

6

GOOD PRACTICE **RRN**
review

**Temporary Human
Settlement Planning for
Displaced Populations
in Emergencies**

by Andrew Chalinder

Edited by Laura Gibbons



This sixth Good Practice Review sets itself the task of broadening thinking on temporary human settlement planning in emergencies. It asks what is good, or at least, better practice in planning ‘for’ not planning ‘of’ temporary settlements for displaced populations. Comments should be sent to:

Relief and Rehabilitation Network
Overseas Development Institute
Portland House
Stag Place
London SW1E 5DP
United Kingdom
Tel: +44 (0) 171 393 1674/47/40
Fax: +44 (0) 171 393 1699
Email: rrn@odi.org.uk
Web site: www.oneworld.org/odi/rrn/

A copy will be sent to the author.

Comments received may be used in future Newsletters.

Subsequent versions of this Review will, at the Coordinator’s discretion, take account of comments and suggestions received.

ISBN: 0-85003-372-1

Price per copy: £10.00 (excluding postage and packing)
(£7.50 to RRN members or for 10 or more copies)

© Overseas Development Institute, London, 1998

Photocopies of all or part of this publication may be made providing that the source is acknowledged. Requests for commercial reproduction of Network material should be directed to ODI as copyright holders. The Network Coordinator would appreciate receiving details of any use of this material in training, research or programme design, implementation or evaluation.

Abstract

This sixth GPR in the RRN series set itself the task of broadening thinking on temporary human settlement planning in emergencies. It asks what is good, or at least better, practice in planning ‘for’ not planning ‘of’ temporary settlements for displaced populations. The author draws a distinction between the more technical aspects of site allocation and preparation and decisions which take into account political, environmental and economic sustainability issues when planning settlements. The Review contends that the long term implications for emergency assistance programmes of the choice of area or region in which a displaced population is encouraged to settle are frequently overlooked in the scramble to find a site and that more attention needs to be directed at a managerial level within both development and humanitarian sectors towards finding a sustainable solution. A key notion which drove the thinking behind the Review was the feeling that the outcome of planning must have at its core a notion of community and sustainability for the different groups affected by displacement, including both the displaced and the host populations. The idea of assisting a target ‘area’ rather than a target ‘group’ is explored as one of a number of possible options which need to be considered as part of a responsible planning process. A range of agencies and individuals with direct field experience of a range of different emergency responses were consulted during the drafting of the paper and it is hoped that the resulting text does justice to their input and emphasis on the practical application of some of the recommendations.

About the Author

Andrew Chalinder is an emergency water and sanitation manager who has worked with a number of UN, NGO and government bodies in Africa. He was also author of the first Good Practice Review in the series, *Water and Sanitation in Emergencies*, published in 1994. He currently lives in Botswana.

Acknowledgements

Tom Corsellis was an invaluable asset to both the author and editor during the production of this Review. Currently undertaking doctoral research at Cambridge University on temporary refugee settlement, his contribution was as much in terms of developing the thinking behind the Review, in particular the ‘integration-segregation spectrum’, as in tireless sourcing and mailing of documentation to the author. His written contributions include case study preparation on Ngara and Nepal based on interviews of humanitarian agency staff in Geneva and Oxfam UK and personal experience, and sourcing of current initiatives. As a member of both Peer Group meetings, he proved a resourceful and knowledgeable participant.

Joe Comerford (UNDP Rwanda), Tim Foster (RedR I), Salvatore Ippolito (UNHCR) and James Fennell (Mercurial) provided early commitment and determination to improve the process of temporary human settlement. Tim Foster helped identify, coordinate and chair the Peer Group meetings and Joe Comerford gave rise to the use of the notion ‘target area’ vs. ‘target group’.

A range of agency perspectives and experience were represented on the Peer Group: Jennifer Ashton, Maureen Connelly (UNHCR); John Borton, Laura Gibbons (ODI); Riccardo Conti (ICRC); Tom Corsellis, (PhD student); Tim Foster (RedR International); John Howard, Paul Sherlock (Oxfam); Barend Leeuwenberg, (MSF-H); John Watt (IFRC). Jennifer Ashton provided insights on vulnerable groups, social considerations, and case study material on Nepal and Pakistan. Maureen Connelly offered extensive comment on Ngara and Dadaab, enthusiasm and good humour as well as sourcing documentation and introducing UNHCR colleagues.

Case study material was also provided by ODI’s Susan Amoaten on Uganda/Tanzania and Koenraad Van Brabant on Sri Lanka; Philippa Atkinson, independent consultant on Liberia; David Riley of UNHCR on Hartisheik, Ethiopia; and John Telford, independent consultant on Jordan and Honduras. Alistair Hallam (ODI), Jeffrey Mposha (UNHCR), Ole Almgren (UNDAC), Flemming Nielsen (DHA), Jurgen Weyand (IFRC) and Yasmin Aysan (IFRC) also provided helpful comment.

Thanks to Laura Gibbons for being persuaded to produce the GPR and sticking with it, encouraging the author and for editorial comment!!

Sarah Scott provided logistical support and oversaw the final formatting and production process and Jean Lubbock carried out the translation.

Finally, my thanks to Paula for lending me to the Review!!!!

Contents

| | |
|---|-----------|
| 1. Introduction | 9 |
| 1.1 The Good Practice Review in context | 9 |
| 1.2 The purpose of the Review | 10 |
| 1.3 Scope | 13 |
| 1.4 Intended audience | 13 |
| 1.5 Terminology | 13 |
| 1.6 Difficulties associated with producing the Review | 15 |
| 2. Basic principles for planning ‘for’ and ‘with’ the DP | 17 |
| 2.1 The case for incremental temporary human settlement | 18 |
| 2.2 The importance of DP participation | 19 |
| 2.2.1 When to gather information about the population | 20 |
| 2.2.2 What tools are available to assist THS planners in getting to know their clients? | 21 |
| 2.2.3 How can DPs be involved in planning for their THS? | 23 |
| 3. Towards Sustainability | 25 |
| 3.1 ‘Planning for’ not ‘planning of’ a THS | 25 |
| 3.2 The ‘best fit’ for THS | 27 |
| 3.3 Key considerations for THS sustainability | 33 |
| 3.3.1 Protection | 33 |
| 3.3.2 Security | 36 |
| 3.3.3 Access | 42 |
| 3.3.4 Environment | 45 |
| 3.3.5 Local Population | 49 |
| 3.3.6 Characteristics of the DP | 51 |
| 3.3.7 Host Authority | 53 |
| 3.3.8 Donor Attitudes | 54 |
| 4. Current constraints to sustainability | 55 |
| 4.1 Objective setting and ‘client focused’ coordination | 55 |

| | |
|--|-----------|
| 4.2 Organisational mandate | 56 |
| 4.3 Influences on agency action | 58 |
| 4.3.1 Internal | 58 |
| 4.3.2 External | 59 |
| 4.4 Political and financial imperatives | 60 |
| 4.5 Media coverage and ‘visibility’ | 61 |
| 5. THS planning phases | 63 |
| 5.1 What is meant by ‘the process’? | 63 |
| 5.2 The actors and their roles | 65 |
| 5.3 Coordinated information gathering phase | 69 |
| 5.3.1 Win support through constructive advocacy | 72 |
| 5.3.2 The need for a professional lead | 72 |
| 5.3.3 What type of information should be gathered? | 73 |
| 5.3.4 Where to find it? | 74 |
| 5.3.5 Develop local capacity and stockpile information | 77 |
| 5.3.6 How is information gathered used? | 78 |
| 5.3.7 The benefits of working together | 81 |
| 5.4 Coordinated planning phase | 83 |
| 5.4.1 When should coordinated contingency planning be considered? | 85 |
| 5.4.2 Who should be involved in contingency planning? | 86 |
| 5.4.3 What should the contingency plan consider? | 87 |
| 5.5 What if there has been no opportunity for advanced planning? | 90 |
| 6. Typical scenarios | 91 |
| 6.1 Hartisheik, Ethiopia, 1988 | 92 |
| 6.2 Nepal, 1991-1997 | 97 |
| 6.3 Tanzania, 1994 | 102 |
| 6.4 Sri Lanka, 1995-1996 | 111 |
| 6.5 Monrovia, Liberia, 1990-1996 | 115 |

| | |
|--|------------|
| Annex 1 - Current initiatives | 121 |
| Acronyms | 124 |
| End Notes and References | 125 |
| Bibliography and further reading | 129 |
| Boxes | |
| 1 The growth in complex emergencies | 9 |
| 2 The failure of camps for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh | 12 |
| 3 The Rwandese refugee camps in South Kivu, 1995 | 21 |
| 4 Sudanese refugees in the Moyo District of Uganda | 30 |
| 5 The impact of Afghan refugees on the Pakistani environment | 31 |
| 6 The economic benefits of hosting refugee populations | 31 |
| 7 The consequences for local Hondurans in assisting refugee from El Salvador, 1979-1980 | 34 |
| 8 Sudanese rebel factions split between camps in Kenya, 1994 | 37 |
| 9 Lack of cultural awareness cause problems in Nepal | 37 |
| 10 The Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 | 39 |
| 11 Children targeted by rebels in Uganda | 39 |
| 12 The UNHCR guidelines on the protection and care of children | 40 |
| 13 Negotiated access, the basis of Operation Lifeline Sudan | 42 |
| 14 Restricted access to the Hartisheik camps in Eastern Ethiopia | 43 |
| 15 Hosting refugees incorporated in to local planning at Luwani, Malawi, 1991 | 44 |
| 16 Target area resistance in Nepal | 44 |
| 17 The depletion of natural resources, Ngara, Tanzania, 1994 | 45 |
| 18 Environmental impact of camps now high on the agenda | 46 |
| 19 Sustainable forestry in Malawi | 48 |
| 20 Environmental objectives for THS planning | 49 |
| 21 From refugee sites to established border settlements, Malawi | 51 |
| 22 International Red Cross and Red Crescent Code of Conduct | 54 |
| 23 Agency self-promotion in Goma, Rwanda | 61 |

| | | |
|----|---|-----|
| 24 | A ‘bad’ camp | 62 |
| 25 | THS planning process | 64 |
| 26 | The ICRC in Afghanistan | 67 |
| 27 | Strategic planning outside the humanitarian field | 70 |
| 28 | Using local knowledge in Zaire | 75 |
| 29 | Satellite technology used during the Great Lakes crisis | 76 |
| 30 | Sharing of information in Goma | 78 |
| 31 | Coordination - a key shortcoming in humanitarian relief efforts | 80 |
| 32 | Establishing good relationships | 81 |
| 33 | Considerations for the strategic information gathering phase | 82 |
| 34 | Rwandese crisis demonstrates limits of contingency planning | 83 |
| 35 | Kuwaiti refugees expected and planned for during Gulf War | 84 |
| 36 | Disaster planning in Bangladesh | 86 |
| 37 | Rwandese encouraged to cross into Tanzania, April 1994 | 89 |
| 38 | Factors leading to segregated camp option | 96 |
| 39 | Lessons Learned in Nepal | 101 |
| 40 | Lessons Learned in Ngara, Tanzania | 108 |
| 41 | Lessons Learned in Karagwe, Tanzania | 111 |
| 42 | Lessons Learned in Sri Lanka | 115 |
| 43 | Lessons Learned in Liberia | 119 |

Figures

| | | |
|---|---|----|
| 1 | ‘Segregation versus integration’ spectrum | 79 |
| 2 | A coordinated response? | 81 |

1

Introduction

1.1 The Good Practice Review in context

The growth in complex emergencies in the North since the demise of the cold war continues to challenge the traditional conceptualisation of relief assistance. Emergencies and the need for temporary settlements are not new, but on humanitarian grounds, large scale complex emergencies are increasingly demanding a revision of the accepted mode of practice of providing for DP (displaced population) human settlement needs.

Box No. 1

The growth in complex emergencies

In 1995, 38 million people fled civil conflict and more than 160 million were affected by natural disasters. To provide for this, 3.4 billion US dollars were spent in addition to the 4.2 million tonnes of food aid distributed. This scale of response is six times higher than a decade ago at the height of the famines in Ethiopia and Sudan (Walker)¹.

Such figures underscore the need for improved performance and nowhere is this more relevant than in the physical planning and human settlement sector.

No longer are DPs a purely southern phenomenon, barracked in fields of plastic tents living a refugee camp existence. Climate, expectation and considerations of improved practice suggest that alternative settlement for DPs should be considered where emphasis is placed on human needs and not purely on technical issues. This Review argues that such concerns should form the basis of THS (temporary human settlement) planning wherever the need may arise.

The discussion starts from the premise that while prevention is better than cure - it is far better that mass population movements are prevented from happening and that the need to plan for and actually provide temporary settlement be eliminated - reality is such that mass population movements do happen and that planning for these movements and the temporary settlement needed to accommodate them can be improved.

This sixth in the series of RRN Good Practice Reviews aims to contribute to the discussion of what constitutes good, or at least better, practice in the area of planning temporary human settlement for DPs. It is not a technical manual about how to design the layout of a DP settlement. Camp planning guides, such as the UNHCR Emergency Handbook and the relevant sections in RedR's (Registered Engineers for Disaster Relief) Engineering in Emergencies, (1995), detail this process. It seeks to broaden discussion beyond the 'default camp option', opening up choices of settlement alternatives, contending that the location in which a DP is assisted lies at the core of issues concerning the political, environmental and economic sustainability of DP assistance.

Where possible, the author has drawn on actual field and programme experience to illustrate points. Some are inevitably used to illustrate examples of 'bad' practice. However, in so doing it is recognised that the programmes cited will have been faced with serious constraints as to what they could and could not achieve. These operational constraints are very real for the front line in all of these discussions - the field worker. Apologies in advance therefore, to anyone who may feel that programmes that they have been involved with are unfairly criticised if they are used as examples to illustrate points in the text. This is not the intention of the Review. The benefit of hindsight is a valuable privilege.

1.2 The purpose of the Review

Until now, the longer term implications for assistance programmes of the choice of area or region in which DPs are to be located have often been overlooked or

even dismissed on the basis that such considerations are too complex or politically sensitive to interfere with. Consequently, current practice remains focused on site specific physical details of locations for ‘camps’, viewed essentially from an engineering and architectural perspective. Typically, sites are allocated by a host authority in areas which are uninhabited, environmentally fragile and offer little potential for the development of activities or initiatives which work towards DP self sufficiency. It may even be for precisely these reasons that they are on offer. Increasingly, however, it is clear that the choice of the location needs to be viewed as a crucial factor in a development process. The Review suggests that if such an objective were to form the basis of current practice, issues of sustainability, dependency, cost recovery, ownership and participation would gain greater prominence. As it is, these issues rarely feature outside textbooks and evaluations.

Where people live largely determines their ability to meet their basic needs. For DPs, the location in which they are allowed to live will form the basis of their survival strategy and dictate, to a large extent, their ability to integrate with the local population and economy. For the local population, a rapid and dramatic increase in the numbers of people living in an area may impose an unsustainable burden on already fragile economies and environments, which can lead to further suffering and even conflict.

However, if DPs are considered as a resource, THS location also has the potential to contribute and provide stimulus to local and regional economies.

This Review therefore makes two principal contentions: i) that best, or better practice, in the sector, should be dedicated to ‘planning for’ THS in emergencies, not ‘planning of’ camps or sites and that ii) the necessary shift to longer term or realistic project life planning will need to be clear exactly who the response is being planned for and ensure that the option of targeting assistance programmes to provide for both the DP and the host population is considered; ‘target area’ as opposed to ‘target group’ planning.

To a certain extent, parallels can be drawn with and lessons learned from the way in which countries prone to natural disasters plan for the eventuality. A programmatic approach is adopted in the knowledge that at some point in the future there will be a need to address the disaster and that organisations and agencies involved should be prepared. Current preparations for the predicted El Niño drought in Southern Africa offer an example of such planning. (See

Box 2). It is argued that a similar systematic approach to planning for emergency prompted THS needs should be adopted.

Hastily created ‘camps’ located in inappropriate locations have become the norm for DP shelter and settlement responses. This ‘business as usual’ approach is becoming less and less acceptable for many concerned with the welfare and provision of assistance to emergency affected populations. Before camps become totally encultured as acceptable semi-permanent solutions, we need to consider what can be done to improve on this present practice by planning for and acting in favour of more sustainable and humane emergency human settlements.

Box No. 2

The failure of camps for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh

The camps established for the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh provide an extreme example of the failure of ‘camps’ to meet human needs from the location in which they live. It seems clear that the conditions the Rohingyan refugees had to endure fell below any standard of human settlement. The extremely cramped conditions in the camps provided opportunities for maintaining lives, but very little else. Yet the objective of humanitarian relief programmes is generally to reduce suffering. We need to ensure that in the process of reducing short term suffering, THS programmes are not designed such that they create the potential for long term suffering for either the DP or local population.

Reconceptualising the implications of location for DP programmes reinforces increasing awareness that today’s emergencies no longer fall into the category of temporary and short-lived. The enduring presence of many ‘camps’ poses a real challenge to the notion of temporality and has been a significant consideration throughout the preparation of this Review. Changing the paradigm will be a demanding and challenging task requiring significant policy, organisational and structural changes between and within organisations involved in the process of planning for THS. Before such a change can be considered, there is a need for open discussion and debate of the options. In each context, a different approach will need to be adopted.

1.3 Scope

Discussion in the following pages is concerned primarily with population displacement as a result of conflict (complex emergencies) as it is such movements which have accounted for the greatest concentrations of DPs since the end of the cold war. Discussion of return, resettlement and integration as understood by UNHCR's 'Durable Solutions' for displaced populations, lies outside the scope of this Review, nor will it consider the process of villagisation or forced grouping of ethnic groups for political or military convenience.

1.4 Intended audience

The Review was written with two principal audiences in mind; those concerned with setting policy for human displacement responses and programme managers from the NGO, UN, donor, Red Cross and host government sectors at both headquarters and field level. It is also of relevance to technical specialists, who, frequently being the first to arrive at a new emergency, may find the Review to be of help in providing a wider, non-technical context for the decisions they are asked to make.

1.5 Terminology

Displaced Population (DP) - Throughout the Review, the term 'Displaced Population' is used. The term refers to both 'International Refugees' and to 'Internally Displaced Persons'. Reference to refugee or IDP will only be made where there is a need for increased specificity. In the context of this Review, it is considered that the problems of both groups, if not the responses to them, are essentially the same.

Temporary Human Settlement (THS) - this term has been chosen to replace the more widely used terms of 'camp' or 'site'. Camps are considered to be one form of THS. There is considerable institutional resistance to the use of this term, primarily related to the notion that a 'settlement' indicates permanency. This is particularly the case for 'refugee' programmes where camps are, for a number of actors involved, considered to be short lived in order to provide a temporary solution to a temporary problem.

For the purposes of this Review, a THS refers to a location where DPs are assisted with shelter and other forms of humanitarian assistance. It refers to

human settlements and as such argues in favour of employing human settlement planning practices. Crucial to the term is the notion of community. A THS is considered to be a collection of dwellings forming a community, which is planned for on the understanding that assistance may be provided on a short-term or semi-permanent basis. It refers to the built environment in which DPs are temporarily accommodated. It does not refer to nor is it intended to cause any confusion with the term ‘settlement’ or ‘resettlement’ as used by UNHCR.

The Review contends that the choice of where to locate DPs will fundamentally affect the assistance programme in three key ways:

- it is of significant to a DP’s chances of working towards self sufficiency;
- it will have a major impact on life cycle costs;
- it has the potential to be beneficial to the local host population and the DP.

Sustainable - refers to the environmental, political and economic sustainability of THS options. It has been difficult to escape using the term ‘durable’ in this context. This is unfortunate as its use has very special meaning for the UNHCR. In the eyes of UNHCR, a ‘durable solution’ refers to the final solution to a refugee crisis. However, it has been difficult to find a satisfactory alternative to the word which, understood in the pure sense, describes much of what this Review essentially seeks to communicate. Camp locations tend to be placed in fragile environments in which the survival needs of a population are provided for. They can be expensive, artificial and thus, more often than not, unsustainable in the currently understood interpretation of this term.

The reason for this emphasis on longer-term planning horizons is partly a response to the fact that many ‘camps’ last far longer than originally intended. As such, they tend towards ragged collections of dwellings which bear witness to the fact that when originally planned more attention was paid to the engineering and technical interpretation of international standards and guidelines which cater specifically for refugee camps, than to the social and economic rights of the DP. The consequence is usually sterile, rigidly planned replicas of so many camps that have been before them. The crucially important human element is often missing.

The Review will, by drawing on recent literature and the Peer Group’s experiences, try to suggest ways in which THS can be made more durable, sustainable, solid, self-supporting (or however the reader prefers to phrase it).

1.6 Difficulties associated with producing the Review

Discussion of ‘planning for’ as distinct from ‘planning of’, taken together with the contention that current THS solutions do not always meet essential criteria, led the author and editorial team into a potentially very wide-ranging discussion of many aspects of humanitarian assistance delivery. The process inevitably led to discussion of a number of professional disciplines involved in emergency responses and the need to expand the professional profile of aid agency staff and redefine coordination structures to adequately address the process of planning for DPs generally.

The second principal hurdle relates to access to documented examples of efforts to seek alternatives to camp solutions. While this argument is not new, and many aid professionals involved in discussions around the production of this Review agreed that the continued preference for camps as the only solution to the accommodation needs of a DP could not be justified, evidence to support alternatives was often hard to come by. Literature on the subject has long supported the idea of boosting coping mechanisms and local capacity to absorb DP influxes, but it has proved difficult to identify agency documentation of where this has happened for large scale DP movements. In part, this is because little written material is published or made available by agencies. Indeed despite the fact that the number of IDPs in the world now far outnumbers that of refugees, suitable case study material on programmes designed specifically for IDPs has not been forthcoming. It is reasonable to assume that, as IDPs are less well catered for by the international humanitarian system, there are more likely to be significant numbers of IDPs who have resolved their own survival needs. There must be lessons to be learned from this experience; lessons which can then be applied to crises where the international community does become involved. These need documenting and sharing.

2

Basic principles for planning ‘for’ and ‘with’ the DP

The following discussion will attempt to draw the reader’s attention to basic principles, such as DP involvement, which should underpin all planning processes, and will in the longer-term contribute to the success or otherwise of the THS outcome.

The practice of planning for THS in emergencies has typically been *ad hoc*, responding to each new crisis as it occurs. Such ‘reactive’ responses contradict good practice in the physical planning profession, where long-term considerations determine short-term planning and action. Well planned human settlements recognise the importance of ecological viability, economic efficiency, satisfaction of physiological needs, social setup and spatial organisation. ‘The final arbiter in settlement planning is the target population, and the most important criterion of success is the well-being of that population over a period of time’ (UNCHS 1984²).

THS planning over the long-term thus needs to incorporate consideration of both physical and non-physical factors. Examples include access to resources; markets; affordable communication and the ability of the community to invest in and modify its built environment in step with its own evolutionary development.

2.1 The case for incremental temporary human settlement planning

The principle of phased THS development is based on the idea of minimum necessary infrastructure. This will allow for future development in line with the inhabitants’ social, cultural and aspirational needs. By adopting a flexible physical layout and design, the option of further development in line with the DP’s preferences is left open.

There are a number of reasons for adopting a phased planning approach:

- it supports the notion that planning of settlements during the emergency phase is the prelude to a more sustainable and acceptable settlement;
- it avoids overly detailed plans and allows for early development of a physical framework;
- it avoids ambitious funding requirements and offers the best chance of being able to accomplish immediate objectives;
- it allows the location to be settled rapidly;
- it allows for maximum involvement of DPs in decisions about final design of their settlement and in actual construction of it. It thus helps build community identity;
- it balances the desire for speed with the need for sustainability of responses by avoiding solutions which appear fast, but which cannot later be easily maintained;
- it allows for both natural and rapid (new influx) population growth.

There are parallels here with the way that people self settle during periods of rapid urban settlement. It is, to a large extent, a natural process imitating what would happen if people were left to their own unconstrained devices. Zetter³ argues that ‘extensive research drawn from many cities in the developing world, describes processes of informal settlement consolidation and upgrading remarkably relevant to the situation of refugee camps... Despite their structural and procedural limitations, these tested processes of mass housing supply for the urban poor, provide a technology for an enabling approach - an ‘upgrading’

or ‘progressive development’ model - replicable for refugee settlements’.

It should, however, be noted that the ability and willingness of DPs to participate in the upgrading and development process of their new settlement, will be constrained not only by the considerations outlined later in Chapter 3, but also by factors which will include the following:

- uncertainty about the duration of exile;
- legal status and access to land tenure;
- access to construction materials and funding.

These are largely structural factors which relief agencies will have minimal control over, but are considerations which challenge the basis of current DP assistance policy.

2.2 The importance of DP participation

Throughout the following sections, the need for participation and collaboration between all partners to the emergency programme will be stressed. Why is DP participation in temporary human settlement planning so important?

Mention is made in much literature of the role that participatory planning can play in reducing the potential for conflict amongst various parties. There are also sound moral and programmatic reasons why beneficiaries should be involved in the planning and management of what are basically their homes, in principle temporary, but which in many of today’s emergencies may need to house them for several years. “Disaster response assistance should never be imposed upon the beneficiaries. Effective relief and lasting rehabilitation can best be achieved where the intended beneficiaries are involved in the design, management and implementation of assistance programme”⁴. As well as acknowledging the issue of human dignity, this also recognises the value of participation. Without participation, assistance will be imposed on a compliant, but possibly increasingly resistant population.

A cautionary note about representation

As programmes adopt a participatory approach, it will be necessary to ensure that information is gathered about all sections of the DP. For fear of stating the obvious, a DP is not a homogenous group of people. It will be subject to its own dynamics and social relationships. These will be unique to every DP. For

a THS planning team, it is therefore important to ensure that DP representation which claims to speak for and represent the whole DP is indeed representative and non-partisan.

Vulnerable groups are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 but typically, they will be amongst the poorest members of the DP and may be unused to speaking out about their circumstances or claiming the right to be heard. Conversely, wealthier groups within the DP will be more comfortable about making their needs heard.

Failure to incorporate each groupings' concerns into the planning process runs the risk of failure to serve the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable sectors of the DP.

2.2.1 When to gather information about the population

Use of expertise from countries of origin can be used throughout the planning phases. Opportunities need to be found to establish a common understanding between all parties at the earliest opportunity. Cultural, religious and ethnic information is crucial to the planning of any programme.

THS location and design play an important role in enabling the host authority and international community to extend protection to DPs, a major consideration of responsible THS planning, explored in more detail in Chapter 3. It is therefore vital that agencies gather information as early in a programme as possible. Here the role of ethnographers or sociologists will come to the aid of the physical planners. The way in which communities are normally organised should be reflected in the settlement design. Emphasis on community structures and modes of organisation should be reinforced through the actual physical layout and design of a settlement.

Emergency affected populations may have endured extreme trauma prior to their arrival at their new THS. The role of the 'settlement' or built environment in supporting social order and the maintenance of social harmony should be fully appreciated. Spatial organisation needs to correspond to elements of social structure and kinship and social stratification, but also to social/organisational norms such as those defining the roles of the sexes and age groups. For this reason, overly 'planned' settlements in the absence of the DP, will almost certainly be limiting their chance of success as measured by the long term well-being of the population. An analogy may be that of European communities

which were presented with socially heterogeneous high rise, apartment block solutions to the urbanisation process.

2.2.2 What tools are available to assist THS planners in getting to know their clients?

Tools are available, which in the absence of professional assistance, can assist the THS planning team to get to know the population they are trying to serve. UNHCR has developed field manuals which use People Oriented Planning (POP)⁵. This approach recognises that refugees (DPs in the context of this Review) do not represent an homogenous group of people and argues that unless the population to be served is understood, then from the agencies' perspective, programmes will suffer in terms of efficiency, cost effectiveness and protection and from the beneficiary perspective, culture and tradition may be relegated to a status of low importance at the very time when they are looking to the familiar for support.

Box No. 3

The Rwandese refugee camps in South Kivu, 1995

'Differences in wealth can be seen simply in the space available for and surrounding shelters. Simple folk have plastic sheeting covering an area of some 12-16m², divided into two rooms by an earthen partition. In one room, 6 people of different ages and sex may be piled together on one mat under a single blanket. The better-off use their money and intimidation of census takers to accumulate shelters and negotiate more space. Although individual conditions are less harsh in the minority of 'rich' neighbourhoods.... there is a serious lack of privacy for everyone, which is particularly painful in light of the Rwandese cultural habits: typical Rwandese dwellings tend to be well spread out, opening onto a courtyard; control of one's emotions is very much the rule - for example, in the presence of a stranger to the family, the only outward sign of intimacy, even between married couples, would be shaking hands almost at arms' length. According to one woman from the élite who drew my attention to the problem, overcrowding in the tents and proximity to

continued overleaf

Box No. 3 (continued)
 neighbouring 'dwellings' - in some camps, tents are almost touching - inhibits "any expression of emotion whether positive or negative". Partners have to go elsewhere to settle their disputes... Such customs have to be overcome if the aggressiveness or tenderness so much part of the dramatic circumstances of the camps may be expressed.'
 Danielle de Lame (RRN Newsletter No. 5 June 1996)

The example in the Box graphically illustrates the importance to the THS planning team of an understanding of the background and demographics of a DP. When possible, consideration for such traditions can be factored into the final settlement design, by allowing for a more culturally acceptable layout of the settlement. Involvement of the beneficiaries, in this case, may have helped cater for these needs which were of particular importance to the refugee population or at the very least, agreed on an acceptable solution within the spatial constraints of the camps.

Participation of beneficiaries can offer many advantages to the assistance programme. It supports the existing coping mechanisms by building self esteem, reduces lethargy and feelings of isolation and worthlessness. Cost savings can be made by utilising the professional and skilled people from within the DP which can help avoid costly mistakes. Protection can be promoted through participation as it helps to build the values and sense of community that reduces protection problems. Ultimately, participation will help towards the goal of self sufficiency and sustainability.

Participation can also help to address the issue of agency accountability to the population they are serving. This aspect of assistance is one that is frequently overlooked as agencies continue to view themselves as being accountable to their donors rather than the community they are working to serve.

There are of course, limitations to DP participation in the planning process. Participation may not be the most appropriate option to enable complex technical decisions to be made. Pragmatism and balance need to guide decisions related to technical and resource constraints.

2.2.3 How can DPs be involved in planning for their temporary settlement?

It is difficult to imagine a situation where a DP will be involved in an information gathering phase (see Chapter 5 for examination of different planning phases). Emphasis needs to be on getting to know who the population is likely to be and gathering information about them. Experts with local knowledge of the pre-displaced populations' place of origin can be used for this. Examples might be relevant university research departments, consultants, anthropologists etc.

It may also be possible to identify expatriates from the pre-displaced population working within the country or region. If this is so, information from such people will be invaluable in both the information gathering and planning phases.

However, at the point of displacement and transit, every effort should be made to identify representative persons from the DP who can contribute to the detailed planning of the THS option. Care needs to be taken that the people identified are truly representative. In reality, it is rare to be able to identify real leaders early on in the emergency and planners should be resigned to a trial and error process. Community social officers need to be an integral part of the planning team, working alongside technical staff. Their knowledge will help in the identification process.

Towards Sustainability

3.1 ‘Planning for’ not ‘planning of’ a THS

As mentioned in Chapter 1, as a sector within the relief community, the staff typically concerned with THS are technical specialists working on camp or site planning, water and sanitation, roads etc. In other words, predominantly engineers. The concerns of the site planning engineers relate essentially to the provision and maintenance of physical resources and the location in which they have been asked to construct the THS. Primary concerns thus relate to specific layout by developing a site plan which details roads, blocks for shelters, water points, latrines, health centres, feeding centres, administrative zones and so on.

This is not ‘planning for’ a THS. It is the ‘planning of’ a THS. This Review seeks to analyse and offer ways of improving planning before a decision to develop a THS has been taken. The two activities are linked, but distinct, with the former feeding into the operational planning of the latter.

The process of ‘planning for’ a THS should thus be viewed not only as a technical process, but as a part of the managerial process of planning for emergencies. It is a process which demands input from and will be enhanced by technical experts, but one which should not be left to technicians alone.

Technicians provide the ‘know how’ rather than the ‘why’. At the risk of offending technical experts, it is far too important for this. A macro, non-sectoral perspective is required. A wide cross-section of professional expertise has a role to play in the process. A ‘planning team’ may thus include land use planners, socio-economists, health specialists, engineers, architects, sociologists, community service specialists, and programme managers.

To be coordinated effectively, the roles of these different professional interests must be understood by managers who have a clear understanding of the importance and value of good THS planning. Recognising this and realigning practice in favour of better coordinated decision-making is perhaps one of the most significant challenges the sector faces.

These considerations have equal validity for new, emergency-provoked population movements and in advance of re-siting of existing settlements i.e. when people are moved to preferred locations or to relieve overcrowding and reduce population densities.

Currently, when faced with a large population needing shelter and a location in which to live, enormous pressures are brought to bear on the field level decision-making process. In the absence of a planned response about where DP shelter and accommodation are to be provided, it is not uncommon for quick and ill-considered decisions to be taken. This is not necessarily the fault of the person(s) taking the decision. They will be basing their decision on the best information available at the time and the situation confronting them. At that point in time, to start considering long-term sustainability objectives may seem absurd and wholly unrealistic to them. Their most pressing and legitimate concern will be to find somewhere, possibly anywhere, to begin the process of establishing a ‘site’ where they can deliver assistance services.

The aim of ‘planning for’ therefore seeks to take some of this last-minute reactive decision-making out of the process. To avoid costly human and financial mistakes borne out of poor preparedness and pre-planning, offer more humane alternatives to the DP and realise opportunities for regional development, more effort and consideration needs to be given to the ‘planning for’ process.

This Chapter goes on to look at the ‘ideal’ or ‘best fit’ THS solution for displaced populations, exploring the context and constraints in which decisions are taken. Some practitioners may consider the advice given to be impractical given

operational constraints. It is also recognised that external factors may severely restrict attempts to ‘plan for’. However, the advice contained here may also be applied in situations where the only form of response possible is reactive, provided that soon after the initial displacement and spontaneous settlement, emergency programme managers step back from the situation and review the options available to them to improve the current situation.

A ‘best fit’ solution in the context of this Review is considered to be one in which the DP is able to live in relative dignity and security, work towards self-reliance in its new environment and which enables the humanitarian community to work with and deliver necessary services to the beneficiaries.

It is in the interests of all involved in the emergency to locate a THS in an appropriate area where life cycle costs can be limited. Remote marginal locations carry with them up-front and hidden costs, both financial and human. Over time, the financial costs will tend to be borne by the host country and the international community and the human cost by the DP and local population.

3.2 The ‘best fit’ for THS

This Review favours an approach to THS which considers the mid- to long-term needs of a DP and the affected local population. This is not a new approach; the majority of literature on DP camp and site planning states that camps should be the last resort, favouring the idea of assisting a DP to help itself, arguing that in so doing, there will be a greater chance of self-sufficiency and reduced dependency. This is essentially the concept of ‘enablement’ which argues that when people are provided with an enabling and supportive environment, they will adopt a survival strategy which is appropriate to their needs. It is argued that in many situations the interests of the DP and the local population are closely linked and, where circumstances allow, should be considered collectively. The country studies in Boxes 4, 5 and 6 on pages 31 and 32 offer some examples of situations in which a DP has been successfully integrated with local populations.

Whilst lip service is paid to the ‘ideal’ of self-sustaining solutions, little advice or explanation of exactly what the alternatives to camps are and the constraints to achieving them, is offered. Not surprisingly then, camps have become the default option adopted by international agencies for THS during emergencies.

Yet estimates suggest that only a small percentage of the world's DPs are accommodated in camps. Where are the remainder? It has to be concluded that they have self-settled i.e. found their own means of survival. Absorption into host communities, be they rural or urban, is most frequently the preferred option. What does this tell us about the camp solution? Could it be that, when options exist, DPs prefer not to be placed into an unknown location with little access to local markets and where prospects for independent survival are very limited? If large numbers of DPs are able to survive largely unaided in self-selected circumstances outside camps, does this not suggest that, as a form of response, international relief programmes should be considering ways of supporting this scenario? (The examples taken from Sri Lanka, explored further in Chapter 6, provide useful indications as to the preferred settlement patterns of DPs and also some of the longer term challenges faced by this choice).

Relief efforts aimed at bolstering local capacity may need to consider casting a wider net than assistance to a particular population in a fixed and largely inhospitable camp location. The programme could consider assisting an area rather than a specific group of people; 'target area' versus 'target population'.

There are of course many issues to be resolved before being able to adopt this approach and it is unlikely that an integrated or 'target area' approach will be appropriate in all circumstances (see Chapter 4). However, as a concept increasingly considered by many humanitarian policy makers and programmers as the way forward, it is worthy of further discussion, not least between development and emergency desks as it emphasises the need to consider holistic responses which bridge the gap between humanitarian action and development.

To achieve this, it will be necessary for programme planners to consider a wide range of locations and try to **match** the incoming DP to local circumstances such that the '**best fit**' is achieved; a fit which considers the potential of the incoming human and financial resources against the potential of the location/area/region to absorb and benefit from them. Accordingly, programme planners would: review regional economies, social and physical infrastructure, DP and local population compatibility, social carrying capacity of the local population for a number of locations; decide on the location which has the potential to sustain and benefit from the new human and financial resources entering the region; and consider ways in which both relief and broader development objectives can be met through appropriate allocation and channelling of the funds which will follow the DP. In short, the 'best fit' location.

This will be a challenging and demanding task, calling for a remodelling of current practice. There a number of policy and institutional hurdles to be crossed before it can be applied. In particular, emergency relief, rehabilitation and development response mechanisms need to be integrated and planned for in an holistic and coordinated manner. In so doing, mutual support can be programmed in at the earliest possible stage.

The challenge of integrating local and regional development needs to support the new influx is significant. It is a challenge which should not fall to emergency planners alone. It calls for:

- coordinated information gathering and planning beyond the level of current practice;
- host authorities, donors and relief agencies to adopt a more flexible stance on the issue of temporality and accept that DPs can become a semi-permanent phenomenon;
- clear objective setting. Relief programmes too frequently ignore the fact that they are there to ‘assist’ DPs. They are not responsible for providing for their every need. The notion of self-reliance and responsibility can easily be overlooked, supporting the negative image of DPs being helpless and to be taken care of. Assistance programmes need to reorient themselves such that the DP can increasingly take on responsibility for its own well-being. Enabling this to happen should be the task of the relief effort.

With these key objectives in mind, marginal, remote locations afford little opportunity for DPs to contribute to their own well-being and to local and regional development. Planning for permanency? Possibly, but adopting this planning approach will at the very least, begin to align assistance such that it can be of long term benefit to DPs and host communities, local and regional economies alike.

The fact that DPs are a potential resource for host communities is also more often than not overlooked. They bring skills and resources which can contribute to local development initiatives. Studies conducted on Mozambican refugees in Malawi, Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Cambodian refugees in Thailand have identified a number of positive economic impacts on contributing to regional development. The studies suggest that there are direct and indirect economic benefits associated with the presence of a DP population.

Box No. 4**Sudanese refugees in the Moyo District of Uganda**

Moyo District in northern Uganda is currently home to about 100,000 Sudanese refugees in a district where the local population approaches 179,000. Both populations have been affected by armed conflict and displacement over the last twenty years. While the Sudanese refugees currently find themselves exiled in Uganda, many of the national population themselves only returned from Sudan in the late 1980s. The local and national Ugandan authorities have adopted a welcoming and supportive attitude to the refugees, and have made large areas of land available for the creation of settlement villages. There are a number of factors which influenced the programme:

The reciprocal nature of support. The good relations between the two communities is based on the mutual nature of the support offered. During the Obote and Amin era, northern Ugandans were able to move to southern Sudan, many living in the local community, though there was some relief work to help cope with the influx of refugees. northern Ugandans are now in a position to return this hospitality.

Lack of competition for resources. This is an under-developed area of a poor country with few modern resources. The local environment was decimated during Uganda's civil strife and though exacerbated by refugees, their arrival was not its cause. The current activities of the Lord's Resistance Army further south in Gulu have ensured development support remains problematic. Relief operations have improved access to resources in the area, agricultural extension, markets, transport, and goods & services in particular, which have benefited the host and local population alike. Similarly all social and economic development efforts of the local population were limited by poverty and isolation. Relief workers have acknowledged the constraints of the local environment, and have reacted accordingly. The INGO ACORD, for instance, is responsible for food security, environmental rehabilitation, community services and income generation, balancing the needs of both populations which, as the refugees integrate further, become increasingly similar.

Box No. 5

The impact of Afghan refugees on the Pakistani environment

An evaluation looking at the impact of 2 million Afghan refugees on Pakistan concluded that they had beneficially contributed to the economy of the country. Energetic entrepreneurship on the part of the Afghan's had a stimulating effect on local business. There was direct involvement of Afghan entrepreneurs in, for example, the provision of local bus services. In addition, the aid given to refugees must have had a multiplier effect which eventually benefited the host population.

Box No. 6

The economic benefits of hosting refugee populations

UNHCR has recognised the potential for economic benefit which can be derived from the presence of refugee populations. The report from the 6th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme on 6th January 1997 (EC/47/SC.7) recognised that "where voluntary return is not immediately feasible, conditions should be created in the country of asylum for temporary settlement of the refugees and their participation in the social and economic life of the community, so they can contribute to its development... In low income areas, the needs of the local population should also be taken into account; in such areas initiatives may therefore be needed which would permit both refugee and local people to engage in economically productive activities to ensure them a decent livelihood"

This positive view is supported by a UNHCR report looking at the economic impact of Bhutanese refugees in Nepal.⁶ The study concluded that there had been a general increase in the circulation of money; a boom in the construction industry; an increase in the purchasing power of the people and an increase in turnover of business houses. These effects are reported for the region of Jhapa, but the report also notes that much of the non-food items supplied to the region are supplied by firms as far away as Kathmandu.

There are, however, also a number of problems associated with this approach, e.g. over time, the poorest of the local population may have to bear the brunt of the negative impacts such as rising inflation and competition for unskilled work. In other situations, the DP has itself been reduced to virtual slave labour, providing local populations with a source of very cheap labour, but contributing very little, if anything, to the development of the DP as a community.

Currently, the majority of field and international emergency response staff are not sufficiently informed or aware of the alternatives to the camp solution, or more importantly why, if a camp solution is the first choice, this is so. This Review thus seeks to aid conceptualisation of the alternatives such that people involved at the earliest stages of an emergency can begin to ask questions about the broader context in which they are being asked to make decisions and not only concern themselves with technical site specific criteria. It is also apparent that for this approach to be successful, substantial effort needs to be invested into advance information gathering and planning, developed in more detail in Chapter 5. The importance of this cannot be over-emphasised. Knowledge about prevailing conditions and ‘best fit’ options/locations for the DP will be important determinants for the success of the programme.

In order to determine what solution offers the ‘best fit’, planners will need to analyse the context and possible constraints to the ideal scenario. Each DP emergency is unique and as such, will carry a unique set of circumstances. These may or may not pre-dispose a response towards integration of a DP with host populations. Conversely, the programme may consider that DP segregation is in the best interests of all parties. Good practice dictates that the options have been considered as part of a professional and thorough planning phase. It is the effect of going through such a planning process which will begin to move practice towards non-camp alternatives where such are appropriate.

The options can be represented as a spectrum ranging from full integration at one end, to full segregation on the other. As will be illustrated by the case study material presented in Chapter 6, the majority of situations fall somewhere between these two extremes.

This should be of interest to donors and host authorities alike, not to mention the DP itself. From the donor and host authority point of view, a less dependent population means cheaper programmes; for the regional economy it could mean accelerated development and economic stimulation; infrastructure programmes

can be targeted at regional needs rather than purely the logistic and survival needs of running a DP programme in an isolated and remote location.

3.3 Key considerations for THS sustainability

As noted above, not all situations lend themselves to a policy of integration with host populations however recommended that option may seem. Where DP location appears along the notional ‘integration-segregation spectrum’ will depend on a number of factors which all need consideration before the ‘best fit’ temporary settlement option can be determined. The principle issues identified by this Review are examined below.

3.3.1 Protection

The term protection here refers to safeguarding a DP from the origins of the crisis from which it has fled.

The legal status of the displaced population will to some extent determine what levels of protection a DP can hope to expect from the international community (see section 4.2). Refugees i.e. those defined and recognised by the international community as ‘a person who is outside his country of origin and who, due to well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself of that country’s protection’ (UNHCR 1982⁷) will generally benefit from greater international protection than those who are displaced within their own country, the so-called Internally Displaced Populations (IDPs), although in practice, even this may be severely restricted by circumstances. IDPs are legally said to be beneficiaries of the protection that their own government or state can provide, irrespective of the fact that most will have moved because their own government has been unable to extend protection to them⁸, or in some cases is the perpetrator of the oppression or violence from which they have fled.

When planning for THS, evidence indicates that protection is the most important consideration. The concept of siting refugee camps away from the border with their country of origin seeks to provide for protection of both the refugee population and for that of the host country and local population. It should not be forgotten that the host authority will inevitably have national security as its main concern. Concerns about locating DPs away from local populations may be extremely valid where there is evidence that its presence could lead to instability or conflict on their own soil and must be recognised during the THS

planning process. An example is provided by the experience of Hartisheik, Ethiopia in 1988 described in more detail in Chapter 6.

DPs are also often considered to be a security threat to the force which has expelled them, acts of sabotage for example, well founded in the case of Goma for instance. This can prompt retaliatory attacks on the DP and, also expose the host population to extreme danger.

Such considerations also apply to IDPs. Whilst they may not have crossed a border to seek protection, it is equally important that they are temporarily settled a good distance from the frontline of a conflict or outside the area of influence of the aggressor force. An example of how complex such concerns can be is given in Box no. 7.

Box No. 7

The consequences for local Hondurans in assisting refugees from El Salvador, 1979-1980

The Civil War in El Salvador, which escalated between 1979 and 1980, resulted in the flight of some 35,000 Salvadoran refugees into Honduras. During the 1980s, they were housed in 3 camps in Western Honduras.

The flight was horrific - a policy of scorched earth was mounted by the Salvadoran military and the associated death squads to expel the rural populations in conflict zones so as to cut support for the FMLN guerrilla. Detailed refugee testimonies claimed that the Honduran military collaborated, specifically in the pincer movement massacre on the border as the refugees crossed the Rio Sumpul.

Amnesty International and local churches documented the massacre which left upwards of 500 victims. Physical and legal protection was paramount and locals assisting refugees ran an immense risk.

In spite of the risks, locals assisted seemingly wholeheartedly as international assistance was mobilised. The refugees camped just

continued

Box No. 7 (continued)

inside Honduran territory all along the border in a number of communities that eventually became camps. There were several reports made of Honduran locals (particularly young men) being abducted as a result of their association with the refugees who were seen as subversives or potentially so.

Refugees congregated around local villages camping spontaneously with local populations. There were ethnic, religious, social, cultural and even family links. While the location was very remote, and aid thus complex, costly and slow, a very significant proportion of the refugees wanted to stay. It is possible that for some this was due to proximity to their homes which meant that they could check on their villages, houses, land etc. For others, it meant that they could participate in the war.

There is no doubt that the logistics of aiding the displaced in such locations was complex and costly. Nor does there appear to be any doubt that the camps did support the FMLN. There were major protection issues as death squads infiltrated across the border. Political pressure was brought to bear to have the refugees moved from the border, ostensibly for logistic and protection reasons, but largely to remove them as a source of support for the guerrillas in El Salvador. One large group were convinced, with difficulty, to relocate some 30 miles inland. The two remaining camps, Colomoncagua and San Antonio, staunchly refused to be relocated, remaining by the border (within 10 km.) and resisted for a decade or more all attempts including murder of refugees by the military, to force them to relocate. This not only caused the refugees, but also the local population to suffer from the political/military polarisation.

The location of a THS must also consider protecting the DP from natural hazards such as flooding, earthquakes, volcanic activity and from disease-endemic areas which may pose an extreme public health risk e.g. malaria, sleeping sickness etc.

Issues of protection are frequently cited as justification for DP camps. It is argued that a camp provides a good opportunity to offer protection as the entire DP (at least those which choose to accept international assistance), may be accommodated in one defined area, which may then be guarded. This undoubtedly has some validity. Where the DP is accommodated by the local population or widely self settled, it is clear that agencies are faced with a particularly challenging scenario with regard to protection.

However, if sustainability is to be a goal in planning for THS, the question has to be asked whose needs are being served by a continued reliance on the camp option? Is it possible that issues such as ‘protection’ and agency mandate are being used to provide for ease of management?

3.3.2 Security

In this context, security refers to an individual or group to be protected or kept safe from aggressive or criminal acts by other groups or individuals. In the same way that protection, as defined in the previous section, is considered to be a human right, so are specific security concerns. Security issues will include protection against violence (sexual and other), exploitation and criminal acts. Thus, THS planning needs to ensure optimum government/UN/NGO presence and assistance to the right people at the right time.

The THS planning process needs to consider such security issues when selecting locations e.g. the presence of landmines, actual or suspected, in the area of a proposed THS has very serious implications for the protection of people’s safety as they search for firewood or collect water; equally, areas where banditry poses a real threat to personal safety or there is a known possibility of forcible child abduction into fighting forces, should be avoided or extra precaution taken in designing the response.

Don’t create future problems through bad planning

DP’s are not homogenous communities. They carry with them the many differences and sometimes grievances from their home environment. They may represent many cultural and sectoral groupings, which if ignored or unrecognised in the planning phases can lead to problems later in the programme. It is therefore important that planning for a THS allows for grouping sectors of a DP such that potential for conflict is minimised.

Box No. 8

Sudanese rebel factions split between camps in Kenya, 1994

As part of the Kakuma programme for predominantly Sudanese refugees in Kenya in 1994, various camps were established for different rebel factions. Following a faction split in 1994, it became necessary to establish a further camp for security reasons.

Box No. 9

Lack of cultural awareness causes problems in Nepal

Amongst the Bhutanese refugees in Nepal, polygamous relationships were not uncommon. However, the way in which families were identified, meant that, in some cases, both wives were forced to share a hut, something they had never done before and which caused immense domestic disharmony.

Especially Vulnerable Groups

When planning for THS, consideration needs to be given to reducing the risk of exposure to security concerns. Certain groups within the population are more vulnerable than others to personal or group attack, abuse and exploitation. The challenge is then to plan in such a way that the physical location and design of the settlement minimises negative impacts on vulnerable groups.

Vulnerable groups may include:

- the elderly;
- the mentally or physically disabled;
- the chronically ill;
- children/adolescents alone or cared for by siblings or in a child group;
- female-headed households or women alone;
- ethnic/religious minorities (posing a special problem and possibly needing to be separated).

DPs often consist of a large majority of women and children. This Review will therefore consider these two groups in more detail. Their special protection needs can (at least partially) be addressed by THS planning, hence reducing the risk of exposure to exploitation and physical violence. For these and other

vulnerable groups, strengthening community/traditional protection mechanisms is an important means of addressing the problem: for example, by keeping social groups together, creating clan or village units within a THS, opportunities for mutual support are increased.

Women

Planning for a THS should take account of the occasions when women are most exposed and vulnerable in seeking to reduce exposure e.g. providing for clustering of female-headed households and providing close and visible access to facilities such as water points and latrines where women are particularly exposed or vulnerable to abuse. It should also be noted however, that grouping may be a way of reinforcing vulnerability by isolating individuals. For example, a group of single women might become known as prostitutes (whether or not this is true). It may, therefore, be preferable to link up with traditional structures, for example, locating two female-headed households together but with other ordinary families.

The economic importance of women is frequently overlooked. Displaced women frequently find employment in the informal economy, often as a domestic helper and as a result are able to offer further support to an extended family on their earnings. Appreciating this may well lead to a choice of location which allows relatively easy access for women to potential markets for their skills. However, where local market opportunities for gainful employment are saturated, displaced females often find themselves depending on prostitution as a means of supporting themselves and their families. When this is the case, there are clear implications for the assisting agencies to extend protection from abuse and exploitation⁹.

Children

The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides international support to the settlement planner to consider the particular protection needs of children¹⁰. It is also noteworthy that the UNHCR policy on Refugee Children uses the Convention on the Rights of the Child as guiding principles (UNHCR 1994¹¹).

Selection and allocation of THS options for a DP has direct implications for the ability of the assisting community's capacity to extend a degree of protection. Unaccompanied children, children living with siblings or amongst a child group are a particularly vulnerable group. Frequently they are exploited for military purposes with temporary settlements proving a rich recruitment ground. Young

girls are particularly at risk of rape, abuse and sexual exploitation. Children as a group can be economically exploited through forced child labour. Unaccompanied children who have no adult legally responsible for their welfare are extraordinarily at risk to all of these factors.

Box No. 10

The Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989

Article 2 states:

‘A state must ensure the rights of each child within (its) jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind’.

Article 3 states:

‘In all actions concerning children....the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration’.

Box No. 11

Children targeted by rebels in Uganda

In September 1997, reports produced by Amnesty International in London and Human Rights Watch in New York described in horrifying detail how members of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) a rebel faction in Uganda, have abducted, tortured - and in many cases killed - thousands of mostly teenage children.

Unable to enlist adults to their cause, the rebel commanders round up children seized during raids on villages and schools. They break the spirit of their young captives with brutal initiation rites such as forcing them to murder other children with axes and sticks. Children have formed the backbone of the Lord’s Resistance Army since 1994.

The reports estimate that between 6,000 and 10,000 children have been kidnapped from their homes and schools in Gulu, Kitgum and other districts in northern Uganda. According to Amnesty International, many of the children are between 11 and 16 years of age when they are captured.

Protection of children should also take account of the importance of the environment on their development, an issue well documented by Satterthwaite et al (1996¹²). In this context, the need to be protected from extreme disadvantage due to environmental influences on development has to be understood.

Box No. 12

The UNHCR guidelines on the protection and care of children

These guidelines provide assistance on determining the special needs of children and will be particularly useful for the THS planning process. Although they refer specifically to refugees, they can be equally applied to IDP situations and are also relevant in non-camp environments:

Shelter and environment:

Shelter: ‘Ensure the availability and an adequate standard of shelter and environment, with particular concern for space, privacy and security. Increasingly the shelter and spatial environment imposed on refugees, particularly when families are forced into shared facilities, is minimal and crowded so as to violate all humane standards; conditions are so low that families cannot maintain a normal family life and are without a minimum of privacy.’

Playgrounds and space: ‘The general refugee camp layout should have enough space for playgrounds and other needs for children. The availability, distribution and location of shelter, playgrounds, water points, health centres and recreational facilities all affect the safety and well-being of refugee children. They should be planned in such a way that children are protected from accidents, away from heavy traffic, canals, garbage (rubbish) dumps etc’

‘The camp should be laid out in community entities and groups of entities. Each group should have, to the extent possible, all communal basic facilities for the children. This will ensure that the children are close to all basic facilities and are provided with protection. Keep in mind the need to take into account the overall camp layout, cultural factors and the roles and daily tasks of mothers and children, especially girls.’

'Lack of space for play may force children away from their parents into remote places and streets. In certain refugee situations where refugees are concentrated and marginalised, refugee children may suffer from social isolation and slip into anti-social activities'

'Urban Areas: Give particular attention to material needs, water, sanitation and shelter needs of refugee children living in urban areas. Refugee families increasingly seek refuge in urban areas and, due to extreme poverty and other difficulties related to their refugee status, may live in situations which put children's health at great risk. Overcrowding and lack of space often create problems affecting children such as, for example, very limited possibilities to play.'

On personal security:

'Camp' Settlement character: Maintain the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps or settlements. The presence of armed resistance fighters in or near refugee camps or settlements increases security challenges and other problems.'

'Location: Locate camps or other accommodation at a safe distance from the border of the country of origin or conflict areas to minimise the danger of armed attacks, harassment or military recruitment'

'Safe Living Environment: Promote safe living arrangements for refugee children and their families. Provide living facilities that offer families and communities the most opportunities to protect children. Consider the needs for privacy, adequate space, spatial configuration of camps, lighting at night and special security arrangements'

Ref: Refugee Children: Guidelines on Protection and Care. Geneva 1994

Planning for the security of vulnerable groups?

At the risk of stating the obvious, it is clear that there is a need for planners to get to know the population they are to provide for. This should be considered fundamental to the planning process. Methods for doing this and important considerations were discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. It is particularly important that vulnerable groups are identified. This is often far easier to say than to do as it may be difficult to access the group directly, resulting in indirect

information flows. An example of this would be where women are reluctant to come forward or are very difficult to reach because of social status and taboos.

3.3.3 Access

Much of the preceding discussion has assumed that relief agencies have access to the DP. In order to be able to satisfy much of what has been discussed as being good practice, it is clear that an underlying prerequisite is access to the DP. Without physical access, it is almost impossible to provide assistance which can be monitored or to extend even a minimum of protection.

Access can be constrained by both physical/logistic and political factors. In late 1996/early 1997, the wide dispersal of Rwandese refugees in eastern Zaire, an area with extremely poor communications and restricted physical access, coupled with the DP's (justified) fears of reprisals by ADFL forces, sent many into hiding, making it virtually impossible for the international community to provide either protection or assistance. Political constraints can be equally restrictive. See Box 13.

Box No. 13

Negotiated access, the basis of Operation Lifeline Sudan

Negotiated access is both the greatest strength as well as the greatest weakness of this programme, since it allows government and armed opposition movements to deny OLS access to the people in need. The continuing prohibition on access to the SPLA controlled areas of the Nuba mountains - an area of enormous humanitarian need and appalling human rights abuses - or the denial of flight permission to the displaced peoples' camp of Labone during a recent cholera epidemic, highlight the power which the government continues to exert over OLS and its capacity to hamper operations. The armed opposition movements have, although to a lesser extent, also denied OLS access to key locations, usually citing security considerations.

Ref: Iain Levine. Promoting Humanitarian Principles: The Southern Sudan Experience. RRN Network Paper No.21

Land rights and ownership also have implications for access. For example, in 1994, following the influx of refugees from the Rwandese genocide and war, the Government of Zaire made the land for Kibumba refugee camp available

to accommodate the refugees. However, the owner of the land has since attempted to obtain payment for the land from UNHCR and the IFRC. This did not cause delays to the programme at the time, but such issues, if ignored can easily lead to major difficulties of access later during an emergency programme. It also highlights the problems for local populations who, whether large landowners, or small farmers, may have their land overrun by sudden influxes of DPs and their crops and land irrevocably destroyed without any compensation. Knowing who owns land will make it possible not only to negotiate with them - in the words of one relief worker, this may mean “a few bottles of wine and a goat or something like that”, but also to offer recompense for lost livelihoods.

Poor experience of the choice and siting of temporary settlements has been an unfortunate aspect of recent experience in the sector. Too often, and for many reasons, some of which have been touched upon above, land is allocated by the host authority which is physically inaccessible or extremely difficult to access at times throughout the year.

Box No. 14

Restricted access to the Hartisheik camps in eastern Ethiopia

The Hartisheik camps in Eastern Ethiopia were extremely difficult to access during the rainy seasons. Access roads and areas within the camps themselves had deposits of black cotton soil which are impossible to drive over when wet. This was a very real problem as all water in the camp needed to be transported from Jijiga town, 70kms away.

Settlement location will also determine the sort of access the DPs may have to economic activity. Locating a settlement away from or outside the local economic centres will lead to both increased capital and recurrent costs. If such a remote location is chosen, for the international community to offer something approximating a guarantee of service and commodity provision, funding will have to be found to upgrade, or even construct new roads and facilities. This may represent a significant amount of external capital investment into a region which is remote from future economic development plans. Where it is an agreed and deliberate policy of the host authority however, this may be a desirable outcome. The example from Malawi in Box 15 is illustrative of this point.

Box No. 15**Hosting refugees incorporated into local planning
at Luwani, Malawi, 1991**

In late 1991 the Government of Malawi closed existing Mozambican refugee camps in the southern region to future entry. A new camp was opened in Mwanza district to accept the relocated southerners and new arrivals. This was a watershed in settlement policy as the new Luwani (also known as Lisungwe) camp was located in an area hitherto unpopulated by refugees, at some distance from the border.

In part, the opening of Luwani camp was a response to overcrowding in the southern camps. The decision also represents a deliberate attempt on the part of the Government to incorporate refugee assistance into regional planning and hence use international support to improve conditions for local development.

Luwani was located in an area sparsely populated and farmed by Malawian standards and was also one of the most poorly developed in terms of transport and health infrastructure. It was located in a dry hilly area of Mwanza district amongst two villages, occupying land previously owned by villagers. There were water shortages during the dry season and flooding during the rains. But by choosing this location, the Government hoped to change this situation by using the refugees as a locus of infrastructural development. Little else about the area was appealing.

Box No. 16**Target area assistance in Nepal**

The Government of Nepal allocated land for some of the Bhutanese refugee camps precisely where they wanted roads to be built. This not only opened access to the camps but also provided access to previously remote areas for the host population. Important considerations for developing economic activity in the region.

In the Nepal situation, this was an entirely appropriate enterprise and fits well with much of the argument of this Review i.e. target area assistance. However, it would be less appealing for agencies to be involved in such a deliberate channelling of relief assistance if the host authority was using the DP funding as a means of fulfilling strategic military objectives.

Excluding a DP from access to local economic activity to all intents and purposes ensures that dependency will be ‘cultured’ into the beneficiary population. In such instances, the opportunity to develop basic economic survival strategies is withheld from or made extremely difficult for the beneficiary community. This can result in increased care and maintenance (recurrent) costs; demotivation of DPs - people like to take responsibility for their own well-being and future and lost opportunities to maximise the added stimulus and cash flows into the local and regional economy amongst other things.

3.3.4 Environmental¹³ concerns

Fundamental to the question of viability of THS location is that of the potential of the environment to sustain the new population. This has long been recognised in development programmes. There is now a growing and valid concern that this is also incorporated into THS planning and management in emergency programmes.

The increasing size of DPs resulting from ‘complex emergencies’ and the consequent increase in size of the camps that have been established has attracted fierce criticism on environmental grounds, the contention being that large scale population movements and the establishment of camps happen without regard to the environment of the area. Numerous instances of the devastating and immediate impact that DPs have had on their new environment exist.

Box No. 17

The depletion of natural resources, Ngara, Tanzania, 1994

By November 1994 only a few months after the influx, in the Ngara District of Tanzania during the Rwanda emergency, tree resources within 5 kms of Benaco camp were completely depleted. Natural resources were strained to the point where it was considered possible that they would no longer be adequate for the local population after the emergency. All households had to walk long distances to collect firewood.

It also worth noting that resource depletion and any economic or agricultural hardships associated with it can become a significant contributor to conflict between locals and a DP.

However, degradation means different things to different people. Some argue that changing an environment has the potential to irrevocably degrade it, but not all temporary changes will automatically lead to long-term degradation. Only when the capacity of the environment to revive or revitalise itself has been lost ‘degradation’ can be said to have occurred. For example, if a DP influx extensively harvests fuelwood resources in an area, an outsider looking at that area may declare it to have been degraded. However, it cannot be said to be degraded in the long-term if it is allowed to and has the capacity to revert to its previous state. This debate is mentioned to illustrate one aspect of the controversy which exists about the impact of DPs on their environment.

In the absence of consensus about the long-term effects DPs may have on its environment, common ground can be found on the short-term effects of mass population influxes into an area. Local renewable natural resources can become over-utilised and damage can be done. Forestry and water resources are amongst the most vulnerable. This initial damage is probably unavoidable. The challenge to THS planning is to minimise this initial impact and try to locate the DP where medium term mitigation against prolonged damage is feasible.

There is much international support for sensitive environmental programming. Agenda 21 states that ‘programmes should be developed for handling the various types of migrations that result from or induce environmental disruptions’ (Agenda 21:5:33¹⁴) Much of the environmental criticism of recent large scale relief programmes contends that their physical planning components have failed to address these challenges and, as a consequence of these failures, host communities have had to bear the brunt of the ensuing deprivations.

Box No. 18

Environmental impact of camps now high on the agenda

UNHCR’s environmental guidelines have recently recognised the need to consider environmental impacts of their programmes in a more holistic and environmentally sensitive manner: ‘It has become

continued

Box No. 18 (continued)

clear that refugee-related environmental impacts can have serious negative implications for the health and well-being of the local population as well as that of refugees'. The same document goes on to say 'Host countries have become more sensitive to the potential economic loss they may suffer, due to environmental damage caused by large concentrations of refugees, as well as the lack of consistent policy covering the rehabilitation of damaged areas once refugees are repatriated'.

Ref: UNHCR Environmental Guidelines: Geneva 1996

Little wonder then that land allocated for THS remains at the margin. Host authorities and governments are becoming more aware of the high environmental costs of providing refuge to a displaced population. Why provide good locations to a programme which, from the outset, will give little attention to the preservation and management it requires? In this case, if compelled to host a destructive programme, why not place it where it can do least damage to current economy and future development? These perceptions, can in part be attributed to poor physical and environmental planning in the past.

Influence of temporary human settlement size on the environment

The argument concerning the size of a THS and the effect this has on the environment is particularly contentious. Essentially, the case for large high density settlements argues that inevitable damage will be restricted to one area, whilst the case for a number of smaller settlements argues that there is a greater opportunity for matching population size to the carrying capacity of the local environment i.e. it has the potential to be more sustainable.

A large DP will usually impose an unsustainable burden on its local environment. The demand for fuelwood, building materials (usually poles made from young flexible trees), and water is of such magnitude that the resources are 'mined' i.e. the rate of offtake is greater than the ability of the resource to recover. Mining of wood reserves can increase soil erosion and surface water runoff as ground cover is lost. Increased runoff means reduced infiltration of water into the ground which carries with it the threat of reduced soil moisture (of concern to local agricultural and fuelwood potential) and recharge of groundwater

sources. Increased soil erosion can lead to increased silt load in surface water courses and possible premature siltation of surface water dams.

Box No. 19

Sustainable forestry in Malawi

In Malawi, 98% of energy requirements for cooking and heating are supplied by wood. Prior to repatriation, about 75% of the 1 million refugees lived in integrated settlements with Malawians, where one estimate suggested that they would have consumed an additional 1.08 million tonnes of wood per annum. Without artificial regeneration, i.e. planting of trees, it is likely that this rate of consumption would have been unsustainable.

It is clear that such negative environmental impacts can have a detrimental effect on the potential for the DP and local population to meet their own needs e.g. excessive rates of soil erosion are likely to have a direct influence on agricultural potential of the area as fertile top soil can be washed away and soil fertility declines.

A large population can also bring with it an increased risk of communicable diseases. Environmental health concerns increase as the population size increases. Large camps are notoriously dirty offering breeding grounds for vermin and disease vectors such as rats and mosquitoes. To combat this threat, agencies are increasingly using chemical means of control. This is often in a relatively uncontrolled manner resulting in high (possibly wasteful) application rates and at the risk of chemical contamination of land and water resources.¹⁵

Standard texts on 'site selection' and 'camp planning' suggest that where camps are the recommended option, settlement should be restricted in size to 20-30,000 residents. This may seem implausible to people who were involved in the Great Lakes crisis, but there are sound environmental reasons for attempting to limit the size of a THS. Cosgrave¹⁶ reviewing the practical implications of camp size concludes that there is ample reason to believe that the size of a refugee camp is a significant environmental factor. Larger camps reduce the ability of refugees to care for themselves by limiting access to external resources and may result in higher long-term running costs and/or higher mortality rates among refugees. Every effort should, therefore, be made by those planning camps to limit them in size to maximise the support which refugees can provide

for themselves through their own efforts. This is particularly important if there are concerns about a shrinking funding base for growing numbers of refugees. While small camps might be best for refugees, there is also a need to look at economies of scale in larger settlements.’ He suggests that camps with more than 50,000 people are likely to face problems in (natural) resource provision.

It is clear that further research is required to establish what may be an acceptable size for THS and whether such suggestions are valid.

Box No. 20

Environmental Objectives for THS Planning

- to minimise irreversible impacts on the environment;
- to minimise negative environmental impacts;
- to promote the sustainable use of natural resources;
- to exploit the sustainable potential of natural resources to the full to give maximum benefit to the DP.

3.3.5 Local population

Selection of a settlement location can easily overlook the impact its siting may have on the local population. In rural areas, this can have many adverse effects on the host community. Typically, DPs are marginalised from their hosts in spite of the fact that, if planned and managed correctly, the location of a THS could have a major positive impact on both communities.

A review of much of the contemporary literature on this subject illustrates that human settlement planning, whether temporary or otherwise, is developmental in nature. The impacts of a temporary DP settlement should be evaluated in terms of the costs and benefits for all stakeholders i.e. DPs, hosts, governments, donors and relief agencies. Locational considerations are critical not only in terms of DP survival and well-being but also for the host communities. Therefore, these considerations should be at the crux of planning and settlement policies formulated in DP situations (Zetter 1995¹⁷).

Frequently, and often justifiably, DP programmes and settlements are criticised for maintaining higher standards for the DP than the surrounding populations.

Ignoring these disparities can be very dangerous leading to conflict between the two populations, especially where they are from differing ethnic and religious backgrounds; it can also be extremely wasteful and many of the causes for conflict between host and DP communities can be minimised by careful and considerate planning. Questions of equity come into this debate. Jacobsen¹⁸ arguing in favour of reducing negative environmental impacts, suggests that ‘..interaction between refugees and local people, in the form of trade, sharing of knowledge and participation in community arrangements be encouraged. Just as refugees have access to local resources, so local people should be able to benefit from the assistance provided to refugees such as health care and clean water.’ The situation in the Karagwe district of Tanzania, described in Chapter 6, provides a good example of the negative effects of isolating a local population from DP THS programme planning.

A common source of discontent for a local population, especially one that is poor, is to see refugees receiving services or entitlements which are not available to them. Refugees may have access to services such as education and health which local people do not. UNHCR attempts to eliminate this disparity by making camp-based primary health care available to the local population, secondary care is focused at local hospitals.

Temporarily settling massive numbers of displaced people in a relatively restricted manner has the tendency to produce high densities of population in specific locations. This often produces dramatic and damaging impacts on what may already be a fragile and degrading environment and economy.

Sensitive location of a THS, choosing a location which can contribute to local as well as DP well-being, will thus go a considerable way to reducing the potential for friction which may occur between the two communities. Friction can result in a number of factors: competition for scarce resources such as land, housing, infrastructure services, water and employment as well as the galling experience for host populations of seeing trucks driving through their communities to give supplies to DPs who may in the end be better off than they are, that an “integrated planning approach ..(to the DP temporary settlement issue)..will facilitate the evaluation of potential areas of conflict, and the preparation of land use and spatial development policies which might help to minimise the conflicts and pressures and maximise the developmental opportunities” (Zetter, 1995).

3.3.6 Characteristics of the DP

Clearly the extent to which a DP is likely or willing to fit into the region in which it is to be temporarily settled will have a significant impact on location choices. Amongst the primary determinants of the success with which a DP can be integrated with a local population are ethnic and religious affiliations. These attributes appear to be amongst the most significant factors which determine the ability and willingness of the DP and local population to live side by side.

Box No. 21

From refugee sites to established border settlements, Malawi

Malawi had an open door policy towards refugees from Mozambique from the 1970s. Numbers remained small until late 1986 when 70,000 additional refugees arrived in the country taking the total number to approximately 100,000. Refugee camps were opened in all receiving districts with the direct involvement of District Commissioners. In 1987, the Government of Malawi requested international assistance from UNHCR and international NGOs when a major offensive in Mozambique led to a second significant flow of refugees into the country. By November 1987 there were in excess of 300,000 Mozambican refugees in Malawi. The period 1989-92 saw the number of refugees stabilise at approximately 900,000.

The UN and GoM referred to the open door policy as that of “traditional African hospitality”. This can partly be explained by history and the delineation of false borders during the colonial period.

Strong ties existed between the people of the what we now know as the countries of Malawi and Mozambique long before the colonial period. In the words of the District Commissioner of Nsanje district in Malawi, the refugees are “friends and neighbours who belong to the same ethnic group and same tribes as our own people. We can thus identify with their trouble.” Most Mozambican border residents had established trading or labour market ties with Malawi long before the onset of violence.

continued overleaf

Box No. 21 (continued)

Despite these strong ties between the peoples of the two countries, there were inevitable sources of conflict between them. Most notable of these were induced by resource scarcity. During the 1992 drought, there were instances of conflict between locals and the refugees when agricultural and business activities of the latter directly impacted on local interests.

The earlier refugees had largely self-settled amongst and alongside established border settlements. The Government of Malawi decided to adopt a policy which would consolidate the existing refugees. Refugee camps were officially opened in a number of districts and previously self-settled areas were officially recognised as refugee sites. The latter represented about 50% of the refugee population.

The *laissez faire* policy seems to have been a pragmatic response to the settlement needs of the refugees. Malawi is a densely populated country and the availability of cultivable land is very low. This fact alone meant that alternative locations for refugee camp sites would have been very difficult to identify without inflaming tension over land. Thus the Government decided to recognise spontaneous settlements and *de facto* camps.

Source: Agnès Callamard: 'Malawian refugee policy, international politics and the one party state' *Journal of International Affairs*, Winter 1994, 47 No.2.

Impact evaluations make this point repeatedly. Positive contributions to local development and minimising conflict situations are, to a very large extent, only likely when the locals and DPs share ethnic ties and religious similarities. Agencies have found certain DPs to be consistently difficult to plan for. Pastoralists are amongst such groups. An example of programmes which have encountered difficulties of this nature are those working with Somalis. Lack of cohesion amongst the social groupings within Somali communities, has made it very difficult for agencies to plan for and with them. Protection is repeatedly cited as an issue. Whilst efforts are made to locate settlements 50km from borders to minimise protection risks, this distance is not considered to be very

far for a semi-nomadic DP. Equally, beneficiary representation proves difficult to address due to lack of community cohesion, and self-appointed leaders frequently ensure that they receive a disproportionate benefit from assistance meant for the population at large. Consequently, as was the case in the Dadaab camps in Kenya, it is common to find instances of food aid being sold outside the camps whilst people inside starve.

Size of the DP is also important when considering THS options. Clearly, the larger the DP the more difficult it becomes to plan for an integrated response in one area. As discussed in the case study of Monrovia in Chapter 6, integration was possible and beneficial until it was no longer possible for the environment to absorb more people. At this point, it became necessary to establish camps.

Whilst the examples given above may seem extreme, they are used to underline the need to have a good understanding of the social and community fabric of a DP and the need for staff to have access to this information.

3.3.7 Host authority

Probably the most significant determinant of THS location will be the host authority's policy with regard to DPs. If the host authority has a policy framework which is less than accommodating to a DP it will prove extremely difficult to work towards sustainable THS options.

The examples provided in boxes 13 and 16 illustrate how host authorities have used the control of access to DPs as a means of ensuring that the assistance programme is conducted on their terms. Equally in the case of Hartisheik, Ethiopia (see Chapter 6), the Government insisted that segregation of the Somali refugees from the local population important and thus, precluded consideration of an integrated THS programme, despite considerable opposition from the international humanitarian community to the eventual choice of location.

If THS assistance policy is to alter, there is a need for greater research into the benefits to be derived from adopting a less constrained or restrictive policy towards DPs. Such information can then be used by international agencies in negotiations with host authorities to convince them of potential mutual benefits of DP integration with their own populations. It can be argued that explicit commitment, supported by action to local capacity building, from both donors and NGOs may help to convince host authorities that a longer term view is being taken by the humanitarian agencies and that they are willing to invest in

that country’s capacity to respond to and better manage future emergencies. Agencies will be seen to be offering assistance to a potential host country as well as DPs. Lack of such commitment is currently a source of justified contention although it is recognised that in situations of conflict it may not always be straightforward identifying ‘neutral’ local partners.

Box No. 22

International Red Cross and Red Crescent Code of Conduct

The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGO’s in Disaster Relief specifically states that ‘we shall attempt to build disaster¹⁹ response on local capacities’ The code recognises that people involved in disasters possess capacities as well as vulnerabilities. It goes on to say that ‘where possible, local capacity will be strengthened by employing local staff, purchasing local materials and trading with local companies. Where possible we will work through local Non Governmental Humanitarian Agencies as partners in planning and implementation and cooperate with local government structures where appropriate’

Ref: RRN Network Paper No.7, September 1994

3.3.8 Donor attitudes

Resistance by host authorities, often the single most important factor in allowing pre-planned choice in setting up THS can in part be overcome by pressure from donors, governments or other bodies. Donor government aid departments are likely to be closely linked to other departments, such as Foreign or State Departments and to foreign and diplomatic policy in those countries where it conducts major aid programmes. These *de facto* or *de jure* links, while they have actually constrained aid policy, may also be used to put pressure on reluctant host authorities. For example the Heads of Commonwealth meeting in Edinburgh in Autumn 1997 offered Britain and others the chance to bring pressure to bear on Nigeria for its role in Sierra Leone. Although this opportunity was not seized, it offers an example of where there is scope for advocacy by aid agencies/NGOs and donor aid departments aimed at diplomatic pressure. Host authorities may also be sensitive to particular trading concerns - again, agencies need to look for opportunities for upward pressure which may help to affect host authority resistance to DPs.

4

Current constraints to sustainability

Chapter 1 sought to raise awareness among readers of the possible alternatives to camp solutions to DP problems. Chapter 2 outlined the key principles which should underpin all THS planning processes. Chapter 3 went on to look at the principal factors affecting programme choices of managers and policy makers when determining what type of settlement option is the most appropriate to stakeholders’ requirements. However, it is clear that there are considerable internal and external contextual constraints to the pursuance of options which reflect a longer-term approach to THS. This Chapter will briefly consider some of these constraints. The list is not exhaustive as it is recognised that each emergency is unique. However, it is felt that the categories given represent some of the most frequently encountered constraints to effective and coordinated longer term planning. An underlying constraint to changing practice seems to be the lack of available information flow between UN bodies, international humanitarian agencies and donors involved in both emergency and development programmes. Organisational interests remain jealously guarded and are, potentially, the source of damaging differences.

4.1 Objective setting and ‘client-focused’ coordination

The need for coordination within and between agencies in preparing appropriate solutions to DP needs for temporary settlement runs as a very strong theme

throughout this Review. For planning to be effective, coordinated effort demands that agencies involved in the programme are in agreement with the overall objectives and are committed to working towards meeting those objectives. Problems, however, frequently occur in assistance programmes as objectives are not necessarily defined or understood by all parties.

This appears to be a peculiar feature of humanitarian relief operations. Agencies are present because they have an undoubted interest in and objective to alleviate human suffering. Whilst being commendable, this is a somewhat vague and ill defined motivation which may not be sufficient to significantly improve the lot of the intended beneficiary of their assistance. Experience has shown that programmes may be set up and maintained without any clear definition of objectives. As a result, it is not uncommon to discover that over time, individual host government, donor and relief agency priorities and perspectives can come to dominate these programmes, with the real concerns of the DP being usurped. As external priorities gradually creep into the assistance programme, agencies may lose sight of why they are there. Whose needs are they there to meet? Their own or the DP as their clients?

The notion of a coordinated team effort, where all agencies are pulling in the same direction, that of assisting the DP to support itself, is often lost after initial emergency phases. It is this question of coordination that has bedevilled many an effort at effective settlement planning. Good practice, increasingly, dictates that external priorities should not be allowed to blur the clearly defined and shared objectives of a plan. To try to pre-empt and ultimately avoid the dominance of particular agendas, it is useful to identify where different approaches may originate.

4.2 Organisational mandate

An oft-cited problem facing humanitarian agencies and obstacle to coordinated action with a view to reaching shared objectives, are official or perceived mandates. For example, some agencies are responsible for refugees alone, some for IDPs and some for both. Some are constrained to acting within legally defined boundaries and others have no official obligations or clearly defined lines of accountability and almost complete freedom of action. Some work in both emergency and development situations whilst others, such as MSF are , almost exclusively emergency-oriented.

UNHCR is officially mandated to protect and assist one target group - refugees, although more recently its mandate has been extended to include ‘others of concern’, for example in assisting IDPs in Bosnia. Currently it is only with special dispensation from the Secretary General of the UN, that the organisation is allowed to broaden its sphere of concern refugees. As yet there is no single agency with a global mandate for protection and assistance for IDPs. Since the recent UN reform package was agreed, the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), Sergio Vieira de Mello, has been mandated by the IASC to coordinate assistance to IDPs. Technically, the Office of the ERC (formerly DHA), can refer to the substantive body of human rights and international humanitarian law to protect the rights of internally displaced people; however, the ERC lacks the sanctions to enforce a protection role and in practice is unlikely to have the political clout to promote the particular interests of populations who have been forcibly displaced within national borders.

As part of its responsibility for refugees, a key role of UNHCR is that of its close collaboration with host governments. This consultation and negotiation responsibility can sometimes lead to delays in decision making and leads to sometimes difficult relations with other agencies with implications for coordination.

The key difference between the ICRC and many humanitarian agencies is the latter’s adherence to the principles of neutrality and impartiality, and commitment to intervene only when there is consent on both sides of a conflict, allowing them to operate. Whilst this mandate covers assistance to both DP and non-DP populations, this strict adherence to humanitarian principles and consent can also hamper action.

NGOs, whether national or international, are self mandated, ie they have no real legal base. This allows them considerable freedom of action compared to the UN or ICRC for example, but they are also rarely large enough to provide assistance to DPs on their own and thus need to coordinate efforts.

UNICEF is also mandated to become involved in emergencies and has ‘an interest and responsibility for all aspects affecting the well being of children’²⁰. The organisation has a primary focus on development issues related to women and children, but can play a key role in negotiations between host authorities and relief programmes. One such example is the pivotal role played by UNICEF in Operation Lifeline Sudan.

In a number of situations it has not been clear which agency has overall responsibility for coordinated assistance. This, compounded by the frustration felt by smaller, less unwieldy organisations e.g. NGOs, with the bureaucracy surrounding decision making, has resulted in un-coordinated responses.

4.3 Influences on agency action

Beyond issues of formal mandate, agencies are subject to a number of other influences when planning for DP assistance. Some are apparent, such as the need for funding, whilst others remain less obvious, but can play a significant role in determining the extent to which THS can be planned for. The following offer some examples of these less visible influences.

4.3.1 Internal

Divisions occur within as well as between agencies. We have all heard technical staff complaining that programme managers don't understand the constraints under which they are forced to make decisions and managerial or administrative staff saying the same about technicians. Essentially communication problems, these divisions can be particularly damaging during an emergency.

Equally, intra agency divisions between development and emergency desks can become a constraining factor. Emergencies may be seen as grossly 'inconvenient' events which undermine ongoing development programmes, attracting disproportionately large amounts of funding and being managed by people who have no real understanding of development work. It is equally argued by emergency desks that their development colleagues are slow to react, have no understanding of the needs of a DP and are generally reluctant to 'dirty their hands' on emergency work.

A further issue concerns the status within emergency programmes of community services personnel. There is a tendency for technicians to disregard the value of this important group and therefore, to work in isolation from them, when in fact the opposite should be the case.

One of the outcomes of poor relations such as these is that development agencies may not provide timely information about DPs which might be extremely useful to a humanitarian assistance programme. Yet it may be often withheld on the basis that in providing it, there is an implication that an emergency is likely which may jeopardise relations with host authorities.

4.3.2 External

On the whole, agencies involved in THS programming are allowed to do so only with permission of the host authority. This makes the position of an agency or group of agencies advocating longer term planning for THS options very precarious if their hosts are unwilling to consider anything beyond the very temporary.

The very action of planning for an event which has not happened may also have negative connotations for governments or authorities who do not wish it to be implied that their country or populations are on the brink of a crisis. Such situations need to be handled very sensitively, not least for the difficult position in which they can place staff based in that country and who are dependent on governmental goodwill for their presence and freedom to operate. The process of planning for an event implies that it is going happen and may even encourage a crisis or displacement which may not have otherwise happened, e.g. prepositioning supplies may cause larger groups than would perhaps otherwise gravitate towards a designated assistance area and the prophecy may become self-fulfilling. This is a very real and serious constraint to agencies attempting to plan for a DP emergency and may well result in soured or severed relations.

For the same reason, agency staff working in such an environment may be reluctant to undertake the sort of planning necessary to ensure responsible THS solutions. They will be very concerned not to be accused of having provoked a population displacement or disruption. Prior to the elections in South Africa in 1994, UN agency staff were refused permission to undertake such regional planning for this very reason.

Another constraint relates more specifically to the anticipated destination country/region of a DP. Few countries or regions, (invariably those parts of the world least able to support sudden influxes of new people) would willingly choose to receive a large number of often destitute people onto its soil. They justifiably fear that in the long term the costs of this new burden will be borne by them and their populations and it can lead to conflict on their soil. These are not easy worries to brush aside and there is evidence to show that often these destination countries do lose out. However, one way to overcome the negative perceptions of population displacement held by host authorities and in order to be able to consider more sustainable THS solutions, may be to demonstrate that DPs are a potential resource to a country. Donors and international public

bodies are well placed to support this process. In particular, showing financial commitment to support the notion that recipient countries can expect benefits from temporary settlement for DPs offers rich potential for facilitating the transition. The ideas being discussed here are not new, but commitment to them from all concerned has until now, been limited.

4.4 Political and financial imperatives

It will be difficult for agencies to raise funds for longer-term non-camp options if funders are unwilling to invest in such initiatives. Donors often regard visibility as an important aspect of their funding priorities. Indeed, donors and relief agencies alike come under pressure to be seen to be doing something when massive population movements occur. Camps are able to satisfy this need. They are quick, highly visible and conform to a somewhat paternalistic view of some donor countries that DPs are helpless and need to be ‘looked after’.

Long-term planning and funding of such activities is also subject to change as donor priorities and allegiance change over time. Major donor governments are subject to regular electoral accountability and may, therefore, change on an equally regular basis. Donors may also provide funding for physical and social infrastructure according to their own preferences and time scales. This usually precludes longer-term regional investment via emergency programmes.

Donors are often criticised for being unwilling to fund preparedness activities. NGOs enjoying the benefit of good levels of private funding are in a better position than those NGOs which rely heavily on donor funding for emergency activities. Nonetheless, it does appear that there is a serious shortfall in the availability of funds available to undertake emergency preparedness planning based on the argument ‘who wants to pay for something that might never happen?’.

It is outside the scope of this Review to develop funding considerations further, but mention of the influences on funding sources and host communities are relevant to the discussion. If a move towards environmental and economic sustainability is to become acceptable to hosts, donors and agencies then a radical rethinking of the policy approach and its ‘marketing’ is required.

Small moves in this direction are being made. ‘Debate amongst donors, the UN agencies and NGOs on the relief-development continuum increasingly

recognises that the institutional split between relief and development departments within their organisations is unhelpful, and has had a negative influence on the way ‘aid’ has developed²¹.

4.5 Media coverage and ‘visibility’

The media have proved to be a very powerful influence on recent DP assistance programmes. The lasting image of fields of plastic shelters is very powerful. It is immediate, easy to capture and emotive. To an extent agencies have become victims of this image as increasingly funds are raised on the back of media coverage for emergencies. Strong images of desperate situations can force donors to respond with more funding than may have otherwise been the case. A consequence of this is that programmes can become driven by the media image of or perception that DPs are highly dependent upon benevolent ‘western’ taxpayers.

There is of course, a positive side to this increased coverage as it lays agencies open to public scrutiny whilst they are in the process of providing assistance. In ‘real time’, people are now able to see how their contributions are being used (although, as was seen during the early days of Goma, this brings with it other problems such as an undignified scramble to work with children and avoid latrine or grave digging tasks which are less media friendly).

Box No. 23

Agency self-promotion in Goma, Rwanda

The practice of displaying agency logos in prominent positions was not confined to small NGOs. All agencies, even donor organisations, engaged in this practice, not only as a way of increasing their profile, but to show their supporters (taxpayers in the case of official donor organisations) who might see the logos on TV, that they were present in Goma. Interestingly, this concern for profile and agency differentiation appears to have had little meaning for beneficiaries. Interviews with refugees in Goma and Ngara during the study revealed that many did not differentiate between agencies involved, but lumped them together under the term “Croix Rouge”.

Ref: Study 3 of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda: Humanitarian Aid and Effects²² (RRN Network Paper No.16)

Box No. 24**A 'bad' camp**

When familiarising a film crew with a refugee situation in Central Africa, the author was requested to show them a 'bad' camp. I did. As we arrived at the camp, a few hours after arriving in the country and three hours before they were due to board their plane for Europe from an airport which was two hours drive away, it started to rain. Things, so it seemed, could not have been better. Images of people huddled together in cold, damp, smoke-filled, blue plastic covered shelters were everywhere. The pictures were taken, the report filmed and the crew delivered to the airport in time.

The result formed part of an award winning report and undoubtedly raised lots of money for relief assistance as it precisely portrayed the stereotypical image of poor helpless people in desperate need of assistance.

Who was being served by this?

5

THS planning phases

This Chapter gives a brief guide to planning for THS which, ideally, should happen prior to an emergency. It is offered as guidance to help the reader identify ways in which current practice can be improved.

5.1 What is meant by ‘the process’?

This section sets out, roughly chronologically, how the author defines the planning process which determines the nature and shape of THS. It is understood that these phases are not necessarily neatly distinguishable and that activities in one area may overlap with others. Nor is an emergency always an easily pinpointable moment in time. The activities involved at each stage and the constraints imposed on those actions need addressing as part of a successful approach to planning for THS’.

UNHCR defines a ‘process’ as ‘a group of people or organisations working together on an ongoing basis to identify shared objectives and define respective actions’²³. The emphasis in this definition is on collective agreement about a series of actions which will produce a change or development in favour of clearly defined objectives²⁴.

Box No. 25

'THS planning phases'

COORDINATED INFORMATION GATHERING



COORDINATED PLANNING



DISPLACEMENT AND TRANSIT



TEMPORARY HUMAN SETTLEMENT ESTABLISHED



PHASED DEVELOPMENT



MAINTENANCE

Clearly, 'planning for' is a proactive event. It may not always be possible to undertake planning in anticipation of events. Reasons such as lack of permission or access to a region or a total lack of warning may mean that it is not possible to plan ahead. However, the absence of an emergency provides opportunities to plan. Good practice requires that a system of quality information gathering,

transparently exchanged between stakeholders, is put in place in a concerted effort to overcome such constraints. A key element of successful planning in emergencies is coordination between stakeholders. This means representatives of various agencies and organisations communicating regularly on a formal and informal basis around trust and mutual understanding of objectives.

Planning for THS marks the beginning of a process which will move on to programme implementation, programme management, monitoring and finally evaluation. It is the starting point from which various responses can be considered and inter-agency coordination structures established. To a certain extent, pre-planning, through information exchange, already happens between various agencies and UN bodies. UNHCR sponsors technical groups where specialists from a number of agencies meet to exchange information. Such groups exist for the shelter and sanitation sectors. However, there is considerable room for improvement in the field of coordination at other levels. Discussing the need for improved practice in planning for refugee settlement options, Zetter²⁵ (1995) argues that ‘planning should be conceived as a process of management as much as a set of physical planning and design activities. The essence of camp planning lies in tackling the complicated but key tasks of project and agency coordination - between different levels, agencies, actors and resource inputs’.

The difficulties associated with accessing internal programme evaluations, a potential source of extremely useful lessons, is possibly indicative of the problems agencies face in sharing information.

5.2 The actors and their roles

It is important to understand which actors are key to the success of the planning process and what their role in relation to THS might be.

The roll call of actors might include some or all of the following (in no particular order of importance): host authority; *de facto* authorities; DPs; media; neighbouring countries (which in the case of refugees, will include the country of origin); donors such as USAID and DFID; the UN; international organisations such as the ICRC and IFRC; local and international NGOs and military contingents (which may also be local such as the contingent of Zairean soldiers under UNHCR in the North Kivu refugee camps, or external such as Operation Turquoise in South West Rwanda during 1994).

A further complication arises from the unwelcome split which exists between some development and emergency desks within agencies with a remit for humanitarian assistance. Such divides may exist because staff of a development programme are reluctant to support pre-planning by humanitarian divisions for the negative signals it would send to host authorities on whom they may be dependent or simply because they do not wish to consider the enormous disruption which the admission of such a crisis might have on their programme efforts over what may be several years. There may also be a failure on the part of the humanitarian sections to seek the views of those, even inside their own agencies, working inside the country/ies in question, or they may give the impression that they have not considered the longer-term implications of their rapid response actions. Such perceptions of each other's work can be extremely damaging to THS outcomes, not to mention other programme objectives and serious attention needs to be given to reconciling and bringing together these two strands of assistance in the name of shared overall objectives.

Although unlikely as a contender in this category, the absence of formal authority may create a vacuum which in itself can be 'an actor' or influencing factor which needs to be taken into account. The situation in Somalia in the early 1990s may represent such a case, generating unpredictable dynamics.

A multiplicity of actors are now involved in the planning and implementation process of emergencies. Typically, one would expect many more actors with which a humanitarian agency must negotiate to be involved in a complex emergency than in a natural disaster: governments, international actors and 'factions', all of which may need to be involved in decisions concerning the location of temporary settlements and in particular, access to them. Officially referred to as 'non state entities' (NSEs), factions can range from well organised *de facto* administrations to heavily armed renegade gangs.

Examples of where such *de facto* authorities have had a significant effect on emergency programmes includes Sudan, where the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) continue to maintain a very influential negotiating stance with Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), and Liberia until recently, a range of warring factions including the powerful Ulimo K and the NPFL controlled access to populations in different and shifting parts of the country.

Rebel movements sometimes establish their own humanitarian wings which can offer a legitimate channel for humanitarian assistance. Examples of these

include REST, The Relief Society of Tigre, the humanitarian wing of the Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front and SRRA, Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association, the humanitarian wing of the SPLM/A.

Box No. 26

The ICRC in Afghanistan

The importance of obtaining recognition from NSEs is illustrated by the case of the ICRC in Afghanistan during the 1980s. For much of the decade, the organisation which was formed in 1863 specifically to provide protection and assistance to the victims of conflict, was paralysed. Despite repeated efforts, the ICRC was unable to obtain the agreement of all the parties to the conflict for it to commence programmes providing impartial assistance.

Ref: ODI working paper No. 74 The Changing role of NGO's in the provision of relief and rehabilitation assistance: case study 1 - Afghanistan/Pakistan. Nigel Nicholds with John Borton.

Roles

The roles of the many different actors will change with location and time, but will involve at least one of the following:

- information gathering;
- decision making;
- negotiation;
- assessment;
- analysis;
- planning;
- communication;
- information dissemination;
- lobbying and advocacy;
- coordination of response;
- implementation;
- monitoring and evaluation.

The roles actors are called upon to play will be subject to many influences and motivation, some of which were considered in previous chapters. Host authorities may, for example, be concerned that international awareness of problems in their country may frighten away potential inward investment. At times, donors may be primarily concerned with funding issues whilst at others, public profile and political strategic interest are more influential on their decisions. Local authorities within the affected country may be motivated by the desire to attract humanitarian funding into their domain to assist with infrastructural developments such as water or road projects. International NGOs may be motivated by the ‘be seen or die’ demands of competitive fund-raising and profile (Eriksson et al. 1996). The list of possibilities is long and given these often ‘hidden agendas’, it can be difficult to obtain unbiased, accurate information on which to base coordination and decision making.

And last, but by no means least, the role of the DP needs to be integrated. As was mentioned in Chapter 2, it is often overlooked in the rush to establish THS programmes. It is clear that there are time constraints and difficulties associated with identifying the right partners/spokespeople among the DP, but to plan and implement in isolation of the ‘client’ does seem anomalous to good practice.

But it is not just the very number of actors that can lead to poor preparation, but the complexity of the conflicts leading to today’s humanitarian crises. In particular, since the Cold War, the reality that relief agencies face today is that of complex internal conflicts; conflicts in which ‘violence is used as a rational strategy for survival within the context of limited environmental resources and increasing marginalisation from the world economy’²⁶ (Slim 1995). ‘The most significant effect is, therefore, to wreck and destroy national, governmental, social, civil and trading structures’²⁷ (Macrae and Zwi 1994). Faced with these factors, it is clear for actors within relief programmes that their roles are evolving into altogether more sophisticated and demanding functions. The importance of strategic information gathering, political analysis, negotiation and conflict management skills cannot be over-emphasised in today’s programmes, but represent attributes which previous generations of relief workers were, to a large extent, not called upon to develop: attention tended to be focused on technical speciality and the details of delivering assistance.

The importance of this changed environment should not be lost on the THS planning process. The complexity of influences and actors involved in the process of planning for THS virtually dictates the need for THS planning to be

conducted by a team of professionals which represents the multiplicity of professional, technical and managerial expertise necessary to interpret such extremely complex situations.

Sections 5.3 and 5.4 discuss in more detail those stages in the process most relevant to ‘planning for’ THS. Although much of the advice contained here does relate to ‘re-settlement’ where an initial settlement is considered inadequate for whatever reasons, as happened in the case of Hartisheik for example, for the purposes of clarity, this chapter is essentially targeted at the period prior to or at the moment of initial displacement.

5.3 Coordinated³¹ information gathering phase

Sections 5.3 and 5.4 consider aspects of both strategic and contingency planning for THS. All emergencies are different and, as with all assistance programmes, situation-specific strategies need to be developed for each crisis. A thorough understanding of local conditions is thus vital. Forward planning is a necessary, albeit speculative exercise, requiring the projection of past and present developments into a possible, but ultimately unknown future. It is the nature of speculation that there are no guarantees of outcome. However, some regions of the world are, sadly, more prone to recurrent conflict. It is in areas such as these, where, although it may be difficult to predict precise outcomes, there is a much stronger case to be made in favour of a concerted effort to gather and analyse quality information and to plan programmes on the basis of this intelligence.

The strategic information gathering phase of the planning process is concerned with establishing a basis for an efficient programme of assistance within the given constraints of a particular geographical and political setting. By definition, it seeks to consider the broad or global aspects which may be pertinent to the anticipated programme objectives. In the case of THS, such considerations should consider such things as:

- potential for displacement;
- potential size and ethnic/age/vulnerability/religious/clan composition of a DP and the likely host region/population
- approximate timing/direction of flight
- principal reasons for flight and likelihood of continued threat

- likely destination and its terrain and suitability from the point of view of those factors set out in Chapter 3 (protection, security, access, environmental/resource issues etc).

Any strategy needs to concern itself with identification of influencing factors, aligning programme action, determining resource requirements and defining relationships with the various actors such that they offer the best possible chance of programme success. It is a phase of collecting and using information to determine best possible options and outcomes.

Box No. 27

Strategic planning outside the humanitarian field

Criteria used in strategic planning by successful multi-national corporations may be of relevance to THS planning in emergency settings:

- Recognise strategic planning as a critical and integral component of good management;
- Identify ‘stretch goals’ which require the organisation to go beyond business as usual;
- Incorporate as wide a range of views as possible, from both inside and outside the organisation;
- Pursue a flexible and adaptable process, offering scope for learning and feedback;
- Find new ways of understanding your market and clients;
- Do not be confined by detailed plans for fixed periods of time;
- Make strategic orientation and strategy execution everybody’s business.

Ref: Galagan PA, “Strategic Planning is Back”, Training and Development April 1997

As discussed above, a number of actors may be involved in the implementation of a programme. This means that, in order to maximise mutual benefit, information gathering needs to be coordinated and the outcomes shared equally and transparently between the parties. This will minimise duplication of effort and funds but also, by means of ‘triangulation’ (the use of a variety of methods to reach a particular result), help to verify information before it is acted upon responsibly. To do this, organisations which may be involved in the process need to be identified and communication between them established clearly in advance of a major displacement.

The process of gathering relevant information should also be ongoing and under constant review as circumstances change. In countries where it is considered feasible and appropriate to undertake advance planning, such information gathering might be usefully considered part of the regular work and programme and planning cycles of development agencies. Agencies with a strong development programme presence may also take the lead in coordinating and disseminating relevant information. This could be a UN agency such as UNDP or a large NGO. A coordinating body might be established, meeting periodically to assess information gathered, review action and, where appropriate, advocate support for the process with the host authority and donors, (although the former will usually only be possible through an internationally recognised body such as the UN or ICRC).

The UN’s information gathering system for complex emergencies is based around DHA (now remodelled around the Office of the Emergencies Coordinator OERC) and UNDP, although others such as UNICEF also play an important role. However, there is some doubt as to how effectively this system has worked in the past and there are still questions as to how this critical role will be carried out under the new system as set out in the recent UN reform package .

In the context of THS planning, the information gathering phase is concerned with collating information related to the physical, economic, social and political aspects of the region. Professionals involved therefore need to familiarise themselves with the key actors and their roles and define means of all-party collaboration such that strong, positive relationships are formed on mutual understanding of institutional priorities and constraints.

This is a challenging but crucial task for THS planners. It is also a task which falls outside the purely technical profile of agency personnel currently

responsible for ‘camp’ or ‘site’ planning. Acceptance of the need for strategic information gathering and planning, demands a multi-disciplinary approach - an approach which requires input from managerial and technical sectors.

5.3.1 Win support through constructive advocacy

As discussed in Chapter 4 such activities can be very sensitive for host authorities and any attempts to undertake such a major planning exercise may be met with strong resistance. The role of the coordinating agency in such circumstances must be to work towards influencing sympathetic cooperation from the host authority and to the collective of actors to ensure that concerns about the potential negative impact of a mass population influx are taken account of.

Relief agencies should be willing to assist host governments and authorities to make the reality of a DP more acceptable to their particular political circumstances. This may be achieved through information dissemination and communication both internationally and in the country where planning is being undertaken.

Donor support will also be a key component of this process; by reassuring hosts of their willingness to support a programme if it becomes necessary and relieve (often well founded) fears by host authorities that they will be left ‘holding the baby’. It is therefore important to know what sector a donor is already supporting. Donors are more likely to be willing to extend longer term funding to relief programmes if the sector in which they are working has been identified for inclusion in the THS programme. For example, if a donor is supporting water programmes in a country, they are more likely to be favourably disposed to extending their interests into the water component of a DP emergency as it may fit in with their own strategic planning.

Agencies may also be able to help this general process by documenting and disseminating information about their experiences of where DPs have made a positive contribution to their local economic and regional environment.

5.3.2 The need for a professional lead

Understanding the full implications of planning human settlement, the complexities of working in an emergency context and the special needs of the DP should be a prerequisite professional profile of the relevant agency staff. Nowhere is this more true than for the lead or coordinating agency. Sectoral

technical inputs and concerns can be incorporated into the overall THS plan; they should not be permitted to dominate the final choice of location²⁹.

It is therefore important that relief agencies and organisations look to the professional profile of their emergency staff to determine the need for professional development in this area; for example training in and awareness of geopolitical situations and community services roles in addition to logistics and technical capabilities³⁰.

5.3.3 What type of information should be gathered?

As a key part of the THS planning process an inventory or audit may be established to consider the resources available to both planning and implementing a THS.

In the context of planning for THS, the most recent data should be identified and gathered on the following areas:

Physical resources and considerations:

- Topography - important for drainage, landslides; in cold climates for winter access
- Soil - for access eg black cotton soils, sanitation, agricultural potential
- Water sources
- Established human communities - DP/host population conflict
- Physical access - roads, bridges, airstrips, canals, rivers
- Environmental health risks -endemic diseases such as malaria
- Forestry reserves - fuelwood and building materials
- Location of water points
- Maps - to include topography and access routes and at all scales; remote sensing data
- Natural disaster vulnerability mapping - cyclones, floods, volcanoes, drought

'Ephemeral' physical resources and considerations:

- Climate - temperature range; cold climate environmental health concerns in winter;
- Rainfall - important for shelter and building materials considerations and agricultural potential;

- Winds;
- Radiant energy - need for shade and considerate/sympathetic design
- Surface water
- Population structures

Non-Physical Resources and Considerations:

- Who is the effective authority? - assess legitimacy against effectiveness
- Demographic profiles - locals and pre-displaced populations
- Ethnic profiles - locals and pre-displaced
- Land and tenure issues - critical and will need to be negotiated
- Economic profile - general and sectoral at local and national level
- Impacts on local population - consideration for conflict minimisation e.g. in drought prone areas will locals get food assistance also?
- Development plans for region
- National and local expertise and resources relevant to emergencies
- International, regional, national and local geopolitical situation
- National and local decision making structures
- Who to liaise with - who represents locals/beneficiaries
- Private sector capacity - e.g. building materials supply, trucking fleet
- Communications network - telephone, radio permissions
- Existing government infrastructure
- Existing relations with donor governments and development agencies

5.3.4 Where to find information?

Collecting such an array of data will be a challenging task. However, much of it will already exist and it will be a matter of identifying where it is held. Universities and research institutes are very useful sources of this kind of information; health ministries will be able to identify pre-displacement disease prevalence in different parts of the country.

National development plans are also a very rich source of information and, where they exist, should be closely consulted. Such information can be used to determine how a THS in a given area may be of advantage to the host country and how it can best be blended with national or regional development priorities. An example might be the construction industry; from a national development plan it should be possible to determine current capacity, projected areas of

expansion and supply options. Such information is invaluable to the process of planning for THS; frequently building material supply bottle-necks can delay programmes and be a potential source of conflict between local and incoming populations. A detailed contingency plan will then help to determine the need for importing shelter materials or alternatively, ways of supporting and encouraging expansion of the local supply side industry inside the country. In this way it becomes possible to form a potential intervention strategy which begins to address long-term development as well immediate needs by supporting local industry.

It is extremely important that areas earmarked for specific natural resource development or with potential for development be avoided. Examples of such areas include those with non-renewable mineral resources or those with potential to become national parks.

Box No. 28

Using local knowledge in Zaire

The importance of local knowledge should be recognised. Local inhabitants of an area will be able to answer many questions which may otherwise remain unanswered. Local knowledge about seasonal changes, health risks and security concerns will be invaluable. For example, the IFRC found that in Lugufu camp for Zairean refugees near Kigoma, Tanzania, land which looked nearly acceptable during the dry season became extremely difficult during the rainy season. The camp turns into a swamp with some of the highest levels of malaria that the Federation has known. Sleeping sickness is also high in this area where a government farm had already failed.

Such knowledge will be very valuable in rapid assessment of why land is not being used already.

Remote Sensing as a tool

A useful aid to rapid physical assessment of various locations is ‘remote sensing’. Satellite imagery and aerial photography provide information which would otherwise take a considerable amount of time to collect. Satellite imagery is useful for strategic information gathering, whilst aerial photography has

more application for detailed location analysis related to settlement design and layout.

Satellite imagery can assist planners to ‘filter’ physically and geographically appropriate locations in which temporary settlement might be established. A very significant advantage of using satellite imagery is that it can be conducted relatively inconspicuously. This means that where host authorities are particularly sensitive about ‘sparking’ an emergency or in situations where it would be dangerous for staff to visit areas due to security concerns, information can still be gathered and analysed.

Depending on the resolution a varying degree of detail can be achieved. The benefit of the ‘GIS’ data (Geographical Information Systems) to advanced temporary settlement planning for emergencies is that it allows a rapid, initial assessment of the terrain, soil and vegetation resources available over a wide area. This can be done ‘remotely’ without the need to travel to a range of locations²⁸. However, Satellite imagery can be very expensive; in support of collaborative planning it may be appropriate for interested parties to share the cost of the information.

Box No. 29

Satellite technology used during the Great Lakes crisis

A number of humanitarian agencies have already gained experience of using satellite technology. During the early stages of the Great Lakes crisis, OXFAM UK commissioned a hydrogeologist to undertake a desk-study involving satellite images and geological maps. This enabled them to locate water sources. This work was then followed up by work in the field. These systems can be expensive, however UNHCR were also interested in using satellite images to monitor the use of fuelwood resources around Ngara, but were unable to find the funding.

Taken from RRN Newsletter No.5, June 1996.

5.3.5 Develop local capacity and stockpile information

Stockpiling of commodities is seen as an effective emergency preparedness measure for many agencies and is often exercised on a joint basis. However, the concept of strategic stockpiling and sharing of information seems to be an area of cooperation which could be further developed. Investing in information dissemination and developing local human capacities to respond to emergencies must be viewed as a priority area for collaboration and coordination. This can be achieved by the creation of a database of relevant local information and human resources which is then shared with others. As stated previously, this can be collated and updated by a development agency within the country.

Although collating and disseminating information can play a key role in the preparedness activities of agencies, unless information is credible, it is unlikely to be used for its designated purpose. It will therefore be necessary to ensure that information is believed once disseminated. Again the role of coordination is crucial to this process. Recognised sources of information need to be collectively determined as part of an information collation process. Verification of planning figures of particular characteristics of a DP can be helped by continual shaping and cross referencing of data: a system designed to facilitate this is currently being piloted in Azerbaijan, known as ‘Azeriweb’. Coordinated by DHA, agencies are encouraged to provide data and text on existing DP numbers, nutritional information, access, warehouse capacity etc. which can then be processed into a regularly updated GIS (Geographical Information System). The challenge is for agencies to provide information in a standardised format that allows it to be placed immediately into the GIS. At present, valuable time is lost extracting geographically relevant information from pages of text onto a website which is regularly updated. The expanded use of regional initiatives such as the DHA’s Integrated Regional Information Network in Central, East and West Africa can also contribute to this build-up of a ‘regional picture’, but as a precondition, agencies must be encouraged to share information in the first place.

Box No. 30**Sharing of information in Goma**

It is important that local information is made available to concerned organisations. A good example of where such information was constructively shared amongst agencies was in Goma when discussions were held about moving people from Kibumba to alternative sites. The following is taken from an IFRC SITREP and discusses a possible site for the relocation and the information was made then available to other agencies:

‘The land has no local population as there are problems of CO₂ (Carbon Dioxide) emissions in this area; the Zairean military had considered a base on this land but declined to do so due to the health risk. The whole lake side in this area is a danger area for CO₂, the camp is planned to be on the lake side and not on the side of the road further away, but even this area has CO₂ pockets. This problem is not particularly bad during the dry season but during the wet season will be very dangerous, especially for children and elderly.’

5.3.6 How is information gathered used?

Each situation will be different and the final decision can only be taken by actors at the time. It is of course recognised that a simple ranking system (see page 80) may help to guide analysis and determine the location of the major enabling or hindering issues to sustainability.

The following example of how information could be used is applied to a real THS experience encountered in providing shelter for Somali refugees in Hartisheik, Ethiopia in 1998.

A number of factors influence responsible ‘planning for’ THS as discussed in Chapter 3: protection, security, access, host populations, host authorities, environmental concerns and DP characteristics. They will have a fundamental impact on the choices and direction which planners will be able to make, and will either predispose THS solutions in favour of a more segregated or integrated solution for DPs.

Fig 1 Segregation versus integration

| Factor | Segregation | Integration |
|------------------|---------------|-------------|
| | 1 | 20 |
| Protection | 4 | |
| Security | 2 | |
| Access | 3 | |
| Environment | 5 | |
| Local Population | 3 | |
| DP | 3 | |
| Host Authority | 1 | |
| Donor Policy | 4 | |
| Total | 25/160 | |

The case analysed here relates to the THS experience of Hartisheik, Ethiopia in 1988, looked at in more detail in Chapter 6. On the 1 to 20 scale, 20 points represents circumstances which lend themselves ‘perfectly’ to integration of a DP with host/local population/environment; 1 represents circumstances least well suited. The relative numbering is not intended to rate options on a best-worst scale, as this can only be determined in relation to a correct analysis of context. However, this Review favours efforts to see a DP settled in a more dignified, sustainable manner than is currently the case in many camp situations. In the case of Hartisheik then, protection scores 4 points out of a possible 20, as protection and national security issues were of major concern to the Government of Ethiopia. They very much wanted to keep Somali refugees separate from Ethiopian citizens. This concern meant that from the outset the THS option for the refugees was predisposed in favour of segregation and, therefore, scores ‘low’. The complexities of clan affiliations in the region mean that security also scores ‘very low’. Access to the area where the refugees were to be settled was poor due to the sensitivities of the border region which would have made access to non-camp alternatives very poor and consequently also scores ‘low’.

The score of 25 out of a possible 160 strongly suggests that a segregated THS option, e.g. a secure camp, needed to be considered as the factors influencing sustainability were largely ‘hindering’ to any form of integrated life with local populations; the potential to influence a programme in favour of a more sustainable option was poor.

The above framework for situation analysis, whilst being somewhat crude, may provide a useful tool on which to base discussion of important elements needed to determine the best possible THS solution. Such structured discussion can provide good, early guidance to help define further action. By keeping an integration option firmly in mind throughout a planning process, the chances of it becoming a reality are increased.

5.3.7 The benefits of working together


Box No. 31

Coordination - a key shortcoming in humanitarian relief efforts

Coordination has been identified time and again as a shortcoming of humanitarian relief efforts, highlighted in particular by the system-wide Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. At the time of writing, two further evaluations are taking place looking at humanitarian coordination in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. One is independent and being coordinated by the DHA and funded by donors and NGOs, focusing on ‘Strategic Coordination’. The other is a joint UNHCR, WFP and UNICEF exercise concerned with lessons learned on operational coordination.

In order to create the institutional environment for successful relief programmes, the relationships between key actors in the programme are crucial. The smooth and efficient implementation of a relief programme is, to a large extent, dependent upon constructive professional relationships between all of the major actors in the emergency. It is very difficult to establish positive relationships during the stressed atmosphere of the early phases of an emergency. The strategic phase, therefore, needs to invest in partnership forming i.e. getting to know other actors. Common objectives need to be defined and an understanding of the limitations and constraints of each actor understood. This will greatly assist

Fig 2. A coordinated response³²



© Red R 1995, "Engineering In Emergencies".

the development of relationships based on trust and understanding. Importantly this needs to be institutionalised i.e. it should not be personality dependent.

Creating an environment of enablement and support to the relief programme should be considered part of the coordinated information gathering phase.

Box No. 32

What can be done by the THS planning team to establish good relationships?

- Understand the hierarchy of the host authority. Protocol is important at both national and local levels.
- Work with host authorities to determine what will be possible in terms of land allocation.

continued overleaf

Box No. 32 (continued)

- Get to know the major donors e.g. what are their priorities?
- Reach advance understanding of what will be feasible in terms of funding possibilities.
- Know how to apply for funding in the most expeditious manner i.e. know how proposals should be written and presented.
- What is the local capacity to respond to an emergency? Where does this capacity lie?
- What are the local resources which may be available? How accessible will they be? Do special permissions need to be sought?
- Who will be responsible for taking decisions on behalf of the local authority (both national and district level)?
- Get to know the staff and institutional priorities of collaborating agencies.

Box No. 33

Considerations for the strategic information gathering phase

- Establish a coordinating body responsible for orchestrating information gathering, dissemination and advocacy.
- Have national economic and development plans been checked for relevance?
- Sensitise hosts to the idea of planning and information gathering ‘just in case’. This is potentially very sensitive. Keep it confidential if necessary and share only amongst those involved
- Stockpile information.
- Are donors aware and on board?
- Have other information sources such as universities, research institutes been checked for relevant information?
- Work to influence hosts and donors of the mutual potential benefits of developing temporary settlements which may be incorporated into future developments/settlements.
- Use remote sensing as a means of identifying possible THS locations.

5.4 Coordinated planning phase

This phase can be likened to contingency planning. The ideal kind of planning in this context would be similar to that described by UNHCR: contingency planning is “a forward planning process, in a state of uncertainty, in which scenarios and objectives are agreed, managerial and technical actions defined and potential response systems put in place in order to prevent, or better respond to, an emergency or critical situation” (UNHCR 1996³³). Discussion concerning the prevention of emergencies lies outside the scope of this review³⁴. However, this form of contingency planning has proved difficult to fund. This may in part, be due to the fact that attempts at such planning exercises have not been entirely successful.

Box No. 34

Rwandese crisis demonstrates limits of contingency planning

The contingency plans for the Rwandese refugee influx into Goma in 1994 provide a good case study of the limitations of contingency planning, highlighting the difficulties of information exchange for early warning, funding, commitment to the plan and adequate resourcing³⁵. Two attempts were made to develop contingency plans in the region in virtual isolation of each other - one led by UNHCR and the other by DHA. That collaboration between two UN bodies broke down illustrates how difficult it can be to address even wider inter-institutional concerns. Moreover, the fact that each of the planning exercises was using a different definition to guide the process, makes it difficult to assess their success. DHA essentially saw their planning exercise as one which was planning for sufficient funding to be in place, whilst UNHCR saw theirs as a definition of strategic objectives and managerial and technical roles.

The problem of which information to use to help formulate the planning phase should have been resolved during the information gathering phase. By this stage it should have been decided which information to act upon or at the very least to have established a well coordinated structure which allows for collective decision-making about the reliability of various data sources.

Box No. 34**Kuwaiti refugees expected and planned for during Gulf War**

During the Gulf War in January and February 1991, a major international decision to prepare for modules of 100,000 refugees expected from Kuwait, was taken in Jordan, Turkey, Syria and Iran. The decision was taken on the basis of experience of the huge crisis in 1990 when some 1.5 million people fled as Iraq invaded Kuwait. In Jordan, the ICRC, MSF and Jordanian agencies assisted with establishing the camps. The camps were actually built to a good standard, but located in the desert which was a no-man's land between border points. This was the policy because the Government refused to consider hosting refugees except for transit to third countries. The idea was to process refugees in these transit camps. As it happened, very few refugees came to these good, custom designed transit camps. The bulk had seemingly fled the year before.

Two lessons can be learnt from this experience:

- If the will is there, and therefore the money, contingencies can be developed.
- The sites, which were in the desert, far from ideal, no shelter, water had to be tankered, etc. were determined by political considerations. Once determined, the actual siting and layout was a technical issue, but the real decision was not a technical matter.

The contribution that coordinated, collaborative planning can make to improved programming should not be underestimated. Good practice in this area, demands that joint plans be put in place and that actors in the emergency know their role from the outset and concentrate on fulfilling their objectives as collectively determined. The common objective of providing assistance to and bettering the circumstances of the DP should be held in firm focus. There are critical events in emergency programmes which can deflect programmes from their objectives. This is highly evident at the beginning of programmes or when a fresh influx of DPs is introduced into an ongoing programme. It is at these highly charged and

stressful times that programmes can be seriously affected by indecision resulting from a lack of clear role definition and objectives. A well conceived and collectively agreed contingency plan can help to minimise the risk of this happening and hold focus on common objectives.

5.4.1 When should coordinated contingency planning be considered?

The role of strategic information gathering will, to a large extent, determine the answer to this question. Early warning³⁶ information and indications that an emergency is even a remote possibility should prompt the relief community to start the process of planning for the possible emergency. Situation assessment and analysis, therefore, form the backdrop to good contingency planning. In regions prone to emergencies, the scope for detailed coordinated contingency planning should be incorporated into regular work and programme plans.

Contingency planning need not be an expensive exercise. Rather, emphasis should be placed on using information and analysis already gathered in setting objectives for a number of different scenarios and sharing the conclusions. For non-development specific disaster preparedness organisations, such as fire brigades, this process is used to help develop responses to unexpected disasters they may be called upon to assist in. They anticipate a number of scenarios and adapt their response to the specific needs of each very different scenario. Likewise, countries prone to natural disasters do very much the same in anticipation of an event. At the time of writing, the countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are undertaking drought preparedness planning for the worst ever predicted El Niño drought effect during 1997-8.

A contingency plan is not a single event. It will need to be flexible, changing and adapting itself to new circumstances as the situation develops; a planning phase comes to an end either because of the need to convert the contingency plan into an operational plan³⁷ or because of a significant improvement in the circumstances which led to the development of the contingency plan in the first place.

Box No. 36**Disaster preparedness in Bangladesh**

Bangladesh expends considerable effort to plan for floods and cyclones and the shelter and accommodation needs of the affected population.

Ideally, governments, donors and agencies in complex emergency prone regions would position themselves such that they are well placed to anticipate and plan for a range of events. It is acknowledged that conflict places major strains upon efforts at predicting population displacement - it is easier to identify flood or drought - prone regions than perhaps exact timing or location of outbreaks of conflict. Such constraints put such planning largely beyond the immediate sphere of influence of humanitarian agencies.

5.4.2 Who should be involved in contingency planning?

To succeed, all relevant actors should be involved in developing the contingency plan or at the very least, be informed about it. In the absence of specific technical representation during contingency planning, for example shelter provision, water, sanitation etc, the plan should reflect this and clearly define what will be expected of the incoming agency or organisation which will take up the role alongside the roles of actors present in the process.

The importance of the involvement of host authorities and, therefore, final acceptability of the options will be critical or *de facto* to the future application of the plan. The role of donors is also extremely important. Financial commitment to longer term DP human settlement strategies is integral to the process; if the international community is unwilling to share the true cost of the mass population movement phenomenon, why should host authorities be persuaded to change their current approach?

It may be necessary to extend the planning process beyond country boundaries. In many instances, the Great Lakes region being one of them, delivery of relief assistance has to consider the regional international context. In the case of Goma for example, delivery of food and other items involved the countries of Uganda and Kenya. In such cases, it will be to have contacted partner organisations in neighbouring countries with whom to conduct the planning

process. This will be particularly important for THS where, for example, building materials supply is identified as a sector needing international input.

It is also necessary for the planning process to develop a framework for working with and rapidly integrating DP preferences into final THS design.

Contingency planning also provides the ideal opportunity for coordinated planning between development and emergency sections within the same agency. If this happens, emergency programmes may well begin to feed into longer term development initiatives for the DP affected area.

The contingency plan is, therefore, concerned with determining organisational and structural relationships which offer the best chance of delivering a successful assistance programme; at filtering out unacceptable locations and determining the criteria for final location selection. It can be regarded as the infrastructure necessary for coordinated effort.

5.4.3 What should the contingency plan consider?

The information required in order to plan will be similar to that acquired during the strategic information gathering stage. Thus, the data bank of gathered information will provide the basis for further planning. However, the level of detail required for a successful contingency plan to be established will be greater, particularly for technical sectors. For example, if a DP is to be integrated into an existing urban settlement, what will be required in order to bring buildings up to the agreed standard; what exactly will need to be done in order to upgrade the water and sanitation systems so that there is sufficient capacity for the existing and additional population?

This information needs to be gathered for a number of THS options and criteria developed to assess the appropriateness of the locations according to priority needs i.e. ability to sustain a DP of a given size; protection; health etc. Unacceptable locations can then be deleted from the list of possibles and further investigation of the probables can look at anticipated realistic full-life costs of developing the THS option.

The contingency plan will need to have considered in some detail what is required at various key points as the emergency develops. Two such events will be the time of displacement and the period during which the DP is in transit.

At the time of displacement

Involve donors as soon as possible. By now it will be crucial that the host authority quickly allocates and authorises the use of a location for THS. It is possible that intense negotiation will be needed at this stage. The presence of well informed donor negotiators may be of significant value at this juncture. Clear indication of the amount of funding that can be expected and the types of programmes that it can be permissibly used for has the potential to be very influential. Commitment at this stage for donors to fund activities or investments which have the potential to serve local as well as DP populations could be sufficient to persuade authorities away from less marginal toward preferred locations.

Adhere to agreed coordination structure. Agreed coordination structures need to be strictly adhered to; failure at this stage by the coordinating body to take a strong lead will set an unacceptable precedent and possible excuse for agencies to go their own way. If the planning phases have included a representative group of agencies and views then at this stage there should be a minimal need to diverge. Common objectives need to be held firmly in view. This may be assisted by encouraging actors to commit to a transparent project cycle ‘contract’ where roles and responsibilities are defined. The idea being that once an agency has signed a contract, there is greater pressure on them to perform and that accountability to co-signatories and donors will be increased. Such a contract could be available in the public domain and would detail the need and means for continual re-assessment and flexibility.

A management tool such as this has been developed between UNHCR and LWS in Nepal. Specifically focusing on water and sanitation, the ‘Project Cycle Management Tool’ provides an example of how to get everyone around a table and then in the field to participate in a process. Agencies sign up to a contract which is designed to be proactive, and aimed at preventing mistakes rather than seeing why they are happening.

The coordination structure will also need to include the hierarchy of inter-agency and host authority meetings. This will need to reflect the structure from the highest level down to sectoral THS based committees.

Involve DP wherever possible. The importance of knowing the DP has been

discussed previously. At the point of displacement it will be possible to precisely identify the characteristics of the DP and draw on all information sources about them.

Relief programme proposals will need to be finalised on the basis of the displacement and submitted to donors for early approval.

Transit

It is at this point, when people are actually on the move between their homes and their unknown destination, that the host authority and partner agencies will have a ‘window of opportunity’ for influencing the exact route taken and hence where the DPs will temporarily settle. In many instances, people do not have a clear idea of where they are heading. They will be moving away from a threatening environment to one which will afford them some, perceived or actual, protection. Beyond that, assuming that they have freedom of movement, physical stamina and good or bad fortune will determine where they set themselves down. Clear guidance towards pre-chosen sites and assistance along the way will help move the DP to where it can be best served and prevent it from settling down in unsustainable locations. This may also minimise disruption of future moves to a more appropriate location.

5.5 What if there has been no opportunity for advanced planning?

Past experience has shown planning of the nature described above is not always possible. Reasons for this will include failure to predict an emergency and extreme resistance from host authorities to such a process.

Box No. 37

Rwandese encouraged to cross into Tanzania, April 1994

As tens of thousands (170,000) Rwandese crossed the Rusumo Falls bridge into Tanzania in April 1994, representatives of international humanitarian organisations were able to keep them moving the additional 12km to the Benaco site instead of allowing them to collapse 1km from the border. This was possible because a few days previously, the site had been designated as a contingency site. This was achieved by use of megaphones, cars etc and simply urging them to keep going; this is believed to have saved many lives.

So what can be done? Firstly, it is important to realise that the principles contained in the previous discussion still hold. Gathering quality information about all of the sectors outlined should still happen to the greatest extent possible. An initial response to an emergency will usually have started with the deployment of technical staff who are concerned with meeting immediate survival needs. There is a strong case to be made for also deploying programme managers or policy makers whose task is to stand back from the emergency happening before them and look at the context in which it is happening. Having people who are not overwhelmed by the day to day detail of the emergency phase and who can take a longer term perspective on the situation will allow for a longer term perspective in planning.

In such circumstances, it is even more important that such professionals are equipped with the knowledge and understanding of the complexities of the situation facing them. There is a great need for them to know what information needs to be collected and how to act upon it. There is no time for learning on the job.

Where host authority resistance has prevented transparent coordinated planning, it may be possible to undertake crude preliminary investigations of the THS options. Although this would run against ideal practice, it may be necessary to undertake such exercises without the knowledge of the host authority or local communities. This should be seen to be the very least that can be done.

6

Typical scenarios

The following section uses case study material to help the reader place previous discussion in context. Where examples chosen allow, the discussion has been framed in the context of the key considerations, such as protection, access and characteristics of the host and displaced populations as outlined in Chapter 3. The reader is asked to consider the examples from the perspective of the integration - segregation spectrum outlined in Fig. 1, page 79, and consider the influences which have determined their relative positions along this line. It has proved difficult to identify case study material specifically related to ‘planning for’ responses to ‘target areas’ as opposed to ‘target groups’. However it is hoped that the outcomes of programmes which took target area considerations into account in their assistance, whether planned or incidental, will help guide future planning.

Use of the word ‘typical’ in the title of this chapter does not do justice to the huge number and variety of situations which aid workers face in their work. However, it is hoped that by depicting five different case studies from different contexts - on the whole large scale, but from both Africa and Asia, urban and rural, IDP and refugee situations - such a framework will help the reader to visualise types of constraints experienced in settling displaced populations and efforts to overcome them.

It is evident that no single experience succeeds in getting everything right. For example whilst Ngara, Tanzania, offers an example of good coordination by the international community, the negative environmental impact of the influx was very significant and the actual location allocated contributed to complex protection issues. However, lessons from both good and bad practice in each case can be used to develop awareness of the options available to planning teams and the outcomes of different actions.

It is also recognised that the following analyses do not represent comprehensive studies of the planning process in the situations referred to. This has proved difficult for the following reasons:

- Detailed analysis of each situation would involve considerably more research than has been possible in the time available to the preparation of this Review.
- It is an indication of the difficulties faced when trying to analyse decisions behind THS location selection. The factors influencing the decision of where to support THS are diverse, complex and different in every situation.
- Lack of access to first hand knowledge.
- Lack of access to internal agency evaluations and reports.
- Quoting from Chapter 2, “The final arbiter in settlement planning is the target population, and the most important criterion of success is the wellbeing of that population over a period of time”. However, it has not been possible to ascertain from the DP or local population whether they considered the final solution to be satisfactory.

6.1 Hartisheik, Ethiopia, 1988

Large influx, protection and security issues, host authority policy to segregate

Much has been written and said about the Hartisheik experience. In many ways it has proved an extremely controversial and significant learning event for many international organisations. The following brief outline does not seek to examine the conclusions and lessons learned about the programme in general, but will attempt to highlight the issues which had a significant bearing on the choice of location for the refugee camp which became known as Hartisheik.

Background

Marking the end of 11 years of hostilities between Ethiopia and Somalia over control of the Ogaden desert, a peace settlement was signed in April 1988. Refugees from the Isaaq clan, former rebels within their own country, were sent home to Somalia ending a period where they were provided with refuge and arms inside Ethiopia. Fighting in and around Hargeisa, the capital of northern Somalia, quickly erupted with human rights abuses reportedly conducted by both Government of Somalia (GoS) and Isaaq rebel fighters. Isaaq civilians became targets for Somali government forces and as a consequence, refugees, some of whom were professionals, still dressed in their business suits, started to pour across the border into Ethiopia in late June 1988. The exodus continued throughout July at an estimated rate of 4-5,000 per day. The majority of the arrivals were split between the villages of Hartisheik, Harshin and Aware.

Hartisheik and Harshin are small trading villages on migratory routes of pastoralists. Hartisheik is approximately 75 kms south east of Jijiga, the main town of the Ogaden. The villages marked the extremes of Isaaq clan territory within Ethiopia. At that time, Aware was an Ogadeni town, inhospitable to Isaaq refugees. The importance of the ethnic division is crucial to the event, as Ethiopia preferred the refugees not to be moved out of the Isaaq area for fear of conflict with non-Isaaq locals.

Many of the refugees from Hargeisa, although related to locals, were no longer nomadic and were, therefore, ill-equipped to survive in a harsh, waterless environment such as the Ogaden.

The size of the influx took the international community by surprise, despite reports from within northern Somalia about the escalating violence, a 100 year history of conflict and a recent 20 year record of relief and rehabilitation. The Government of Ethiopia (GoE), already under strain from coping with 300,000 Sudanese in the west of the country, asked for international assistance. Initially however, they were reportedly extremely reluctant to permit access to foreign officials and journalists for fear of antagonising President Barre of Somalia, who denied the existence of the civil war inside his country and, therefore, the refugees³⁸.

Difficulties of the location

Logistically, Hartisheik was extremely difficult to serve. The nearest developed water source of sufficient scale to service the refugees was 75 kms away in Jijiga. This led to probably the largest water tankering programme ever for a refugee community, aggravated by the fact that roads in the area were very poor with the existence of pockets of black cotton soil making them virtually impassable during rain. Food and other supplies had to be transported overland from Djibouti which proved a problematic route. There was minimal potential for agriculture in an environmentally fragile area where fuelwood was soon in short supply. From a logistic and natural resource perspective, the location was clearly a very poor choice. Ethnically and culturally, however, the location represented a much better fit with minimal security issues during initial stages of the crisis.

The site of Hartisheik was originally proposed as a location to which the small refugee population at Harshin was to be relocated, moving them away from the border. However, the site was suitable for no more than several thousand residents. When the mass influx began, it was repeatedly stated that the site was unsuitable for the larger population, it was quite untenable in all respects except protection and security. But these were in the end, the deciding factors for the GoE. Hartisheik was only acceptable as a temporary site to allow a small group of refugees to reside prior to the foreseen repatriation.

Protection and security

There had been a small Somali refugee presence in Harshin since late 1987 and there were relatively few protection problems during the first major influx, although physical conditions were atrocious for some time. The nutritional status of the refugee population deteriorated rapidly and death rates during the first year rose to about double the normal rate for non-refugee populations in Ethiopia and Somalia. However, physical security and the principle of asylum were not threatened in the initial phases.

This situation changed over time, as Hartisheik became established. Fights over the refugees' need to collect firewood in areas which bordered Ethiopian villages, sometimes inhabited by rival sub-clans, became more frequent. Friction also arose due to attempts on the part of a number of refugees to live or work in the larger towns of Jijiga and Harar.

As more Somalis entered the region, security became much more of an issue, due in large part to the appearance of a very large number of weapons. The increase in weapons made travel everywhere in the region more dangerous for locals and refugees alike.

Local Population

In the early days of the influx, economic and social relations with the host population were minimal, except for those individuals with sub-clan links and relatives. Jijiga at the time had a mixed population of Amharas, Oromos and ethnic Somalis. Somalia had invaded Ethiopia just a decade before and there was still considerable suspicion by the highlanders of a large Somali population in the region. This suspicion was echoed by the GoE and military which did not encourage contact. The local population in closest proximity to the refugee camp, made their own arrangements with the population, engaging in some barter but also insisting on a zone of separation.

Host Government

The position of the GoE of the time was that all refugees should remain in camps, although this was occasionally relaxed, particularly when referral of refugees to medical facilities in Jijiga was essential. From the time of the initial influx, the GoE insisted that refugees should be separated from the local population for reasons of national security.

Coordination

The GoE was at all times the principal actor in the operation. The camp was administered by government employees and patrolled by the military. Coordination was difficult at first as there were three government institutions involved in the operation. The local government was also involved in some decisions (e.g use of the road, water supply, etc.) but most important decisions were made centrally in Addis Ababa. Negotiations were carried out both in Jijiga and the capital, depending on the issue.

By the beginning of 1989, the GoE had established the Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) which became the interlocutor for UNHCR. ARRA remained very much ‘influenced’ by the Ministry of the Interior.

Coordination amongst the international actors was mixed. There were regular meetings between UNHCR and NGOs, but there was too little emphasis on the establishment of common objectives and joint planning which, unfortunately, led to mutual distrust. UNHCR and WFP were the only UN agencies with significant input into the operation in eastern Ethiopia, and coordination between the two was reportedly very close.

The refugee programme in eastern Ethiopia at the time had many setbacks, some relating to the host government and others not. Among the difficulties were poor communication between the capital and the field offices, a very mixed quality of government staff at the camp, negotiations by UNHCR which were not sufficiently forceful and continued frustrations in establishing a meaningful dialogue with camp residents.

Why choose to create a large camp at Hartisheik?

Firstly, it should be stressed that there were very few options in the area. Ethnically and politically, the region was in turmoil. It seems that these considerations above all others persuaded the GoE to settle the large refugee population on what was originally planned to be a site for a small number of refugees from Harshin. Government security concerns seem to have been primarily focused on preventing large numbers of Somali refugees being located close to Jijiga, an important government centre and garrison town.

It has been argued that UNHCR did not lobby hard enough with the GoE to allow for relocation of the camp to a more physically suitable location. However, relocating to a better endowed environment would not have been without its own difficulties. It would have meant taking hundreds of thousands of refugees into Oromo land towards Harar, Gursum and Dire Dawa. This would almost certainly have led to conflict with the host population and the national defence forces.

Box No. 38

Factors leading to segregated camp option

- Complex international and domestic political situation and history of conflict meant GoE had major concerns about national security.

continued opposite

Box No. 37 (continued)

- Donor policies and attitude shrouded in cold war politics. The Soviet Union initially supported Somalia after independence in 1960. Hostilities between Somalia and Ethiopia over the Ogaden, the native population of which is Somali, started in 1963 and led to the Ogaden war in 1977-78. In 1977, the Soviet Union switched sides. Their massive airlift of military equipment and Cuban troops in support of the Ethiopian Government, led to the Somali invading force being defeated. The USA then became the influential ally of Somalia.³⁹
- Complex ethnic mosaic of the region meant that non-camp choices and alternative locations would have been extremely problematic.
- Physical attributes and environmental sustainability was not a consideration for GoE.
- Absence of planning for a large influx and dedicated coordination.

6.2 Nepal, 1991 - 1997

High local population density; medium sized DP; improvements to local economy; good DP participation and consultation

The example which follows illustrates a number of issues raised in the Review. It provides support to the argument that a relatively small, by recent standards, and coherent DP population, can be accommodated into areas where there is potential for serious resource-related conflict. It is also instructive of the way in which an agency with a strong development presence in an area can influence the style and outcome of a situation by using its knowledge of the DP and local population and working very closely with them.

Background

The Bhutanese refugee camps in Nepal are held up as model examples, as they meet most major standards for site planning and operations management. 92,426 refugees (UNHCR May 1997) live in seven camps in the Jhapa and Moreng districts, with populations ranging in size from 8,000 to 46,000. Some 10,000

refugees have spontaneously settled elsewhere in Nepal. The current influx is negligible, although the annual refugee population growth rate is 2 - 2.5%.

The refugees began to arrive in small numbers in 1990, via the Indian state of Sikkim, which separates the two Himalayan kingdoms of Bhutan and Nepal. The Bhutanese government was taking an increasingly hard-line against its ethnic-Nepali minority, which had been farming the south-western plains since the end of the last century. The Bhutanese authorities felt threatened by the increasing number of ethnic-Nepali's, many of whom had been illegally contracted by Bhutanese citizens in the 1960s and 1970s. At that time, labour shortages led the authorities to overlook this process. Negative attitudes and new restrictive policies, originally directed towards these officially illegal immigrants, were then directed to the rest of the ethnically-Nepali Bhutanese. Politicians pointed to the annexation of Sikkim by India, after Hindu-Nepalese migrants used the newly-established democracy to overrule the Bhuddist native population. The refugee situation is currently deadlocked, with Bhutan refusing to accept the return of the refugees, and the geopolitical influence of India and China overwhelming international efforts to solve the problem.

The major influx of Bhutanese refugees began at the end of 1991. At the peak of the influx, in mid-1992, 600-800 refugees were arriving daily. Three sites were spontaneously self-settled at Maidar, Timai, and Sanischare (formerly known as Pathari). UNHCR was not present in the field until June 1992, when it declared an emergency and invited other NGOs to assist the Lutheran World Service (LWS), until then, the sole external agency delivering aid.

Difficulties of the Locations

The largest number of refugees spontaneously settled at Maidar, a location prone to violent flooding. In all three settlements, poor water and sanitation provision combined with severe overcrowding, resulting in higher mortality than expected and morbidity rates. There was a contained outbreak of cholera in 1992.

Sites for new camps were negotiated between UNHCR and His Majesty's Government of Nepal (GoN) in Forestry Department land at Goldhap, Khudunabari, and Beldangi. Maidar was then closed and the population transferred to planned camps. The remainder of the original camps were gradually re-built and infrastructure improved. Planning of the new camps

was undertaken by an LWS engineer aided by a refugee surveyor and planning team and in close consultation with refugee community groups. This team relationship continues, working on extensions and re-organisations of the camps.

The negotiated sites were accessed from a series of un-paved roads, connecting to the east/west Highway. Although problems foreseen by UNHCR and LWS were encountered in maintaining access to these roads, especially during the monsoon season, GoN has benefited significantly from work on these roads, which also connect a number of towns.

Overall there has been very little competition for resources, although forestry land was used by locals for cattle grazing. Initial local concerns about firewood collection were later allayed when kerosene stoves were introduced. All trees were felled in the earlier camps by the Forestry Department. This had a significant effect on microclimate and soil erosion.

During the initial camp planning, pressure was exerted by GoN for high-density camps, partially due to local pressure on land by the large numbers of landless Nepalis. Although this was resisted by LWS, the final average density was 10-15 square metres per person, which was still under half the WHO recommended minimum. However, the camps have been extremely successful, following good infrastructure provision, hygiene extension programmes, and fire drills. However, flooding during the monsoon proves a continual threat.

Protection and Security

Most of the refugees fled without difficulty, although there were reports of severe cultural and physical harassment, imprisonment, and torture in Bhutan. The Indian authorities were determined to prevent them from staying in Sikkim and transported many by bus to the Nepali border. At one stage the Bhutanese police arrived in Birtamod, a border town inside Nepal, and arrested suspected ‘anti-nationals’. There were also rumours of Bhutanese agents in the region at that time, and since.

Inside the camps the refugees successfully self-policed until 1994. Disputes with the local population were settled in courts run by refugees and surrounding communities. Police posts were later established in each camp, largely following Nepali political agitation, which also demanded the camps be fenced and closed to prevent refugees looking for work in Nepal. However, the fences did not become reality and a great number of refugees work, both locally and throughout

the country, despite official policy which prohibits the refugees from leaving the camps.

Local Population

The surrounding population have made numerous claims for compensation for alleged losses and damages resulting from the presence of the refugees. Since 1994, UNHCR has coordinated a ‘Refugee Affected Area’ programme, considering the claims and additionally offering short-term general development projects such as the building of clinics.

There are many business links between refugees and locals. Refugee construction labourers have replaced workers from India. This has not greatly affected the Nepali labour market, as the introduction of new crop varieties into the neighbouring Indian states has meant fewer casual labourers are available. Refugees are not legally allowed to hold property, however some cattle is unofficially co-owned. Many of the teachers in the popular English-medium schools are refugees, who have benefited from the well-run education system in the camps.

Host Government

The presence of the refugees provides continual stories for the Nepali media, and has therefore become politically charged. UNHCR and its implementing partners have been quick to head off crises however, and the focus has remained largely on negotiations with the Kingdom of Bhutan. The GoN has maintained that the integration of the refugees into Nepal is impossible and has negotiated to ensure that as much as possible of the economic burden is borne by the international aid community.

Coordination

Coordination inside and outside the camps is now considered exemplary, with regular inter-agency and sectoral meetings at every level. A stable population and ideal security conditions have supported the development of good relations between all parties. Most functions within the camps, including food distribution, are based almost completely on refugee participation.

However, it is generally accepted that LWS did not feel properly consulted when, at the beginning of the situation in 1992, UNHCR took over the

coordination of relief operation: UNHCR invited specialist NGOs to take over sectoral responsibilities from LWS, such as health and education.

In response to these early pressures on coordination, UNHCR introduced a new contract coordination system called the Project Management Tool (PMT) or Project Cycle Management Tool (PCMT), which it then developed very successfully in collaboration with LWS. PCMT requires donors, host line ministries, NGOs, commercial contractors, and UNHCR to sign against their respective roles, agreed in joint meetings. These contracts occur at every level of management, supporting coordination, communication, and easing the impacts of staff-turnover.

Why choose to create camps that are officially ‘closed’, with half the refugees densely populating one site?

There were options available for dispersing the refugee population further, allowing more camps with a lower density and a more sustainable relationship with local communities. But both the GoN and UNHCR argued against this: the government did not want the refugees to become integrated or in any way independent of aid, or a burden upon the economy; while UNHCR and WFP wanted camps of a size that was economic to manage and supply.

Box No. 39

Lessons learned in Nepal

- Camp location can help to soften host authority resistance to DP presence. Incorporate temporary settlement locations into development planning and ensure wider benefits to local region. Use this in negotiations about locations.
- Good planning and coordination is crucial and significantly benefits from host authority and DP participation.
- Support local industry and economy. Purchasing construction materials and food locally aided the economy.
- Local knowledge and understanding offer significant benefits to a THS programme.
- Strong local competition for land has a significant impact on THS options and requires sensitive planning and local benefits.

6.3 Tanzania, 1994

The following two case studies provide contrasting views of the Rwandese refugee influx into North West Tanzania during 1994. The first, related to the Ngara district, considers the effects from the refugee programme perspective. In terms of the Great Lakes crisis it is referred to as a success story. The other, related to Karagwe district, views the influx from the perspective of the local host population. This provides very different reading to the first, offering a graphic, possibly typical account, of how a ‘target group’ project can miss many opportunities for ‘target area’ development and in the absence of pre-planning, contribute to the erosion of the socio-economic base of the host population.

To reinforce the statement made in the introduction to this Review, these very brief case studies are not intended to criticise any group or individual either directly or by implication. The Great Lakes crisis of 1994 was an exceptional event, calling for exceptional responses. The Ngara programme is known by many people and for this reason, will be open to varying interpretations. The following case studies should thus be read in the context of this Review, they are not intended as an evaluation of performance.

Ngara District

Very large, rapid influx; good coordination; protection issues; environmental carrying capacity

Background

The Ngara refugee emergency in April 1994 was highly visible, attracting a great deal of international attention from donors, media and NGOs until it was overshadowed by the events surrounding the Goma exodus. The operations were managed in the context of preparations made for the 250,000 Burundians the year before, two thirds of whom had subsequently returned home. Potential camp locations had been identified, and relationships formed between UNHCR, the host government, and NGOs. The unexpected return of the majority of Burundians released many of the initial resources of personnel and materials then drawn upon during the Rwandese refugee emergency.

Additionally, UNHCR had fielded an emergency response team to establish a contingency plan in the event of a large influx. Although the scale of the

eventual influx had not been anticipated, the fact that a contingency planning process had been initiated meant that basic standby arrangements had been made with potential programme partners. It may be helpful to examine what happened in Ngara to understand better the potentials of contingency planning and rapid reaction, but finally the importance of THS location.

Over 170,000 of the refugees crossed over from Rwanda in 24 hours in April 1994 in what has been described as an organised evacuation, rather than a spontaneous flight. The influx then continued over the next twelve months. Upon their arrival in Tanzania, the refugees were generally in good health, bringing with them some food and personal belongings. Some had been IDPs in Rwanda, which meant they were familiar with camp life, and some even brought distributed non-food items. Within the first week, they had been reorganised into their communes of origin, improving operational management and community involvement.

Difficulties of the locations

The speed of the initial influx forced the selection of a site at Benaco by the GoT District Commissioner. The site had already been identified as suitable for up to 20,000 refugees during the search for sites for Burundian refugees in 1993, and accepted for a population of 60-75,000 at the time of the Rwandese influx. However, at one point later in the programme, it held over 400,000. It was on the same road the refugees had crossed from Rwanda, and within walking distance of the border. It was also the site of the only source of open water in the area, containing a reservoir made by a road construction company.

The Rwandese refugees self-settled there 26-27 April 1994. Refugees were still arriving at the rate of 500 to 1,000 every day, making registration impossible. There was insufficient emergency sanitation provision, such as defecation fields, and construction of family pit latrines was slow. There was never more than 10 litres of water per person per day available. Given the extreme overcrowding, it is difficult to explain how an epidemic was avoided, although morbidity and mortality rates were unacceptably high.

The identification of new sites became the priority and a selection team was formed, composed of representatives from UNHCR (physical planning and water and sanitation), local government officers (home affairs, planning, land, and health), and NGOs such as Oxfam and MSF (all sectors). Not all members

of this team were present at all times which diluted its effectiveness. Surveys were based upon the site selection process undertaken for the Burundian emergency the previous year. The new process began with overflights using a UNHCR aeroplane, with the aid of good maps and land surveys drawn up previously by a Norwegian development NGO operating from Kigoma.

It was decided the sites had to be within one day's walk from Benaco for a child, as mechanised transportation for all but the disabled was impossible. Given the scale of the logistics operation which would be required, access was the other key criterion.

New camps were finally started at Khatosa, Numasi, Kitale, and Musuhura - an extension of Benaco. Khatosa had to be abandoned after access roads had been built, as the land had been leased previously to a mining company, probably attributable to poor communications between government departments and information gathering by relief agencies. Numasi was planned for 80,000, but finally held 120,000-150,000; Kitale, which suffered from inadequate water sources, held 50,000; Musuhura held 80,000. Benaco was re-planned, and its remaining population moved to the new plots allocated.

In the absence of sufficient quantities of land to support lower densities, original planning was for 10x20 metre plots. Each area was to include a kitchen garden, with more land around the camp perimeter allocated to farmers. The gravel road built from the main tarmac road had regular spurs, leading to clusters of grid-planned plots. An environmental buffer was left dividing these clusters. The presence in the region of a road construction company with heavy plant greatly speeded the work, although the company charged over twice the normal rate per kilometre completed.

Refugees were made responsible for plot allocation and teams were used for marking-out as soon as the roads were graded. The same teams were used to communicate the importance of environmental protection to incoming families.

Two of the new sites were prepared within four months and refugees were transferred by commune, several hundreds of families per day. Stations were established en route to provide first aid, water, and high protein biscuits.

At all stages throughout the emergency, commune leaders played a controversial, but key role in coordination.

The environmental damage caused by the Ngara camps was devastating: three of the camps were a few kilometres apart, but the initially uncontrolled collection of fuelwood soon meant that they became joined. Benaco was virtually deforested within weeks of the influx, although impacts there were lessened as it was the rainy season. Fuelwood resource depletion was critical and unsustainable. The nearby game reserve was decimated by hunting by the refugees with much of the game meat finding its way to the camp markets.

Water remained a serious problem throughout the life of the camps, and supply never exceeded ten litres per person per day.

Protection and Security

The re-establishment of Rwandese community structures immediately after the influx presented a dilemma to the international community: the same commune leaders and social conditioning that were to ensure the overall success of the camps had shortly before been the instrument of the Rwandese genocide. The rapid onset meant the international community could not mobilise sufficient resources to take over the necessary coordinating and social functions and, despite a number of serious confrontations, the structures remained. It was periodically reinforced by violent actions by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) against the remaining Hutus in Rwanda.

This resulted in persecution within the camps and cross-border military operations into Rwanda. The proximity of Benaco to the Rwandese border aided this cross border activity. Provision of protection and security within Benaco was virtually impossible. Those suspected of having Tutsi ancestry who did not escape to a segregated camp were almost all killed. A ‘mixed marriages’ camp, known as Burigi, was established 80km away and needed special Tanzanian police guards.

The environmental damage also had its impact: Gathering wood around Benaco meant walking a considerable distance from the camps, and this became both dangerous and time consuming.

Local Population

The local population were hugely outnumbered by the refugees. There were few disputes over competition for resources, in spite of the refugees settling and deforesting large areas. This was due largely to the vast areas of almost

unused 'traditional land', and to the cultural affinity and long-term communication between the two groups. Following one notable incident of theft by refugees in a local town, the refugee community caught, tried and punished the perpetrators.

The local population had generously received a number of refugee influxes over recent years. They did however feel hurt by the return home of the Tutsi refugees, immediately following the victory of the RPA. This was because they had been living in Tanzania for many years, and had some positions of responsibility and power in the communities.

Host Government

Tanzanian local government departments and line ministries were heavily involved in the site selection process, although there were communication difficulties with Dar es Salaam.

The GoT refused to accept that the situation would be anything other than temporary, and would not permit the identification of a greater number of smaller, more sustainable sites with larger plot sizes. More distant sites, to help improve the security situation, were also not considered, though this was partially a logistics problem.

To highlight the view of temporality, the Rwandese refugees were never formally recognised as refugees by the GoT, only being offered group based temporary asylum i.e. individual claims for asylum were not considered and the status was awarded *en masse* to the arriving Rwandese population. The camps in which they lived were never formally gazetted and were always considered to be temporary phenomena.

The government was generally more sympathetic to the plight of the Burundians than that of the Rwandese, partly because of cultural affinities, and partly because the numbers involved were so different. The site selection process undertaken for the Burundian refugees the previous year had re-settled around 100,000 in five camps. The region contained a large area of formerly good agricultural land, including abandoned villages, left vacant following villagisation policies 15 years previously. The GoT appeared happy to return the land to cultivation. A density of three acres per family was requested by the government, although the Burundians finally received between a half and two acres. Interestingly, donors and the international aid regime supported

larger and less sustainable camps, as they were easier to manage and supply.

The Rwandese refugees were finally forcibly repatriated by the Tanzanian military at the end of 1996, following considerable cross-border military activity.

Coordination

Coordination between all of the actors involved in the emergency is generally regarded to have been one of the main reasons for the relative success of the Ngara programme. A largely successful recent operation with the Burundian refugees meant that UNHCR, the NGOs, and the GoT knew their roles, what to expect from each other and who their opposite numbers were.

While the aid community publicly condemned the hold of the Hutu leadership over the refugees, they were wholly dependent on them for cooperation and support, especially when faced with overwhelming numbers in the initial phases.

Why locate large militant refugee populations close to their own border?

While aid operations succeeded in saving a large number of lives early in the crisis, the Ngara camps finally failed in so far as the size and location of the camps gave the Hutu leaders both the control over their refugee communities and an opportunity to undertake military operations. These factors were the main cause of the forced repatriation. Rapid response, contingency planning, and cooperation between UNHCR, donors, NGOs, and the government made for a well coordinated response during the emergency phase and later, but these successes were undermined by site allocation and selection which was to prove both environmentally devastating and problematic for protection of both the refugees and local population.

Limitations of funding and commitment made it virtually impossible to break up the refugee population into smaller communities and to transport them to suitably dispersed sites in order to prevent them organising militarily, environmental degradation and conflict with local populations.

Questions remain as to whether those resources ought to have been made available, or whether other options should have been pursued. It has been argued that if the camps had been sited two or three days’ walk into Tanzania from Benaco, military contact with Rwanda might have been broken or seriously weakened and protection concerns, at least partially addressed.

Box No. 40**Lessons learned in Ngara, Tanzania**

- Early support from the host government was critical to the early establishment of the camp and in coordination at all levels.
- Basic contingency planning established standby arrangements between programme partners and identified potential camp locations.
- Presence of experienced, professional UNHCR and NGO emergency response teams with an understanding of the local conditions and their roles facilitated quality coordination and prompt, well-defined decision-making.
- Rapid donor response assisted early decision-making
- Strong refugee leadership assisted community coordination
- Heavy machinery allowed for rapid development of the location.
- Location near the border produced serious protection and security issues.
- There was little benefit or consideration of the local population.

Karagwe District

Large DP; negative impact on local population; ‘target group’ programme.

Background

Between June and October 1994 over 750,000 Rwandese poured into Kagera Region of NW Tanzania. Most settled in one area of Ngara District, with most of the remainder spontaneously settling in two areas of Karagwe District at Chabalisa and Kagenyi. The population of the latter two districts increased from around 56,000 to 216,000 in three months devastating the existing way of life. Aid agencies were quick to respond to the emergency, setting up three camps where the refugees had settled.

Up to the arrival of the refugees, the relatively fertile environment allowed most people to produce enough food for consumption and some surplus for local sale. However, this is a remote area of an isolated and neglected region of

Tanzania where there were few government extension services, no surfaced roads, few feeder roads and where transport services were rare and expensive. The low level of the cash economy meant there were few opportunities for people to diversify from basic farming activities. There were limited modern developments; electricity had only reached the district headquarters in 1994 and healthcare and education facilities were limited with only one secondary school. The district was able to exist at subsistence level adequately but few if any inroads to modernisation had been made.

Effects of the influx

By October 1994 this inherently stable scenario was totally disrupted. Local people welcomed the refugees initially, many of whom were severely malnourished or sick when they arrived. Historic links between the populations in this region, including strong cross border trade links, meant the two communities had much in common and were in sympathy with each other. Refugees exchanged labour for food and there was much socialising between the two communities. However, by December the situation had started to change as the existing social and economic base started to collapse under the strain of a 300% increase in population.

Environmental Strains

Fuelwood supplies, often a problem for village women in rural areas became critical. At Chabalisa the enormous demand for construction wood only increased the shortage. Food rations for refugees were normally dried (grain, maize and beans) needing long cooking times. Women were having to travel up to 6km to gather wood with every available combustible substance being put to use. Fuel became an economic commodity widening existing inequalities, with locals particularly suffering as they had less to barter with.

Economic effects

The whole economy became monetised. Refugees tried to access meat and fresh vegetables to supplement their dried food rations, bartering their rations or labour in return. Poor local people were unable to compete, unable to afford to buy basic essentials. Malnutrition and food shortages were felt for the first time by many. Farmers tried to seek compensation for the loss of their land on which the camps were established, but this was tied into a bureaucracy which called for proof of legal ownership.

Women were particularly badly affected by the influx. Historical problems of their lack of access to resources made it difficult for most to capitalise on a sudden market for their labour. Previously, it had often been women who would sell their labour to richer farmers and make some money on selling food crops, but the supply of refugees reduced the need for local labour and the monetisation of food crops meant that men took control of selling it and keeping any profits.

Security strains

Security problems were also increasing. Initially any conflict between the two populations was rooted in questions of access to resources. Theft was common, particularly of food crops and livestock and it is thought that local bandits were teaming up with some refugees to carry out raids. Some livestock keepers chose to sell off their stock at low prices rather than risk theft. The monetisation of the economy led to increased theft and locals being less willing to provide their resources (particularly water) for free. Not all crimes were committed by the refugees, but their arrival and the resulting change on the local economy led to urban style crime rates. The question of security became so serious that by November 1996 a government policy was put in place whereby the Tanzanian military trained villagers near the camps in self-protection.

‘Target area’ versus ‘target group’ strains

International organisations arrived soon after the emergency and by most accounts responded well to the needs of refugees, setting up camps with all relevant basic needs being met. Weekly meetings were held with the local district authority, but there was limited if any contact either with the two local NGOs or other local leaders. The lack of contact created a great deal of resentment in some quarters. For years the District Authorities had been constrained from undertaking full social and economic development work through lack of resources (money, materials, training, transport etc) in the poorest region of one of the poorest countries in the world. Suddenly there was an influx of well-resourced international NGOs working with an influx of people who were having a phenomenal affect on the local population, without having resolved basic issues such as land and water rights.

Host government policy

Host authority policy, as expressed by local government departments, was to encourage the international aid agencies to include local populations in their

programmes, but this had very limited success. Local communities were allowed access to camp medical facilities, but not to schools despite the fact local schools had been pillaged with desks being removed for fuel and equipment stolen.

Box No. 41

Lessons learned in Karagwe, Tanzania

Consideration needs to be given not only to the immediate setting up of emergency support, but also to local populations at the time of influx, long term environmental factors and the effect of the exodus on refugees.

- Massive population movements are devastating to everyone concerned, irrevocably altering social, environmental and economic patterns. International NGOs needed to look to their role in supporting all people affected by the major population influx.
- The INGOs pulled out too soon. As refugees returned to Rwanda, most of the international NGOs left the region despite the fact that the exodus of refugees would again impact the local authority.

6.4 Sri Lanka

The following examples, taken from Sri Lanka, illustrate some of the difficulties which can arise when considering more integrated temporary settlement options. Being aware of the potential difficulties, it may be possible for planning to take account of them and to programme assistance more effectively.

The Vanni, Sri Lanka, 1995 - 1996

Large DP; local absorption; problems of relocating; local/DP strains.

Background

In the face of a major government offensive, the sudden, large scale, displacement of almost the entire population of Jaffna town in the autumn of 1995, forced an estimated 250 000 IDPs to cross the lagoon to the Vanni. Most of the displaced settled around the one major urban centre, Kilinochchi town, until this came

under artillery fire and was evacuated in the summer of 1996. The Vanni is situated in the ‘dry zone’ (compared with the hill country and the south western ‘wet zone’). At the time of displacement the whole island suffered one of its periodic severe droughts in the winter and spring of 1995-1996.

Even in those areas under total control of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the government maintained a skeleton administration. Government Agents (GA) in each district acted as key coordinator, together with delegations of the respective line ministries i.e. health, education, agriculture etc. Most however were understaffed, had limited budgets and logistic capacity, cash flow problems and shortages of supplies that were banned or restricted as part of the war effort. While reporting to the central government, they were inevitably forced to reach a practical accommodation with the LTTE, which would voice its views and opinions on all important matters. The government administration, with the GA, the lower level units of the divisional offices and the ‘grama sevaka’ (‘village administrators’ as approximate translation of the function) would be officially responsible for the registration of all IDPs and the coordination of the relief effort. In practice, given their limited operational capacity, much information and organisation was done by the Tamil Relief Organisation (TRO), which claims to be an independent humanitarian NGO, but whom many see as close to and influenced by the LTTE.

Pattern of temporary settlement

Approximately 90% of new IDPs in the Vanni were taken in by local residents. About 10% ended up in what are known as welfare centres i.e. public buildings especially temples, schools, or an abandoned cooperative, while a few lived on the streets in Kilinochchi, having no local contacts or money to be accepted by local households and not wanting to move into the rather crowded welfare centres. Subsequent rapid research revealed that IDP host families tended to have sought each other out on the basis of socio-economic (which easily corresponds to caste) affinities. Fisherfolk from Jaffna (both an occupational and a low caste group) sought hospitality from other fisherfolk on the peninsula and on the west coast of the Vanni. The research also revealed that those in the welfare centres tended to be the poorer families, who probably didn’t have the appearance or the means to be acceptable to the townspeople of Kilinochchi. This arrangement meant that the IDP population was relatively dispersed, an aspect that increased after the war forcing the evacuation of Kilinochchi, including a part of its resident population.

The new influx constituted a rapid strain on local water and shelter. Pressure to relocate grew after 3 to 4 months, when the local population wanted certain services to re-open, in particular the schools. Education has a very high priority amongst Sri Lankans and the local population did not want their children to miss a year. To address this problem of capacity, the TRO started to organise IDPs from the welfare centres to clear and open up new ‘greenfield’ sites. These, it turned out, were located some way from Kilinochchi, often in quite dense jungle land. The international aid agencies were reluctant to help with these new sites for political reasons: the central government which tightly controls their activities, wanted the IDPs to return as soon as possible to Jaffna town, by then under government control, and any assistance to the new sites might have been considered support to a displacement of political and military importance to the LTTE.

Moreover, the greenfield sites suffered from water shortage, the need to start food production from scratch, greater distance from peopled areas and hence from opportunities to earn a casual wage. IDPs expressed concern over reduced economic opportunities, and fear of snakes and wild elephants from the jungle. The jungle on the one hand would have provided fuelwood, but also a source of danger for especially the women, who, out of modesty would have to go at night to relieve themselves or to wash during menstruation. Some were also identified as having been sited, presumably by the TRO and nominally agreed by the local administration, in flood prone areas, a factor not noticeable in the dry season.

Difficulties faced by humanitarian agencies

Conscious of the political implications of providing plastic sheeting at the new greenfield sites the agencies planned to distribute it at the welfare centres and to host families, thus leaving IDPs the option of where they wanted to go. Interestingly the central government objected to plastic sheeting for IDPs in the Vanni, preferring ‘cadjan’ (dried coconut palm leaves woven together to make walls and roof around a wooden hut frame, a traditional building model now only used by the poorest in Sri Lanka). Yet ‘Cadjan’ had to be bought and transported (greater volumes than plastic sheeting hence more expensive) south of the frontline (government controlled area), because the use of cadjan meant that there needed to be more timber to hold p the cadjan walls and roofs. The NGOs were aware that the need for trees would increase and hence the problems arose with LTTE controlling timber supply.

In the face of ongoing TRO preparations and some relocations, the NGOs felt obliged to provide support for water provision i.e. with hand-drilled tubewells. Interestingly, the LTTE has and enforces a policy under which people are not allowed to cut trees and clear land without prior permission. The reason for this is not totally clear and is thought unlikely to be inspired by solely environmental considerations. Control over natural resources and a concern for protective vegetation for guerrilla activities may also have played a role. The LTTE has control over trees and timber and will normally sell it. In this case it did not appear though that the aid agencies would have had to pay for the poles for IDPs to put up their shelters.

Puttalam, Sri Lanka 1990

Small DP; local/DP characteristics; local absorption; medium-term resource & economic strains.

Puttalam is a district on the west coast, north of Colombo. In late 1990, the northern part of it, mostly inhabited by Muslims and Tamils, had to absorb some 30,000 Muslim IDPs, when the LTTE expelled all Muslims from the North which it then controlled. Many of those who came to Puttalam apparently did so because of the affiliations of being Muslim, of similar fishing occupations and prior economic and social contacts (many came from Mannar district just north of Puttalam).

As with the IDPs in the Vanni, many could count on host population hospitality. Most were allowed to set up a 'cadjan' hut on private land, and use local amenities such as a local well, school and health centre. After two to three years, however, tensions arose, and the patience of the host population ran out. This was largely due to the increased economic competition from IDPs selling their labour at a lower wage or restarting retailing and business activities. Concentrations of IDPs as in the Vanni were small, ranging from a few individuals to some 200 perhaps.

By 1995 those who had been able to borrow money or get financial support from the Gulf and a few international Islamic agencies, tended to buy private land on the market and relocate there. Others who could not were relocated by the government on Crown Land (state owned land), getting a small level of assistance money and a lump sum for a cement floor for a 'cadjan' hut.

Box No. 42

Lessons learned in Sri Lanka

- Host population very supportive during initial stages of displacement.
- Cultural and socio-economic similarities were important for local acceptance.
- Choices about where and how to locate the DP were politicised.
- Tensions arose over time as competition between locals and DP for economic opportunities increased and over services such as schools.
- Assistance programmes targeted at self-settled populations require broad planning and need to consider ways in which conflict for resources can be minimised.
- Local NGOs were instrumental in handling the large initial displacement, but the vertical management style worked against DP participation relating to where they should be resettled, and subsequently causing problems of compliance.
- Selection of ‘green sites’ by TRO did not consider technical difficulties of relocating DP in densely forested areas.

6.5 Monrovia, Liberia 1990 - 1996

Urban; large DP; ‘Target area’; support to local solutions

The following programme example relates specifically to the way in which food aid was used as the basis for a ‘target area’ response. The way in which the DP largely self-settled amongst the local population, was at least in part, a motivation for the approach. It is an example taken from a largely IDP programme in an African urban context. The context may be regarded as a typical scenario in IDP programmes, where a DP flees to the relative or perceived

safety of an urban environment. THS solutions were largely self-selected by the DP and local population. A relief programme was developed to assist the self-selected THS option. Although the response was borne out of the circumstances and was not ‘planned for’, it does represent an initiative which illustrates benefits of providing support to a DP and local population simultaneously on a target area basis.

Background

The first influxes of displaced people came during the fighting in 1990, when the population of Monrovia increased from an estimated pre-war level of 0.5 million to 1 million. At least one major camp was spontaneously established during the fighting. This was done with the support of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), one of the warring factions which supplied some food to the camp. It was situated outside Monrovia on a university campus. Serious protection issues developed in the camp (including massacres of groups opposed to the NPFL) which meant that people moved out.

Following this there were no camps in Monrovia until the war started again in 1992. The DP were living in the town, either with relatives or in houses they had claimed. Much of the housing stock in Monrovia is rented and many people took over empty houses. After a while they were able to pay the rents. Some landlords allowed displaced people to stay for free, particularly female-headed households during the first few months.

Many of the DP originally lived within Monrovia, but were forced to move as their houses were destroyed or looted. The Liberian population is very mobile, with many upcountry families having relatives in the city. Many people moved to Monrovia during the fighting and stayed because the country was then split between the city and upcountry NPFL territory. The population on the Monrovia side were scared to cross the NPFL imposed border. Monrovia and its environs were protected throughout the conflict by ECOMOG forces, with two major exceptions when fighting concentrated on the city. The city became the only area of the country where there was adequate security and, therefore, where aid provision was almost continuous.

‘Target area’ approach

WFP, in conjunction with US embassy staff, and a newly set up local NGO, SELF (Special Emergency Life Food), decided in the summer of 1990 to serve

the population with food aid regardless of displaced status. This was in response to a generalised famine and cholera epidemic that affected Monrovia in the few months from July 1990 to November 1990, when the cease-fire was established. The Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) did not play a large role in this decision, but were generally supportive.

SELF devised a system to register the population by numbering all houses in the city, dividing areas into communities and finally streets, which set up their own committees to count people and oversee the distributions. This system lasted until early 1996, when the general distribution to roughly 750,000 urban dwellers was finally phased out. It was based on an explicit ‘self-help’ philosophy, devised by the Liberians who set up SELF. Apart from the food aid role, SELF also attempted to get communities to use the committees to organise other services, including the rebuilding of latrines, school houses etc.

SELF worked on the basis of food for work (FFW). The FFW system was extended to sewage and rubbish collection. This was done with the help of Save the Children UK, who provided the trucks for the rubbish collection. FFW is also to be used extensively in reconstruction. SELF can take some credit for initiating the mainly positive use of food for work in Liberia.

Flexibility of the approach

The SELF system greatly helped with the first new influxes in 1992 from upcountry. SELF, through the community teams, allocated buildings to be temporary camps for the new IDPs and was able very easily and quickly to extend its registration system to include new caseloads. Some of these people were then integrated into the general population. The provision of food aid to everyone again helped. The fact that every household received some aid input, probably contributed to their desire and ability to put up relatives or friends in their own houses. Once the influxes became too big, however, camps had to be set up, eventually containing well over 100,000 people in Monrovia alone.

The general distribution to the city was finally phased in early 1996 out because it was judged not to be needed any more.

Effects of the approach

Displaced people in the city had more or less the same access to opportunities as the original resident population. Although they may have faced some greater

constraints, in terms of having fewer contacts through which to find jobs or business opportunities, there were no major differences. There were no clan differences and indeed, many people were related to city dwellers.

The decision to serve everyone, while perhaps not justified after the initial emergency in terms of strict targeting, seems to have had a very positive effect on the city's economy. The inputs of food, at a half ration delivered monthly, greatly increased the overall capital available in the city, contributing to trading activities, by which most people survived. It therefore served a very important role as an income transfer. When later influxes arrived in Monrovia, the fact that the existing population had managed to regain some food security, with the help of the distribution, possibly motivated their own attempts to develop coping mechanisms.

It was also positive to treat the population's needs together in terms of service provision. As part of FFW, sewage clearance and rubbish collection were organised through local communities. This system was also used periodically for cleanups, after further incidents of fighting in the city.

Following the withdrawal of the general distribution, two INGO's, MSF and ACF, set up feeding centres around the city. These centres targeted poor districts whose populations included many displaced people outside the camps and who were vulnerable partly because of the withdrawal of food aid, but also serving the camps themselves. MSF and ACF nutritional surveys have recently shown small differences in malnutrition rates between the camps and city populations, with the former global rates around 12%, and the latter at 10%. The feeding centres thus represent a good example of an attempt to serve non-camp and camp populations together.

Conclusion

The SELF programme was not without problems such as food leakage, and false or 'ghost houses' being registered. Such problems probably exist within all such programmes. However, the experience from the programme is generally considered to have been favourable.

Whilst the aim of the programme was not specifically to prevent people from congregating in camps, it was a very significant outcome. Although camps were later set up in the city and its environs in response to later fighting, from

late 1992 onwards, the majority of those displaced before then were able to stay in the city and have participated in the general coping strategies of the population.

Box No. 43

Lessons learned in Liberia

- Urban programmes usually demand more innovative, non-camp responses than rural situations.
- Camps caused protection and security problems.
- Support to local initiatives and responses seems to have provided an appropriate solution to a difficult situation.
- The THS solution and food assistance system seem to have been able to adapt to new influxes and represents an attempt to plan for new arrivals.
- Importance of ethnic and cultural ties between DP and host population and willingness of both to integrate.
- Economic and environmental efficiency by using existing housing stock for shelter provision.
- Integration can be a stimulus to local economy.
- Large numbers eventually forced establishment of camps as existing capacity to absorb DP become exhausted.

Annex 1

Current initiatives

There appear to be conspicuously few current initiatives specifically related to the subject of this Review. The only specific work known to the author looking at ‘site selection’ and the role of NGOs, identified during the writing of this Review, is PhD research being undertaken by Tom Corsellis, principal contributor to this Review, in conjunction with Oxfam. In part, this lack of activity in the sector has been the motivation for the Review. However, those which come to light include the following:

- Emergency settlement project by UNDP/Ford Foundation - Wisconsin Disaster Management Center.
- A number of organisations and individuals are looking into the impact of refugees on the environment. This may be a reflection of the fact that concern about the importance of environmental considerations appears to be the one sector in which there is general acceptance and discussion between humanitarian agencies, host authorities and donors, of long term thinking. It is a particularly challenging subject for DP THS planning and its relevance to the concept of sustainability, as used in this Review, can not be overstated.

Despite this, the recently published UNHCR ‘Environmental Guidelines’ (UNHCR, 1996), mention THS location selection only briefly. However, there does appear to be funding available to UNHCR, largely from the Japanese government, for environmental research. Current research includes the ‘Towards Sustainable Environmental Management in Refugee Affected Areas’ (TSEMPRAA) project of UNHCR which seeks to learn from environmental management from past UNHCR experience. Ten country reports are currently being edited on Nepal, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Congo-Zaire, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Guinea and Cote D’Ivoire. UNHCR is also preparing a compendium of lessons learned, and new environmental training materials.

Discussion of environmental protection and management is not integrated into current manuals and technical literature for NGOs. It is hoped, that

research such as TSEMPRAA will help to establish sophisticated THS option and location selection.

Research by Roger Black at the University of Sussex in the UK has considered the relationships between forced migration, environmental change and sustainability issues. The research is critical of simplistic approaches to the ‘damage’ caused to the environment by refugee settlements, and contends that a wider understanding of economic, political and social dynamics of refugee situations which influence outcomes for the environment and natural resources is required by practitioners⁴⁰.

UNHCR is currently developing a new Emergency Handbook, to replace the 1982 edition. It has not been possible to discuss the content, particularly in relation to this Review. The publication is expected to be available in 1998.

- The Steering Committee For Humanitarian Response (SCHR) and InterAction are developing a set of standards in core areas of humanitarian assistance in order to improve the quality of assistance provided to people affected by disasters, and to improve the accountability of agencies to their beneficiaries, their membership and their donors. Standards are to be based on the recognition and elaboration of a set of rights, drawn from existing law, conventions and practice, relevant to all with a legitimate claim to be assisted by the humanitarian community in disaster situations. These basic rights will be highlighted in a humanitarian charter for people affected by disasters.

The Sphere Project is a collaborative process, initiated in July 1997, by a consortium of humanitarian organisations. It involves NGOs, interested donor governments and UN agencies. UNHCR, DHA, UNICEF and WFP have stated their support for the project and are participating in the dialogue.

As part of the project, Sphere will set out minimum standards in four essential sectors. These are: water & sanitation, nutrition & food security, shelter & site selection, and health services. To prepare the technical standards, a network of experts for each sector is reviewing existing protocols and norms developed by agencies throughout the world. They will produce an agreed set of technical standards describing the goods and services that should be available to meet the rights identified in the humanitarian charter⁴¹.

The project also aims to take the expression of standards forward by demonstrating acceptable implementation procedures with descriptions of best practices from a variety of situations around the world. These practical illustrations of humanitarian response in diverse geographic and cultural settings will incorporate appropriate approaches to complex issues such as gender equity, environmental impact and livelihood sustainability.

In time, the Sphere Project should provide a forum for NGOs to further define cooperation and coordination amongst themselves.

Apologies to anyone who has, or is currently undertaking work in this area which is not known to the author.

Acronyms

| | |
|----------|---|
| DHA | Department for Humanitarian Affairs |
| DP | Displaced population |
| ECOMOG | ECOWAS Monitoring Group |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| ERC | Emergency Relief Coordinator |
| FFW | Food for work |
| GA | Government Agents |
| GIS | Geographical Information System |
| GoE | Government of Ethiopia |
| GoM | Government of Mozambique |
| GoN | Government of Nepal |
| GoS | Government of Somalia |
| GoT | Governement of Tanzania |
| IASC | Inter Agency Standards Committee (UN) |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| IDP | Internally displaced population |
| IGNU | Interim Government of National Unity |
| INGO | International non-governmental organisation |
| LRA | Lord's Resistance Army |
| LTTE | Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam |
| LWF | Lutheran World Federation |
| MSF | Médecins Sans Frontières |
| NGO | Non-governmental organisation |
| NPFL | National Patriotic Front of Liberia |
| NSE | Non-state entity |
| OLS | Operation Lifeline Sudan |
| PCMT | Project Cycle Management Tool |
| PMY | Project Management Tool |
| POP | People oriented planning |
| REST | Relief Society of Tigre |
| SCHR | Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response |
| SELF | Special Emergency Life Food |
| SPLM/A | Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Movement/Army |
| SRRA | Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association |
| TRO | Tamil Relief Organisation |
| THS | Temporary human settlement |
| TPLF | Tigrean Peoples' Liberation Front |
| TSEMPRAA | Towards Sustainable Environmental Management in Refugee Affected Areas |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |

End Notes and References

1. "Peter Walker, IFRC in RedR Newsletter No 42. Spring 1997.
2. Planning Settlements in Arid Lands: report of an ad hoc expert group meeting on human settlement planning in arid and semi-arid areas; UNHCS, Nairobi, 1984.
3. R Zetter "Shelter Provision and Policies for Refugees: a state of the art review" - too numerous to explore further here, interested readers are referred to the Zetter paper, which, in this context, goes on to discuss the elements of urban experience which could be replicated in the upgrading and consolidation of refugee settlements and which can be incorporated into refugee planning needs.
4. Red Cross and NGO Code of Conduct, RRN Network Paper 7, ODI, London, September 1994.
5. POP at work. Using POP to improve UNHCR programming. UNHCR, Geneva, 1994.
6. Economic impact of the Bhutanese Refugees in Jhapa, Nepal. UNHCR November 1995. It should be noted that because the study was undertaken by economists from the refugee population, the Government of Nepal claimed the report was biased in favour of the positive impacts. Governments have been known to downplay any positive developmental impacts which may be attributable to a refugee population on the basis that it contradicts their arguments for additional international financial assistance.
7. UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies Geneva 1982.
8. At the time of writing, proposed UN Reforms suggest that UNHCR's mandate may be extended to include responsibility for IDPs as well as refugees.
9. See: Guidelines for the protection of refugee women, UNHCR, Geneva 1991 for a fuller discussion of this issue.
10. Only two countries remain non-signatories to the Charter. These are the USA and Somalia.
11. Refugee Children: Guidelines on Protection and Care; UNHCR Geneva 1994.

12. The Environment for Children; Satterthwaite et al, UNICEF and Earthscan, New York, 1996.
13. In the context of this review, the ‘environment’ is taken to mean the built environment - i.e. the physical environment constructed or modified for human habitation and the natural environment, in which the temporary settlement is located (adapted from Satterthwaite et al; The Environment for Children. UNICEF and Earthscan New York 1996).
14. Agenda 21: Report of the UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio, June 1992.
15. It should be noted that in many developing countries, chemicals which have been banned elsewhere are still readily available at low prices and their use is permitted. Examples would be DDT and Lidane.
16. John Cosgrave: Refugee Density and Dependence: ‘Practical Implications for Camp size’ Disasters Volume 20 Number 3. The term external resources refers to resources of the camp hinterland, which includes amongst others, renewable natural resources.
17. R Zetter: A State of the Art Review of Shelter Provision and Settlement Policies for Refugees: in studies on Emergencies and Disaster Relief No. 2: Nordiska Afrkansinstitutet 1995.
18. K Jacobsen: Refugees’ Environmental Impact: The Effect of Patters of Social Settlement.
19. A disaster is defined in the Code as a ‘calamitous event resulting in loss of life, great human suffering and distress and large scale material damage’.
20. Assisting in emergencies: A resource handbook for UNICEF, UNICEF 1986.
21. ‘Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development: The Debate Continues’ an article in RRN Newsletter 5, June 1996.
22. Eriksson J. et al “The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. Study III Humanitarian Aid and its Effects”, Copenhagen, 1996.
23. UNHCR contingency planning guide for field workers.

24. It may also be useful to understand what is meant by ‘planning’. A plan refers to a detailed scheme or method for attaining an objective. Planning is the act of preparing a plan and as such, is very closely related to the term ‘process’.
25. R Zetter: A State of the Art Review of Shelter Provision and Settlement Policies for Refugees: in studies on Emergencies and Disaster Relief No. 2: Nordiska Afrikansinstitutet 1995.
26. Hugo Slim: ‘The Continuing Metamorphosis of the Humanitarian Practitioner: Some New Colours for an Endangered Chameleon’ in Disasters Vo. 19 Number 2, 1995 (110-126)
27. Macrae and Zwi et al ‘War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies; Zed Books and SCF, London 1994, in Hugo Slim’s article.
28. In this Review, the definition of coordination will be the same as that used in Study III of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, defined as ‘*orchestration of effort*’.
29. Arguably the presence of water is the most significant determinant of the location of a temporary human settlement. See GPR No. 1 for discussion of this.
30. See RRN Network Paper No. 20, ‘People in Aid Code of Best Practice’, February 1997.
31. For a more detailed discussion of Satellite imaging and possible resource centres, see RRN Newsletter No. 5, June 1996.
32. © Red R 1995, “Engineering In Emergencies: a practical guide for relief workers.”, London. Used by permission
33. UNHCR; Contingency Planning: A Practical Guide for Field Staff; Geneva, August 1996.
34. Interested readers can refer to RRN Network Paper No. 18 1996 by John Bennett and Mary Kayitesi-Blewitt.
35. See Section 6.2 in Study III of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda and also ‘The Rwandan Refugee Influx into Goma in mid-July 1994: An Assessment of the Performance of Contingency Planning and Early Warning Arrangements Within the International Humanitarian Aid System.’ Prepared by John Borton, ODI, January 1995.

36. The effectiveness of early warning systems has been of limited value and cannot be relied upon to predict all emergencies.
37. Operations planning differs from contingency planning in that some uncertainty has been removed; a phase where a response is planned in the face of a more tangible situation.
38. J Shoham, J Rivers & P Payne: 'Hartisheik' June 1989. A report commissioned by SCF (UK).
39. See K Van Brabant 1994:10-11 in RRN Network Paper No. 4.
40. A book called: 'Refugees, environment and development' will be published in 1998 by Longman.
41. The Author and Principal Contributor to this review are involved in the SPHERE working group looking at site selection. The Group is under the chairmanship of P Wijmans, LWF field director in Cambodia.

Bibliography and further reading

Cooperation/coordination

Bennet, J. (1994). NGO Co-ordination at Field Level: a Handbook. Oxford: International Council of Voluntary Agencies. RRN Network Paper 23.

de Wolf, S.C. (1994). Practical Aspects of UNHCR - NGO Partnership. Refugee Participation Network no. 17. Oxford: Refugee Participation Network.

Goovaerts, P. (1993). Specifications & Standards, Emergency and Longer Term. Unpublished paper presented at the First International Workshop on Improved Shelter Response and Environment for Refugees. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Hodgson, R. (1990). Planning for Emergencies. Refugee Participation Network no. 7. Oxford: Refugee Participation Network.

Stevens, Y. (1993). Discussion Paper: Preparedness and Quick Response. First International Workshop on Improved Shelter Response and Environment for Refugees. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Environment

Biswas A.K. & Tortajada-Quiroz H.C. (1994). Environment Impacts of the Rwandan Refugees. New York: United Nations Development Programme.

Leach, M. (1991). Refugees and the Environment. Refugee Participation Network no. 11. Oxford: Refugee Participation Network.

Lonergan, S. (1995). Population Movements and the Environment. Refugee Participation Network no. 18. Oxford: Refugee Participation Network.

Stevens, Y. (1991). Discussion Paper: Refugees and the Environment. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1996). Environmental Guidelines. Geneva: UNHCR.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1996). Refugees and the Environment: Caring for the Future. Geneva: UNHCR.

Gender

Anderson, M.B., Brazeau & Overholt C. (1992). A Framework for People-Oriented Planning in Refugee Situations Taking Account of Women, Men and Children. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Anderson, M. B. (1994). People-Oriented Planning At Work Using POP to Improve UNHCR Programming. Cambridge (USA): Collaborative for Development Action, Inc. / United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Belgian Administration for Development Co-operation (1991). Manual for the use of Objective-Oriented Intervention Planning. Brussels: Belgian Administration for Development Co-operation.

Nguyen-Lazarus, V. Q. (1995). Refugee Women and the Politics of Shelter. Unpublished Paper. Boston: Departments of Sociology and Social Work.

Voutira, E. (1995). Improving Social and Gender Planning in Emergency Operations. Unpublished paper. Oxford: Refugee Studies Programme.

Physical planning

Cuny, F. C. (1977). Refugee Camps and Camp Planning: The State of the Art. Disasters, vol. 1 (2) pp.125-143.

Goethert, R. & Hamdi, N. (1988). Refugee Camps, A Primer for Rapid Site Planning. Unpublished draft manual for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Goethert, R. & Hamdi, N. (1988). Refugee Settlements, A Primer for Development. Unpublished preliminary outline for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Hoerz, T. (1995). The Environment of Refugee Camps. Refugee Participation Network no. 18. Oxford: Refugee Participation Network.

Jacobsen, K. (1994). The Impact of Refugees on the Environment: A Review of the Evidence. Washington: Refugee Policy Group.

Leach, M. (1991). Refugees and the Environment. Refugee Participation Network no. 11. Oxford: Refugee Participation Network.

Nordberg, R. (1994). Planning and Construction of Human Settlements for Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons. Nairobi: United Nations Centre for Human Settlements.

United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (1984). *Planning Settlements in Arid Lands*. Nairobi: United Nations Centre for Human Settlements.

Protection

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (1991). *Guidelines On The Protection Of Refugees Women*. Geneva UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1994). *Refugee Children. Guidelines on Protection and Care*. Geneva. UNHCR.

Shelter

Corsellis, T. (1994). *The Sahrawi Refugee Camps of Western Algeria*. Paper presented at the Seminar Civil Strife and Relief. The Hague: The Disaster and Emergency Reference Centre/The Institute of Social Studies.

Davis, I. (1978). *Shelter After Disaster*. Oxford: Oxford Polytechnic Press.

Howard, J. & Mister, R. (1979). *Lessons learnt by Oxfam from their Experience of Shelter Provision 1970-78*. *Disasters*, vol. 3 (2) pp.136-144.

Howard, J. & Spice R. (1989). *Plastic Sheeting: Its Use for Emergency Shelter and Other Purposes*. Oxford: Oxfam.

Manyara, J. (1994). *Initial Report - Feasibility Study Alternative Shelter Materials*. Unpublished report. Dadaab: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Dadaab Sub Office.

Oger, P. (1995). *Shelter International Research Project, Draft Report*. Mérygnac: Medecins sans Frontieres France.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1993). *Summary of Proceedings. The First International Workshop on Improved Shelter Response and Environment for Refugees*. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Zetter, R. (1995). *Shelter Provision and Settlement Policies for Refugees: A State of the Art Review*. *Studies on Emergency and Disaster Relief No. 2*. Sweden: Noriska Afrikainstitutet.

Sustainability

Christensen, H. (1984). *Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: From Emergency Towards Self-Reliance*. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Christensen, H. (1982). *Survival Strategy for and by Camp Refugees*. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Clark, C. *The Refugee Dependency Syndrome: Physician, Heal Thyself*. Article in *Refugee Studies Programme Documentation Centre*. Washington: Refugee Policy Group.

de Voe, D. (1981). *Framing Refugees as Clients*. *International Migration Review*, 15/1-2, pp. 88-94.

Lewis, J. (1994). *Vulnerability Reduction, Survival and Sustainability: What Kind of Development*. Paper from the Seminar *Civil Strife and Relief*. The Hague: Disaster and Emergency Reference Centre/Institute of Social Studies.

Nimpuno, K. (Undated). *Emergency Settlement: Unsustainable Development*. Delft, The Netherlands. Disaster and Emergency Reference Centre

Reynolds, R. (1995). *Development in Refugee Situations*. Refugee Participation Network no.18. Oxford: Refugee Participation Network.

United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (1991). *Human Settlements Development Through Community Participation*. Nairobi. United Nations Centre for Human Settlements.

Voutira, E. (1993). *In Search of the Locus of Trust: the Social World of the Refugee Camp*. The First International Workshop on Improved Shelter Response and Environment for Refugees. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

World Health Organisation (1992). *Emergency Preparedness: Investing in the Future*. Geneva: World Health Organisation.

UN/NGO-specific manuals

Davis, J, & Lambert, R. (1995). *Engineering in Emergencies*. London: RedR.

Eade, D, & Williams, S. (1995). *The Oxfam Handbook of Development and Relief*. Oxford: Oxfam.

Ockwell, R. (1986). *Assisting in Emergencies: A Resource Handbook for UNICEF Field Staff*. Geneva: United Nations Children’s Fund

Pratt, P, & Boyden, J. (1990). *The Field Directors’ Handbook*. Oxford: Oxfam.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1982). *The Emergency Handbook*. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

GOOD PRACTICE RRN GOOD review

Good Practice Reviews are commissioned 'state of the art' reviews on different sectors or activities within the relief and rehabilitation field. Prepared by recognised specialists, and subject to peer review, they are produced in a format that is readily accessible to field based personnel.

This is the sixth Review in the series. Other titles available are:

Water and Sanitation in Emergencies by Andrew Chalinder, 1994

Emergency Supplementary Feeding Programmes by Jeremy Shoham, 1994

General Food Distribution in Emergencies: from nutritional needs to political priorities by Susanne Jaspers and Helen Young, 1996

Seed Provision During and After Emergencies by the ODI Seeds and Biodiversity Programme, 1996

Counting and Identification of Beneficiary Populations in Emergency Operations: registration and its alternatives by John Telford 1997

Temporary Human Settlement Planning for Displaced Populations in Emergencies by Andrew Chalinder, 1998

The Evaluation of Humanitarian Assistance Programmes by Alistair Hallam, forthcoming 1998

For details on how to order these publications, see overleaf.

how to order

Orders can be placed in any of the following ways:

By Fax: +44 (0)171 393 1699

By Phone: +44 (0)171 393 1674

By Email: rrn@odi.org.uk

By Letter: RRN Administrator
ODI
Portland House
Stag Place
London
United Kingdom
SW1E 3DP

In Person: at the above address

Cost: £10.00 per copy (£7.50 per copy for orders of 10 or more or to members of the RRN). Postage and packing is added at 20% of order value for UK and EU delivery, 25% for all overseas orders; 35% for Far East and Australasia.

Payment: by credit card (visa/mastercard) - include card no. expiry date, name on card and card billing address. by cheque (sterling only) made payable to the Overseas Development Institute.

Please note that the RRN also produces a Network Paper Series. Should you require any further information regarding the RRN or its publications, please contact the Administrator.

RRN

Background

The Relief and Rehabilitation Network was conceived in 1992 and launched in 1994 as a mechanism for professional information exchange in the expanding field of humanitarian aid. The need for such a mechanism was identified in the course of research undertaken by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) on the changing role of NGOs in relief and rehabilitation operations, and was developed in consultation with other Networks operated within ODI. Since April 1994, the RRN has produced publications in three different formats, in French and English: Good Practice Reviews, Network Papers and Newsletters. The RRN is now in its second three year phase (1996-1999), supported by four new donors — DANIDA, ECHO, the Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland and the Department for International Development. Over the three year phase, the RRN will seek to expand its reach and relevance amongst humanitarian agency personnel and to further promote good practice.

Objective

To improve aid policy and practice as it is applied in complex political emergencies.

Purpose

To contribute to individual and institutional learning by encouraging the exchange and dissemination of information relevant to the professional development of those engaged in the provision of humanitarian assistance.

Target audience

Individuals actively engaged in the provision of humanitarian assistance at national and internal, field-based and head office level in the 'North' and 'South'.

This *RRN Good Practice Review* was financed principally by
in conjunction with RRN Phase II donors: