

# Pakistan floods response 2010-12



## Evaluation

**For Christian Aid and its partners**

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# Acknowledgements

Making an evaluation happen takes a great deal of preparation work from the agencies involved, involving time, meetings, information gathering, site visits, logistics and administration. To mention any names in particular would inevitably risk missing some out. Suffice to say therefore a heartfelt thank you to the communities met with, various government authorities and staff at Christian Aid, CWS-P/A, DKH, NCA, NRSP, PVDP, SSD and NRSP involved in this evaluation, for their openness, willingness to answer our questions and their patience regarding the evaluators' learning curves.

The evaluators were Nicola Morgan, Shagufta Naz and David Sanderson (team leader). Additional support in London was provided by Alex Barrett.

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*Photo cover: CWS-P/A housing at Jumo Adam Mallah village, Thatta*

## Acronyms

ACT	Action by Churches Together
BHU	Basic Health Unit
CA	Christian Aid
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CBHA	Confederation of British Humanitarian Agencies
CTTCs	Construction Trade Training Centres
CWS-P/A	Church World Service-Pakistan/Afghanistan
DKH	Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
FGD	Focus group discussion
GoP	Government of Pakistan
HRCP	Human Rights Council of Pakistan
ICHC	Information and complaints handling centre
IP	International partner
KAP	Knowledge and practice
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LHWs	Lady Health Workers
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
NFI	Non-food items
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
OCHA	Office for the Co ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
MH	Muslim Hands
NDMA	National Disaster Management Authority
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NRSP	National Rural Support Program
PHF	Pakistan Humanitarian Forum
PPHI	People's Primary Healthcare Initiative
PVDP	Pakistan Village Development Program
Q&A	Quality and accountability
SSD	Society for Sustainable Development
TA	Technical assistance
ToR	Terms of Reference
VWC	Village Water Committee
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Health

## Summary

The floods that struck Pakistan in 2010, and which reoccurred in 2011 and 2012 on a lesser scale, were the worst in over 100 years, affected around 20 million people, killed nearly 2000 and destroyed livestock and infrastructure.

In response Christian Aid mobilised £5.6 million which it used to fund partners directly and/or via the ACT Alliance. The partners were CWS-P/A, Muslim Hands, DKH and NCA. Partners in several instances sub-contracted local partners to carry out work, including PVDP, HRCP, SEEDS Asia, NRSP and SSD. CA funded works<sup>1</sup> included relief, rebuilding houses, work in quality and accountability, WASH and livelihoods activities (distribution of livestock and skills training). The CA funding period was from August 2010 and is due to end March 2014.

Overall there have been many successes in the interventions, on a number of levels; however in a smaller but significant number there have also been some failures. Positive outcomes include the housing interventions where across the board good quality houses have been built. Importantly, and successfully, the response avoided building temporary shelters, but chose instead to invest in lasting assets, which have improved the lives of villages who benefited. Different designs between partners have been successful, with evidence of high levels of community engagement in design changes.

Cash for work programmes have been successful, though in one instance a question remains whether cash for work should be used to pay community members to work on their own houses, rather than that being community contribution (as other partners did).

WASH activities were to a very high standard: infrastructure (latrines and water systems) were well built and were being used and maintained, and remote villages were assisted, notably by PVDP working with NCA. Such activities had a positive impact on women in particular. Water committees mostly demonstrated ownership, however in at least one instance this needs to be improved to ensure the committee clears blocked drains which pose a malaria risk.

Health centres refurbishment and management by CWS-P/A has been to a very high standard, with a significant achievement being the hand over of BHUs to the GoP's PPHI programme – this is in contrast to responses after the 2005 earthquake where BHUs shut when funding ended.

Quality and accountability activities were encouraging. Community focus groups were positive about their usefulness, though enacting useful mechanisms in illiterate communities, and ensuring women complain, remains a challenge.

DRR information dissemination and community training was successful across in all communities visited, with FGDs demonstrating knowledge for instance on handwashing. A highlight was the MKRC operated by SEEDS Asia via CWS-P/A, which provided a high profile and fun way to communicate knowledge, which was demonstrably remembered by communities visited.

Livelihood responses were more varied: goat and poultry distribution by DKH working with Sungi had an unacceptably high level of goat mortality. Issues were also raised in women's FGDs that what the project supplied did not match community needs. Also, skills training provided to women was reported in FGDs to be sub-standard.

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<sup>1</sup> All these agencies, and their partners, were also implementing activities for other donors and partners

In terms of efficiency, inevitably the best interventions occurred when agencies built on their existing expertise and implemented sound approaches that applied good management with a strong interaction with partners. In most agencies this was the case, many of whom had learnt lessons from the earthquake response. Monitoring outputs and outcomes (eg impact of training given) rather than only measuring inputs (eg number of trainings held) needs however to be improved.

The working relationships between implementing partners at all levels appear to have worked very well. Partners in all cases chose good and expert partners to implement projects. The partnering model comes at a cost however: funds channelled via several agencies/organisations adds up the overhead costs. All partners valued CA's active involvement very highly, and especially the technical assistance provided in housing.

### **Lessons for the next disaster**

**Partners** were asked what they would do differently next time, based on their experiences in this response:

- Focus on the partner's priority area. For example NCA's strategic focus (since 2011) to focus solely on WASH
- Improve co ordination, especially concerning GoP permissions to access areas. While this was relatively straightforward in 2010, by 2011 permissions were reported to be much harder to obtain
- Work harder at assessment. One partner reported they not undertaken proper assessments
- Get the right intervention – this is tied to the last point. One initiative at least was criticised for not matching response with need well enough
- Hire competent staff – one agency reported that, having learnt from the 2005 earthquake response, they had improved HR substantially
- Choosing the right partner. This has worked well in almost all cases in this response

**A community focus group** of women in Rajanpur was asked for their views on lessons for the next disaster – most lessons focused on DRR:

- The dire need of (this) area is drinking and irrigation water. DRR should focus on this
- Any agriculture or livestock related activities are based on the sustainable supply of inputs which is scarcely available due to the water shortages
- Apart from protection from flash flood the community also recommended support in the storage of flood water. For example those who could afford to build a small pool for water storage were at a greater advantage to those who only had seasonal water rights
- Retention walls, raised river beds, roads, irrigation and drinking water facilities would be helpful
- The selection of beneficiaries should not be limited to the 'poorest of the poor'
- Prior experience, commitment and local institutional building will contribute to the success of a project.



# Recommendations

The following recommendations were discussed and agreed at a meeting on the last day of the evaluation in Islamabad of representatives from CWS-P/A, DKH, MH and NCA. Beneath each recommendation the following is provided: clarity to whom the recommendations aimed at; page reference where the recommendation is further discussed; and what the evaluation team recommends to address the issue.

## Efficiency, impact and effectiveness

1. Ensure village structures such as WASH committees and VHCs fully 'own' activities and proactively fulfil their obligations

*Aimed at all operational partners and sub-partners (and in particular DKH/SSD WASH), with monitoring by Christian Aid; illustrated by the example on page 13; addressed for example through VHC training and awareness raising on VHC good practice to proactively identify and address health-related issues in communities*

2. Monitor the 'so what?' of project activities, eg the results of trainings (outputs and outcomes) and not just numbers that attended (inputs). KAP surveys, eg those used by CWS-P/A and DKH/SSD may help in this

*Aimed at all partners, sub-partners and CA, and linked to M&E, discussed on page 16; addressed through improved monitoring practices, perhaps with training provided to M&E teams, with oversight provided by partner senior management and CA*

3. Agencies should revisit all their projects some time later to see what the outcomes of their work really are

*Aimed at all partners, and discussed in the final partner group meeting; agencies need to see the relevance and importance of learning from impact, which can only come after several years. Even if project funds are not available for such initiatives (although this does not have to be at high cost), small amounts should be found from unrestricted funds. Also alliances could be made with research institutions to undertake longitudinal studies*

4. Undertake recovery interventions only if you have the right skills and knowledge, eg in livestock management; if not provide short term relief only to avoid wasted investments

*Aimed at all partners, with a reference on page 16 and an example on page 19. This needs to be a policy decision by partners, with support in good strategic decisions made by partners supported by CA*

## Quality and relevance

5. Good assessments must always be carried out, with interventions that reflect genuine need and community capacity

*For all partners, with an example concerning livestock provided on page 19. Action requires constant attention to good practice and an understanding at the highest level that this is a crucial activity, with skilled staff leading assessments*

6. In recovery, always continue to prioritise long term solutions over short term recovery, eg WASH, housing

*For all partners, and illustrated throughout this report by the decision to permanent housing. Action is to continue good practice, learning from this disaster, and to instil this into policy, both in partners and within CA*

7. For housing, continue good practice of sharing designs between communities and partners; for more community ownership, build models first for discussion and design revision

*For all partners and CA engaged in building houses, and illustrated by the example on page 15. Action is to follow the recommendation*

### **Downward accountability**

8. Continue and improve Q&A mechanisms and consider literacy rates and ensure voices of women are heard

*For all partners and sub-partners undertaking Q&A mechanisms, and referred to on page 21 and elsewhere. Some actions on this are being experimented with, for example the use of phones, for which lessons can be learnt and applied for the next disaster. Field monitors might also be considered*

9. Consider whether conditions should be attached to beneficiaries' receipt of goods, eg whether permitted to sell livestock

*For all partners and CA. This is a debateable point, discussed with partners during the evaluation, and so action would be to monitor and review emerging evidence from practice and research on what works best for future disaster response*

10. Sensitise people on what 'complaining' is - people might not know what it means

*For all partners and sub-partners undertaking complaints mechanisms, and referred to with an example on page 19. Action is as described, to take place at the inception and throughout such a programme*

### **Partnership**

11. CA continues its close working relationship in offering technical expertise to partners, eg in housing.

*For CA and referred to on page 24 and elsewhere. Action is as described*

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## Study approach

The approach adopted appreciative enquiry as its overarching approach, ie to 'allow the factors that underpin best performance to be explored and built upon'<sup>2</sup>. Appreciative enquiry fosters mutual learning from successes as well as challenges in programme implementation. The two weeks of field work was largely qualitative, involving community FGDs and interviews with key informants. Findings where possible were triangulated, and the team was careful to be aware of the degree of accuracy based on the information they were able to gather, ie not to make generalisations, unless justified by enough evidence. Activities included:

- Desk top review of documentation, including CA and partner proposals, progress and final reports. This included one well researched external evaluation of DKH/Sungi's livelihoods programme in Rajanpur. Other evaluations included that carried out by ACT and previous evaluations from the earthquake to determine 'lessons learnt' (as required by the ToR)
- Two days of meetings at CA headquarters in London, comprising one on one interviews with eight key staff involved in the response. An additional interview was held with a member of staff from Muslim Hands. A structured questionnaire was used based on the ToR wherein ToR questions were turned into statements for interviewees to respond to. The questionnaire can be found in the appendices
- Field visits to beneficiary villages. These were selected by CA and partners and confirmed with the evaluation team. Primary reasons for selection concerned accessibility, both physically (some locations were remote) and security-wise (ie where it was safe to go). The team visited at least one project of all partners. Appendix one lists participant numbers (by women and men) in respective meetings
- In communities the consultants usually met separate male and female FGDs
- Interviews with key staff of partners
- Meetings with relevant external key informants, including PPHI and PHF. Additional meetings eg with OCHA were attempted but were unsuccessful.

Before completing the field visit, the evaluators presented their findings in two meetings: to CWS-P/A at a meeting in Karachi, and the following day to all partners at the offices of MH. At that meeting findings and recommendations were presented and discussed. Final recommendations were negotiated and agreed by all those present.

### Limitations

This was a large and complex response, and the evaluators are only too aware of the risks of focusing on isolated actions. A key limitation was security, which for example prevented the entire team from visiting Rajanpur (one team member went).

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<sup>2</sup> Newton B and Hartley V (2005) *Appreciative Enquiry: A practical guide*. Institute for Employment Studies. Page 1

# CA and its partners' response to the floods

CA's net spending on the floods was £5.6 million. Project partners and activities are summarised below<sup>3</sup>:

PARTNER	DESCRIPTION	GRANT (GBP)	BENEFICIARIES
CWS-P/A	Food Packages & some nfi items(CBHA1) & NFI Packages (SG) - DI Khan & Swat - August 2010	150000	1098 HHs (10,000 individuals)
CWS-P/A			
CWS-P/A	NFI & Health - Khaipur & Sukkur - 23 Aug-23 Oct 2010	271504	5000 HHs total (56,000 individuals) (4000 NFI packs, and health care for 6329)
CWS-P/A			
NCA	Food and NFI and WASH	4000	Food & NFI - KPK province 558 HHs (3906 individuals)
DKH	Relief – agric inputs	75000	Agricultural inputs - started end-Sep 1500 HHs (12,000 individuals)
CWS-P/A	DEC Ph1 = 3,000 HHs food packages (2 months), 2700 livelihoods, 9 Q&A trainings - Aug10 to Jan11	71055	Funds for CWS-P/A ACT Appeal PAK102
CWS-P/A	DEC Ph1 = 3,000 HHs food packages (2 months), 2700 livelihoods, 9 Q&A trainings - Aug10 to Jan11	712834	
			Remainder of DEC Phase 1 funds (2 transfers)
DKH	10 months early recovery - temp shelter, hygiene kits & awareness raising, latrines, construction & household materials thru CFW, CFW debris-clearing, seeds & fertiliser provision	103092	Contribution to ACT appeal - KPK Province
CWS-P/A	Quality & Accountability - training, mainstreaming & capacity building Nov10 - Nov12	100000	CWS-P/A staff and teams, CBOs, and flood affected communities
Muslim Hands	Shelter and tube well provision, Thatta District, Sindh - Jan to April 2011	63646	63 families to receive houses including latrines; 10 tube wells in villages - total beneficiaries 1250
CWS-P/A	DEC Ph2 - 18 months - provision of health services and disaster risk reduction	1108564	105,000 individuals to receive curative & preventative healthcare thru 3 SHUs in Swat; and 15 villages to receive DRR capacity building thru MKRC etc in Thatta
Muslim Hands	Shelter and livestock - part DEC Ph2 funds and part CA - Sep11 to Feb 12	199224	100 permanent homes and 163 families to receive livestock, Thatta District, Sindh
DKH	Livelihoods for 2500 HHs - CA Appeal funds - 15 months project Sep11 to Nov12	571420	1000 families livestock, 1000 families poultry packages, 500 women technical trainings, (alongside these activities: seed supplements, IEC material re agric, livestock care & rural enterprise dev., agric tool kits)
CWS-P/A	Shelter provision Thatta District, 15 months Sep11 to Nov12	1242026	500 families to receive permanent homes
CWS-P/A	Pro-poor tax reform initial research - From Nov2011, 45 days consultancy	3124	
NCA	Shelter for 200 families Dadu District, Sindh - Jan-Apr 2012	100000	200 families permanent homes
CWS-P/A	Supporting Humanitarian Advocacy Officer post at CWS-P/A - 2 yrs from Jan2012	40000	
Muslim Hands	1st Sept 12 to 31st January 2013	96462	86 families permanent homes, Thatta District
CWS-P/A	DRR & Women's Livelihoods/Empowerment - Sep12-Sep13	104618	700 women livelihoods/literacy/reproductive health' 300 men reproductive health, and 1,000 people DRR

<sup>3</sup> Source: CA Pakistan floods grants tracker

# Location of activities

Project activities were located in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) in the north, Rajanpur in South Punjab and Sindh in the south





# 1. Efficiency, impact and effectiveness

## **Coordination between teams at CA and programme management in providing support to the partners and programme**

- The London based appeal staff were a small core team who were very experienced and familiar with CA systems. CA Media and Comms staff reported good communications with the Pakistan team and partner staff. Meetings were held regularly and key people attended

## **The efficiency of CA's internal management and resource allocation, including communications between teams in order to support the programme**

- No major issues were cited by staff or partners regarding the timeliness of grants. There were however occasional delays due to senior level sign off being required, and some problems of CA's new Promise Grant Management System. CBHA funding gave an extra push for grants to be timely
- Several CA staff raised the issue of where Pakistan sits in CA, given it is not a country programme. If this model of responding when there is no country programme is repeated again, it should be made clear from the start what are the roles and responsibilities of people from the different departments involved in the response. This may also help with another issue cited by some CA key informants – that it was more difficult to get organisational (CA) interest in the response due to the lack of country programme.

## **Compliance with CA's procedures**

- Relevant procedures appear to have been complied with in terms of the Humanitarian Handbook and appeal management.

## **Programme impact on the economic and physical well-being of target communities in view of objectives and indicators as indicated in the Rolling Plan and other project, partner and programme documentation**

- Positive impacts on economic and physical wellbeing were cited by all beneficiaries spoken to, eg for houses: give protection against rain, heat, dust, provide an asset and security, home maintenance costs reduced, dignity, a covered kitchen enables cooking in all weathers improving health, WASH facilities reduce open defecation and associated disease, and enable women to feel safer as they no longer have to go out at night to fields
- There has been a positive impact on community assets, for example using cash for work for rehabilitating village infrastructure such as roads, rehabilitating schools and health centres
- In some instances cash for work was used to pay people to work on their own housing. However in other housing projects beneficiary involvement in house construction was seen as their contribution. This evaluation questions whether cash for work should be used in this way – the requirement for community contribution is diminished - and might not better be used for other uses, eg community owned assets, public infrastructure
- BHUs that were handed over to PPHI was a success, with efforts from the outset from CWS-P/A to ensure that BHUs were not closed at the end of (external) recovery funding

- Many projects targeted physical wellbeing, eg shelter, WASH, NFIs, health, food etc. There is less evidence around impact on economic well-being as articulated in the CA Rolling Plan, eg 'Indicator: Improved level of local economic activity and employment (including among vulnerable groups); stability in economic activity and employment levels relative to pre-flood levels'
- CTTCs sought to link trainees with job opportunities, for example with other agencies. Follow up appears to be encouraging - one review found that 76% of graduates were in employment after six months
- Impact on behaviour appears to be positive. For example communities when asked were able to demonstrate lessons learnt on good hand washing, while latrines visited were clean and used
- The ICHC project had positive impact in terms of enabling people to hold government to account and secure their rights
- CWS-P/A's Q&A project sought to improve humanitarian assistance delivered by itself and other NGOs which could have significant impact in future disasters – a stated aim is to 'focus on national level NGOs who are lesser exposed to Q&A than INGOs - the ones who are often closer to the ground realities for various reasons including security.' This evaluation found this work undertaken to be worthwhile, in providing an organisational impetus to improve Q&A that was endorsed by senior management, and also in providing and disseminating good quality information for other agencies to use.

### **Programme impact in terms of increasing resilience for communities and individuals against future cases of flooding**

- There have been further cases of flooding in 2011 and 2012 (although on a smaller scale than 2010) which has tested to some degree resilience. All beneficiaries spoken to who received housing said that their new homes were resilient, eg for MH, 'After the rains within the area, our field team had asked the community how they felt about the homes and if there was anything that they would like to change after these rains. Fortunately the families said they had felt much safer in these homes and could not think how they could be made more resilient' (key informant interview). This was verified in subsequent visits to beneficiary communities
- Investment in DRR to increase resilience, eg through MKRC project appears to be beneficial - beneficiaries in focus groups were able to articulate many practical examples of what they would do differently to protect themselves and their possessions in future cases of flooding, as well as earthquake and fire. In addition the MKRC evaluation pointed to a good degree of retention of knowledge and understanding, for example from final MKRC/SEEDS report - 84% of students targeted showed improved DRR knowledge after training as compared to before. The MKRC approach of 'action based DRR education' appears to be an effective way to transmit knowledge, particularly to groups such as children
- The impact of DRR training has gone beyond direct beneficiaries in some cases with training being multiplied throughout community through committees and informal networks. A good indicator is that of the 15 communities involved in schools training from the MKRC initiative, three set up village committees, an activity not originally a part of the programme
- Some adoption of household level mitigation techniques such as using vegetation and plants as flood barriers were witnessed. Community early warning systems were established, eg flag system used by NCA, 'Life saving bottle kits' for use in flooding developed and distributed by MKRC; also building houses on raised land to reduce the effects of floods.

### **WASH: men's FGD with village WASH committee, Dagai Muhallah, Nowsherha**

SSD was subcontracted by DKH to undertake WASH activities in Dagai, one of 15 Muhallahs (grouping of 15-30 houses). Activities included repair of handpumps (photo below), health education, eg on hand washing, installation of latrines, with VWC's undertaking management and maintenance of WASH in the community.

All FGD members were very positive about SSD's work. They stated they were proudest of the latrines (open defecation had happened before) and livelihoods diversification training (funded by another donor). On asked what was missing, they stated that a river flood protection wall would have reduced flooding.

On inspection, all latrines visited were clean and were in use. Taps also worked, though it was noted that parts were less readily available - SSD's engineer explained that special parts were needed due to the tap accessing a deeper water table for better quality water. When asked about maintenance the engineer stated some WASH committee members had been trained in maintenance, and that many of the parts were replaceable.

On walkabout it was noted that several drainage channels built by another NGO alongside newly built walkways had blocked (see photo below). The water was fetid, smelt and mosquitoes were breeding, children were playing next to the blocked channels which themselves were six feet away from homes. Maintenance of these channels needs to be undertaken by VWCs, with a better sense of ownership and responsibility of the entire community instilled, not just of isolated projects.



### **Alignment with CA's corporate strategies Turning Hope Into Action and Partnerships For Change 2012+**

- Several partner interviewees and CA staff commented positively that CA had not set up an office in Pakistan. As one CA key informant said, 'Most country programmes originate in disaster. Resisting the temptation to build our own little empire and partnering instead goes to the heart of Partnership For Change'
- Key areas of alignment identified include working through church/ACT partners, and focusing on the resilience and accountability agendas respectively. Partnering with Non-ACT partner MH was also seen as a strength: as a CA key informant stated, 'Partnership with MH was valuable because shows supporters we work through other religious organisations, goes to the heart of our philosophy to work with those in best position to help'

- Actions aligned with Turning Hope into Action, namely: Goal 1.1, Strengthening and protecting livelihoods (To strengthen the ways poor and marginalised women and men make a living, and protect their lives and livelihoods from shocks and emergencies), evidenced for example through livestock programmes; and Goal 1.2, Enhancing community resilience (To enable poor and marginalised communities to work together to manage livelihoods, risks and resources), for example through the provision of stronger homes and work in DRR
- Actions were in alignment with Partnerships for Change, namely SCO3, Fair shares in a constrained world (We will work to transform unjust and unsustainable economic policies and practices so that poor and vulnerable people can gain thriving livelihoods, and face disasters more effectively while protecting the natural resources on which all our futures depend). However, engagement with policy was not undertaken to change systemic issues, although CWS-P/A undertook research into tax.

### **Incorporation of lessons learned from previous emergency programmes and earlier evaluations of the programme**

- Partner agencies, such as CWS-P/A, had taken on board lessons learnt from previous relief operations, in particular the 2005 earthquake, which had led to a fundamental reorganisation of some procedures and approaches
- Several CA staff in interviews commented that good learning has been incorporated in this programme from different disaster responses, but because of knowledge/ experience of key staff involved rather than systems or processes
- At partner level, good examples of lessons learned being incorporated into successive phases of house-building, for example Muslim Hands' iteration of house layout between different phases to reflect residents' preferences
- CA's management response to the ACT earthquake evaluation mentions among other things that it will provide adequate technical support, which was the case for this response, noted in the building of permanent houses
- CA's management response to ACT's evaluation following the earthquake also appears to have been acted on in other areas. For example:
  - 'In future Christian Aid shelter projects we will ensure that partners / communities taking on this role have sufficient expertise or are provided with the necessary technical support' - technical support at partner level and CA level was provided, no major quality issues identified with houses
  - 'CA proactively spots opportunities of synergy and cases of overlap from its (unique) perspective of knowing which partners are doing what and where' – yes, for example CWS-P/A gave training to other partners with their expertise in Q&A and DRR
  - 'That for the next disaster CA encourages partners to include downwards accountability mechanisms within their work' – yes, to varying degrees but certainly with CWS-P/A, although other partners stated that they needed to undertake more work in this area
  - 'Assessments need to proactively seek out and hear the voices of women. Where this is difficult NGOs have the opportunity to decide to act as agents of change, eg in ensuring mixed teams as a matter of their own human resources policy' – CWS-P/A gave examples of how they have worked hard to ensure women were recruited, for example putting together motivational packages, weekend buses (but noted this is only possible in big budget responses like this)
  - 'CA provides TA/advice on the options partners have in programme approaches they might consider, eg cash transfers, based on their experiences elsewhere' – this has been attempted, but perhaps could have been done more. When discussed at least one partner was not convinced that increased cash transfers was a good option, citing accountability of funds usage, in particular to donors.



## Housing: visit to Niaz Mallah village, Thatta

In Niaz Mallah village Muslim Hands (MH) built 102 houses with 86 funded by CA (MH did not want to leave any households out of receiving the houses, and paid for the remainder). Each house comprises a living room, kitchen and latrine. In phase one, kitchen and latrine opened into the living room; however in later phases, following community consultation, the kitchen and latrine open externally. This is to reduce odours into the living room and to increase privacy for women cooking. A women's FGD found that although women were consulted about the design in Phase One they found it hard to participate in any meaningful way as they said they had never lived in this kind of house before and so just accepted whatever design was presented to them. In one woman's words, 'we were under the sky so whatever they gave us we were happy'. However, once the first batch of houses were built they could see and articulate what they thought should be changed. They also said that it was their idea to have the houses all built around a communal square area.

Many of the houses have verandas added to them, which are in some cases are built to a high quality (see photo below). The space outside each house is very well maintained. Many households have made storage places out of mud and added decoration to houses. The flat roofs are finished in mud, which needs to be maintained to prevent leaking. Community members during FGDs stated this was acceptable practice and that they were maintaining the roofs. Internal inspections showed no signs of leaks. Community feedback from men and women was overwhelmingly positive. All members appreciated the houses, which are a huge improvement on living conditions beforehand. The houses are in good condition and are well maintained. They are well built and with good effective cross ventilation – even on a hot day the houses are cool. Latrines were well maintained, in use and clean. The kitchens are in use, although mesh covering the upper vent, intended for mosquitoes, has quickly become clogged up grease, preventing smoke from escaping and should be removed. Cooking also takes place outside most houses, with internal kitchens used during monsoon. A further iteration might be to remove doors to increase ventilation as per CWS-P/A's covered, open cooking spaces.



## 2. Quality and relevance

### **The range and coherence of work supported with appeal funds and whether it is in line with the aims of the appeal**

- Partner actions in relief and recovery operations were in line with the appeal, which was that, 'urgent humanitarian aid was needed for millions who are in dire need of water, food and shelter'. CA and its partners provided food, as well as NFIs, and addressed water and shelter via WASH and housing programmes respectively
- The recovery actions of many partners prioritised long term benefits, for example the provision of permanent and not temporary housing, livelihood provision and WASH activities.

### **The quality of the project work (needs assessment, M&E, gender, Sphere, HAP, impact assessment)**

- M&E quality has been found to be good among partners. This is evidenced for example by reports to CA which were usually to a high standard with good and useful information. SEEDS Asia's MKRC reporting with evaluation findings was thought to be a particularly good example, as was the evaluation commissioned by Sungi of the livelihoods programme
- Concerning DKH/Sungi, livestock and poultry was a concern. A good percentage of livestock did not survive due the inappropriate breed selection, extreme weather conditions, disease outbreak, delays in distribution and the beneficiaries earlier experience in livestock management. Poultry mortality was due to the extreme heat, wild animals and poor feeding practices
- Female stakeholders/community group in the Swat BHU while asked for the lessons for next disaster identified the need for better coordination between IP and government counterparts. The coordination tends to be very comprehensive at the management level but at the lower implementation level the coordination and sharing of information could be improved
- Concerning DKH's livestock programme, centralised procurement and vendor selection process caused an initial delay in input delivery. The IP vaccination procurement also caused delays.
- Sometimes difficult to get disaggregated beneficiary data from partner reports to get clearer idea of targeting. For example a MH report references targeting the poorest, those with disabilities, female headed household and the elderly but this information is not then disaggregated in the beneficiary lists they provide in the same report.



## **Basic Health Unit (BHU) Dehria, Swat. Men's and women's FGDs; meeting with PPHI and BHU team**

CWS-P/A oversaw improvements in and management of nine BHUs and one MHC in Swat. Dehria is one of three BHUs renovated and managed by CWS-P/A. In FGDs all participants agreed that this was one of the better equipped BHUs in the region. It currently sees 60-70 patients per day and delivers some 23 babies per month. During the project this BHU was seeing 100-150 patients per day.

Feedback of CWS-P/A's support for this BHU in FGDs, with staff and PPHI was very positive. CWS-P/A had provided timely interventions, paid the salaries of staff, had provided medicines (see photo), had renovated the building to a high standard (see photo), and had provided additional equipment, notably an incinerator (paid for by CWS-P/A).

The BHU suffers however from load shedding and is not equipped with a generator. Male FGD members regretted that a generator that had been provided by CWS-P/A had been removed at the end of funding. On raising this with CWS-P/A it was stated that PPHI would not have paid for fuel. All female FGD members also regretted the absence of health promoters, who carried out awareness raising during the programme in issues such as hand washing. While a loss, this is also a positive indicator that these activities were valued.

A key benefit cited in both male and female FGDs had been the employment of a lady doctor. The PPHI representative later stated that this hiring had prompted PPHI to hire lady doctors elsewhere. Another benefit of the BHUs lies in the attention given by CWS-P/A to handover of the BHUs once funding had ended. CWS-P/A was careful to co-manage the BHUs from the outset with relevant medical authorities. This has been helped a lot by the GoP's PPHI, which has funded continuation. This is in stark contrast to operations after the 2005 earthquake when BHUs closed after aid funding had ended.

The PPHI representatives reported that CWS-P/A had 'contributed a lot' to healthcare in the region. They confirmed this was a well run BHU, better than many others in the region, and that CWS-P/A and PPHI had held joint monitoring visits.



## **Capacity of CA partners, and their partners, to implement the work**

- The capacity of all CA partners was high, as were the capacity of partners' partners, evidenced for example by competency of partner staff interviewed, quality of projects visited, satisfaction of beneficiaries met, quality of reports submitted etc. In all cases good choices of partners had been made. Where programme outcomes were disappointing, notably the livestock programme by DKH's partner Sungi, other elements of the project were found to be strong
- In most cases partnerships were already established, eg CA with CWS-P/A, DKH and NCA. CA's partnership with MH was reported to be positive, with the latter demonstrating a high level of capacity to enact good projects. For example when their project start was delayed due to floods in 2011 they managed to adapt and boost capacity in the area with additional staff and still complete the project on schedule.

## **Timeliness and appropriateness of programme inputs and activities**

- Actions were found to be timely, with quick relief responses by partners and internal mobilisation by CA (evidenced by HQ documentation trail)
- Actions took on as quickly as possible a long term recovery/development perspective, eg in housing and health, which is commendable
- There was evidence of projects adapting to need, eg changes in distributed kits to have for example appropriate tooth cleaning. MH's housing designs were also amended to reflect beneficiary preferences, between Phase One and Phase Two.

## **To what extent gender considerations were factored into programming and how were they achieved; note any evidence demonstrating gender sensitivity in achievements**

- In the housing projects visited women took the lead in deciding the location and positioning of the housing, kitchen and other facilities. Both male and female FGDs reported they were confident in raising issues beyond the project activities; for example, women FGDs identified the need for health and education facilities for both boys and girls. In Sindh women's FGDs overwhelmingly reported they were happy with their new houses. They also however identified the need for skill development for their young girls
- Women's FGDs overwhelmingly found that while trainings given were useful to the extent of saving money on stitching clothes for family members on the Eid festival, the trainings given could not be utilized for earning money. A key reason given for this was that poor rural community members could not afford to buy clothes. To these ends a better approach could be to develop a business model around the marketability of new skills taught and linking these to available markets
- Gender was considered by all partners, for example all projects with village committee structures had both men's and women's groups. CWS-P/A's health programme BHU secured a lady doctor, which set a precedent that PPHI has sought to replicate, due to local demand
- Ensuring women's voices in complaints mechanisms continues to be a challenge, where rates of women complainants is very low. More women might however be complaining than records perhaps reflect, wherein husbands complain on their behalf. Women in at least one FGD (in Mingora) said they could send their husbands to complain on their behalf. However, when given the opportunity to easily complain directly (when a complaints centre was set up very close to their homes) they took it
- Other activities such as CWS-P/A's CTTC programme specifically targeted building men's skills, as likely principle household earners

- The skills development training for women within the DKH/Sungi project was varied. The stitching and embroidery skills introduced to women were very basic and dependent on backward and forward linkages, which were found scarce in the target community. For example the FGD participants (see box below) who received skill training could not use the skills for earning money due to the unavailability of business in the community.

**Livelihoods: FGDs held with two male and three women groups in Two UCs Harrand and Manjuwala, Rajanpur District**

DKH working with local NGO Sungi implemented agriculture, livestock and livelihood activities with community members in the selected villages. Women are generally responsible for livestock and poultry. Some of the community members specialised in livestock management and raised others livestock on a sharing basis. Poultry at household level is generally fed all available grains, ie maize, wheat and soaked bread.

Sungi formed village committees to organise communities around planned activities. Gender considerations were taken into account in the selection of beneficiaries and village organisation formation in the community.

Beneficiaries were selected following Sungi's selection criteria, which concerned identifying the poorest of the poor. Beneficiaries were trained in poultry and livestock management. Livestock mortality was high: only one beneficiary in the FGD community group of some 25 women had goats that survived with the three offspring. The other participants had almost 50% mortality in goats. The poultry beneficiaries reported to have very few birds that survived after the project period.

The reasons for mortality from several FGD members were noted to be the extreme heat, improper feed and in some case the lack of protection of birds from other animals. For example the project trained beneficiaries in commercial basis poultry management. However birds could not cope with the extreme heat conditions of the area and died.

Similarly, readymade protein feed was provided and beneficiaries were also trained in replication of feed formula. However, only one woman could increase the number and that was possible through indigenous and locally available feed such as maize and wheat grains. The area faces acute scarcity of irrigation and drinking water.

Kitchen garden and agriculture inputs were useful where irrigation channels were rehabilitated. The small shops were reported to be very useful and successful.

### 3. Downward accountability

#### **Level of involvement and participation of communities and men, women and children in the process of needs assessment, implementation and evaluation of the work**

- Overall there was evidence of a good level of men and women 'being heard' (see earlier points which also expand on this). For example in housing projects men and women monitored construction (CWS-P/A and MH). MH noted that this close community monitoring improved delivery standards, giving the example that on two occasions lower quality bricks were identified by beneficiaries and sent back to suppliers, while these may have been overlooked by the engineers
- Where communities had previously lived in mud houses they were able to alter their design according to their social and environmental conditions. For example in Thatta (CWS-P/A housing) the community identified a number of changes in the positioning of room and kitchen to cope with cyclones and extreme weather conditions. Women also contributed in the beautification of the houses
- Community members altered the designs of MH's housing to make kitchen and toilet doors open to the outside rather than inside, thus providing more privacy. A further iteration could be to remove the kitchen door altogether to allow for better ventilation (CWS-P/A's houses are designed in this way already)
- HAP was enacted well, most notably in CWS-P/A's Q&A project (see box on page 21). CWS-P/A's accountability research was also of a high standard, and hopefully widespread dissemination of the report will ensure its take up. A mid term peer review of this work by Nigel Timmins also found the project to be on track
- DKH's livelihoods project followed standard need assessment and beneficiary selection. The project adhered to HAP and sphere standards (evaluation report, project proposal and final report) M&E systems were in place during the implementation period of the project (evaluation and other reports). M&E tools and fields visits were reporting on the intended results
- DKH/Sungi applied HAP standards and accountability mechanisms in the form of a complaints box and a contact number to report any complaint to the organisation. Beneficiaries were also aware of the animal quarantine period and mechanism to report or approach project vet in case of livestock and poultry disease.

#### **To what extent community members had access to the information about the programmes and how this information was used**

- Access to information was high: for example concerning health and hygiene (posters and instructional materials); and in DRR, for example in MKRC distribution of information; and the promotion of ICHC through advertisements; and in the use of information boards at shelter and cash for work sites
- An issue raised in some FGDs concerned the short-lived interaction between agencies and communities. Several FGDs identified the need for long term sustainable actions to tackle disasters, with longer term projects to give them economic empowerment and lead to ownership and self reliance. For example flash floods hit some of the target areas every year, and longer term regular assistance would be valuable. There is therefore a need for agencies to think about response as long term investments, that meet both immediate needs and long term resilience
- In one community of the DKH/Sungi project, where irrigation channels were rehabilitated, the village committee – formed by the project with capacity built - felt strong enough to approach government offices. They approached NADRA (National Database and Registration Authority) to get ID cards for the community members.

One president said, 'after organising ourselves we are now more powerful to approach government'.

### **Accountability: Information and Complaints Handling Centre (IHC), Mingora city**

Men's FGD with five community members and three IHC team members, and women's FGD with seven community members.

The organisation the Human Rights Commission for Pakistan (HRCP) was subcontracted by CWS to manage the IHC. The IHC handles complaints from community members relating to the flood response. Their role was to forward complaints to relevant organisations. IHC followed up complaints resolution. The FGD reported that some 800 complaints received in the Mingora City area, some 350 were reported resolved by community members.

The FGD community members reported that a frequent complaint related to the non-receipt of GoP Watan (debit) cards. It was reported that some complaints submitted to IHC had resulted in Watan cards being issued; also that complaints led to cards being unblocked and missing instalments being paid. Examples were also given of water supply and gas problems being addressed. In the words of one community member, 'government problems were solved with this system'.

When asked, community members were clear that the role of IHC was not to resolve complaints, but to handle them – this is important in terms of expectations of IHC were realistic. To these ends all FGD members said they were very satisfied with the IHC. They had found staff to be courteous and helpful, and had found them available out of office hours, by telephone.

IHC's reputation in the area was high, they said, and higher compared to the complaints centre operated by the GoP for Watan cards. Women in the FGD said they thought it was a 'fair system' and that they were 'very happy with it'. They noted that information about the Centre was share effectively through for example TV adverts, banners, radio and people coming door to door. They also noted that the proximity of the Centre meant that they could go themselves to make complaints, rather than sending their husbands on their behalf.

When asked what could be better next time, HRCP noted that co ordination with relevant government authorities was always key, and that this (unsurprisingly) relied on contacts made in the right places. On any continuation, a community member said that he now handled complaints.

### **To what extent community members had the opportunity to raise concerns/ complaints on the delivery of the programmes and how these were addressed**

- A complaint and response mechanisms were facilitated by all partners for the affected people to give feedback on the their services. These were generally used, although records of complaints as noted previously were mostly from men. Community FGDs conformed that 'informal' feedback was given regularly in housing programmes where rapport was established between community members and NGO staff

- In largely illiterate communities, beneficiaries discussed issues face to face with project staff rather than write or call
- Some women FGDs recorded that women were unaware of complaint mechanisms. However they were comfortable to discuss issues with project field staff. Some of the community members mentioned that they did not know what to complain about and how to raise concerns. This issue was raised in the women's FGD in Thatta (about 25 females in two FGDs). Almost 100 % of FGD members were satisfied in interacting with project staff. However, about 20 % were not sure of what to complain about – and indeed why to complain if they were to get 'beautiful houses' and other assistance from other initiatives such as the livelihoods project
- Beneficiaries mostly in South Punjab and Sindh provinces identified the need for access to education health services and creation of economic opportunities – an issue concerned perhaps with ongoing chronic poverty, and less immediately related to the floods
- Housing was confirmed as a priority in several FGDs – which serves as a confirmation of the approaches adopted by several partners and by CA
- Partner organisations had clear guidelines for community consultation and generally followed criteria for beneficiary selection, for example in CWS-P/A's housing programmes, where the neediest community members received housing. However in some cases beneficiary selection and needs assessment revolved more around project activities the organisations were offering rather community priorities - some FGD members stated that they were not asked about their needs but rather that preconceived projects were brought to them. An example of this would be goat distribution and women's livelihoods programmes in Rajanpur. In this case the learning is that better assessments are required
- All FGDs that were asked stated that communities helped in identifying the most vulnerable based on the respective organisations' selection criteria. Initially beneficiaries and non- beneficiaries were happy with the individual assistance. However they also identified broader community needs, for example raised platforms, retention walls, drinking water and permanent protection from flood where the community is close to rivers
- FGDs identified that some beneficiaries got inputs and assistance more than once while some were left out. A reason for this is that beneficiary assessment is done at the beginning of the project and some of the beneficiaries may have moved out of the area. In such cases such people could not qualify for the selection criteria and were left out of assistance - one family in Thatta returned to the area when almost all houses were completed.



## **WASH: activities in Osha village, near Bahrain, Swat. Men's and women's FGDs**

Osha village is one of 10 villages that received improved WASH delivered by the NGO PVDP who were subcontracted by NCA. PVDP specialises in reaching villages that other agencies do not help, based on their remoteness, often up in the mountains with difficult accessibility.

Osha was included in the programme after the village contacted PVDP and invited them to undertake an assessment. Osha village is located high up in the Swat valley, accessible only by walking up a steep hillside. Osha comprises 38 households each with 3-4 families. Activities comprised the installation of a gravity fed filtered water supply (using biosan filters) that supplies high quality water to taps in the villages; and the provision of household latrines. Separate water committees of men and women had been formed (12 or so members in each) and two men trained in maintenance. A third is being trained. The water system uses locally available parts. When maintenance is required households contribute to a fund.

While only one year old the system was functioning well: taps worked and produced high quality water. Tap stands were clean and maintained, with (for some stands) run off to crops. All latrines visited were clean and well maintained. More than one had installed electricity and an extra tap, at the householders' own cost. Minor maintenance had been carried out, including replacement of sockets.

In two separate FGDs, of 15 men (photo below) and 15 women respectively, feedback from the project was overwhelmingly positive. Before, defecation had been open air, and water was accessed by some 40 minute round trip by women, including a 25 uphill walk, which was particularly difficult in winter when paths were covered in snow. The women's FGD said that sanitation facilities (photo below) addressed many gender specific health and social issues. Prior to the facilities women and girls had to wait for dark to defecate in the open area, and noted that they felt vulnerable doing so. Other benefits noted by women included getting a better idea of personal hygiene and how to keep the latrines clean.

In asking what could be improved next time, a response was given to use local masonry skills rather than external skills, to ensure better quality, ie that the mason would be known and would be a member of the community. The village had received training in water conservation, though it is noted that on arrival in the village a tap had been left running with no one around. Further reinforcement of this message might be required. PVDP staff reported that in the 10 villages they worked only one had not succeeded, due largely to lack of self-organisation.



## 4. Partnership

**The extent to which gains made with ACT and non-ACT partnerships during the floods programme is leading to opportunities in Pakistan, and the potential to replicate the approach in other contexts**

- All partners were very positive about their relationship with CA. All saw it as adding value, not only financially, but especially in terms of technical assistance and encouraging support provided. All partners valued the frequency of visits and valued highly the professionalism and friendliness of CA staff
- One partner was impressed by the fact that CA did not have an office presence in Pakistan, enabling more funds to be spent on local partner projects
- MH reported that CA's shelter expertise had allowed them to amend housing designs in Thatta, saving money which allowed the project to supply milk cows. MH reported that this had been very positive and beneficial
- Equally good relationships appeared to be the norm between partners and their sub-contracted partners. One stated their partnership was 'growing day by day'
- One partner noted they had hoped for more time from CA in project monitoring, but acknowledged that security concerns might have been a factor here.

### **CA staff perceptions**

One to one interviews were held with CA staff involved in different stages of the response. Their responses to the statement, 'The extent to which gains made with ACT and non-ACT partnerships during the floods programme is leading to opportunities in Pakistan' are as follows:

- 'Yes definitely. (We must) maintain links with partners'
- 'Absolutely yes. Hope to maintain links after emergency ends'
- 'Broadly yes. Credibility for resources for Pakistan. Will have watching brief and relationships for future in emergencies'
- 'Yes. CWS-P/A is massive strategic opportunity for CA'
- 'Yes. For CA. for partners, eg possibly DFID. Muslim Hands a good new partner.'

The same staff's responses to the statement, 'There is potential to replicate the approach in other contexts' are as follows:

- 'Yes, absolutely. Pre-planning etc. look at Nepal'
- 'Yes – what being an act member is about'
- 'Depends on ACT mechanisms; it's an exception when it works well'
- 'Yes. (we need) a light footprint, eg two staffer. Works with strong ACT forum.'

**The implications of carrying out large emergency programmes in the context of no existing or continuing programme in the country: how have the mechanics of the partnerships performed**

- The mechanics of the partnership have performed well. The partnership model however does come at a cost, with several levels of overhead for each institution involved (this can be as many as five if funds are channelled via ACT, eg. for housing or infrastructure: CA – ACT – partner – local partner - contractor). It should be noted that CA's partners in Pakistan are themselves INGOs. The counter-argument of course is the reduced costs of no office; also the belief that long term

partnerships build local capacity. The question for CA is whether the number of levels of involvement of several different organisations is worth the cost

- Another implication of having INGO partners who implement through additional local partners rather than having the direct relationships with IPs is that CA is more removed from those doing the implementation and therefore must rely more on the INGO's accountability and monitoring systems/requirements, which may be different to CA's - for example CWS-P/A have different audit requirements of their IPs).

### **CA staff perceptions**

One to one interviews were held with CA staff involved in different stages of the response. Their responses to the statement, 'Carrying out large emergency programmes in the context of no existing or continuing programme in the country is an acceptable approach, based on this programme' are as follows:

- 'Yes absolutely – humanitarian obligation'
- 'Humanitarian imperative – mandate to respond'
- 'Yes. A good example of showing this is possible'
- 'Yes it is. Ignores developmental realities. An exception – only place like this. Before was Darfur'
- 'It's what CA should be able to do.'

The same staff's responses to the statement, 'The mechanics of the partnerships have performed well' are as follows:

- 'They have. Robust discussions, challenged in both directions. Good news'
- '(an opportunity to) develop to security training, HAP stuff'
- 'Different with each partner. MH and CWS-P/A strong relationship'
- 'Satisfied. Quality good. Trust there. If there's an earthquake we'll do exactly the same thing.'

While the majority of the feedback has been that this approach of working in a country with no developmental programme has worked well, the programme's successes reflect both the experience and knowledge of the CA staff involved, and the expertise of its partners.

# Appendices

**Village meetings participants**

**ToR**

**Questionnaires**

**Pakistan travel itinerary**

## Village meetings participants

Location	No. FGDs and approx. no. of participants (women)	No. FGDs and approx. no. of participants (men)
Osha village, near Bahrain, Swat	1x15	1x15
Village WASH committee, Dagai Muhallah, Nowsherha	1x40	
Niaz Mallah village, Thatta	1x45	1x70
Basic Health Unit (BHU) Dehria, Swat	1x11	1x10
UCs Harrand and Manjuwala, Rajanpur District	2x25	3x25
Information and Complaints Handling Centre (IHC), Mingora city	1x8	1x7
<i>Jumo Adam Mallah village, Thatta</i>	1x20	2x30

**Terms of Reference**  
**Evaluation of Christian Aid's response to the 2012 floods in Pakistan**  
**For the period August 2010 to May 2012**

**1. Background and broad strategy of the appeal**

The Christian Aid (CA) Pakistan appeal was launched in early August 2010 following extensive flooding which eventually spread from the north to the south of the country, impacting men and women in 4 Provinces. By September 2010, it was estimated around 20 million people in 78 districts across the country had been affected and around 6 million forced from their homes. 1.9 million houses were damaged. The impact of the floods also caused damage to infrastructure with more than 1,000 bridges washed away and numerous schools, livestock, health facilities, cultivable land, education services and shops and businesses damaged or lost. Deaths reached over 1,600. The security situation in Pakistan continues to be insecure and highly volatile at all times, resulting in a challenging context for the humanitarian community.

CA does not have a presence or on-going country programme in Pakistan, but has been able to respond to the floods primarily through other members of the ACT Alliance and one additional partner. The programme is currently due to complete by mid-2013. Interventions have included food, nfi, health, temporary shelter and permanent housing, livelihoods, community level DRR and support to quality & accountability initiatives. Advocacy has also been a part of the programme including support to partner capacity in this area. Overall, £5.6 million net income was available for the programme from several sources of funding. At the time of the floods, CA did not have an on-going programme in Pakistan but we have worked there in the past. Most recently this has included an emergency programme following the 2005 Kashmir earthquake as well as earlier work during CA's history such as for health, livelihoods, relief/response to other smaller scale emergencies, community development, support to Afghan refugees, and education.

**2. Purpose of the evaluation**

Given the particular environment and of CA's current status in Pakistan, the external evaluation is planned to provide an opportunity to assess the programme to date. It is also to identify areas for lessons learning for our and our partners' future work, both in Pakistan and elsewhere. The aims thus include to:

- Assess the outcomes, impact and sustainability of CA and its partners' response to the 2010 Pakistan floods on the lives of Pakistani men, women and children.
- Assess the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of CA's and its partner's response to the floods and identify lessons to learn, recommendations and suggestions for CA future engagement in similar disasters elsewhere and within Pakistan itself.

**3. Objectives**

Within the context of CA and partners responding to the 2010 floods in Pakistan:

i) To evaluate the efficiency, impact and effectiveness of the CA Pakistan Floods programme to date. This will include both looking at coordination between teams at CA and programme management in providing support to the partners and programme; and at activities and outcomes of the programme itself. Evidence should be sought to assess:

- The efficiency of CA's internal management and resource allocation, including communications between teams in order to support the programme
- Compliance with CA's procedures
- Programme impact on the economic and physical well-being of target communities in view of objectives and indicators as indicated in the Rolling Plan and other project, partner and programme documentation
- Programme impact in terms of increasing resilience for communities and individuals against future cases of flooding
- Alignment with CA's corporate strategies Turning Hope Into Action and Partnerships For Change 2012+.



- Incorporation of lessons learned from previous emergency programmes and earlier evaluations of the programme

ii) To evaluate the quality and relevance of partners' work and CA's support. This will involve looking at:

- The range and coherence of work supported with appeal funds and whether it is in line with the aims of the appeal
- The quality of the project work (needs assessment, M&E, gender, Sphere, HAP, impact assessment)
- Capacity of CA partners, and their partners, to implement the work
- Timeliness and appropriateness of programme inputs and activities
- To what extent gender considerations were factored into programming and how were they achieved; note any evidence demonstrating gender sensitivity in achievements

iii) To evaluate to what extent downward accountability was established within the programme delivery process, including:

- Level of involvement and participation of communities and men, women and children in the process of needs assessment, implementation and evaluation of the work
- To what extent community members had access to the information about the programmes and how this information was used
- To what extent community members had the opportunity to raise concerns/complaints on the delivery of the programmes and how these were addressed

iv) To evaluate what the appeal and response has meant in the context of 'partnership' with CA not having an on-going presence or development programme in Pakistan, with particular focus upon immediate next steps and the longer term. This should include consideration of:

- The extent to which gains made with ACT and non-ACT partnerships during the floods programme is leading to opportunities in Pakistan, and the potential to replicate the approach in other contexts.
- The implications of carrying out large emergency programmes in the context of no existing or continuing programme in the country: how have the mechanics of the partnerships performed

#### **4. Methodology**

The final methodology should be developed and agreed with the lead evaluator, and will include:

- A desk review of existing documents, including partner proposals, reports and other related documentation
- Interviews, discussions and de-briefing sessions with CA partners
- Interviews, discussions and de-briefing sessions with relevant CA staff
- Interviews and focus group discussions with a sample of direct and indirect beneficiaries identified together with partner and CA staff if possible.
- Direct observations through visits to project and partner sites
- Lessons learnt workshop with partners and relevant CA staff; one in Pakistan, one in UK
- Case study on permanent shelter work

#### **5. Evaluation Team and responsibilities**

Evaluation Team Leader (external) responsible for leading the evaluation process, preparing the detailed methodology, detailed schedule for the evaluation, debriefing the team according to the schedule, producing draft and final reports, producing the presentation for the learning event with partners.

The evaluation team should include a local consultant to assist the team leader in country. Also a third team member, preferably from a different geographic division within CA, to enable cross learning.

It is requested for the final report to be no longer than 30 pages, including an executive summary, and for up to 15 recommendations to be included.

## **6. Evaluation Management**

An evaluation steering group will oversee the management of the evaluation and ensure its purpose is fulfilled. This group will sign off the ToR and then meet as required. This is likely to be at least twice – including to review and collate feedback from initial findings of the evaluation, and to produce the formal management response to the final report. They will also assist with communicating the findings of the evaluation.

Steering group suggested membership

Neill Garvie, Ginny Robins, Adrian Ouvry, Coree Alvarez , Juliet Parker

CA will coordinate with partners for ensuring their involvement in the evaluation. This will include participation in a lessons learned workshop in Pakistan.

## **7. Evaluation Timeline**

- TORs drafting and agreement – by mid-June 2012
- Agreement and contract signed with consultant – by 25<sup>th</sup> July 2012
- Preparations and interviews with CA staff – September 2012
- Travel to Pakistan – October 2012 – dates tbc
- De-brief and presentation of initial findings to partners and CA staff in country - October
- Finalisation and submission of draft report – tbc when travel dates confirmed
- CA response to draft report – tbc, as above
- Final report submission – tbc, as above
- Management response produced by steering group - tbc

## **8. Pakistan programme partners**

Church World Service – Pakistan/Afghanistan (CWS-P/A)

Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe (DKH)

Muslim Hands (MH)

Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)

## Community FGD questions/checklist

1	<b>Programme efficiency, impact and effectiveness</b>
1.3	<p>The programme increased the resilience of communities against future cases of flooding</p> <p>Received any training and how used it?            What doing differently now than before the flood?            Any contingency flooding, raised buildings, flood protection, awareness, etc?            Tangible outcomes of awareness raised?            Is the NGO able to do the job? Competent?</p>
1.6	<p>Lessons learned from previous emergency programmes and earlier evaluations were well incorporated into the programme</p> <p>NGO worked with you before? If so doing what?            (check previous evaluations)            Is the NGO better or worse than last time? Why?</p>
2	<b>Quality and relevance of partners' work and CA's support</b>
2.3	<p>The quality of the project work was sufficient (needs assessment, M&amp;E, gender, Sphere, HAP, impact assessment)</p> <p>How were your needs assessed?            Did what was assessed match what happened?            Who took part in any needs assessment? How did it work? (process)            How often do you meet with/see NGO staff? What happens? Do you talk with NGO people?            What improvements result from visits, if any?            For SPHERE, HAP: observations, how houses used, etc            Have you been linked to any other organisations that can provide long term support?</p>
2.4	<p>CA partners, and their partners, had adequate capacity to implement the work</p> <p>Were the NGOs any good?            How could they have done things better?            Were they friendly, efficient, building trust, co operative?            Are NGOs addressing needs well, eg linking/referring to other people?</p>
2.5	<p>Programme inputs and activities were timely and appropriate</p> <p>Were NGOs timely?            Did NGOs address what was needed? What was missed?</p>
2.6	<p>Gender considerations were factored into programming</p> <p>Were men and women treated differently? How?            Involvement of women? How?            Do you meet with female NGO staff members? Any impact?            Women from other countries?            How were women's voices heard in assessments?            For women: were you asked what you wanted?            For women: learnt money from any livelihood project? Got to keep it?</p>
3	<b>Downward accountability</b>
3.1	<p>There was a high level of involvement of communities and men, women and children in the process of needs assessment, implementation and evaluation of the work</p> <p>How involved were you in: needs assessment, implementation and evaluation of the work. How?            Describe? (stories)            How were beneficiaries selected? Who decided and how?            Did people know criteria for selection? What were the criteria?</p>

3.2	<p>Community members had a high degree access to the information about the programmes and how this information was used</p> <p>What do you know about the programmes?  What information?  What have you been told and when?  Are you updates regularly? How?  Know anything about the budget?  Did anything change as a result of any interactions with NGOs?</p>
3.3	<p>Community members had the opportunity to raise concerns/complaints on the delivery of the programmes and how these were addressed</p> <p>How do you complain? And to whom? What happens as a result?  If you have a concern how do you raise it?  Did anything change as a result? What? Examples?  Have you raised any concerns?  What are the feedback mechanisms?</p>
4	<p><b>Partnership</b></p>
4.1	<p>ACT and non-ACT partnerships made during the floods programme is leading to opportunities in Pakistan</p> <p>Are your projects linked to projects of others? How? Or other parts of a project?</p>
4.2	<p>There is potential to replicate this approach in other contexts</p> <p>Will you do what you've learnt here somewhere else or again?  Would you recommend same thing to others?  How would you do things differently?  If you could make things better for the next time, how would you recommend this to the NGO?</p>
4.4	<p>The mechanics of the partnerships have performed well</p> <p>Did NGOs work together well?  Which NGOs are involved? Do you know?</p>

## Pakistan floods evaluation, all questions

### CA HQ individual meetings, November 2012

- 1-5 scale, where 1 = not at all to 5 = very much
- Yellow highlighted questions are of particular CA HQ relevance – see second page
- All findings are confidential

		1	2	3	4	5	n/a
<b>1</b>	<b>Programme efficiency, impact and effectiveness</b>						
1.1	The programme was compliant with CA's procedures						
1.2	The programme achieved the objectives of the Rolling Plan						
1.3	The programme increased the resilience of communities against future cases of flooding						
1.4	The programme aligned with CA's corporate strategy Turning Hope Into Action						
1.5	The programme aligned with CA's corporate strategy Partnerships For Change 2012+						
1.6	Lessons learned from previous emergency programmes and earlier evaluations were well incorporated into the programme						
<b>2</b>	<b>Quality and relevance of partners' work and CA's support</b>						
2.1	The range and coherence of work supported matched the aims of the appeal funds						
2.2	The programme was in line with the aims of the appeal						
2.3	The quality of the project work was sufficient (needs assessment, M&E, gender, Sphere, HAP, impact assessment)						
2.4	CA partners, and their partners, had adequate capacity to implement the work						
2.5	Programme inputs and activities were timely and appropriate						
2.6	Gender considerations were factored into programming						
<b>3</b>	<b>Downward accountability</b>						
3.1	There was a high level of involvement of communities and men, women and children in the process of needs assessment, implementation and evaluation of the work						
3.2	Community members had a high degree access to the information about the programmes and how this information was used						
3.3	Community members had the opportunity to raise concerns/complaints on the delivery of the programmes and how these were addressed						
<b>4</b>	<b>Partnership</b>						
4.1	ACT and non-ACT partnerships made during the floods programme is leading to opportunities in Pakistan						
4.2	There is potential to replicate this approach in other contexts						
4.3	Carrying out large emergency programmes in the context of no existing or continuing programme in the country is an acceptable approach, based on this programme						
4.4	The mechanics of the partnerships have performed well						

# Questions on CA HQ efficiency, impact and effectiveness and CA support

## CA HQ individual meetings, November 2012

1-5 scale, where 1 = not at all to 5 = very much  
confidential

Record explanations of scores given. All findings are confidential

		1	2	3	4	5	n/a
<b>1</b>	<b>Programme efficiency, impact and effectiveness</b>						
1.1	Compliance						
1.2	The programme implemented CA procedures efficiently						
1.3	The programme implemented CA procedures effectively						
1.4	The programme achieved the desired impact						
1.5	What should be done differently next time?						
1.6	Alignment with CA's corporate strategy Turning Hope Into Action						
1.7	Programme alignment was efficient						
1.8	Programme alignment was effective						
1.9	Desired impact was achieved						
1.10	What should be done differently next time?						
1.11	The programme aligned with CA's corporate strategy Partnerships For Change 2012+						
1.12	Programme alignment was efficient						
1.13	Programme alignment was effective						
1.14	Desired impact was achieved						
1.15	What should be done differently next time?						
1.16	Lessons learned from previous emergency programmes and earlier evaluations were well incorporated into the programme						
1.17	Lessons learn from previous programmes were incorporated efficiently						
1.18	Lessons learn from previous programmes were incorporated effectively						
1.19	Desired impact was achieved						
1.20	What should be done differently next time?						
<b>2</b>	<b>Quality and relevance of partners' work and CA's support</b>						
2.1	Range and coherence of work supported matched the aims of the appeal funds						
2.2	CA support to its partners was relevant						
2.3	CA's support to its partners was high quality						
2.4	What should be done differently next time?						
2.5	Is there anything important we've missed or you'd like to tell us about?						