation on the ground, which normally is characterised by a large degree of informality in land acquisition and housing.

Often the planning laws and regulations in developing countries are inherited from the former colonists, resulting in legislation that is not adapted to the environment it is applied in. For example with too high standards when it comes to construction norms or inflexible rules for joint land ownership. Some urban plans in these countries focus only on the formal parts of the city, thus ignoring a large part of the population and contributing to increasing segregation. Other plans on the contrary focus only on the improvement of the informal or slum settlements, disregarding the gains that could be made from seeing the city as a unit.

1.3.1 Establishing a vision and a strategic action plan

Figure 4 illustrates the inter-relationships between the various components of a strategic planning approach. In brief, the approach circles around three vital questions:

1. Where are we today? – **Situational analysis** (including stakeholder identification), **spatial analysis** (including identification of drivers of change) and other analyses.
2. Where do we want to go? – **vision**, supported by the overall objectives
3. How do we get there? – An overall **strategic action plan**, indicating major strategic interventions to be carried out in accordance with agreed timetables.

The strategic action plan could include planning principles (including policy development and revision of legislation), strategic medium-term action plans and processes/systems for continuous city consultation and establishment of cooperation and communication structures. The strategic action plan should be accompanied by benchmarks, indicators and system for monitoring and follow-up.




Figure 4. Citywide strategic planning. This schematic plan illustrates some of the fundamental parts in a citywide strategic planning exercise.

Situation analysis and spatial analysis

The foundation of the process is to analyse the present situation to get a starting point, a kind of baseline. The analyses and mapping exercises that are carried out do not have to be too detailed (as facts and information can be added at later stages in the process according to specific needs) but should rather provide a basic picture of the city.

A situational analysis can be done using rapid assessment methods, e.g. the Rapid Urban Sector Profiling for Sustainability developed by UN-HABITAT. It can also analyse existing material on the city in question, coupled with interviews and workshops with the stakeholders identified in the process. The situational analysis content includes demographics, housing, land management, urban infrastructure, security, urban environment, institutional settings, and management capacity.

A spatial analysis, i.e. a general representation of the city using basic maps or drawings, should be made at an early stage in the process. The spatial analysis will pinpoint the urban structural elements (road networks, drainage systems, markets nodes, topographic features or historic patterns) of the city and describe these with a geographical perspective. Risk-prone areas in terms of natural disaster are identified, and parts of the city where the most vulnerable people live. The level of detail should not be too specific in the spatial analysis, as this would risk putting focus on the particularities instead of on the general picture. The spatial analysis works very well as foundation for decision-making, as it explains a complex reality with a few lines.

Vision and overall objectives

The stakeholders, who were identified in the situational analysis, will

come together to establish a common development vision, towards which all efforts should be geared.

The vision should be clear and realistic and represent the residents' desired future for their city. For stable countries the vision could be set a couple of decades in the future, whereas the time span for fragile or post-conflict states should only be five to ten years. In order to make the vision more manageable, it should be supported by a set of overall objectives to guide the development efforts throughout the planning period. These overall objectives will be of fundamental importance for monitoring the process in order to ensure that the development is on track.

Strategic action plan and medium-term action plans

Starting from the vision, the overall strategic action plan is developed. Planning principles and the medium-term action plans take shape guided by the vision and the strategic action plan. The planning principles will reach all the way to the vision whereas the medium-term action plans will consist of operational objectives on a short-time basis, still guided by the vision's overall objectives and the overall strategic action plan. The medium-term action plans should be accompanied by, amongst others, timetable, work plan, budget, specification of staffing and responsibilities, specification of key stakeholders and their roles, benchmarks so that the result can be monitored and evaluated, risk assessment, environmental impact assessment and description of partnerships or collaboration.

Both the strategic action plan and the medium-term action plans could be created using the back-casting method (see fig 5 below), i.e. starting with a future goal (the vision), the actions required to reach that goal are developed. The medium-term action plans should be realistic and contribute substantially to reaching the vision.




Figure 5. The road towards the vision. Through envisioning the future objectives, the overall strategic action plan is decided upon. Medium-term action plans are then created for shorter periods of time, with incorporated checkpoints for periodical monitoring.

1.3.2 Principles and elements of citywide strategic planning

Local ownership, participation and coordination

The citywide strategic planning process should be locally owned, not donor-driven. It is central that there are strong and committed leaders for the process, normally provided by Mayors or other politically elected figures, but subject to the local environment, the leadership of the process could be located elsewhere, e.g. in a relevant Ministry or in a special unit set up for planning purposes.

Consultations and coordination are at the heart of the citywide strategic planning process and need to be well organized and efficient so that the stakeholders will remain committed to the cause. With strong leadership and local ownership it is easier to ensure participation from different groups in the society. Stakeholder groups should be mobilised or created for continuous consultation and, at a later stage, for providing feedback into the planning process.

The authorities shall strive to initiate (or maintain) partnerships with different groups such as other governmental bodies, civil society and private sector. In resource poor countries or cities it is of immense importance to have solid ties with the private sector. Private sector companies will not enter a partnership without there being something in it for them; however in most cases areas of mutual interest can be found where cooperation can take place.

The citywide strategic planning should not be an isolated project but instead endeavour to incorporate other development initiatives and complement what is already being carried out. Harmonisation between different interventions is key for the strategic planning. The citywide strategic planning thus gives local authorities an opportunity to gain support for their coordinating function.

Entry points that will make the difference

Citywide strategic planning aims to establish a structure of principles (policy and regulations) and a strategic action plan inside which different interventions can be carried out with a view to reach the city's development goals. Due to its specific characteristics as a strategic planning document, it is important that the strategic action plan focuses on key strategic issues and interventions – entry points that will make the difference for the future improvement of the city.

Quick win to build commitment

Demonstration projects have the advantage that they will strengthen the stakeholders' confidence and build trust with donors, so these quick impact projects are especially important in the beginning of a citywide strategic planning exercise. They could also be of use for fragile or post-conflict states where the institutional and human capacity is weak. Thus, demonstration projects with quick impact provide opportunities for early responses during the planning process

“Private sector companies will not enter a partnership without there being something in it for them.”

to urgent needs, as well as valuable feedback to the on-going planning process.

Although some of the needed interventions with necessity must be large-scale, the citywide strategic planning aspires to function as an umbrella for quick-impact demonstration projects that incrementally improve the city's situation.

Mapping of 'drivers'

Another starting point for strategic planning could be the analysis of 'drivers' and 'impediments' of the (non-) development of the city and its economy, for both the formal and the informal sectors. Identification of markets and other trading centres, as well as transport system that encourages trade, are some of the conditions to investigate, but other, more hidden drivers also need to be pinpointed. Linked to this are socio-economic issues. This type of information could be mapped as a part of the spatial analysis.

Right to the city

Another basic principle for the citywide strategic planning is the "right to the city" (UN-HABITAT & UNESCO 2005), translated here as equal access to land, housing, public space and basic services. To introduce a rights-based approach in urban development also brings with it the opportunity to talk about the citizens' responsibilities. Rights and responsibilities agreements can be realised through social contracts between local authorities and local communities, and/or between central and local governments.

Resource mobilisation and use of local resources

As many financial resources as possible should come from the city itself and not from outside donors. If local resources (from municipalities, national government, private sector, NGOs, individual citizens) are used the result tends to be more sustainable and more strategic, as the prioritisation is carried out more carefully. Only the most urgent and strategic activities will be implemented if local resources are used to a larger extent. In most developing countries, it is impossible for a city to finance implementation of action plans entirely from its own pockets, but it is important that the donor funding only constitutes a part of the resources and that resource mobilisation is included in the process at an early stage. Ways of increasing the local authorities' income should be part of the resource mobilisation. In-kind contributions from the city, such as making staff available, can also contribute a lot.

An understanding of the city's economic conditions, in particular of the informal sector, is important, as one of the main concerns for poor people naturally are to increase their daily income. Identification of markets and other trading centres, as well as transport systems that encourage trade is a vital part of citywide strategic planning.

Continuous capacity building

Capacity building is not only necessary for experts – planners and technicians – but maybe more so for the staff who will use the citywide strategic plan in their daily work, such as service providers, notaries, building inspectors. If staff are not competent in using and implementing the plan, it might not be worth developing it in the first place. Similar training needs are usually found also among political decision-makers. But there is another target group of equal importance for capacity building, namely the stakeholders involved in the planning process. In order to wisely execute their roles as vital contributors and members of the planning process, they need to know at least the basics of strategic planning. Being part of the process, they will “learn by doing”, but still an initial training would be a great advantage.

Both human and institutional capacity building are needed. A low transparency level in municipalities and the central government could be increased through better information systems and clear rules for access to information. The division of roles and responsibilities could be revised to achieve a less bureaucratic and less corruption-prone environment. Capacity needs assessments should be carried out on institutional as well as personal levels.

Capacity building is not a one-time event, but has to be established as a process to last for many years to come. The current staff, politicians and stakeholders will change and the new individuals will need to develop their capacities. Moreover, competence and capacity are fresh commodities and if not institutionalised, in practice or updated, the newly acquired skills will disappear. For both human and institutional capacity building, support should be sought from development partners or other external partners, as there is need for assistance from the outside.

Adaptation to local conditions

The citywide strategic planning process does not come pre-packaged. Each city must analyse and understand its own situation and form the strategy accordingly. This situation analysis aims to assist metropolitan Port-au-Prince in finding possible entry points for citywide strategic planning.



Children in one of Port-au-Prince numerous slums © Asa Forsman

2. Urban land and infrastructure in metropolitan Port-Au-Prince

In this section, elements and issues of importance to urban planning are presented. It describes the situation on the ground in metropolitan Port-au-Prince, while simultaneously offering entry points for the analyses and recommendations in the following sections.

2.1 Urban trends and development

Around 30% of Haiti's population live in metropolitan Port-au-Prince, where 90% of the country's total investments and formal jobs are found (Republic of Haiti 2003). This heavy concentration of the economy in one city is not good for the national economy, but

explains some of Port-au-Prince's attraction power. If the current rate of urbanisation continues, which is likely according to the predictions of the United Nations Population Fund and other experts, more than four million people will live in the metropolitan area within the next ten years. The pressure on infrastructure, land, housing and services, which is already untenable today with 2.7 million inhabitants, will be even more unsound in the near future unless mitigating measures, e.g. in the form of urban planning, are undertaken.



Figure 6. Overview of parts of Pétion-Ville. The map shows the crowded living situation on one of the hills to the left, neighbouring a planned settlement.

Source: Google Earth 2008

“Concentration of the economy in one city is not good for the national economy”

2.1.1 City profile

Port-au-Prince was established in 1749, when the French sugar planters and other important economic actors considered necessary to create a capital for the then colony Saint-Dominique. Its strategic position in the middle of the island was one advantage, as was its protected location between the mountains and the sea. By the end of the 18th century, the city had 9,400 inhabitants.¹⁷ Up until mid 20th century, Port-au-Prince grew slowly but steadily, without any major transformation in the city's management and design.

Between 1950 and 1970 Port-au-Prince's population more than

¹⁷ Commission pour la commémoration du 250^e anniversaire de la fondation de la ville de Port-au-Prince (1999)

doubled, from 150,000 to 350,000. Decreasing mortality due to advances in health care, better employment opportunities than in the countryside, and heavy investments by state and other actors in industries and other businesses all contributed to this rapid population increase.

The road network was improved during this time, which made it easier to either move to the city or to commute. Most of the people in this early migration wave found houses in formal areas, which grew more dense. Suburbs surrounded the commercial centre in central Port-au-Prince, where all business took place (Republic of Haiti 2003). By the end of the 1970s other, smaller centres emerged.

Between 1982 and 1995 there was another surge of the urban population, which almost tripled during these years. The economic crisis made it necessary for people to move from the countryside to the cities, especially the capital, in search of employment. With all the more people rapidly moving into Port-au-Prince, the need for shelter, basic services and markets increased. Government housing schemes failed to supply adequate housing, especially for the poor, who instead built their own dwellings, occupying or renting private or state owned land. The provision of basic infrastructure and services could not keep up with the rate of urbanisation, and the services deteriorated rapidly, apart from for the wealthiest people.

After Baby Doc's fall from power in 1986, the enforcement of the planning and building laws were relaxed as a consequence of the disappearance of the monopoly state. In 1986 there were massive invasions of public land, and slums started to become consolidated in Port-au-Prince.¹⁸ Ever since 1986 the state has not enforced regulations regarding land use, planning and construction. The governments that followed after Baby Doc all have been less strong and less stable, resulting in a thriving informal market.

From the 1980's, Port-au-Prince became a more divided city. In one part there was water and sanitation, with formal, often large, properties with green lawns. In another part, where chaotic urbanisation took place without basic services, the plots were illegal or at best informal, often tiny and built on unhygienic, dangerous land such as dump sites or precarious hillsides. The so-called "*bidonvillisation*" of Port-au-Prince had come to stay.

During the last decade, increasing numbers of NGOs and international organizations began working in the slums and poor parts of Port-au-Prince. Between 2004 and 2007 about 33 million USD was spent on different slum upgrading programmes in Port-au-Prince (Republic of Haiti 2007). Unfortunately, these interventions have not followed any urban planning or regulations, they have been badly coordinated, often overlapping, and without local anchoring in the municipalities or other local government.

Haiti is a country where the peak of the urbanisation is yet to come, and where most of the cities' growth is migration from rural areas. On

¹⁸ Université Quisqueya (2000), CLED/ILD (1998)

average, 75,000 migrants have every year moved into metropolitan Port-au-Prince during the last twenty years. The natural growth of the capital is currently around 40,000 persons per year, bringing the total annual increase in population to 115,000 (World Bank 2006).




Figure 7. Population increase in Port-au-Prince. In 1789 there were only 9,400 people living in Port-au-Prince. 200 years later the city had more than 1.5 million inhabitants. In 2008 the estimated population is more than 2.7 million. Sources: Republic of Haiti (2003), Republic of Haiti (November 2007), The Economist Intelligence Unit (2007), CLED/ILD (1998).

More than half of today’s population in metropolitan Port-au-Prince originally lived elsewhere, and in the informal areas more than 70 percent of the inhabitants have moved in from the countryside (GHRAP 2008). In some areas in the capital the annual increase in population is 8%. The rural migrants, whose main reason for moving is greater economic opportunities, normally end up in informal settlements. Of the new migrants, one third moves to already built areas, which means that the density is increasing, and two thirds moves to new informal and often peri-urban settlements (Republic of Haiti 2003).

2.1.2 Urban planning

The responsibility for spatial planning of metropolitan Port-au-Prince rests with the central government, which also takes care of most management, maintenance and provision of infrastructure and basic services. The municipalities are marginalised.

There is no legally approved master plan for metropolitan Port-au-Prince. Several plans with different geographic and thematic scope have been developed, most with assistance from donors (see the table below), but they have neither been endorsed nor institutionalised by bylaws and regulations. In practice, they have not served as a proper framework for spatial and social development but only as inspiration for a few random interventions.

Table 2. Previous plans for Port-au-Prince

Year	Name of plan	Developer
1974-1976	Plan de développement de Port-au-Prince et de sa région métropolitaine	UNDP and PADCO (private company) for the predecessor to MPCE
1988	Plan directeur d'urbanisme de Port-au-Prince	UN-HABITAT and Lavalin (private company) for MTPTC
1996	Plan National de logement et de l'habitat	UN-HABITAT
1996	Projet d'appui aux municipalités et projet d'appui en aménagement du territoire	UN-HABITAT
1997	Plan directeur de circulation pour l'aire métropolitaine de PAP	MTPTC, Pluram international and Lavalin (private companies)
1998	Actualisation du schéma directeur d'eau potable pour l'horizon 2015	CAMEP and Tractebel développement (private company)
1998	Schéma directeur d'assainissement por la région métropolitaine de PAP	MTPTC and Groupement SCP-GERSAR-Lavalin (private companies)
1998	Plan de drainage pour la région métropolitaine de PAP	MTPTC and Lavalin (private company)
1999	Schéma directeur du front de mer de la ville de PAP	MPCE and Commission pour la Commémoration des 250 ans de la Fondation de la Ville de Port-au-Prince
2000	Concept général pour le développement de Port-au-Prince	Commission pour la Commémoration des 250 ans de la Fondation de la Ville de Port-au-Prince, Université polytechnique de la Catalogne
2000	Plan d'aménagement de la région nord de Port-au-Prince	Commission pour la Commémoration des 250 ans de la Fondation de la Ville de Port-au-Prince, Jimenez-Pons and Urbanex (private companies)
2003	Plan-Programme de développement de la zone métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince	MPCE, Experco International and Daniel Arbour et associés (private companies), funded by the Inter-American Development Bank

Adopted from Republic of Haiti (2003)

The most recent plan for the capital dates from 2003. It was developed by MPCE (Plan-Programme de développement de la zone Métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince) and financed by IDB with 730,000 USD (Republic of Haiti 2003). The plan included a thorough analysis of physical, institutional and legal aspects of the city and a large consensus seeking process amongst the major stakeholders. The proposals of this plan, which was never implemented due to political and financial reasons, have parts that are still valid and could be used. The background documentation and analyses are also still relevant and only need to be updated.

Aside from the absence of an adequate master plan, the statistics and basic information of metropolitan Port-au-Prince are scattered and only randomly updated. Neither the central government nor the municipalities have data banks or registers with reliable information on numbers of inhabitants, infrastructure, legal status of land, or access to services (Republic of Haiti 2003).

According to the Ministry of Planning there are more than fifty institutions that share the responsibility to manage metropolitan Port-au-Prince (Republic of Haiti 2003). The municipalities are too weak to coordinate the processes according to geographical location and have to face being given technical assistance from different divisions inside the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Public Work, and other ministries.

“There are more than fifty institutions that share the responsibility to manage metropolitan Port-au-Prince”

The different responsibilities for metropolitan development and management are dispersed in a labyrinth of government institutions, agencies, departments and divisions without any coordinating agency. Duplication and gaps are common.

2.2 Human settlements

Port-au-Prince is a densely populated city, characterised by what many Haitians call wild urbanisation (*urbanisation sauvage*). The small hills surrounding the city are being covered with dwellings of different quality, many of them situated precariously on steep slopes, in danger of being washed away by the next torrent or hurricane. Other slum dwellers, in the centre of the city, risk flooding due to their location in the bottom of the basin of Port-au-Prince. Wealthier families, who preferably live in the hills, contribute to the hazardous situation for the city's inhabitants due to lack of solid waste disposal and uncontrolled drainage. Soil erosion is also a serious problem, exacerbated by the lack of enforcement of the building codes and little or no restrictions on construction.

2.2.1 Physical conditions for land and housing

As figure 8 shows, more than half of the informal settlements in Port-au-Prince are located in ravines and gullies and are susceptible to inundation. Flooding is also the main threat for those who have chosen to reside on wetland areas close to the sea. About 40% of the informal inhabitants are housed on the hillsides, where they face the risk of landslides (see more on natural disaster in section 2.4.2).

For most informal settlements in Port-au-Prince, the absence of a grid plan makes it difficult to provide services such as water, electricity, sanitation and garbage collection to individual households. A majority of the inhabitants in the slums do not have access roads between their plots.

In addition, the steep hills make it difficult to construct proper roads, and many of the dirt roads have to be constantly repaired after every heavy rain.

The rapid population growth of Port-au-Prince has not only meant a degradation in housing standard and basic services, but also an increase in the number of people sharing a house, and a decrease in living space per person. In the year 2000, the average household size in Port-au-Prince was just over five persons, and probably higher in informal areas (Université de Quisqueya 2000).




Figure 8. Informal settlements in Port-au-Prince, in percentage according to location.
Source: CLED/ILD (1998)

A government study from 1997¹⁹ shows that 67% of the population lived in informal areas that only covered 22% of the inhabited areas of the city. The inequality in living space is thus similar to the income inequality discussed above (see section 1.1.2). An earlier study from 1988 demonstrated that the average living area for slum dwellers was 1.98 m² per person.

Apartment blocks of three to five floors are becoming more common in Port-au-Prince, despite the fact that there are no regulations concerning houses higher than two floors (Université de Quisqueya 2000). This may indicate that people from higher income groups are willing to live in apartments instead of houses with gardens. The lack of land can direct the development towards multi-family apartment blocks for people who are better off.

Many families cannot obtain loans for buying land and/or building a house. Instead they build the house slowly using available cash, taking five, ten or even fifteen years to finish. This piecemeal way of building is widespread in poor as well as in affluent parts of Port-au-Prince, and is also encouraged involuntarily by the tax regulation that exempts partly built houses from property tax. Another reason for the incremental construction is that people rely on remittances which are intermittent. In an average family in metropolitan Port-au-Prince, remittances make up just over 30 percent of household revenue, and the money is often invested in housing (World Bank 2006).



Box 1. Low-cost public housing gone amiss

The Public Enterprise for Social Housing (EPPLS) has had a shortage of funds for the last decade and has thus not provided much housing lately. Even when there was funding, production capacity was inadequate. One example of public housing done by the EPPLS is just north of Cité Soleil, in a small suburb called Village de la Renaissance. Originally, the housing scheme of 700 apartments was planned for inhabitants from Cité Soleil who needed to be relocated when a public road was built where they lived. However, corruption resulted in occupation of the houses by civil servants instead. The cost of the apartments, 1,000 gourdes per month, is far too expensive for most of the inhabitants in Cité Soleil, where typical monthly rent is 100-200 gourdes per month. The Village de la Renaissance is not an exception in Port-au-Prince or Haiti. Housing schemes constructed for poor people have often been used for political gain. The problem with the production of public housing is its extremely low scale of production, which hardly makes a dent in the enormous housing deficit.

Source: visit in Cité Soleil in March 2008.

In Port-au-Prince, it is common to build on landslide prone areas

Photo © Å. Forsman

¹⁹ "Projet HAI-94-003", Commission pour la commémoration du 250e anniversaire de la fondation de la ville de Port-au-Prince (1999)

2.2.2 Formal and informal settlements

Very few Port-au-Prince residents have legal titles for their land. Even in the more wealthy areas of the city the normal procedure, when selling and buying a property, is to go to a public notary who makes a declaration of ownership. The problem is that there can be several claims to the same property, as there is no cadastre or official register of ownership. The ownership or transfer of ownership is normally not registered by local authorities or the legal system and is therefore not fully secured.

The land in Haiti is either owned by the state or by a private person or organization. Due to inadequate registration and follow-up, there are no clear records of what land is owned by the state or by someone else. If there are doubts, people have to bring their case to court.

The land and property belonging to the state of Haiti is divided in two groups: public and private property. The state's public property is not transferable and consists mainly of public spaces such as roads, lakes, rivers, parks, cemeteries and shorelines. The state's private property can on the other hand be appropriated by an individual or juridical person, and this property falls under the jurisdiction of the General Revenue Office (DGI).

The rules for buying and renting state-owned and privately owned land are different. In both cases it is a cumbersome, expensive and long procedure to become the lawful owner of a property. While the buyer is in the process of obtaining the title, which takes years, a temporary title is normally issued. One of the longer steps in the process involves the actual transcription of title at the DGI and can take between one and two years. For these reasons, most people do not even try to acquire land. Instead they lease land and build a house, rent a house or get property on the informal market.

There are many shades of informal or illegal tenure. The two major types are informality in land acquisition and informality in construction on or use of the land. The owner or leaser of the land can be different from the owner or leaser of the construction, which in turn can rent out part of the construction. For land and house tenure there are several different ways in which the property can be considered informal:

1. Land

- Lack of title, squatting, land grabbing
- Illegal sub-division
- *Fermage* (a type of lease) is used for non-agricultural land
- Leasing land from false owners or false state representatives²⁰
- Seller did not comply with tax regulations

2. House

- No construction permit

²⁰ Much of the state land is rented out to citizens by local chiefs, who do not have the authority for such transactions.

- Non-compliance with construction standards
- Not following planning or land use regulations
- Subleasing without permission
- Failure to pay rent

In the state's public housing schemes, a leasing type that was originally used for agricultural land, called *fermage*, came to be used for the plot the house was built on, combined with a full ownership title for the house. Over the years this type of lease from the state got more popular even outside the public housing schemes, especially the *fermage* with the option to buy the land after a certain period of time. It finally spread into privately owned land and is now being used all over Port-au-Prince, even though it is not strictly formal. It is not considered illegal in most cases, but it does not comply with the land use regulations. According to some estimates around 80 percent of the residents in Port-au-Prince have a *fermage* contract with the option to buy.

A comprehensive study on urban real estate from 1998 by the Instituto Libertad y Democracia, in collaboration with the Haitian NGO Centre pour la Libre Entreprise et la Democratie (CLED/ILD 1998), also found that an overwhelming majority of the informal tenants or owners had contracts of one sort or other or permission from local authorities.

Table 3. Informal housing in Port-au-Prince

Land ownership	Type of tenancy	Percent of occupied area	Type of informality
Public	Direct recognition (contract or authorisation)	4%	State housing projects with incomplete titling
	Indirect recognition (de facto)	41%	Invasions with a <i>fermage</i> contract
			Invasions which are applying for a <i>fermage</i> contract at DGI
			Invasions tacitly accepted by authorities
Private	Direct recognition (contract or authorisation)	44%	Land and/or houses with incomplete titling or limited transferability
			Land and/or houses subleased without the owner's consent
			Land and/or houses in informal subdivisions
	Indirect recognition (de facto)	6%	De facto invasions
	Land in litigation	5%	Ownership, tenure or right to occupy land under legal dispute

Source: CLED/ILD (1998)

In many cases landowners in Port-au-Prince who have obtained their land legally still have problems with illegality or extralegality. It is not only difficult to become a legal property owner, but also to remain one. Building and planning regulations, subdivisions of land and other laws are not easy to adhere to. The urban legislation that should

Box 2. Local NGO aims to change building standards

The Haitian NGO Fondation Connaissance et Liberté, FOKAL, is amongst the few civil society organisations in the country working with land and property issues. FOKAL is mainly a cultural NGO, focused on democracy and social change. Its programmes target education and cultural and political awareness raising, but it has recently employed a city planner to strengthen its work in urban areas. FOKAL, in collaboration with the Port-au-Prince municipality, the EU and several international and national NGOs, has started a project to create a botanical garden in the slum area Martissant also working with the surrounding neighbourhoods on issues such as property, land access and building norms. Reduction of local violence, access to water and sanitation and improvement of the education will also be part of the programme. FOKAL wants to carry out an in-depth study of the communities around the park, including their access to land and their housing situation. The NGO hopes it can initiate small pilot projects on construction norms, which in the future may be used for policy purpose within the Port-au-Prince municipality.

For more information on FOKAL, see www.fokal.org

encourage participation in the formal land and housing sector instead works as an incentive for people to join the informal sector.

Quite surprisingly for a city where property rights are insecure and the location of informal settlements are precarious, even the poor inhabitants of Port-au-Prince choose to construct their houses with durable building material such as concrete bricks, corrugated iron sheets and concrete flooring. A lot of money and resources go into these buildings, regardless of the insecurity of both the environment and the legal status.

One reason is that the state does not bother the squatters; normally they are not evicted and the Direction Générale des Impôts does not collect any tax in informal areas. Some of the slums are more or less independent units. The gangs who run the area avoid contact with the government and the government has no power to intervene.

The last ten years have seen very few forced evictions, if any. Even if this is positive from a human rights perspective, it has more to do with a laissez-faire attitude of the Government than with concern for its citizens.

2.2.3 Land regulations and institutions

The policies and legal framework for land issues are dispersed, contradictory and in most cases not implemented. Even though there are many layers of administration set up to manage different legal procedures regarding land, there is an absence of a wider framework and general policies on how land should be administered and managed.

One of the reasons for the weak policy foundation is that the institutions that are supposed to execute the policies do not possess the necessary capacity. Another obstacle for registration of leasehold and freehold is that the civil registry is incomplete: around 40 percent of Haitians lack identification documents and are not considered “legal”. The identity cards used for the elections in 2006 are however being recognised as a legally binding document, which means that more and more people are eventually getting into the legal system.

The technical base in terms of a cadastre is also missing. The National Cadastre Office (ONACA) is responsible for developing, updating and maintaining cadastres, however the only existing cadastres (although not complete) are for the department Artibonite, and for parts of the municipalities of Delmas, Tabarre and Pétion-Ville. All of these cadastres were created after donor demand due to projects that were being carried out involving expropriation of land.²¹ The ONACA does not have enough staff or financial resources to develop more cadastres.

The Direction de Domaine under the General Revenue Office (DGI)

²¹ In the case of Artibonite, the cadastre system being introduced was of a German model (as GTZ was the one funding the road project in the area), which turned out to cause difficulties as the property laws in Haiti are built on French law.

is responsible for surveying the state's private property and it manages and approves of land leasing.²² DGI also houses the Direction de l'Enregistrement et de la Conservation Foncière, which registers property for tax paying purposes. The registers are not computerised and in many cases not updated. Copies of the registers could be found at municipal levels, but the coordination between these two levels is weak so it is difficult to know which register to follow. The registers are not map based, but sorted after the owners, which makes it almost impossible to ensure that double registrations are not taking place, or to find the owner for a certain property.

The National Centre for Geospatial Information (CNIGS) is the Haitian agency for geographical information, geodesy and cartography. The agency has been supported by a long-term capacity building programme funded by the EU and is as a result very efficient and competent. CNIGS collects baseline reference data and develops applications of the data together with stakeholders such as ONACA or DGI.

The systems in DGI, ONACA and CNIGS are firstly not complete in themselves and secondly not synchronised, which makes it very difficult for laypersons and even experts to know to which authority to turn for what services concerning land administration. Other entities might be involved as well in different land procedures (see figure 9 below).




Figure 9. Deficient coordination Different types of land related information are kept for different purposes within different authorities and the information is not combined. Adapted from International Federation of Surveyors / UN-HABITAT (undated)

The inefficiency of keeping separate systems for land information is obvious. Furthermore, the corruption risk with non-computerised systems (ONACA and DGI) is elevated. The DGI's registers have two

²² under the form of "fermage", which originally was a tenancy for farmland but gradually has developed into a leasehold for both state and privately owned property

parallel systems; one with the DGI and one with the municipality, thus increasing insecurity. The authorities are not held accountable for the land transactions as the registers are complicated to access and not designed for information retrieval. The Haitian land sector has no anti-corruption safeguard and corruption is rife.

There are no special land tribunals where ownership issues or other conflicts regarding properties can be resolved. The court of law is already overburdened with civil and criminal trials and is not the proper venue for settling land rights cases.

Although property and land issues are considered to be important and even potentially explosive in Haiti, there are very few initiatives to deal with the issues. However in the beginning of March 2008 an informal, inter-ministerial reference group on land, property and human settlement was created with representatives from the main government agencies.

2.3 Basic services and infrastructure

In many places in Port-au-Prince, infrastructure is not constructed and basic services are not delivered to the population due to difficulties to access the area. In some informal areas the houses are built too densely together for any pipes to be laid, sewers or drainage to be drawn or roads to be built. In other areas the access problem is related to the hilly topography. Some slums are so prone to flooding that there is no point in installing infrastructure that will be destroyed by heavy rainfall.

Consequently, large parts of Port-au-Prince are not provided with basic services such as water and sanitation, waste management and roads. The deficiency of the service infrastructure affects everyone, albeit at different scales and with different consequences. One solution to the malfunctioning of state-provided basic services is to rely on private providers. This is an option for the more wealthy but not for the poor as services from the private (often illegal) sector are too expensive. Another common solution is for NGOs and local community organizations to provide services such as water supply or electricity.

The risk with the unregulated character of the basic service provision is that political interest groups can exploit it for political support and patronage (World Bank 2006). In the extreme cases, armed gangs in different parts of the city have taken control over water points, which allows them to dominate the area that is dependant on water and to use the proceeds for their own purposes. Furthermore, the uncoordinated nature of the interventions also causes problems. The fairness of distribution is not controlled, which leads to unequal access to services and could create un-serviced pockets in areas where neither government nor private providers are present.

The Government of Haiti admits that the residents of metropolitan Port-au-Prince who can afford to detach from the public service system they usually do (Republic of Haiti 2003). They produce their own electricity with a generator or solar panels, they use mobile phones instead of landlines, they get water from private suppliers and a private company collects their garbage. This independence from the authorities contributes to the increasing informality and sometimes illegality of public services delivery.

2.3.1 Water and sanitation

There are two authorities responsible for delivery of drinking water in metropolitan Port-au-Prince; Centrale Autonome Métropolitaine d'Eau Potable, CAMEP, and Service National d'Eau Potable, SNEP.

CAMEP mostly provides individual and communal water taps, but in the nineties CAMEP carried out a project together with NGOs to construct water kiosks in some of the informal areas where it is too difficult to install pipelines (Republic of Haiti 2003). Local water committees now manage the water kiosks. But publicly provided water is getting more rare, as figure 10 shows. From having had almost the whole market in the nineteen eighties, the public utilities now only have about half of the market share.




Figure 10. Water provision in metropolitan Port-au-Prince. The difference between 1985 and 2005 in type of service provider is striking. In 1985 the state was the main provider. In 2005 private providers are almost as important. Source: CAMEP (undated).

Even for people with individual water taps the access is irregular and often the water is not suitable for drinking. Many of the more affluent inhabitants, larger hotels and restaurants, have disconnected from the public service and get water from private water trucks. For the poorer parts of the society the solutions range from public service water, to buying from water trucks, from neighbours or from private

Box 3. Institutional change in water provision

Water provision is today in principle divided between Centrale Autonome Métropolitaine d'Eau Potable, CAMEP, and Service National d'Eau Potable, SNEP, but in the PRSP it is suggested that regional offices in charge of both water and sanitation will replace them.¹ In a second phase, the management will be transferred to the municipal level. Already, an office for water and sanitation, *Cellule de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement*, has been established under the Ministry of Public Works, for coordination reasons. Its tasks are amongst others to come up with a new tariff policy and to establish indicators for management of the water and sanitation systems. Before the regional offices are in place, and during the transition period, capacity building will take place in CAMEP and SNEP along with institutional changes to make the conversion easier. This gradual decentralisation of national agencies into regional and then municipal entities is a new way of looking at implementation of the 1987 constitution. Other authorities and government agencies might be transformed in similar ways in the future.

For more on water provision, see section 2.3.1

¹ Republic of Haiti (November 2007)

Box 4. Three quarters of solid waste is not collected

Martissant, a mostly informal area in the municipality of Port-au-Prince, produces 160 tons of waste every day. According to recent research, only 25% of this is collected by the municipality or private entrepreneurs. Of the 75% remaining, half is burnt in shallow pits or by the road or in the backyard. The remaining 60 tons is left elsewhere. Some solid waste is recycled or reused, but most ends up in the rivers, on the streets, in gullies, the sea and in open channels transporting both sewage and water.

Liquid waste disposal is even worse. There is no sewage system, all wastewater simply flows from the house onto the street, where it will join a river or water channel flowing to the sea. Many water sources in Martissant have been contaminated as a result.

Visit in Martissant in March 2008 and GHRAP (January 2008).

“In the whole of Port-au-Prince, there is no major waste processing”

providers who may be formal, informal or illegal.²³ The most desperate households collect water from rivers or other waterways and boil it if it is to be used as drinking water. Between 25 and 50 percent of the metropolitan population is estimated to have access to safe water.²⁴

The lack of access to clean water has two major reasons. The first one is that the demand exceeds supply. The state has not kept up or increases its services in terms of maintenance and management as the population grows. Nor is the infrastructure for distribution sufficient. Secondly, the protection of water sources is either ill planned and managed or not existing, so the water production is insufficient and irregular. The absence of watershed management or land use zoning has in practice sanctioned informal constructions to be built anywhere, without regard to environmental consequences, which results in contamination of water sources. CAMEP has had to stop using several of its water sources due to contamination from heavy metals or human and animal faeces.

There is no system for purification or other treatment of wastewater in Port-au-Prince and many parts of the city lack rainwater drainage systems. Instead the rainwater, which is combined with the wastewater and other polluted water, flows in the gullies, the open water channels and the few existing gutters, ending up in the sea. The Ministry of Public Works has a master plan for drainage, proposing to build five major rainwater drainage channels (Republic of Haiti 2003). So far, one has been completed, for the centre of the city.

2.3.2 Waste management

Only half of the residents have access to latrines. Most households in the slums use on-site sanitation, i.e. the waste from the pit latrines and septic tanks are collected from that point and not flushed into sewers. Leaks or overflows of human waste contaminate the water system causing health risks for the whole city. People with no access to latrines defecate wherever there is a reasonably private place – behind the house, on the riverbank or wherever suitable - leading to groundwater contamination and disease. According to UNICEF only 34 percent of the population in Port-au-Prince has access to adequate sanitation.

In the whole of Port-au-Prince, there is no major waste processing and recycling and no well- managed landfill. There are three large dumpsites which are not sufficient for a city approaching three million inhabitants. Even in the more affluent parts there are garbage heaps on street corners, waiting for days or weeks to be picked up or are burnt to get rid of the stench.

The Service Métropolitain de Collecte des Résidus Solides does not

²³ Illegal connection to CAMEP's and SNEP's pipes is fairly common and often carried out by an illegal provider that sells the stolen water to individuals. The price for this water was originally about the same as for the water from the public service, but has increased substantially the last ten years as the water availability has declined.

²⁴ Republic of Haiti (November 2007), WHO and UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for water supply and sanitation www.wssinfo.org, World Bank (27 April 2006)

have the capacity or means to manage the enormous amount of waste that is produced every day in Port-au-Prince. In the richer areas private companies are in charge of the garbage collection, but in the poor communities there is nothing.

The solid waste that is not picked up is piled in the streets, in gullies and in open rainwater and wastewater channels, where it blocks the flow and causes flooding with filthy water. Much of the garbage is burnt, directly on the street or in garbage pits in the gullies or backyards, contributing to urban air pollutions.

Very little recycling takes place and basically no sorting, with waste from households, industries, hospitals and slaughterhouses being mixed and either burnt or buried together, without environmental or health concerns.



Piles of garbage blocking a street in downtown Port au Prince

Photo © Å. Forsman

2.3.3 Transport

From early in the morning the roads in Port-au-Prince are crammed with cars, tap taps (shared taxis in the form of covered pickup trucks or mini buses with vividly painted decorations), buses, motorcycles and pedestrians. 85% of the country's traffic is concentrated in metropolitan Port-au-Prince (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2006). The roads are in bad condition, with small and large potholes, bumps and jagged surface, not to mention the garbage heaps that sometimes hinder the traffic. The roads are normally a mix between dirt and tarmac surface. In the older parts of the city the roads are surfaced, although worn out, but in many of the newer settlements – i.e. from after 1986 when the urbanisation picked up speed – the roads are made of less resistant material and are often dusty and corrugated.

The reason for the situation is an outdated and ill planned transport network that cannot keep pace with the increase in population and in motorised transport means. The hierarchy of the roads (primary, secondary, tertiary) is furthermore not working efficiently. The city does not have enough road capacity for the necessary diagonal traverses between the major roads, which are directed outwards from the city centre in a star-like formation.

A book on environmental problems in metropolitan Port-au-Prince (published in 1999 to commemorate the city's 250th anniversary)

“Walking is by far the most common means of transport in Port-au-Prince”

identified and mapped the main hot spots for traffic jams.²⁵ It was established then and it still holds true that the congestion is worst in the historic city centre, but that other blockages are found in the vicinity of major crossings, normally between the primary and secondary roads. It is difficult to find updated information on the number of motor vehicles in Port-au-Prince.²⁶

Public transport in Port-au-Prince is totally privatised and has been for the last 20 years. The tap-taps are the core of the public transport, one of the cheapest ways to travel. There is a great number of them so passengers rarely have to wait. The ‘tap-tap’ stops whenever a passenger calls for it (or taps with a coin on the metal frame, which is how the vehicle got its name) At major crossroads or other junctions there are “stations” for tap-taps. These stations are not planned or maintained.

The public transport sector in Haiti used more than half of the total diesel consumed by vehicles in 1990²⁷, and the proportions are probably still similar. It is also a major source of tax revenues for the state.

Despite the fact that walking is by far the most common means of transport in Port-au-Prince (see figure 11), no policy or plan takes it into consideration, and the road or transport projects ignore it (Henriquez, Lionel 2000). The poverty of Port-au-Prince has made it the only city in the Caribbean where walking is more common than motorised transport.




Figure 11. A city of walkers. Transport use by category in Port-au-Prince, 1984. A chart for today would probably show even more emphasis on walking as the major means of transport. Statistics from Henriquez, Lionel (2000)

By economic necessity the poorest inhabitants have to walk to get anywhere. The distance to a cheap and convenient transport such

²⁵ Commission pour la commémoration du 250e anniversaire de la fondation de la ville de Port-au-Prince (1999)

²⁶ 150.000 motor vehicles in 1997 according to Republic of Haiti (2003)

²⁷ Commission pour la commémoration du 250e anniversaire de la fondation de la ville de Port-au-Prince (1999)

as a tap-tap is normally also large for the people in the informal areas. Most of Port-au-Princes inhabitants will have to walk to a major road or bus station to find a tap-tap, taxi or bus, and then walk again from the drop off place to the destination. The city is not planned for pedestrians. In the old parts of the city, pavements exist but are crowded with merchants, goods and garbage and thus nearly impassable. In other parts of the city there are only very narrow pavements or nothing at all, so people have to walk on the road, in danger of being hit by cars, tap-taps and motorcycles. There are very few safe pedestrian crossings in Port-au-Prince, and this also increases the risk for accidents.

Regardless of the many walkers, the pollution from cars, tap-taps, buses, lorries and motorcycles in Port-au-Prince is extensive, and is bound to get worse in the near future as the traffic increases in parallel with the population increase. The transport sector is responsible for the major part of air pollution in metropolitan Port-au-Prince.²⁸

Apart from road-based traffic, Port-au-Prince also has a number of harbours and an international airport, all of which are important for the planning of the city as they constitute entry and exit points for both people and goods. The harbours receive almost all of the imports of goods and likewise are responsible for exporting the Haitian produced goods. All fuel that is imported pass through the ports. As the harbours are all centrally located, this increases the transports, congestion and pollution.

2.3.4 Other public services

Electricity

The official electricity provider in Haiti is Électricité d’Haiti, which is a semi-autonomous agency under the Ministry of Public Works, MTPTC. Électricité d’Haiti estimates that of all electricity produced, less than half reaches the clients. Around 5% is lost through technical faults and 55% is lost through theft. In most cities in Haiti, pirate connections, often set up by illegal “electricity companies”, are by far the most common means of accessing electricity. Poor people often pay more to the illegal electricity companies than they would have paid Électricité d’Haiti for the same services. In Port-au-Prince the majority of the population has access to electricity, around 80-90% according to most sources.

Communication

Haiti is one of the least developed countries in the world when it comes to modern communication systems. In 2005 the country only had 50 mobile phone subscriptions per 1,000 people and even fewer land-line connections (UNDP 2007). Even with the cell phone business booming for the last few years, the usage is still below many Least Developed Countries in Africa.

²⁸ Commission pour la commémoration du 250e anniversaire de la fondation de la ville de Port-au-Prince (1999)

Public space

Besides the centrally located square “Champ de Mars” there are very few public parks or other public spaces in Port-au-Prince. Around the metropolitan zone, there are only three protected areas; the coastal mangrove belt, the mountain Morne l’Hôpital that provides the city with major parts of its drinking water, and the hot springs Sources Puantes. These are reserved for eventual use of their thermal energy (Republic of Haiti 2003). The EU and other donors have recently started a project to establish a botanical garden in Martissant, up on the hills of Morne l’Hôpital, which will be one of the few places where inhabitants of Port-au-Prince can enjoy free open space.

Cultural heritage

Port-au-Prince is famous for its so-called gingerbread houses, which were built in the 19th century. This cultural heritage is dispersed throughout in the city, and none of the houses are protected. Many of them are currently falling apart. There is also an old fort overlooking the city, Fort Jacques, which needs protection. These sites are of historical value for the inhabitants of Port-au-Prince, and may also have potential tourism value.

Box 5. Evacuation of children from violent-prone areas

Bel Air is an old, poor settlement in Port-au-Prince where the inhabitants have proper land titles but not much more. The Brazilian NGO Viva Rio plans to improve the area’s access to water and sanitation. During the baseline survey Viva Rio realised that one of the main challenges in implementation is the security situation in the area. The results of the baseline survey’s data was clearly at odds with national statistics. The population pyramid for Bel Air showed few children between age 5 and 19. After further study the NGO found out that the reason for the absence of children was that parents sent their children away during times of insecurity. During the first baseline survey the political and security situation in the area was poor. On average, one child per family moved out from Bel Air in times of insecurity and political struggles in the area. Around 13,000 children, out of a total population of 80,000, were temporarily sent to relatives or friends in calmer parts of Port-au-Prince, or out to the countryside.

For more information on Viva Rio, see www.comunidadeseguridade.org

2.4 Human and natural risks

Both human and natural risks must be considered when urban planning is concerned, as they both can endanger the sustainability of the physical and social environment.

2.4.1 Safety and security

A World Bank report considers urban violence in Haiti to be one of the main obstacles to poverty reduction, noting that “violence and insecurity in Port-au-Prince’s slums in particular have undermined the political process, fuelled conflict, and negatively affected development and reconstruction efforts” (World Bank 2006). The report maintains that the focus for any development intervention should be on restoring the core functions of the state through delivering security and rule of law, infrastructure and basic services.

Over 40% of Haiti’s population is under 14 years old, and more than half is under 21.²⁹ Poor households normally have twice as many children as non-poor households. Children are still seen as economic and social security for ageing parents. Haiti’s poor youth are not well educated and often unemployed, especially in urban areas. The combination of poverty and inequality and unemployment pushes youth to involvement in gangs or other criminal activities.

Remittances have played an important role in keeping young people away from work (World Bank 2006). The several hundred thousand unemployed youth in metropolitan Port-au-Prince contribute to the insecurity of the city. Both inhabitants (in the violence-prone areas) and experts believe unemployment to be source of frustration that

²⁹ Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d’Informatique, www.ihsi.ht

leads to violence. Another factor is believed to be unstable family situations. In metropolitan Port-au-Prince, 60% of the children do not live with both of their parents (i.e. the majority live with only their mother) and 17% of the children do not live with either of their parents (World Bank 2006). The differences in family structure must be addressed in spatial planning and land intervention, as the children and the women headed households otherwise risk being disadvantaged.

When discussing violence and insecurity, it is easy to focus on crimes such as kidnapping and murder, for which Haiti has become notorious. But the most common form of crime is domestic violence against women and children. Local women's organizations observe that domestic rape is a very frequent though seldom reported crime.

There has been a rise in the occurrence of gang rapes and politically motivated rapes the last decade. Increased use of hard drugs and a steady influx of small arms encourage criminal gangs to commit more violent crimes such as rape or gang rape, murder and physical abuse. Protection businesses and kidnapping have also become more widespread in metropolitan Port-au-Prince. Fifty eight percent of the capital's inhabitants said they felt unsafe most of the time in their own home and in their neighbourhood, compared to 15 percent in the countryside (World Bank 2006).

Despite a recent initiative to increase the Haitian police force, there are still more private security officers than police officers in the country (World Bank 2006). The United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti is active in reinforcing and developing much needed capacity in the Haitian police force. The arbitrary and corrupt legal system has not been able to control the violence. In 2007 there was a slight decline in violent crimes, probably due to the stable political situation.

2.4.2 Natural disaster and climate change

Situated in the Caribbean, right in the hurricane belt, Haiti is exposed to tropical storms and hurricanes on an annual basis. Even the less serious weather conditions can cause injury and damage to people and property, especially more vulnerable people, such as those living in slums.

In 2004 Haiti was hit by flooding and hurricanes that killed more than 4,000 people and left 20,000 homeless. Since then, smaller disasters have occurred regularly, also with loss of life and property although not at the same scale. Disaster preparedness in the country is low, despite reoccurring storms and heavy rains. In addition to weather hazards, Haiti is located on tectonic plates, with two main fault lines crossing the country; one following the north coast and one directly traversing Port-au-Prince.³⁰ The capitol was partly destroyed by earthquakes in 1751 and 1771, and another might occur any time.

30 GHRAP (January 2008)

Port-au-Prince is exceptionally ill-prepared to cope with the increased risk of more unstable weather patterns, rising sea levels and warmer temperatures. An assessment of people living at risk from natural disasters, especially flooding and landslides, should be done to estimate the potential dangers, the number of people that can be affected and ultimately will need to be relocated.

For all the natural disasters, as well as the threat of fire, the risks could be lowered substantially if spatial planning existed and planning regulations and building codes were followed. Allowing houses to be constructed in drainage zones, densely packed together on steep hills and on marshy, instable or contaminated ground, worsens the impact of natural disasters and fire.

Box 6. Between landslides and floods

Martissant is a community ward situated in the southern part of the city. It is home to more than 200,000 inhabitants and is growing steadily. Martissant is bordered on one side by the sea and on the other side by a mountain, the Morne l'Hôpital, newly arrived migrants have to establish themselves on the edges towards either of these locations, which is unsafe and risky. According to the research institution Groupe Haitien de Recherches et d'Actions Pedagogiques Reconnu d'Utilit Publique (GHRAP), 52% of Martissant's population live in what the institution has defined as risk zones.

The informal settlements facing the sea are located on ground that is at or even below sea level. At the smallest rainfall the ground is flooded, as all water from the surrounding hills has to pass the area to reach the sea, and the drainage and channels are either not large enough or filled up with garbage or soil. The settlements also get flooded whenever the sea rises, which happens when there are strong winds. As if the flooding was not enough, the people in this area are surrounded by solid and liquid waste, disposed by themselves and by inhabitants living up the hills. When there is an inundation, the sanitary situation deteriorates further. In parts of the seaside settlements, the ground itself is composed of garbage that has been piled up. This is precarious when it comes to construction, as the foundations being built are rarely stable on the garbage ground and risks falling or floating away during times of bad weather.

Up the hills the perils are not the same but equally dangerous. Houses are constructed on steep slopes, closely together and with no access roads other than small narrow paths or steps stamped out in the soil. Landslides happen often, and their occurrences are accelerated by the deforestation that has taken place over the years. If one house slides down, the risk is that it takes other homes with it, creating a domino effect on down into the gully.

Visit in Martissant in March 2008 with GHRAP and publication from GHRAP (January 2008).

3. Analysis of challenges and opportunities

The analyses in this section are made to bridge the gap between the current situation in metropolitan Port-au-Prince and the recommendations for future actions that follow in section 4.

3.1 Inventory of urban planning and land stakeholders

The stakeholders of urban planning and land interventions in metropolitan Port-au-Prince consist of all individuals, groups and institutions that can affect or be affected by urban planning, urban development and land management. The stakeholders include potential beneficiaries as well as those who could be adversely affected. Most of the stakeholders in metropolitan Port-au-Prince have been presented earlier, and their interests and impacts have partly been covered. See Annex 2 for a list and short descriptions of different stakeholders.




Figure 12. Level of institutional interest and power. The positions of the different groups show where they are today and the arrows for some of them show where they should ideally be. The light/yellow circles represent national stakeholders, dark/green circles = international stakeholders.

In figure 12, the key players are the municipalities and the relevant ministries. They should preferably move towards the upper right corner, where they would have greater influence over the situation, as well as a keen interest to be in charge of urban planning processes.

The municipalities will firstly need to strengthen their influence on urban planning and other relevant decision-making on urban development. Secondly, they need to increase the interest for these issues, which is best done by demonstrating the practical value of

urban planning (see section 4.3.2 for demonstration projects). For the relevant ministries, the interest for metropolitan planning is still low. The overlapping roles and responsibilities for this work need clarification. If one ministry was given the planning mandate, the other ministries would decrease their influence on the processes and there would be less competition between the ministries.

Another group that should shift towards more influence and more interest is the residents. This group is very diverse and could of course be represented by civil society organization. At present the NGOs and CBOs do not seem to represent the citizens, partly due to the scramble for donor funding and in-fighting between different civil society organizations. Residents' interest for metropolitan, municipal and local planning must be encouraged and systems set up for consultation and constant feedback.

Looking at the whole picture, it is troubling that so many of stakeholders have a low or neutral interest in urban planning. In an ideal situation, the level of interest would be higher, and a few stakeholders would be given increased power. The decision-making processes can be participatory even when the power is not equally shared. The important point is that all stakeholders make their voice heard and influence the decisions.

The stakeholders in the upper left hand corner in figure 12 have greater interest, but little power. Their role could be to put pressure on more powerful stakeholders. Some of the land related institutions, for example, have both knowledge and interest to influence the municipalities and the relevant ministries to enhance their planning capacities. The donors could also play a significant role by lobbying for change.

3.2 Evaluation of citywide planning scenarios

Due to the politically sensitive situation and the general instability in Haiti it is difficult to judge the general direction of the country in terms of human development. Therefore, three fundamentally different scenarios representing potential futures have been visualised for the country and the capital. It is assumed for all three scenarios that the urbanisation rate will remain high, as all predictions point in that direction.

Scenario 1. Return to political instability

Scenario 1 means a return to political turmoil, as the result of a coup d'état, revolution, rebellion, election fraud, mass demonstrations or other means. The international community will loose faith in the Haitian state, donors will withhold their funding or return to humanitarian assistance. The UN troops will be reinforced. Tension between people from different political fractions and with different incomes will increase and lead to violence.

Political factors: The central Government takes back its monopoly

and becomes even more centralised, but it is still a weak state without enforcement power.

Economic factors: Haiti's economy declines further, causing a deterioration basic services such as water and sanitation, health and education.

Social factors: Increasing poverty and increasing inequality in combination with the politically sensitive situation lead to more crime and political violence. Gangs take control of communities and rule over their own little kingdoms.

Technological factors: Infrastructure is destroyed by riots or lack of maintenance and the state does not have capacity to restore it.

Legal (and institutional) factors: There is a return to lawlessness and corruption is thriving. People do not trust the government authorities. The informal sector gains in importance from an already high level.

Environmental factors: The control system has more or less broken down for all sectors and for the environment this means increasing degradation. The water supply system in the metropolitan region risks collapsing.

Scenario 2. Continuing stable political climate but with weak economy and institutions

Scenario 2 represents a situation where the relative stability from 2007 in politics is re-established however the societal development is slow. This scenario, probably the most likely, (as described in sections 1 and 2) represents a continuation of the situation in 2007.

Political factors: The decentralisation process is advancing slowly. The municipalities will still not have power or resources to perform "normal" tasks such as planning, service provision, infrastructure.

Economic factors: No real development of the economy. Food prices rise. More and more food needs to be imported. Donor money will however be more readily available, both as donations and as loans.

Social factors: Inequality persists even though people slowly are getting less poor. The trust in the national and local Government is low. Outbreaks of gang violence happen but are rare. Demonstrations and riots due to soaring food prices and unemployment occur now and then.

Technological factors: No major changes from current situation.

Legal (and institutional) factors: Capacity development will take place in certain state bodies, according to donor interest. There will be a few strong institutions but the majority of them will remain weak.

Environmental factors: No major changes in policy or enforcement, so environmental destruction continues.

Scenario 3. Institutional, economic, political and social improvements

Scenario 3 is the most desirable but least likely of the three scenarios.

Political factors: Decentralisation and devolution will be implemented with support from government from all levels. Municipalities will have more power and resources and will take on more responsibilities, especially regarding city planning and provision of basic services and infrastructure.

Economic factors: The economy is steady, not decreasing. The donors are confident in the (new) Government and make long-term commitments.

Social factors: Decreasing inequality and slowly decreasing poverty. Less violence in the streets as employment rate goes up and education is improved.

Technological factors: Due to the stabilised economy, more services will be provided on a regular basis, which means that access to electricity and Internet will be more widely available. New mobile or Internet services will emerge, such as banking.

Legal (and institutional) factors: National capacity development strategies are put in place and implemented. There is a slow improvement in the overall institutional, human and organizational capacity, both in government and civil society. New laws are passed that institutionalise the constitution and activate the decentralisation process.

Environmental factors: Stronger environmental policies and control leads to a more sustainable metropolitan area. Problems are not resolved, but at least the environmental damage does not continue unabated.

The scenarios have been devised to evaluate what type or level of citywide strategic planning can be realistically developed and implemented in metropolitan Port-au-Prince. With the prerequisites as above, a citywide strategic planning initiative would have a different set-up for each scenario, as shown in the table below:

Table 4. Summary of three scenarios that will influence on a city wide planning process

Citywide Strategic Planning	Scenario 1. Return to political instability	Scenario 2. Political stability, slow socio-economic development	Scenario 3. Political, social, economic and institutional improvements
Planning	Planning will be top-down and not participatory	The central government will lead the planning process but with support from the municipalities	The municipalities are able to lead the planning process, with support from central government
Land administration	Land will be used for political purposes and to gain support from individuals or groups in the society. It will be very difficult for development programmes to influence this trend	Increased coordination between the different authorities responsible for land Land records would slowly be established and eventually merged into a national land information management system	Land issues would be handled by one authority that would have local offices in the municipalities In the long term a national land record and information management system would be developed
Coordination	Central coordination of all land and planning related authorities, including the municipalities. Weak management leads to overlaps between different authorities	Coordination at central level for all planning and land issues, but municipalities would be the most important stakeholders	Coordination at metropolitan level for all planning and land issues, line ministries would serve as advisors and for the purpose of policy development
Regulations and laws	Law framework for planning, land and construction will remain the same	Municipalities will endorse new by-laws for planning and construction	New laws to simplify the decentralisation will be adopted. New planning by-laws will be adopted Regulations and norms for construction will be revised
Enforcement	The state will have no means to enforce the existing regulations due to weakened institutions	The enforcement will be coordinated by an agency with representatives from municipalities as well as from line ministries, but will be implemented by the municipalities	The enforcement will be completely decentralised, sometimes even down to community ward level
Service delivery	The service delivery will be even more haphazard and directed to the areas where the present political power has support or needs to buy support An increase in pirate connections for water and electricity	The municipalities will be in charge of supervising the service delivery, which will continue to be executed by public utilities (such as CAMEP, SMTCP etc) and private service providers (some legal, other illegal or informal)	The municipalities will be in charge of supervising the service delivery, which will be executed by public utilities and formal private companies. The service delivery will be regulated for equity in access and price and the "pirates" in the business will be stopped
Settlements situation	Increase of squatter settlements No regulation as of where new settlements could take place, so there will be an increase in settlements in precarious sites	The location of new settlements, be they formal or informal, will be decided by the coordination agency (and enforced by the municipalities), so the growth of slums and low-income areas will be more controlled and future urban sprawl will be mitigated	The location of new settlements will be decided by the municipalities, which means more controlled growth of low-income areas and slums. The squatters on Government owned land will be regulated into leasers. Land documentation will be easier, quicker and less expensive to obtain, and will continue to be an option, in particular on private land
Conclusions	No real citywide strategic planning could take place Even if donors do not suspend their funds they would still be cautious towards the state and would not want to invest in any long-term or politically sensitive programmes, such as planning and land reforms	A full-scale citywide strategic plan would not be possible to develop, and even less possible to implement. First steps towards citywide strategic planning include: a) create a metropolitan agency for coordination and planning, b) develop a citywide strategic framework for development control, c) strengthen regulation enforcement at municipal level, especially concerning settlements.	It would be possible to develop and implement a full-scale citywide strategic plan, which would be coordinated at metropolitan level and implemented at municipal and community ward levels Donor support possible and even likely for land reforms and urban planning

3.3 SWOT analysis for citywide planning in Port-au-Prince

In the matrix below, the SWOT components are listed on the sides and combined in the gray areas in the middle. Conclusions are drawn from the combinations, resulting in priority areas for interventions, which are listed in the upper left hand corner.

Table 5. SWOT analysis results

<p>PRIORITIES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity building • Coordination • Enforcement of regulations • Increase the responsibilities of the municipalities • Increase the revenues of the municipalities (fees, taxes) • Set up structures for stakeholder participation in decision-making • Donor coordination for urban issues • Tools for urban management (regulations, guidelines and frameworks on e.g. planning, land use, zoning, construction) 	<p>Strengths</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relative political stability • Port-au-Prince is the economic engine of growth for Haiti 	<p>Weaknesses</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of capacity in municipalities • Decentralisation not implemented so municipalities are not autonomous • Lack of communication and coordination between local and national authorities and NGOs • No cadastre and no reliable land records • Inadequate service delivery • Weak community based organizations that do not influence decisions • Residents unaware of their rights and duties • Uncoordinated interventions by NGOs and donors • High crime rates • Urban sprawl • Lack of political support from higher level • Centralised management of urban planning and development • Donor volatility
<p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Municipalities that want more responsibilities • Initiative from Government to ask for donor support on planning, land issues and slum upgrading • Donors more willing to work with the Government • Cities Alliance proposal will probably get funding • Revenue base for municipalities could be enhanced 	<p><i>How can these strengths be used to take advantage of these opportunities?</i> There is a momentum for change, which could be used to capacitate the local authorities, specifically the municipalities.</p>	<p><i>How can the weaknesses that prevent taking advantage of these opportunities be overcome?</i> Capacity building for municipalities and setting up a unit for metropolitan coordination.</p>
<p>Threats</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fast growing metropolitan population • Young, uneducated and unemployed population • Weak preparedness for natural disasters 	<p><i>How can these strengths be used to reduce the likelihood and impact of these threats?</i> Start with a less extensive citywide strategic planning, with focus on coordination and enforcement of regulations.</p>	<p><i>How can the weaknesses that will make these threats a reality be addressed?</i> Initiate processes to regulate the slum growth. Densify central parts of the city and limit growth in the outskirts.</p>

Looking at the weaknesses it is easy to despair, but the matrix also demonstrates that there are several possibilities to start development initiatives in metropolitan Port-au-Prince, as long as it is on a smaller scale. The national and local authorities lack adequate implementation capacity for an advanced planning exercise. However, small but deliberate interventions could be implemented, which would also serve the purpose of simultaneously strengthening the capacity of the implementers.

There must be a balance between the quick-win short-term projects and the more strategic long-term interventions that will improve Port-au-Prince and the living situation for its residents. Section 4 will investigate future avenues for metropolitan planning and development.



Availability of social housing in Port-au-Prince is extremely low.

Photo © Å. Forsman

4. Future activities and policy priorities

The informal settlements and the slums of Port-au-Prince are permanent. The people and most of the houses are there to stay. The slum cities that have been created are permanent cities, and may change over time like any city, but they will not disappear. Therefore, the solution to the low living standards in the slums cannot be found in isolated slum upgrading projects, but requires the development of the whole metropolitan Port-au-Prince. Slum *prevention* could also be achieved through proper use of planning tools such as spatial plans and regulations on land subdivision.

The resources that are being put into every house in the slum areas are considerable. If they were harnessed better, they would be a benefit to the city instead of causing environmental and health hazards. This is the very reason that an overarching strategic planning framework is needed for metropolitan Port-au-Prince. With well thought-through guidelines concerning land use, zoning and building regulations, the money and labour that Haitians, poor as well as rich, put into their houses can contribute to the creation of a more functioning city.

Decentralisation has been an objective for the Haitian state officially since 1987, when the constitution emphasised the importance of a decentralised state. In reality, not much has happened and there are today perhaps even larger gaps between central and local governments, as there is a competition for resources. In a society where the political and administrative mandates for authorities are unclear, government corruption is huge. The large-scale or so-called ‘grand corruption’ has its foundation in the government structure and behaviour, and affects the whole society, undermining its political and economic stability and allowing corruption to thrive in other sectors.³¹

Urban planning involves land use, land administration and construction, thus it is a corruption-prone area with strong individual and political interests. This makes it a priority area for interventions for anti-corruption and accountability reasons. Responsible planning and land administration can decrease corruption and graft.

As indicated in the analyses above, the institutional setting is too weak and the country too fragile to benefit from full-scale citywide strategic planning. Instead, an incremental development of citywide strategic planning should be supported. The three main avenues that this situational analysis suggests are presented in this section:

- 1. Establishment of a metropolitan agency** with the major tasks to: coordinate all bodies with a stake in urban planning and development in metropolitan Port-au-Prince; develop planning policy, regulations and legal frameworks; delegate implementation; and ensure an efficient execution of citywide strategic plan.

³¹ Transparency International & UN-HABITAT (March 2004)

- 2. Development of a citywide strategic framework** for metropolitan Port-au-Prince with major planning principles, enabling and controlling rules, regulations and tools that will set the agenda for spatial, social and economic development in the capital. In parallel with the development of a strategic framework, simple demonstration projects should be implemented to keep the process moving and generate feedback.
- 3. Reinforcement of the municipalities.** The municipalities will be in the centre of all metropolitan development and need to be strengthened. Regardless of how long the decentralisation process takes, the municipalities would benefit from gradually increased responsibilities coupled with increased assistance for capacity building and institutional strengthening.

This section consists of descriptions of the three main recommendations, followed by general recommendations. Finally, suggestions for benchmarks and indicators for the monitoring process, as well as risk assessment and risk management, are presented.

4.1 Establishment of a metropolitan agency

The idea of a coordinating body for the metropolitan area appears in many of the documents and plans for improving the living standard and environment in metropolitan Port-au-Prince. Although most stakeholders agree on the necessity of such a body, the idea has not been executed. Reasons for the non-accomplishment of a coordinating agency are, amongst others, restricted financial means and lack of political will. Apart from securing funding and political will, it is crucial to keep the structure of the agency simple and basic.

The MPCE proposal to Cities Alliance includes the creation of an urban agency for the metropolitan region. If the Cities Alliance proposal is approved, it is important to coordinate the different interventions under that project. Only one urban agency is needed, regardless of which intervention takes place.

In the development plan for metropolitan Port-au-Prince from 2003 the establishment of an agency for the development and improvements of the capital was the first priority (Republic of Haiti 2003). The plan suggests an agency consisting of 60 staff members, with wide responsibility for planning and implementation in the metropolitan area. According to this situational analysis, it is not advisable to set up an agency of that scale. The costs would be enormous, but more importantly it would be difficult to find the human resources necessary and it would draw staff capacity away from other authorities. Instead, it is proposed that a minimal yet efficient unit is established, according to the following simple structure (see also figure 13 below):

Secretariat – staffed with personnel competent in urban planning and development, but also in management and coordination

Advisory committee – representatives from relevant government

agencies at national and municipal levels, private sector, civil society and donors

Steering committee – will have the executive power and will therefore be made up of the political decision-makers, but should also have some technical expertise




Figure 13. Set-up of the metropolitan agency. The networking function is the most important for the agency, which will coordinate all relevant stakeholders.

The metropolitan agency should be small and not necessarily with autonomous legal responsibility. In order for the agency to still have legal and political instruments to fulfill its mission, it could be housed under one Ministry, e.g. the MICT or the MPCE.

The agency’s main tasks are to:

- Coordinate stakeholders
- Coordinate the strategic framework
- Policy development
- Develop regulations and legal frameworks
- Delegate responsibilities

The agency should set up a framework, planning principles, regulations and development standards. These should be enforced and controlled by national government, municipalities and/or community wards. It is important that the metropolitan agency is *not* responsible for implementation, which should be carried out by central government and, increasingly, the municipalities. Different task teams or working groups can be established under the metropolitan agency to address technical issues such as housing, waste management and security.

The agency should be responsible for coordination of all government

bodies with a stake in urban development in metropolitan Port-au-Prince. This is the most important of its tasks and also the most politically sensitive. Strong political support from all involved parties and all levels is necessary for the coordination and cooperation to work. The agency should also interact with civil society, the private sectors and development partners.

To facilitate cooperation and coordination a so-called urban pact, which will ensure the commitment of the major stakeholders, could be established. An urban pact is an agreement between the key stakeholders, both governmental and non-governmental, to formalise their commitments, in this case to follow and contribute to the metropolitan strategic framework and to support the metropolitan agency.

A monitoring system that will avoid repetition of mistakes and improve the process and the Agency should be established.

4.2 Metropolitan strategic framework

The administration in Port-au-Prince, described in section 1.1.4, is exceptionally weak. A full-fledged citywide planning process is difficult to implement within the present institutional setting and level of capacity. It is instead suggested that a more general citywide scheme be developed; called the **metropolitan strategic framework**. Once a more stable and decentralised institutional setting has been reached, Port-au-Prince can take the next step towards a more comprehensible citywide strategic planning.

4.2.1 Basic conditions for a successful citywide strategic planning process

Citywide strategic planning is more holistic and more participatory than traditional urban planning. Although the difference may seem small, it actually means changing the whole process, making it more demanding and complex. Therefore, a stronger institutional foundation is a necessity. In the case of metropolitan Port-au-Prince, an incremental approach towards citywide strategic planning is suggested, starting with a citywide strategic framework that sets the rules of the game, which will constitute the foundation for the future citywide strategic plan.

Prerequisites for undertaking citywide strategic planning

- Political commitment
- Relevant legislation in place, e.g. concerning decentralisation
- Local authority with enough capacity, resources and mandate for planning and implementation
- Institutional capacity within all stakeholder organizations
- Reliable and updated maps and other basic information available
- Mechanisms for public participation and representation of women and vulnerable groups

- Longer term funding to ensure implementation
- Enabling environment for close cooperation between national and local authorities

In metropolitan Port-au-Prince, only some of the above prerequisites are fulfilled. To initiate citywide strategic planning at this stage would probably lead to another failure, only adding to the master plans and other plans that have been developed but not implemented (see section 2.1.2). Instead, a framework for the top priority spatial development issues in metropolitan Port-au-Prince should be elaborated as a precursor to a more comprehensive spatial and strategic citywide plan.

4.2.2 Development process for the metropolitan strategic framework

Many of the steps in a full-scale citywide strategic planning process also apply to the more limited variety that is recommended for metropolitan Port-au-Prince. In short, the major steps for developing the metropolitan strategic framework are:

1. Ensure that there is adequate political support and leadership and that all stakeholders have ownership over the process. Establish a core team that will be responsible for the process.
2. Define what “metropolitan strategic framework” implies for metropolitan Port-au-Prince and make sure that not all aspects of urban development are addressed at the same time; instead an entry point of great importance for the metropolitan development could be chosen, such as land issues or waste management.
4. Initiate the process, start consultations, define roles of stakeholders and prepare work plan and budget.
5. Review key documents, including relevant legislation, to benefit from past experience and specify potential barriers in the process. Continue the analysis of the current situation, e.g. with a spatial analysis (described later in this section), and/or rapid assessment of different areas.
6. Arrange a brainstorming event with representatives from the stakeholders and define a common vision and overall objectives for the metropolitan strategic framework.
7. Prepare the overall strategic action plan and get the metropolitan strategic framework agreed upon by the key stakeholders.
8. Revise the metropolitan strategic framework so that it matches laws and regulations and can be formally endorsed by the government.
9. Market the overall strategic plan, disseminate information to all stakeholders and ensure that the involvement remains high.
10. Hold regular follow-up meetings to check the progress against benchmarks. The framework or action plans can also be revised according to new needs.

12. Make capacity building an ongoing process, not only while the plan is developed but for many years into the future.

Several of these activities can and should take place simultaneously. The goal is to develop the framework in a participatory manner. This means that the process, managed by the metropolitan agency, encourages different stakeholders from state and non-state organizations to express their views, needs and ideas for a sustainable and pro-poor development of metropolitan Port-au-Prince. The private sector should be included in the consultations from the start. Yet it must be clear that the main ownership of the process is within the state, with as many of the activities taking place at municipal level as possible.

In order for the participatory process to become an integral part of the development of the metropolitan strategic framework, a consultation plan should be established at an early stage. It should clearly indicate *who* the concerned parties are, *when* consultation will take place and when involvement of selected stakeholders is especially important (such as for start-up, different draft stages, implementation), *how* the consultative meetings shall be organized so the process is as democratic as possible, and *what* shall be achieved, in terms of consultation outputs and in terms of capacity building of the stakeholders.

The participatory process and consultations thus serve at least two purposes: to ensure ownership that achieves a more sustainable framework, and to build capacity amongst stakeholders.

One example of a spatial analysis that has been carried out in Port-au-Prince is the development plan from 2003 (Republic of Haiti 2003), where a poly nuclear model was used and metropolitan nodes were identified. The development plan emphasised the importance of limiting the city borders and has mapped the zones where settlements are allowed and where they should be restricted or prohibited altogether, in order to avoid sprawl. The nodes would serve as central points for business and commerce and/or as tourist centres and the development of the metropolitan area was supposed to follow these nodes.

A spatial analysis could assist the stakeholders in prioritising, both geographically and thematically, as the information presented will be mapped out. This prioritisation will be vital for the development of the actual metropolitan strategic framework. The Spatial Analysis and this situational analysis will contribute to the development of the strategic framework, and hopefully in the long run to the citywide strategic planning.

Alongside the development of the citywide strategic framework, implementation work should start. In many processes there will be a gap between the design and the implementation of the framework. This almost always leads to a dip in the momentum and a decreased interest from stakeholders to initiate the implementation. If the framework process is concluded before implementation starts, the threshold to begin may be difficult to overcome.

To avoid the gap between the framework and the implementation, it is better to start small-scale implementation while still developing the framework. If strategic interventions are being implemented at an early stage, it will also assist the framework development process in terms of feedback. Early implementation projects provide opportunities for quick response to urgent needs, building confidence among the public and other stakeholders that strategic planning delivers real benefits.

It is also useful to think of the framework development process as circular instead of linear. Priorities need to be revised over time; monitoring the implementation will give reasons to change direction, while some challenges or needs disappear as others emerge. The metropolitan strategic framework that will be developed for Port-au-Prince is not a goal in itself but a tool that will continue to be developed, ideally with the long-term objective to develop a citywide strategic plan for the capital.




Figure 14. Elements that will lead from a metropolitan strategic framework to a citywide strategic plan.

4.2.3 Components of the metropolitan strategic framework

The content of the citywide strategic framework will be developed following the structures described above. Regardless of what content the metropolitan strategic framework will have, it needs to encompass issues of equity, gender sensitivity, sustainability and affordability.

Decisions should be taken at lowest level of government and with as much public control of implementation and budget as possible.

Without steering the process in a certain direction, it is useful to give examples of what types of issues will be covered by the framework. The list below presents examples of spatial, social and institutional components to include in a citywide strategic framework.

Table 6. Components in a strategic planning framework

Identification of possible expansion zones and zones that should be kept free from construction to limit urban sprawl and safeguard the environment	Poverty mapping and decisions on targeted interventions for certain areas	Stakeholder mapping and division of labour, roles and responsibilities
Identification of risk zones (flooding, land slides, earth quakes)	Set up processes for consultation and participation	
Identification of public spaces, open spaces, areas for environmental or historic/cultural protection	Establish coordination and communication systems for stakeholders	
Outline of road and transport system, including pedestrians	Private sector involvement (including informal sector) and public-private partnerships	
Outline of local economic development corridors	Information campaigns on land rights and alternative tenure forms	Establishment of a metropolitan agency for coordination
Outline of local economic focal points (markets etc)	Strengthening the institutional and human capacity in the municipalities	
Outline of water, sanitation and waste systems	Legislative review and revision	

Some of these components have already been presented in the 2003 Government plan for metropolitan Port-au-Prince (Republic of Haiti 2003). As much information as possible should be used from this to avoid reinventing the wheel. Other documents that have been produced should also be reviewed relatively early in the process.

It is important not to be too detailed or have too many different areas to cover. The scope of the citywide strategic framework must be adapted to the capacity and resources available in the responsible organizations. The framework should be general enough to be flexible and adaptable according to local circumstance. The implementation of the same component could look very different in Pétion-Ville compared to Cité Soleil for example, due to differences in topography, poverty level, existing infrastructure, and capacity of the municipality.

Many of the residential services in metropolitan Port-au-Prince are already provided by private companies (see figure 10 for water provision). The tendency is towards more privatization and more involvement of the informal business sector in service provision. Instead of combating this development, the metropolitan area could take a pro-active step and make it easy for the informal sector to become formal. Illegal activities such as theft of water or electricity

from the public companies should of course not be allowed, but many of the private service providers are not illegal, merely informal. The state should provide the framework within which they could operate, and should also be responsible for the coordination and control of the providers to ensure a fair market with equal access to these services.

4.3 Reinforcement of the municipalities

The metropolitan strategic framework will work as an umbrella for interventions carried out at a municipal or local level. In different parts of the metropolitan area, people have different needs and the situation on the ground differs between municipalities or community wards. Even if the decentralisation process has not really taken off, much can still be done at municipal level. In order to increase the municipalities' capacity, it is important to incrementally increase their mandate and responsibilities.

The majority of the population in Port-au-Prince does not have access to basic services such as water and sanitation. The current institutional system lacks the capacity for providing such basic necessities for daily life to the residents. The eight municipalities should be in the centre of any intervention focusing on the metropolitan area, as they are the ones that will be responsible for future planning and service delivery. The capacity building interventions that are suggested give priority to the municipalities in the first room, but recognises the need for involving other authorities, civil society and the private sector.

4.3.1 Coordination

The major coordination at metropolitan level will be managed by the metropolitan agency described above. However the municipalities also need to coordinate between themselves. There is already a municipal group of the eight metropolitan Mayors³² that wants to focus on retrieving responsibilities and resources for the municipalities; in other words to put decentralisation into practice. In reality not much has happened.

³² The municipal group is called "Collectif de la Zone Métropolitaine"




Figure 15. Three levels of municipal coordination. Firstly, metropolitan coordination through the metropolitan agency, secondly coordination between municipalities, which already exists as the so-called “Collectif de la Zone Métropolitaine”, and thirdly the coordination within each municipality.

The municipal group is at the moment very unofficial but could function as a pressure group that can influence central government on issues such as decentralisation, devolution, planning and service provision. It could also constitute a much needed discussion group to share experiences and ideas. The group does not necessarily have to become formal, but its role needs to be clearer and it needs to be prioritised by the Mayors.

A third need for coordination is at municipal levels, to ensure an efficient use of resources and a more equal distribution of services. In most of the municipalities in metropolitan Port-au-Prince where NGOs, international organizations and donors carry out projects, the work is uncoordinated. In many cases the municipality does not even know what projects are ongoing within its own jurisdiction.

In Martissant, the municipality of Port-au-Prince has tried to bring together the different actors to share information. This is probably the best example of coordination, although it is not entirely effective. There are several NGOs working in the area that only recently became aware of the coordination initiative.

It would be useful to create more formal coordination groups within each municipality, assisted by groups at lower levels in the community wards, that would not only harmonise the projects and avoid duplication and bias towards specific settlements, but also ensure that the interventions are in line with the main metropolitan framework. In turn, these coordination groups could exchange experiences under the framework of the municipal group of Mayors.

4.3.2 Demonstration projects

In addition to the metropolitan agency and the metropolitan strategic framework, a few practical projects, should be carried out in order to strengthen the capacity of the municipalities. The demonstration projects help prove the rationale for the metropolitan strategic framework, while working towards a full citywide strategic plan.

Most of the policy-related projects are implemented at municipal level, calling for strong communication between the municipalities. Exchanges on the different interventions between the municipalities' staff should take place so that practical lessons can be shared.

The list of project ideas below is meant to serve as inspiration and as a base for ideas that can be developed further, and build on discussions and interviews with stakeholders. The stakeholders in metropolitan Port-au-Prince are responsible for detailed formulation of the metropolitan framework and to decide what policies and interventions to give priority.

Examples of demonstration projects

Growth control

The idea is to manage the growth of metropolitan Port-au-Prince through indicating plots in the most growth prone areas, which will be identified during the development of the metropolitan framework. The respective municipalities will be responsible for marking plot limits according to a grid plan. The municipalities will also control where people settle within the grid plan, on demarcated subdivisions. The purpose is firstly to ensure that people do not construct houses in areas prone to flooding, landslides, pollution or other hazards, secondly to manage the growth of the city so that the municipality will at least be in control of where new construction takes place, and thirdly to make certain that infrastructure can be put in place easily and at lower cost than in unplanned housing areas. To take a few simple pre-emptive measures can save Port-au-Prince and the nation both money and human suffering. This demonstration project can be piloted in a community ward in one of the better functioning municipalities before attempting larger scale initiative. Lessons learnt from such a project can be used in scaling up.

Densification instead of sprawl

Urban sprawl could be limited through changing construction norms so that it e.g. will be easier to get permission to build more than one floor. This type of construction takes place already informally, in areas that are considered a bit more "secure" from the point of view of evictions, and where inhabitants are wealthier. An encouragement of building in several floors would also open up for more renting than there is today, when almost everyone is constructing their own house. Another form of tenure that could be used is joint ownership, which will simplify the production of multilevel buildings and also has other advantages e.g. when it comes to management. To limit the sprawl

will on a long term also mean shorter distances, and a more walkable city, less dependent on motorised transport. Municipal advice offices could be established for assistance regarding e.g. applications for construction permits, technical support for the construction and legal advice on different forms of ownership or leasing.

A city of walkers

To walk is the most environmentally friendly means of transport, yet it is not promoted in the city structure. It is also the cheapest mode of transport. All new roads being built and all improvements of existing ones – primary as well as secondary and smaller – should include sidewalks and pedestrian crossings designed with safety in mind.

Study of needs for legislation review

Informality is not a result of people not wanting to have a proper contract for their property, but rather the complicated legislation around property, both when it comes to freehold and leasehold. The *fermage* legislation could be revised so that it would be legal to obtain a *fermage* contract either with the state or privately. The process could be simplified and the tax law could be changed so that even people with *fermage* would pay tax, not only the owners of land. Legislation regarding building codes and planning standards may also need revision. If codes were adapted to the actual situation in Port-au-Prince it would be possible to formalise more of the construction that is now considered illegal. A study to examine what legal modifications would lead to the most positive changes for poor and marginal people could be a good first step towards an improved legal framework for urban development and land management and administration.

Private sector engagement

There are already a few examples of private companies engaged in urban development projects in Port-au-Prince, in particular in the informal and slum areas. In Cité Soleil for example, there are many private companies that build new schools, parks or other public places. This type of isolated project should be encouraged, as all efforts are needed, but metropolitan Port-au-Prince should also develop a strategy for cooperation with the private sector. The strategy could involve different projects. One example could be that a company or group of companies becomes responsible for keeping a certain street or neighbourhood clean. Another idea used in other cities with good results is that companies are offered to “adopt a light” through paying for a streetlight that the company can use for advertising. In Pétion-Ville, Digicel has recently set up street signs promoting the company’s name. This type of joint advertisement and funding can be also be used for other public spaces, such as park benches, pavements, football grounds. However ethical discussions need to be held when deciding what spheres of the public spaces that should be kept non-commercial.

Dissemination of the municipal budget

Carrefour municipality has recently initiated methods to share the budget with its inhabitants. The budget will be published on a monthly basis and distributed to the residents, to increase transparency and residents involvement in the management of the municipality. This initiative could also in the future lead to the development of participatory budgets, where the residents will have an opportunity to influence how their municipality prioritises spending.

Protection from natural disasters

Port-au-Prince and its inhabitants are exposed to natural disasters such as flooding and landslides, as well as to humanly induced disasters such as fires. There are many ways to mitigate the effects of these frequently occurring disasters, e.g. by constructing retaining walls that can help avoiding flooding for the most vulnerable parts of the coastline, or to establish escape routes and safe places that can be used when a disaster occurs. In the long term, people in dangerous areas, such as on steep hills and along the coastline, need to be relocated to other areas, but this process is costly, long term and complicated. A first step is to physically protect the people and their property and meanwhile ensure that no new development takes place in precarious areas. Early warning systems for flooding, from the rivers and from the sea, could be set up with the municipalities as communication centres that would be part of such a system. Local projects at community ward level to keep drains free from garbage to reduce the risk of flooding can also be initiated.

Regardless of what types of demonstration projects are implemented, the emphasis should be on policy influence, on building stakeholders' capacity and on following the planning principles that are part of the metropolitan strategic framework. Remember that a failed demonstration project could be worse than no project at all, so the projects should be carefully planned.

4.3.3 Capacity building

One of the first capacity building activities is a needs assessment. It identifies the needs in detail and specifies what kind of capacity development would best suit the particular municipality. If the needs assessment is carried out at different times in each municipality, earlier exercises in other municipalities will be used for lessons learnt and good examples.

In the matrix on page 66, a series capacity building activities are suggested. First a few of the most important areas are described more in-depth, such as capacity building to increase the state's accountability, transparency and efficiency.

When authorities and state organs are transparent on their respective roles, mandates and responsibilities, the citizens will know where to turn to demand accountability. The state can be held accountable for its actions only if citizens are clear about the functions of the state.

On the contrary, in a case such as Haiti where it is very difficult to know what the different state bodies' tasks and responsibilities are, it is difficult to hold anyone accountable.

Confusion in organization, overlapping legislation and cumbersome bureaucracy can be used by the state to mislead its citizens. Corruption in the land sector in Haiti is rife, especially in Port-au-Prince, where land values are higher, as is the competition for land. Corruption is more widespread when there is lack of transparency, when there is a monopoly situation, when rules and regulations are complicated and when the public cannot easily control the distribution of the good in question.³³ All of this is true for the land sector in Port-au-Prince.

Ways for municipalities to counteract corruption and low accountability include more openness and better organization and division of roles. Rules and regulations need to be simplified and made understandable to the citizens. Relevant, accurate and updated information on land ownership, distribution of basic services, poverty and other key municipal data should be made available to the public. The people on the other hand need to become aware of their right to information and their right to access to public services as well as their responsibilities towards the society, e.g. paying taxes. It is crucial to have information campaigns directed to the citizens, especially on sensitive and complex issues such as land rights and different options of tenure.

Human capacity development is a continuous process, with ongoing need for improvements in every institution. New situations emerge, external and internal policies change, staff get promoted and get new working tasks, some people quit their jobs and others join the service. To adjust to and make the best of these changes, human capacity development will continue to be a necessity for the municipalities over a very long period. The needs for human capacity development will peak in the beginning of the reinforcement of the municipalities. The capacity building needs assessment should not only cover technical skills but also attitudinal capacity such as gender equality, focus on pro-poor and affordable basic services, and equity in access to information.

The capacity development needs assessment will specify the interventions, but some suggestions for capacity building are given in the following table.

³³ Transparency International & UN-HABITAT (March 2004)

Table 7. Capacity building suggestions by theme and stakeholder

Theme	Stakeholder	Capacity building
Municipal planning	Municipalities	Establish planning departments at municipal levels, set up organizational structure
Anti-corruption	State	Improve access to information for the residents on the due processes for different services, e.g. on how to access land, how to obtain a building permit. Regulatory frameworks on property ownership and leasing need to be reviewed to become coherent and more transparent.
	Municipalities	Bylaws for e.g. fermage and for easier procedures for land acquisition should be established and in parallel system for their enforcement should be set up. Capacity building in law enforcement should take place even if it takes time for changes in legislation to be endorsed.
	Civil society	Legal training to be able to influence the development or revision of the legal framework, and to be able to monitor the implementation of it, at local and national levels
Accountability	State bodies	Transparency in organization of different levels of government and different sectors and clarity on roles and responsibilities. Dissemination to the public of the state structures and roles concerning urban planning and land issues.
	Civil society	Awareness raising on rights and responsibilities. Training of paralegals to ensure people's rights, such as tenure rights.
Transparency	Municipalities	Set up procedures for wide publication and dissemination of municipal funds and budgets. Carry out a transparency survey to see where other improvements need to be made.
	Civil society	Creation of watchdog functions
Access to information	Municipalities	Train staff on public access to information and on how information can actively be shared with the residents.
Management structures and procedures	Municipalities	Assess and if need b revise the management structures and procedures.
Coordination between municipalities	Municipalities	Establishment of a coordination group as described in section 4.3.2 above.
Coordination between municipalities and NGOs and CBOs	Municipalities	Establishment of coordination groups inside each municipality, as described in section 4.3.2 above.
	Civil society organizations	Information and education on the need for cooperation with the municipality in whose constituency they operate. Nominate a focal point within each civil society organization for communication and cooperation with the municipality.
Coordination between municipalities and line ministries	Municipalities	Establishment of a group for cooperation between the eight municipalities, to function as a focal point for communication with the state.
	Ministries	Establishment of the metropolitan agency, as described in section 4.1 above.
Human capacity building – technical skills	Civil servants at municipalities	Strategic urban planning, spatial planning, participatory planning, management, monitoring and evaluation.
	Tax inspectors at municipalities	Enforcement of planning and construction regulations.
Human capacity building – attitudinal skills	Civil servants at municipalities	Capacity building according to the needs, focusing on e.g. land rights, women's rights.
Direct democracy in planning	Municipalities	Create mechanisms for participation in decision-making concerning planning and implementation for the residents in the municipality.
	Civil society	Create community mechanisms for representation in municipal decision-making.
Gender	Municipalities	Training on use of disaggregated data in strategic planning or on women's rights to housing.
Environment	Municipalities	Basic environmental education to raise awareness of the issue, appointment of environment focal points.

The table lists many possible capacity development interventions for institutional strengthening and organization, but only a few for human capacity building. The reason is that human capacity building is more specific and not much can be said before the needs assessment is carried out. For the human capacity building the need should preferably be addressed in a more permanent way, e.g. through a partnership with a private education and training entrepreneur, or on-the-job training via a long-term twinning relationship, such as the one between the municipalities of Port-au-Prince and Montreal. As it is risky to train municipal staff in a country where the emigration of educated people is still very high and the salaries in NGOs or for consultants are much higher, the above can also work as incentives for staff to stay in public service.

Study tours to neighbouring Dominican Republic or other countries in the region are a good method for learning, on an individual and institutional level. Exchanges between municipalities from different countries is another option. One type of exchange is to swap offices. For example two persons with the same post but located in Port-au-Prince and Havana in Cuba would take over each other's work. The exchanges could be for longer or shorter periods of time, but probably a time span of three to six months would be needed to really benefit from the experience and to have enough time to penetrate into the structures and system of another country. This type of capacity building could take place within the framework of a south-south twinning relationship.

Capacity building needs to be carried out continuously for a long time. Sustainability will only be reached if capacity development is planned as a long-term effort, not as a project, especially for the human capacity needs.

4.4 Implementation recommendations

Most previous development plans of Port-au-Prince were never carried out. Lack of funding, lack of initiative, lack of capacity, lack of political support and lack of commitment from civil servants and politicians alike were some of the reasons that were given in the stakeholder workshop that was organized in April 23, 2008. Most of the problems could be solved or at least mitigated with capacity building, clarification of roles and responsibilities and institutional strengthening, so this is where to focus interventions. Another important point is the powerlessness of the municipalities. Many of the municipalities are nevertheless trying to gain more influence with their scarce resources and unclear mandate and there are many examples that can be shared between them.

To avoid repeating the same mistake and end up with yet another urban plan that is not implemented, the process must be transparent and information on it made available, not only for the major stakeholders, but for the inhabitants in the whole metropolitan area. The structures must be clear and easy to access so that the citizens know where to

turn to inform themselves or to influence the process.

Another lesson is that if the planning takes place at a high level, the municipalities will not implement it. They must therefore be at the core of the process, from the start, even though the administrative and political system does not yet give them the authority to formally lead the process.

To carry out activities and policies proposed in the previous section, some short recommendations are given. For the implementation it is also important to put extra effort into developing systems to measure results and avoid risks, and therefore these issues are looked upon as well in this section.

4.4.1 Recommendations for state actors

The proposed activities will mainly be planned and implemented by the municipalities and the state. Civil society is important in many respects and will be part of the process, but will not take on the roles of implementer or coordinator. These roles will instead be the state's responsibility. In an early stage it will, apart from the work by the metropolitan agency, be the line ministries that will carry the brunt of setting policy and regulations, coordination and implementation. Later on, certain tasks will hopefully be transferred incrementally to the municipalities.

Both the metropolitan agency and the work with developing and implementing the citywide strategic framework can also serve as a vehicle for increased local level influence. From today's very low level of responsibility for most of the municipalities, an expansion in the scope of their tasks would imply that more staff is needed. One way of solving this problem for a short time could be seconding staff from the line ministries to the municipalities.

If Haiti's Government chooses to embark on a metropolitan strategic framework for Port-au-Prince, staff must be made available to the already very stretched municipalities. The most obvious way of solving this problem is with salary increases, but this may not be financially possible. As discussed above, other means to make it attractive to work for the municipalities must be examined, such as incentives in form of training and education, study tours, twinning arrangements. It is also important that the capacity building is not only for the planners and politicians, but also for the staff that will implement the metropolitan strategic framework. Other more tacit means, such as an increase in decision-making and more appealing career opportunities, could in the long-term lead to more qualified staff in the municipalities. The salary differences between the NGO sector and government could be brought up in dialogues with donors, as they are partly to blame for the situation.

The potential Cities Alliance programme mentioned in section 1.2.2 will influence the metropolitan strategic framework should it be implemented. The proposal involves the establishment of a metropolitan agency for coordination and policy development, and

the development of a City Development Strategy. For planning purposes, both activities complement the eventual development of a citywide strategic plan, but it would be necessary to coordinate the two interventions as soon as possible.

The cooperation between the municipalities of Port-au-Prince and Montreal will also influence the framework and be influenced by it. The twinning initiative should become a part of the framework, and if possible extend its scope to the other municipalities as well.

The state actors need to take a lead role in coordinating the Cities Alliance and the twinning initiatives, as well as other development programmes, avoiding duplication and ensuring that interventions complement one another.

4.4.2 Benchmarks and indicators

In all interventions a monitoring system is needed to track progress, measure results and apply the lessons learnt to the ongoing process. The basic requirements for any monitoring system are benchmarks (or checkpoints) and indicators. These not only assure the residents and donors that they get value for their tax money or funding, but also, and more importantly, they will be a tool in the implementation of the process.

Benchmarks measure progress at certain reference points in time and indicators identify exactly what will be measured.

First, a baseline study defines the current situation and identifies the changes that should be achieved. At this point it needs to be decided what should be measured, as it would be too extensive to measure everything. As a starting point, the vision, overall objectives and in particular the medium-term objectives could be used as the ultimate benchmarks, as they should be reached in the end. But even the medium-term objectives need to be divided into smaller reference points that can be measured at different points in time.

When the benchmarks have been identified and agreed upon, a baseline will be developed so that the starting point is clear. Information for the baseline will come mostly from existing documents, such as the 2003 development plan, UN reports, government statistics and municipal statistics. Others will have to be found through e.g. interviews or small assessments of certain issues (Republic of Haiti 2003).

For the metropolitan strategic framework, one example of a possible benchmark is level of the cooperation between the municipalities. Indicators would in this case be number of meetings, number of municipalities participating in these meetings, number of consultations between the municipalities, numbers of activities carried out jointly.

Another example of a benchmark could be the planning process in itself. Once it is outlined, there will be a number of activities that should be carried out, and each of these could constitute a reference point for the benchmark. Indicators would then consist of a spatial analysis finalised, media information campaign carried out,

“A monitoring system is needed to track progress, measure results”

stakeholder meeting on legislation held.

The indicators are specified by the means of verification, which for the media campaign above could be; number of people reached by the campaign, number of people in low-income areas involved in the process as a result of the campaign, percentage of the reached population that improved their knowledge in a certain area.

How detailed one chooses to be with the indicators and the means of verification depends on what type of information one wishes to attain for that particular benchmark. There is a risk in setting too detailed indicators, where the cost of collecting and analysing the information overrides the gain in outcome. But setting indicators that are too vague also risks gathering imprecise information cannot be used to monitor the process. The trick is to find the right balance between the two.

Setting actual numbers for the indicators makes it possible to measure if a benchmark has been achieved. Indicators should be ‘SMART’: specific, measurable, achievable, relevant (or result-oriented or realistic in some versions) and time-bound.

4.4.3 Risk assessment and management

There will be risks that are external – that cannot be controlled by the intervention – such as natural disasters and conflicts. Other risks are internal – can be controlled and managed by the intervention – such as the design of the intervention and the management. Some risks fall in between – can only partially be controlled and influenced – such as the political environment with its policies, institutions and political will. Risk assessment looks at all of these.

To decide where the efforts should be put, divide the perceived risks in two groups: low-risk and high-risk. The low-risk group will include highly unlikely risks and/or risks that will not lead to substantial damage to the intervention. The high-risk group will include risks that are more likely and/or will lead to more damage should they occur. The high-risk group will be monitored more closely and more often than the low-risk group.

Below is a short description of some major risks for the strategic framework. A few of them have been selected as examples (marked in bold and red), and possible risk management strategies for these will be discussed. All the chosen risks are high-risk and will need close monitoring.

Corruption

Looking at the statistics from Transparency International (see section 1.1.4) it is clear that corruption is expected to be a problem when developing the metropolitan strategic framework. It is also obvious that the land sector in particular is corruption prone, due to low regulations and high financial value. The administration in general

Table 8. Risk analysis

Type of risk	Example of risks for the metropolitan strategic framework
Environmental	Hurricanes, flooding, land slides, earthquakes
Financial	External economic factors: inflation, interest rates, Haiti's weak economy Internal economic factors: lack of funding, co-financing difficulties, difficulties in getting a loan if it should be necessary, difficulties to increase the municipal revenues
Operational	Poor management, corruption, poor monitoring and evaluation, low capacity, lack of means of communication
Organizational	Weak institutions, unclear roles and responsibilities for implementation, low execution capacity, weak coordination between the stakeholders, weak leadership, frequent changes of staff
Political	Lack of political will and support, political instability, change in government, slow decentralisation process
Regulatory	Lack of functioning legal framework for planning, lack of relevant policies, unclear mandate for the issues, failure to pass new legislation or bylaws
Strategic	Failure in bringing the partners together, lack of support from development partners, low ownership by municipalities
Socio-economic	Fast and uncontrolled urbanisation, unemployment,
Others	Lack of public participation and engagement, lack of support from media

Format adapted from UNDP/GEF (April 2006)

will most likely be affected by corruption. One way to counteract this risk is to improve the performance of public resource management. Working in cooperation with UNDP's governance programme in Haiti, which funds a public sector reform programme, could be useful in combating corruption and increasing accountability. Two practical examples are to set up transparent taxation and auditing systems for the municipalities and to assist the municipalities to publish their budgets, and on a long-term effort to assist them in developing participatory budgets.

Political instability

Some external risks have already been presented above in scenario 1, "back to political instability". Obviously, the implementation of the proposed intervention would experience a setback, possibly closure, if the political situation grows more unstable. If there are more changes of government and new staff in the ministries and municipalities, it will be difficult to keep the political support and also the continuity of the intervention. The proposed mitigation of the possible impact of such a situation is to start small, start with a strategic framework that can adapt to the political situation and also allow for scaling down if need be.

Slow decentralisation

The decentralisation process in Haiti is slow, which will negatively influence the proposed metropolitan strategic framework. On the other hand, the framework will in itself support the decentralisation process, as it will endeavour to incrementally increase the responsibilities of the municipalities. While working to influence the decentralisation process, the framework will have to accept the limitations that follow from the centralised environment and adapt

its activities to the reality. Where possible the municipalities will take the lead, but they will need the support from the ministries for a long time. It is important that the ministries are involved from the start, but also that it is made clear that their importance will decrease with time. It could be a difficult balance to engage the ministries and on the same time ask them to step back for the municipalities. In order not to consolidate a situation where the ministries are in the driving seat, it could be useful to have the decentralisation process as one of the benchmarks, so that it can be checked at certain points in time if the municipalities could take over some of the responsibilities for the intervention from the ministries.

Ownership by municipalities

The municipalities are overstretched, with so many emergencies to deal with on a daily basis that they do not have time for planning or coordination. The situation overrides the need to take on more responsibilities that will take time and resources away from urgent daily work. Apart from capacity building to increase efficiency at the municipalities (was discussed in section 4.3.3) there are other measures that could be taken. Secondment of staff from the ministries to the municipalities is one solution, which could be difficult to implement, not least due to salary differences. More realistic is probably to look for external funding for additional municipal staff to coordinate and implement the metropolitan strategic framework. Another way forward is to lobby for a clarification and possibly upgrading of the municipalities' role. Development partners should be involved in the lobbying, as they normally have access to powerful politicians.

A risk management system should be set up in conjunction with the monitoring system. Effective feedback is critical for both of these arrangements to function. The metropolitan framework should use the experiences, successes and failures to redesign and improve the process.

5. Conclusions

Considering the weak urban planning and management capacity of metropolitan Port-au-Prince, there are nonetheless assets of institutions, land, property, business opportunities, networks and human resources, which could be put to better use. Coordination is the key.

The overwhelming institutional confusion of the city's administration, closely linked to the lack of coordination, needs to be dealt with. This study is a guide to how such a change can be initiated. The establishment of a metropolitan agency is a key requirement in order to initiate a more holistic and integrated strategic planning of the city.

Metropolitan Port-au-Prince should start small with a process that can be attained. The city and all stakeholders should agree on a realistic vision that can be reached. The metropolitan strategic framework must be tailored to the needs and capability of the stakeholders in Port-au-Prince.

Most of the funding can come from metropolitan Port-au-Prince, including the key city stakeholders including the private sector, and not from outside development partners or donors. The intervention thus more focused and sustainable, targeting the most urgent needs of the city. Development partners should not be left outside the process, but be seen as catalysts. They should be used for technical expertise, sharing experiences and assisting in putting pressure on the politicians for support and for fast-tracking the decentralisation process.

The many steps described in this situational analysis may turn out to be too complicated or demand too many resources. In that case, scaling down certain elements in the metropolitan strategic framework can be done. One option is to first focus on the metropolitan agency, and let it take the time required to build such strength that the other activities can begin.

The municipalities are today not in a position to make contributions to the city planning and management. In addition to capacity building and institutional strengthening of the municipalities, their responsibilities need to be gradually increased so that they will be able to better serve their residents. Many activities implemented at central level could, if properly coordinated, be more efficiently managed at local level.

It is not only coordination between authorities at different levels that is needed. This study makes clear that there are huge gaps between the state and the civil society that will have to be bridged. The residents do not feel included in the state and they do not have the opportunity to influence decisions concerning their daily lives. The state on the other hand feels that the residents, and in particular the NGOs and CBOs, are pushing their own agenda, without any will

to coordinate with the authorities. Provisions should be made for residents' representatives to participate in and contribute to planning and delivery of basic services. The metropolitan agency should be designed to that end.

For metropolitan Port-au-Prince to develop positively, the major stakeholders will have to agree on a way forward and commit themselves to work in that direction. It will not be easy to merge the many different opinions on how the metropolitan area should develop and views on who will be in charge of different sections. The stakeholders will have to find the middle ground to support the development of a strategic metropolitan framework. Communication, coordination and participation do not happen by chance but are achieved through hard work. When a shared vision of the future is agreed upon it will be easier to commit to that work.

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- World Bank’s Governance Indicators, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_country.asp

Annex 1. Methodology

The information gathering for the Situation Analysis has been carried out using literature review, semi-structured interviews, field visits and a stakeholder workshop. For the analysis part, four analysis methods have been used: stakeholder analysis, scenario building, PESTLE and SWOT (see further down for the latter two). The draft guidelines for citywide strategic planning have been developed in parallel with the Situation Analysis and the two processes have informed one another.

The Situation Analysis is more of an overview of the current urban situation in metropolitan Port-au-Prince than a precise measurement of the same. Therefore, the report will not primarily present quantitative data that can be used for further research, but still give at hand systematic and consistent information, together with trends and scenarios, which have been used in the analysis. The methods used for finding and compiling data served the purpose of collecting reliable information, as it in doubtful cases was triangulated – checked with several interviewees or other sources.

The following paragraphs describe briefly the main steps in this study (not necessarily in the order they were carried out, as many of the steps overlap each other).

Literature review

To collect basic information and to prepare for the visit to Haiti, the consultant carried out a quite extensive desk study. Especially for the production of the guidelines, which are generic, it was important to gather experience from different parts of the world.

Stakeholder identification

Before the interviews and meetings started, the stakeholders needed to be identified. Although some of the organisations and individuals involved in spatial planning and land issues in metropolitan Port-au-Prince had already been pinpointed prior to the start of the consultancy, the main part of the identification was carried out in Haiti with the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation, MPCE.

Semi-structured interviews

In semi-structured interviews the questions may be altered during the interviews according to the responses of the interviewees, but will still follow the main thread of questions. The advantage of using semi-structured interviews was that plenty information could be collected rapidly and different points of views could be compared and analysed. Both individual and group interviews were held, depending on the situation.

Rapid Urban Sector Profiling for Sustainability, RUSPS

UN-Habitat's method Rapid Urban Sector Profiling for Sustainability (RUSPS) served as inspiration as this study implied a rapid assessment of a city and country. In addition, many of the questions for the semi-structured interviews were taken from the RUSPS's questionnaire. During the time of the study there was no UN-Habitat support in place in Haiti, which made it difficult to start the rather extensive participatory process of RUSPS. UN-Habitat plans to carry out a RUSPS in Haiti during 2008 and this Situation Analysis will feed into that process.

Field visits

In order to complement the views of professionals and of the literature review, several field visits to different parts of Port-au-Prince were made. The visits involved both observation and discussions with NGOs and inhabitants. Visits were made to informal settlements as well as to peri-urban and planned settlements, in order to get a more comprehensive understanding of the different urban livelihoods in Port-au-Prince.

Stakeholder workshop

A stakeholder workshop was organised in Port-au-Prince to discuss the draft Situation Analysis, discuss the possibilities and obstacles for successful planning and agree on a way forward. Representatives from national government, most mayors in metropolitan Port-au-Prince, civil society organisations, urban planners and architects participated.

Analyses

The consultant has used three recognised for the analyses: stakeholder and power relationship analysis, PESTLE (Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal and Environment factors) and SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats). The stakeholder analysis is made to pinpoint the relevant actors, examine their respective roles and come to conclusions on their potential roles and responsibilities for planning in metropolitan Port-au-Prince.

While the PESTLE analysis was used to achieve a more thorough understanding of the situation in Port-au-Prince and under what circumstances citywide strategic planning could be employed in metropolitan Port-au-Prince (see section 3.2 for scenarios), the SWOT analysis was used to specify what activities would be most realistic and opportune to carry out (see section 3.3 for the SWOT matrix). The PESTLE analysis, being wider in scope, preceded the SWOT analysis.

The PESTLE analysis consists of six factors that cover the whole range of perspectives for an institution, a situation, a place or another object of analysis, in this case metropolitan Port-au-Prince. The political factors include internal politics, conflicts, policies, state and non-state actors and their abilities to influence outcomes. The economic factors describe the current economic situation as well as looking at economic trends and how the economy is influenced by external factors. The social factors look at livelihoods, demographics, unemployment, culture and religion. The legal factors address institutional and regulatory arrangements, mandates and their operations. Finally, the environment factor considers the environmental situation, including the effects of climate change.

SWOT is a tool that is well suited for examining an intervention and its environment. In this case it is used to assess the potential of citywide strategic planning with a land perspective.

Annex 2. List of stakeholders

- **Public utilities:** CAMEP, SNEP, EDH, SMCRS
- **Land related institutions:** Government institutions such as ONACA, CNIGS, DGI, EPPLS
- **National NGOs:** national and local NGOs and CBOs (including religious groups) working on urban issues, as well as universities
- **International NGOs:** international NGOs working on urban issues
- **Residents:** people living in the area, including low-income groups and vulnerable groups
- **Relevant ministries:** MPCE, MTPTC, MICT
- **Other ministries:** ME, MEF
- **Municipalities:** the eight metropolitan municipalities
- **Private sector:** businesses, professional associations
- **Relevant donors:** Cities Alliance, IDB, UN-HABITAT, possibly World Bank and MINUSTAH
- **Other** donors active in Haiti but not on urban issues

Major Haitian stakeholders

Beneath follows brief presentations of the major Haitian stakeholders effective in metropolitan Port-au-Prince, focusing on urban planning, land and property. The list is in alphabetical order and not in order of importance.

Centrale Autonome Métropolitaine d'Eau Potable, CAMEP

CAMEP is the public utility responsible for water provision in the municipalities of Port-au-Prince, Carrefour, Delmas and Pétion-Ville. All piped water in these municipalities is distributed by CAMEP, which has around 20 percent of the total water market in the area. A decentralisation and merger of CAMEP and SNEP has been discussed. One of CAMEP's difficulties in increasing its range of delivery is according to the agency itself the lack of urban planning.

Centre National de l'Information Géospatiale, CNIGS

With a mandate to produce and disseminate geographical information, CNIGS was established in 2006 through a fusion of two previous agencies dealing with GIS and cartography. CNIGS is organisationally placed under the MPCE (see further down), but provides geographical services for almost all ministries and state agencies. The European Union has for more than a decade supported CNIGS to build capacity in spatial imagery and to create satellite maps for the whole of Haiti. These maps can serve as a good foundation for creating a cadastre.

Direction Générale des Impôts, DGI

The DGI manages the state-owned properties and is responsible for property tax collection. The property registers are not computerised and the manual registers are in many cases not updated. The interface with

the municipalities is not clear. E.g., the DGI is supposed to collect the property tax and deliver to the municipalities, but when this fails, many municipalities take over the tax collection.

Électricité d’Haïti, EDH

The Électricité d’Haïti is a semi-autonomous agency in charge of providing Haiti’s citizens with electricity. In Port-au-Prince, where the electricity coverage is amongst the best in the country, only a small portion of the inhabitants are serviced by EDH, the rest get their electricity from other, often illegal, sources.

Entreprise pour la Promotion et la Production de Logement Sociaux, EPPLS

Responsible for social housing, the EPPLS has been fairly inactive recently due to lack of funds. The conventional housing production that EPPLS focuses on will never reach the scale necessary to deal with Port-au-Prince’s or Haiti’s housing deficit.

Local and national NGOs

There are few local NGOs working in Port-au-Prince and even less community-based organisations, CBOs. National NGOs are also rare compared with international ones, and often the national NGOs are supported and influenced by international donors or charities. There is no coordination mechanism for the NGOs in metropolitan Port-au-Prince. In some exceptional cases coordination groups have been established, on a geographical basis, and normally when the NGOs are collaborating with each other. One of the most active NGOs for urban issues in Port-au-Prince is FOKAL. FOKAL is also interesting as it stands for an integrated view of urban development and has as objective to influence policy on building standards with a pilot project in Martissant. Another important actor is the Centre pour la Libre Entreprise et Démocratie, CLED; an NGO working on rural and urban property rights and businesses inspired by the work of the Instituto Libertad y Democracia, ILD, in Peru. With funding from the Inter-American Development Bank, CLED will in short embark on a programme to formalise properties in Haiti, starting in Port-au-Prince.

Ministère des Travaux Public , Transport et Communication, MTPTC

The MTPTC has a wide mandate including water and sanitation, waste management, transport, communication and electricity. Its mandate also includes planning for metropolitan Port-au-Prince, but the interest and capacity for carrying out this mandate has been low.

Ministère de la Planification et Coopération Externe, MPCE

Apart from being responsible for the external cooperation and donor contacts, the MPCE has a mandate on regional planning and land use planning. This mandate does not extend to urban or metropolitan planning, but there is interest and knowledge of urban planning within the Ministry, however the concept of Master Plans is still what is referred to when discussing planning. In order to renew the attitudes towards planning, it has been suggested that a unit for informal settlements should be created as a first step towards more integrative planning. MPCE has recently proposed a new law, which is not yet endorsed, involving a decentralisation of urban planning to the level of *arrondissements*.

In the case of Port-au-Prince, there is at the moment no arrondissement, but if one would created it would most probably incorporate the eight municipalities of metropolitan Port-au-Prince.

Ministère de l'Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales, MICT

Responsible for the decentralisation process and the administrative division into collectivités territoriales, the MICT is also in charge of the municipalities, which report to MICT.

Municipalities of metropolitan Port-au-Prince

The eight municipalities of metropolitan Port-au-prince are: Carrefour, Cité Soleil, Croix-des-Bouquets, Delmas, Kenscoff, Pétion-Ville, Port-au-Prince and Tabarre. They are very different in number of residents, size and level of income for the residents. An informal cooperation group between the Mayors exist and focuses on lobbying against the government for increased decentralisation and devolution, and for transfer of staff from central to local level.

Office National du Cadastre, ONACA

Despite this agency's name, a national cadastre for Haiti does not exist. ONACA is responsible for developing and maintaining cadastres, but so far very few exist and they are not compatible with one another, so it would be difficult to transfer them into a national cadastre. The agency is very weak in capacity and resources, human as well as financial.

Public notaries

The public notaries in Haiti are responsible for verifying the process of transfer of ownership. They inspect the surveying that has been done, control the previous chain of title owners and attest that the individuals exchanging title and resources are the persons they claim they are. The notaries also attest that the whole process of transfer is legal. The verification can take a long time, as the notaries have to look up titles for the last 20 years in the register at DGI.

Service Métropolitain de Collecte des Résidus Solides, SMCRS

SMCRS does not have the capacity to keep the metropolitan area clean and has therefore focused on keeping the main roads accessible and passable. The agency only collects around 60-70 percent of all garbage produced in Port-au-Prince (Republic of Haiti 2003). The IDB started a trash collection programme in 2006 with SMCRS, also aiming at job creation through the use of manual garbage collection and sorting.

Service National d'Eau Potable, SNEP

This state-owned enterprise is responsible for water supply in rural areas and secondary cities, which also includes Cité Soleil, Croix-des-Bouquets, Kenscoff and Tabarre in metropolitan Port-au-Prince. A union between SNEP and CAMEP is being discussed.

Major donors, multilaterals and international NGOs

The major donors, multilaterals and international NGOs when it comes to urban development and land issues are presented beneath. As for the Haitian stakeholders, the list is in alphabetical order and not in order of importance.

Canadian International Development Agency, CIDA

Canada is one of the largest donors in Haiti, contributing with around 100 USD annually focusing on good governance, the rule of law and access to basic infrastructure. CIDA has supported the implementation of the so-called Interim Cooperation Framework, and in ensuring the continuity between the transitional and elected government. Through this programme CIDA also financed consultancy assistance for MPCE, which has been vital for building the Ministry's capacity.

Cities Alliance, CA

Cities Alliance, CA, is a global coalition of cities and urban stakeholders working for implementation and scaling up of urban poverty reduction approaches. The Haitian Government, represented by MPCE and MICT, submitted a proposal for slum upgrading and urban planning and development to CA in 2007. CA is presently awaiting the revised proposal from the Government to make a final decision on funding.

Delegation of the European Union, EU

During the last years of crises, the EU only implemented small, short-term projects of pilot character in the slum areas. As the political situation has improved, the EU is ready to engage on a more long-term basis again, and will fund the state and civil society with around 100 USD annually. The EU's urban projects are focused on secondary cities, such as Gonaïve and Cap-Haitien. The EU considers the chances of success are bigger in smaller cities, due to issues such as smaller scale, simpler technology and less investment. The EU furthermore regards the institutional weaknesses of the urban institutions, authorities and organisations in Port-au-Prince as a major obstacle to success. In addition, the geographical flat features of both Gonaïve and Cap-Haitien make it easier for infrastructure delivery than for the hilly Port-au-Prince. EU supports one urban project in Port-au-Prince: the upgrading of the botanical garden in Martissant.

Inter-American Development Bank, IDB

IDB has several projects in Haiti on urban development, with different focus, such as micro businesses in the slums and improving the electricity system. A big slum rehabilitation programme for in total 50 million USD, co-financed by CIDA, started in 2005 with the aim to upgrade Cité Soleil through neighbouring upgrading and capacity building. The programme is still ongoing. Also related to urban development are the capacity building programmes that IDB is carrying out, such as for MTPTC and EDH. A feasibility study for another landfill for the metropolitan area is underway, and IDB is also considering supporting a programme for land titling in Port-au-Prince to be implemented by CLED. The IDB financed the plan for metropolitan Port-au-Prince that was developed in 2003 but never was implemented, and therefore the IDB could be interested in funding strategic metropolitan planning elements that builds on the plan from 2003, e.g. a metropolitan agency.

International NGOs

There are numerous international NGOs working in Haiti, and many of them have urban interventions, almost all at a very small scale and not policy-related. GRET is focused on urban and peri-urban areas and has several projects in Port-au-Prince, ranging from infrastructure improvements to maternal health. GRET works with what they call urban social engineering and is cooperating

closely with public utilities and local authorities. Viva Rio is an NGO that has successfully worked with violent neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro and now brings its experience to Port-au-Prince, in particular to Bel Air where Viva Rio has started a project on water provision. The Christian NGO Habitat for Humanity is engaged in housing constructions in Haiti but has so far not worked in the metropolitan area.

Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation de Haïti, MINUSTAH

In November 2007 the MINUSTAH had just over 7,000 UN military staff and almost 2,000 UN police staff in the country. In addition, 1,500 international and local civilian staff and 200 voluntaries are part of the Mission. MINUSTAH has been in Haiti since 2004, after Aristide was forced out of the country. Apart from securing the peace in the country, MINUSTAH also supports capacity building of different state organs, assists in elections, works with child protection and non-violence. The Mission is engaged with NGOs in Port-au-Prince working on safety and security, but in small scale. The yearly budget is around 500 million USD, but the majority goes to the peacekeeping mission and only small funds remain for development and humanitarian work.

United Nations Resident Coordinator's Office

The UN's Resident Coordinator's Office is responsible for coordination within the UN system and for those donors, banks or major NGOs who would like to take part. The so-called UNDAF is developed as the major framework, with objectives and indicators in line with the PRSP. The present UNDAF is under development, and it follows the PRSP closely. Therefore, urban development is also represented.

United Nations Development Programme, UNDP

UNDP is focusing on good governance in Haiti, implementing amongst others a project on modernisation and decentralisation of the state, including management of the collectivités territoriales and fighting against corruption. It is presently investigating a support to MICT and MPCE on the collectivités territoriales and would want to cooperate with UN-Habitat on this issue. UNDP funds several projects in Cité Soleil on education, job creation and urban environment. UNDP is fundamental for the UN coordination and will hopefully take on a stronger role regarding donor coordination in the future.

The Global Land Tool Network

The main objective of the Global Land Tool Network (GLTN) is to contribute to poverty alleviation and the Millennium Development Goals through land reform, improved land management and security of tenure.

The Network has developed a global land partnership. Its members include international civil society organizations, international finance institutions, international research and training institutions, donors and professional bodies. It aims to take a more holistic approach to land issues and improve global land coordination in various ways. These include the establishment of a continuum of land rights, rather than a narrow focus on individual land titling, the improvement and development of pro-poor land management, as well as land tenure tools. The new approach also entails unblocking existing initiatives, helping strengthen existing land networks, assisting in the development of affordable gendered land tools useful to poverty-stricken communities, and spreading knowledge on how to implement security of tenure.

The GLTN partners, in their quest to attain the goals of poverty alleviation, better land management and security of tenure through land reform, have identified and agreed on 18 key land tools to deal with poverty and land issues at the country level across all regions. The Network partners argue that the existing lack of these tools, as well as land governance problems, are the main cause of failed implementation at scale of land policies world wide.

The GLTN is a demand driven network where many individuals and groups have come together to address this global problem. For further information, and registration, visit the GLTN web site at www.glttn.net.

Acknowledgements

Åsa Forsman (principal author of the report) would like to express gratitude to the Haitian *Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe*, MPCE, in Haiti, who provided office space and assisted in contacting relevant persons and organizations. I also extend deep gratitude to Leslie Voltaire at MCPE, who provided essential background to the challenges in Port-au-Prince. Sincere thanks to all staff at the MPCE's consultants' office. In particular I would like to mention Gilbert Bazabas, who provided great assistance. Others who were helpful in the process include Paul Emile Simon, Robert Denizé and Dominique Mathon, Kersaint Yves, Margaret Mathurin (GRAPH), Pierre-Antoine Archange (UNDP), Michele Oriol, Lucie Couet (FOKAL).

I would like to thank the Mayors of the Communes in Port-au-Prince for devoting time to meet me and attending the workshop. The determination among them to create a more sustainable and livable Port-au-Prince bodes well for the future of the city. From UN-HABITAT, I thank Clarissa Augustinus, Remy Sietchiping and Filiep Decorte who all gave valuable advice. Finally, I thank all Ministries, Communes, NGOs and private individuals whom I met with in Haiti and who freely shared their knowledge and experience.

About this publication

This situational analysis of metropolitan Port-au-Prince gives in-depth background to the city's condition in terms of urban development and planning. The report maps a way forward for future planning of the metropolitan area. It argues that the main stakeholder for any urban development intervention should be the state, and more precisely the municipalities. The municipalities in Port-au-Prince need support in planning and delivering basic services.

The challenges and opportunities for a decent urban livelihood in Port-au-Prince have been analysed, and are followed by recommendations on the most effective type of spatial planning and/or land related interventions. The situational analysis of metropolitan Port-au-Prince focuses on citywide planning with an urban land perspective. The term "citywide" embraces the whole metropolitan region. The situational analysis also covers the wider aspects of housing, urban infrastructure and the socio-economic situation.

The situational analysis provides major stakeholders with the necessary background information and hands-on recommendations to initiate a citywide planning process in metropolitan Port-au-Prince.

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