

WHAT IS THE VISION FOR SHELTERING AND HOUSING IN HAITI?

Summary Observations of Reconstruction
Progress following the Haiti Earthquake
of January 12th 2010

Ian Davis



SUMMARY PAPER

“Where there is no vision, the people perish”

Proverbs 29:18

***“Vision without action is a daydream.
Action without vision is a nightmare”***

Japanese Proverb

***“As long as Haitians’ Number One Dream
is “a visa and leave”, no effective recovery
is possible”***

José Magloire van der Vossen



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1. CONTEXT

This report emerges from Ian Davis's visit to Haiti in November 2011, to examine progress with reconstruction approximately twenty-two months after the earthquake. His visit only lasted three weeks, but his reflections relate to almost 40 years of work, as an architect, academic and consultant examining, researching and writing about post-disaster sheltering and housing in about 30 different recovery situations. During his visit he was able to visit various sites and interview a spectrum of informants that included NGO, UN and Government officials as well as earthquake survivors, consultants, private sector representatives and academics. Ian Davis's findings are totally independent viewpoints since he was not employed by any agency operating in Haiti.

This is a summary of a longer, fully illustrated report with relevant historical examples. This can be downloaded from www.onuhabitat.org/haiti

The author gratefully acknowledges all who generously gave their time and valued insights to this report. A list of contributors is included in the full report. In order to expand the author's limited perceptions of reconstruction and specifically of the Haiti context, he asked four colleagues with extensive experience of the Haiti Reconstruction (Anshu Sharma, Jo da Silva, Maggie Stephenson and José Magloire-van der Vossen) for their own priority list of 'actions needed' Their rich insights were gratefully received and are reproduced in full in the Appendix of the main report, and they have also been fragmented and placed within section 6 under appropriate proposed actions. The draft of this summary was helpfully reviewed by members of the E-Shelter/ CCCM Cluster and some of their reactions have been quoted in the text. Special thanks are also due to Conor Gallagher for professional support in the design of the summary and the main report.

2. RECOVERY AIMS IN HAITI

The history of disaster reconstruction is a gallery of frequent failures and rare success stories. Recovery fits into four broad categories: Scenario 1 being the worst solution, while Scenario 4 is clearly the target to aim for:


- in **Scenario 1**, there are numerous examples of *no recovery*, where years after the disaster, there is still abundant evidence of ruined buildings, half finished projects and the failure to deliver the early promises;
- in **Scenario 2**, there are examples of *insufficient or erratic recovery*, where buildings may have been rebuilt, but there are not enough jobs, society remains fragmented and trees have not been replanted;
- in **Scenario 3**, – the 'status-quo' option, there are examples of attempts to *recover the pre-disaster situation*, but alas, that 'normality' was also the 'vulnerability' that gave rise to the disaster...;
- but in **Scenario 4**, there are rare examples of recovery where *positive development* has taken place to produce a better and safer environment.

In the following diagram four key elements are noted in this scenario:

- *Build back both better and safer*
- *Complete all sectors*
- *Inspired Vision*
- *Strong, persistent and wise leadership*


This scenario must be the only aim and vision for Haiti's Recovery Plans.

These stages can be seen on the following model, where recovery has been broken down into its four essential strands: *vision and leadership*, *resources*, *participation and ownership* and *organisation*.



This model of Disaster Recovery can be expanded in scope to break the process down into five sectors:

- *psycho-social recovery*,
- *environmental recovery*,
- *institutional and governmental recovery*,
- *physical recovery*
- *economic/ livelihood recovery*.



Since each of these sectors is dependent on the others - needing close integration, the aim must be to move each sector, in a balanced manner, towards Scenario 4 'Development Recovery' Close multi-sectoral integration must be the only way forward for Haiti's Recovery Plans to avoid the risk of neglecting one sector at the expense of another

Thus the underlying assumption of my report is that full 'development recovery' is needed in Haiti that moves beyond replicating the dangerous pre-disaster status-quo and that this recovery integrates all the key sectors in a balanced approach through an agreed policy framework.

3. POSITIVE IMPRESSIONS OF THE HAITI RECOVERY

- 3.1 Immediately after the earthquake, excellent support was extended to survivors by **'host families'**. This reduced the burden on authorities and provided essential security to traumatized families.
- 3.2 The survivors are highly motivated in their reaction to occupy vacant lands in **spontaneously created camps**. In the way they have survived in these makeshift settlements they have demonstrated well developed improvisation skills in building, communal living and general survival.
- 3.3 **External Global Solidarity** has been expressed through massive bilateral support from 140 countries, (out of a global total of 196) and through generous remittances from the Haitian diaspora of about 3.5 million people.
- 3.4 **Private Sector Support** to reconstruction has been strong, with exceptional support from DIGICEL in rebuilding the Iron Market as well as for the reconstruction of schools and infrastructure. The rapid reconstruction of the much loved Iron Market fulfilled a vital practical function, but it was also an inspired symbolic act in giving hope to the population that the downtown area of their city would be rebuilt.
- 3.5 **International NGO Support** was still present after 22 months. In many contexts there would be minimal presence of NGO's at this stage.
- 3.6 Despite initial fears that this would impede reconstruction, **earthquake rubble clearance** appears to be progressing well, with delivery to sites that will not become unsafe new building sites with unconsolidated soils. The recycling of rubble to form new concrete blocks was a sensible labour intensive move, even though it is of doubtful whether such blocks end up being cheaper to manufacture than newly produced blocks.
- 3.7 The **repair strategy** has been a key approach in preventing the wasteful demolition of houses that are repairable, although it was evidently late in starting.
- 3.8 The **housing expo of prototype designs** was an excellent way to enable the housing/ shelter private sector to display their wares in a comparative setting.
- 3.9 **Communication strategies** have been effective during the relief phase and will be increasingly important during reconstruction.

4. MIXED POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE IMPRESSIONS OF THE HAITI RECOVERY

4.1 **Land invasions** in Canaan indicate enterprise, and must be regarded as an asset in reducing the population pressure on the congested urban centre and through the gradual establishment of micro-enterprises such as concrete block-making, car repairs, tailoring, laundry services etc. But there is a negative side since most houses, set in unplanned settlements, have been built with a lack of quality construction, and many were not built safely.

4.2 The scale and nature of **Community Level Actions** are most impressive. The mapping exercises as well as the community enumeration processes pave the way for vital subsequent neighbourhood upgrading programmes.

But negative concerns relate to the inexperienced persons who are undertaking some of these exercises as well as the serious risk of raising community expectations to address the priorities that communities have identified through these studies, since there is no certainty of implementation given the absence of allocated funds. However, some of the issues identified can be undertaken at low or no cost by the communities themselves.

4.3 The joint **Habitat for Humanity and HAVEN two week house building initiative** in Leogane in November 2011, that involved the active involvement of Jimmy Carter (aged 87) and his wife Rosalind was of mixed value. Positively it involved ‘community to community’ volunteer assistance on a heroic scale and there is no reason to doubt that the Carters’ contribution to the building work was a sincere gesture of support

But negatively, the project was very expensive, and gained wide publicity that was misleading. This relates to the suggestion to the armies of volunteers as well as their supporters in Europe and the US, that this is the best way to reconstruct, when clearly far better ‘user-build’ alternatives are available. There was also the criticism that bringing in plane loads of volunteers from Ireland and the USA, for just one week of building and exposure to Haiti’s plight was a superficial form of ‘poverty and disaster tourism’.

4.4 The presence of **young international staff in NGO and UN projects** presents a mixed blessing. Positively such young persons are enthusiastic, energetic, learn fast and engage easily with the predominant local population of young people and children.

But, many I met clearly lack previous exposure to a developing country and lacked an understanding of disaster or development practice. Some also lacked essential qualifications and experience and remain for inefficiently short periods. Thus, the risk is that many are making decisions far beyond their capacity or competency. One way forward is for better staff selection, induction training as well as ‘on-the-job’ training, perhaps undertaken on a joint inter-agency basis.

4.5 At the project level, **coordination** appeared to be working well when several agencies collaborated on the same integrated project. But there is serious criticism of a lack of coherent well coordinated donor activity. There was also repeated criticism of the Government of Haiti for failing to get a tight grip on recovery activities. But this may be changing (*see item 6.1*).

4.6 The **16/6 neighbourhood return policy** has the positive value of seeking to rehabilitate existing settlements rather than attempt unrealistic relocation projects that have occurred with dire negative consequences in many disaster recovery situations. The underlying intention to symbolically clear key public spaces to provide hope and confidence to the population is also an excellent idea

But, there are unresolved negative risks implicit in the programme. Given the high proportion of renters who are to be relocated to their original locations, there is a clear need to rapidly regenerate a large stock of affordable rental accommodation, ranging from a single room to a full dwelling, and at present that does not appear to exist. In addition the programme for the selected camps will not be replicable to all sites since at present there is insufficient capital available.

5. NEGATIVE IMPRESSIONS OF THE HAITI RECOVERY

5.1 There appears to be a **vacuum in the Government concerning leadership, strategic management, policy directives, co-ordination of actions concerned with permanent housing reconstruction.**

To emphasise this gap I quote from a pungent critique of inaction by the GOH as well as the international community. An experienced informant notes the:

“.....damaging effects on progress of the lack of a reconstruction policy and strategy and thus to hold those who have failed Haiti accountable. No agreement has been reached up to today (January 18th 2012) on size, possible designs, costs, and detailed methodology (installments: how many? supervision? by whom?) of P-Housing reconstruction.

No policy on who is entitled to a permanent house has also been established. Also, no overall estimation of the needs, costing and timing of the reconstruction process, study on the availability of skilled/unskilled human resources and materials availability has been undertaken.

Additionally, no clear understanding of how much money has actually been set aside for reconstruction has been reached. The GOH has repeatedly asked for support to develop these parameters/cast light on this information. But the international community has, so far, failed to deliver on these requests. Donors have not invested in P-Housing reconstruction mostly due to the above mentioned lack of clarity in the approach”.

E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster member’s comments/feedback

5.2 While the **creation of over 100,000 T-Shelters** has provided much better accommodation than improvised tent structures, the results have been mainly negative, for five reasons:

1. They have absorbed approximately \$500 million USD¹. This vast sum could have been far better used to build permanent dwellings. They could have been built for little more money than T-Shelters (*average costs of T-Shelters: \$138.8 USD per sq m compared to average costs of permanent dwellings \$166.00 USD per sq m (HAVEN).*

However, the World Bank (PREKAD) and the Bureau of Monetisation are anticipating the cost of permanent dwellings to total \$7,000 per unit of 18 sq.m or \$388 USD per sq m.

¹ *“An enormous sum has been spent on temporary housing (easily \$500 million when all is completed), which has gone largely to existing landowners in non-urban settings. A conservative estimate is that reconstruction could cost \$1.6 billion. Less than \$400 million is now available, and it is committed to a disproportionately small number of beneficiaries. More funding is needed, but it should be allocated more equitably and spent more efficiently.”*

Priscilla Phelps (2011) Haiti Interim Recovery Commission Housing Sector Background Report Item 4




Figs. 9 & 10. Transitional Shelters in Port-au-Prince. Note- in the right hand picture the T-Shelter has been constructed inside partially constructed permanent dwelling, enclosing rubble from the original demolished house. (Credit: Ian Davis)

2. They frequently occupy land in densely populated urban that is needed for dwelling reconstruction, thus blocking the construction of permanent reconstruction
3. They are not easily demolished to be recycled into permanent dwellings . (This is on account of the lightweight timber technology of T-Shelters in comparison with the heavy concrete block infill within reinforced concrete frame construction of permanent houses)
4. If international experience is anything to go by, these shelters will not be demolished, rather they will remain as sub-standard dwellings for years to come as a dismal legacy
5. They failed to generate extensive much needed local employment. I did not hear of any skill training attached to construction programmes of T-Shelters.



Figs. 11 & 12. Left: Transition Shelter donated by the IFRC in Delmas 9 in Port-au-Prince .The photograph was taken in November 2011, 21 months after the earthquake. The family of six sleep in a space of 18 sq metres. They complained about the lack of space, the lack of security from theft and the heat from the CI roofing that they have tried to reduce by hanging sheets below the metal sheeting. They also find the shelter very noisy when there is heavy rainfall. (Credit: Ian Davis)
Right: Permanent House in Cabaret by HAVEN. Note the temporary timber roof that the owner will probably replace with a concrete slab when resources become available in order to build a second floor (Credit: Maggie Stephenson)

The following pair of scenarios indicate alternative recovery options. Scenario 1 has been the prevailing pattern adopted in Haiti.



Response to the above five point critique of T-Shelters from the E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster:

“The idea that T-Shelter is a physical obstacle to construction is ludicrous. Not only there exist many examples of the transformation of the timber frame into (part of the) permanent construction (not furniture) but there are vast areas damaged where the coverage with T-Shelter is minimal or non-existing. Coordination on permanent housing programming which has been very poor throughout the response, would ensure that those areas with no coverage would be served with permanent housing. There are many areas which can be served still by T-Shelter and permanent programming without conflicts.”

E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster member’s comments/feedback

5.3 Three important **safety concerns** emerged during my visit:

1. Individual engineers, employed by NGO’s appear to be checking repairs and reconstruction projects for seismic safety. However, given the scale of building repairs/ retrofit or reconstruction, the limited numbers of qualified engineers will not be able to respond to the potential massive demand for such advice. Therefore, engineers need to apply a strategic ‘cascade approach’ to teach a community the principles and practice of ‘seismic safety compliance’.
2. Retrofitting is more appropriate for critical facilities than individual dwellings. Thus, schools/ churches – buildings of multiple assembly are appropriate as they demand enhanced protection.
3. When agencies are assigned individual neighbourhoods for upgrading, overall safety should be a key part of their mandate- so that they check **all** structures, and offer training to **all** local builders , masons etc in safe construction.

- 5.4 The **evictions of camp dwellers** have caused acute hardship to surviving families who have already suffered enough over the past two years. I am informed that according to the latest eviction report (November 2011), a total of 63,109 people living in camps have been evicted since July 2010. An additional 99,098 are currently facing threats of eviction. Overall this figure represents 19% of current IDPs. Evictions remain for almost one out of five IDPs a daily threat.
- 5.5 **The relocation of surviving families to the only ‘official’ disaster relief camp in Corail**, is generally acknowledged as an ill-considered decision. There appear to be a host of problems with Corail:
- The uprooting of the occupants to move them to this site
 - The highly exposed site, without shade and a long distant from most residents work place in Port-au-Prince
 - The unimaginative, regimented military style layout
 - The inadequate design of the T-Shelters
 - The lack of infrastructure, and dependency of services to maintain water and sanitation
 - Dissatisfaction of the settlement by the occupants
 - The lack of any plan for its future development.

6. ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROMOTE FULL RECOVERY²

6.1 ESTABLISHING, AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP OF RECONSTRUCTION WITHIN GOVERNMENT

The closure of the *Haiti Interim Recovery Housing Sector* on October 24 2011 was a major source of concern. The perceptive Background Report on Perceptions of Recovery Priorities by Priscilla Phelps, (See Appendix 2 of Main Paper) indicates six key issues that urgently need to be addressed. I trust that the commission’s existence and mandate will be renewed, or be replaced by a similar body since it is crucial that all sectors of disaster recovery/ reconstruction need a focal point at the centre of the Government of Haiti to give direction and coordinate these complex tasks

However, as I write there are encouraging signs that the Government of Haiti is beginning to move forward, since in January 2012 the Haitian Government’s Ministry of Public Works is now working closely with the Unit for Reconstruction, UCLBP that is well placed under the Prime Ministers Office. It is to be hoped that the main donors will support the Government as it lays down the foundations of a reconstruction management structure to establish governmental machinery that can supervise the varied sectors of reconstruction.

Accountable management and leadership are essential, but a clear vision for recovery is also needed with ‘champions’ who will inspire the entire process, work through the host of obstacles and provide the public and all the assisting groups with direction and confidence

The coordination model for recovery needs to be one with multiple linked nodes in a devolved model, (rather like a network of wire netting) rather than a centralized, cumbersome and unwieldy ‘command and control’ model (*rather like a bicycle wheel with all spokes leading to a central hub*).

2 After each proposed action, a series of quotes are inserted in italics. These come from experienced informants with experience of Haiti who were approached to seek their own proposals for recovery, and expand my own perceptions. Their suggestions are included in full within the Appendix 1. of the Main Report

“Change-

is possible and recovery is a challenge for those who remain flexible and positive so keep trying

José Magloire - van der Vossen_ Haiti Earthquake Disaster Response

“Lack of Vision at the Micro-level”

In the absence of credible master planning processes, the best option available is perhaps the creation of smaller plans wherever work is being carried out, and then stitching them together. Unfortunately, comprehensive visions were not easily found even at this small scale.”

Anshu Sharma, Independent Consultant

“Lack of Vision and Leadership:

Re-construction relies on the cumulative and collective action by a wide range of actors (various government departments, UN, NGO’s, local institutions, civil society). They need to unite behind a clear and realistic vision of what reconstruction can achieve set out by the GoH. A vision statement is necessarily high level, and is more useful if supported by more specific goals (or objectives). Both could be developed quite quickly through a professional facilitated 1-2 day workshop involving key stakeholders. The greater challenge perhaps is who should participate in that workshop, and who comprises the leadership group (or individual) who will take ownership of the vision and goals, and has the mandate to develop a strategy that responds to this. A government entity needs to be established urgently to take on the leadership and co-ordination of reconstruction. A key question is whether this should be integral to government or a more distinct entity. Secondly, how this entity will be effectively supported by the UN and other international organisations”.

Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup

“Strategy for co-ordination and integration:

A strategy is critical to achieve co-ordinated effort and action, and ensure that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts, and that opportunities are not overlooked. At present, a key challenge is that those contributing to reconstruction are doing so in isolation. The limited successes to date tend to be one-off, one-time projects in more rural areas where integrated approach is less critical”.

Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup

“One overall plan:

All support from local & international organisations should fit in one overall plan to build back better”

José Magloire - van der Vossen_ Haiti Earthquake Disaster Response

- **Will require continual financial support to the Government of Haiti by International Donors**
- **Will require action by the Government of Haiti**

6.2 MOBILISING NATIONAL RESOURCES

Given the massive challenge of reconstruction that will take many years to accomplish, support from the full range of civil society is essential. The government will need to find appropriate ways to engage with locally based bodies that will include institutions/ academic courses in reconstruction and virtually all aspects of society: *for example: architecture/ planning/ engineering / finance/ legal/ religious bodies/ chambers of commerce/ private sector/ media etc.*

“Consider issues of equity:

The resources available, both financial and technical, have to date been allocated on a quite ad hoc project-based logic. Some areas, communities and families have won the recovery lottery with high levels of support, and others have been less lucky.

The Government of Haiti needs to ensure the distribution of assistance is more balanced, more fair, and more accountable. Likewise the assistance community needs to coordinate and support the Government in managing the optimisation of resources”.

Maggie Stephenson, UN-HABITAT Haiti

“Funding/Costs:

Funding is limited and there needs to be greater transparency as to how much is available and what is being budgeted and who holds the purse strings. Expenditure needs to be perceived as investment rather than aid/compensation, based on at least a qualitative cost-benefit analysis. (This approach might have prevented so many T-Shelters being built!). The cost of technical expertise is currently perceived as expensive as it is related to the capital costs of ‘a project’ (eg. a school, a house); in fact investing £50k in developing a safe school design or retrofitting guidelines is trivial when 100s of schools are being built and houses retro-fitted. Without it, the larger investment in building structures may be wasted if they collapse in a future event.”

Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup.

“Partnerships:

The complexity of the challenges in Haiti requires unified effort by diverse organisations. Cross-sectoral partnerships are a proven mechanism for combining the strengths of different entities, but are only effective if there is a shared goal and governance amongst the parties which promotes trust and collaboration. Public procurement processes are an obstacle to this approach as they stipulate a ‘consultant’, a ‘firm’ or a ‘consortium’; and often focus at transferring risk to others rather than combining strengths to solve a problem”.

Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup.

- **Will require continual financial support to the Government of Haiti by International Donors**
- **Will require the full resources of civil society to be mobilised**
- **Will require action by the Government of Haiti**

6.3 MANAGING THE EXPECTATIONS OF SURVIVORS

Evidently there is a widespread expectation among the survivors that they will each be provided with a new house (see *Haiti Interim Housing Sector Report*, item 3 in the Appendix of the Main Report) Therefore the government must dispel such assumptions and explain their overall policy for the future of homeless families

“Develop an Effective Communication Strategy:

This is needed to project the vision, publicise emerging policy and place GoH in the driving seat. The current expectation that everyone will be provided a home needs to be dispelled, and the GoH need to re-position themselves as a facilitator of recovery rather than a provider. There needs to be a marked threshold between the last two years of ‘aid’ and the next period of reconstruction.”

Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup.

- **Will require very urgent actions to be taken**
- **Will not require extensive further financial investment**
- **Will require action by the Government of Haiti and IOM**

6.4 DEFINING HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION POLICY

The government need to urgently define the ‘rule-book’ for housing reconstruction to avoid different standards being adopted in a piece-meal manner. Facing such key questions as: what to build, where, when, how safe, how large, for whom and at what costing level?

“Lack of Reconstruction Strategy:

A strategy simply sets out the big picture in terms of what needs to be done, and the inter-relationships (dependencies) between different elements. Policies can then be developed which relate to specific aspects of the strategy (eg. land tenure, T-Shelters, compensation etc)”

Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup.

“Think like investors:

How can programmes and activities be more strategic, more efficient, more effective and provide better value for money. How might we leverage multiple impacts and outcomes from resources invested in reconstruction, (invest in training people, invest in strengthening institutions). How will our actions

now, supporting reconstruction, ensure Haiti is safer in 20 years time, or otherwise contribute to long term development”

Maggie Stephenson, UN-HABITAT Haiti

“Infrastructure

There is too much focus on housing and not enough on infrastructure. This is an important element to improve quality of life in Port-au-Prince and it much easier and more cost effective to introduce now as part of reconstruction than integrate it into a pre-existing urban fabric. Investment in such public services provides confidence and motivation for families to invest themselves in re-building or repairing their houses. It is suggested that priority should be given to developing drainage, road, sewage and potable water networks followed by power, telcomms, and solid waste management”

Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup.

“Focus

mostly on rural support, facilitate good basic infrastructure to attract occupants from the PauPrince area.

José Magloire - van der Vossen_ Haiti Earthquake Disaster Response

“Neighbourhood Masterplans:

These need to be developed by experienced urban planners in consultation with those living there as well as the government, and specific action plans developed. International technical support is needed but could be done cost effectively thorough workshops and mentoring which supports and builds the capacity of local planners/engineers/architects. We envision a central programme management office would act as a resource centre providing a centre of excellence/knowledge/advice. In this way the learning from the upgrading of one neighbourhood would feed into the next.”

Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup.

- **Will require very urgent actions to be taken**
- **Will require action by the Government of Haiti and the Department of Public Works**
- **Will require continual financial support to the Government of Haiti by International Donors**

6.5 ADVISING ON THE FUTURE OF TRANSITION SHELTERS

There is a strong case to cease building T-Shelters immediately, and using remaining available funds for permanent dwelling reconstruction. Advice needs to be provided to the occupants of T-Shelters concerning their rights to demolish or modify/ upgrade them into permanent houses, or how they demolish and recycle the building materials to enable them to build permanent dwellings on the T-Shelter sites.

“T-Shelter Policy

Advice is needed on the status of T-Shelters; and the whether the occupants are permitted to re-use/ recycle materials; or improve their shelters in-situ. We caution against the notion of ‘upgrading’ to a ‘permanent house’ without there being a clear definition of the latter. We note also the inherent conflict between the aspiration for a durable masonry house which unless build correctly is likely to be unsafe in earthquakes, and a lightweight T-Shelter (which is vulnerable to hurricanes)”.

Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup.

- **Will require very urgent actions to be taken**
- **Will not require extensive further financial investment**
- **Will require action by the Government of Haiti**

6.6 SUPPORTING ECONOMIC RECOVERY

A policy is needed to use local materials and labour wherever possible in reconstruction. In addition, a policy and programme is also needed to enable survivors to secure sustainable livelihoods that can assist them in financing their own recovery. The development of micro-credit facilities and small loans to business enterprises will be a pre-requisite to economic recovery at the neighbourhood level.

“Local Capacity:

The lack of local skills ranging from skilled tradesman to engineers and project managers is a critical issue. At the same time the greatest opportunity reconstruction affords is to build this capacity in-country. The starting point is a comprehensive assessment of the capacity in Haiti and targeted training programmes. A key challenge at present is that most of the NGO’s implementing programmes in Haiti also suffer from limited technical and program/project management capacity. New partnerships are needed (probably with the private sector) to develop and deliver training materials, and construction of public buildings should be used as opportunities to demonstrate best practice”.

Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup.

- **Will require continual financial support to the Government of Haiti by International Donors**
- **Will benefit from technical support from ILO and International Finance Institutions**
- **Will require action by the Government of Haiti**

6.7 SECURING LEGAL TENURE

Building from the community enumeration work, for the government to provide legal tenure title deeds for the owners of individual land and dwellings. Building from the community enumeration work, the government needs to grasp the opportunity to provide legal tenure...

“Land Tenure/Certification

Those agencies (eg. Haven) who have built ‘permanent’ houses have only managed to do so because they acquired land. ‘Why has a land-titling programme to provide a legal basis for community-driven land adjudication not been established? Is individual land titling appropriate in Haiti given the density, numbers of renters/squatters, multiple occupancy households in PoP. Since there is a tendency for the most poor and vulnerable to be excluded, is community level land certification a possibility?’”

Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup.

“The government

should effectively reinforce the registration of land ownership, and ensure that this ownership is respected”

José Magloire - van der Vossen_ Haiti Earthquake Disaster Response

- **Will require very urgent actions to be taken**
- **Will require further financial investment**
- **Will require action by the Government of Haiti**

6.8 BUILDING PUBLIC SAFETY AND CREATING SAFE CRITICAL FACILITIES

The aim is to provide protection from threats to lives, livelihoods and property (Natural disasters such as hurricanes/ landslides/ flooding and earthquakes) and giving priority attention to the reconstruction and protection of all critical facilities in each neighbourhood. These could include all buildings of multiple occupancy such as schools/ churches/ cinemas/ government buildings as well as basic water/ electricity/ telephone services.

“Safe Construction:

I see as the greatest challenges to effective recovery in Haiti to teach owners & construction workers the practical highlights of safe construction (knowledge & practice!)”

“There has been talk of improving technical competence in the areas of architecture and engineering, and of improving the codal provisions for structures. I felt that raising awareness of home owners and training of masons will bring more benefits. The only credible mason training initiative I found when I was in Haiti was one that had been in the planning pipeline for months, and was to be carried out by American consultants, targeting 25 masons for a one day training. The plan left me depressed”.

“Perceptions are a major issue – both at community level, and as understood by agencies. While a number of local house-owners are rebuilding vulnerabilities in the absence of any opportunities, I also took a number of pictures of INGO managed reconstruction projects that were hugely over-engineered”.

“Retrofitting is still not being talked about – perhaps it is too big a luxury in the present context?”
Anshu Sharma, Independent Consultant

Compliance with Regulations:

“The government should assure that construction rules and regulations are respected and that contravenors are punished”.

José Magloire - van der Vossen_ Haiti Earthquake Disaster Response

Rebuilding Vulnerability:

“The reconstruction of Haiti is likely to take 8 to 10 years (PDNA). The cluster understands that there is a high probability for hurricane or important rainy season in the region in the next few years. The cluster is also extremely concerned about the vulnerability of Haitians to further earthquakes, including families / not including of families who have returned to unsafe buildings. The cluster is also concerned over the families who have repaired or reconstructed their homes without adequate technical advice or support. In this context, the Cluster has prioritised shelter and camp support which offers protection against next potential disasters.”

E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster member’s comments/feedback

“Damage Assessment and Safety:

Kubilay Hicyilmaz (Arup) spent several weeks in Haiti in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, and expressed two key reservations about the approach to damage assessment, which remain a challenge.

1. It is not clear to occupants (or others) that the red-amber-green classification relates to the condition of the building in relation to its pre-earthquake state. ie. is it habitable now? not is it safe? Many buildings classified as green are unsafe either due to a brittle structure or because they are located on land prone to flooding, for example.

2. The FEMA assessment method followed was developed in the US. There, it links to a follow up process for support, advice, compensation. In Haiti it was done in isolation. There is still a vacuum in terms of policy for damaged houses, as well as know-how on how to retro-fit houses.”

“ Post-Tsunami there was considerable debate over the phrase ‘build back better’ and whether it was synonymous with ‘building back safer’ as you have used it here. Safe construction is critical in reducing exposure to natural hazards, and I fully support unpacking this to include design, workmanship and siting. However, building back better surely also entails improvements to basic services, creating more jobs, and conservation/enhancement of natural ecosystems which have a significant impact on building resilience.”

Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup.

- Will require very urgent actions to be taken (safety demands priority attention to avoid rebuilding vulnerability)*
- Will require further financial international investment and technical support*
- Will require action by the Government of Haiti*

6.9 RECOGNISING THAT TO ACHIEVE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOMES DECISIONS ON RECONSTRUCTION MUST INVOLVE THE SURVIVORS

In the words of the GFDRR Reconstruction Guidelines:

“...empowering communities to carry out reconstruction allows their members to realize their aspirations and contribute their knowledge and skills. It also assist their psycho-social recovery, helps establish community cohesion, and increases the likelihood of satisfaction with the results”

GFDRR (2010) ‘Safer Homes, Stronger Communities’ Guiding Principle 3 page 1

“Community Responsibility:

Rebuilding is more than construction, it is a mindshift for the better. Create awareness at community level that earthquakes are a reality and that rebuilding is the responsibility of each community member at all levels. ‘No growth without ownership’.

José Magloire - van der Vossen_ Haiti Earthquake Disaster Response

“Get the money to the ground:

There is not enough money available for reconstruction or to address many other basic needs. Haiti more than most disaster affected countries cannot afford to spend remaining funds on poorly justified projects, or in high overheads. A higher proportion of funds needs to reach more affected people more directly, and allow them to decide how it is used to address needs they prioritise themselves.”

Maggie Stephenson, UN-HABITAT Haiti

“The point made above - ‘Get the money to the ground’ is vital. I worry that we talk about reconstruction with too much emphasis on the physical and not enough on the economy, on what is needed to catalyse the economy and household level investment. Your models at the start of the paper recognise this, and the rebuilding of the Iron Market was a positive step but this could perhaps be emphasised more”.

Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup.

- ***Will require the full resources of civil society to be mobilised***
- ***Will require the support of NGO’s and the voluntary sector***
- ***Will require action by the Government of Haiti***

6.10 SUPPORTING OWNER-DRIVEN HOUSING CONSTRUCTION AND AN ASSOCIATED PROGRAMME TO DEVELOP BUILDING SKILLS.

Owner-driven housing has many advantages over private sector driven housing in reconstruction . This approach is particularly appropriate for Haiti in view of the massive housing need. A key component of these programmes is the development of useful building skills, with the ability to build safe quality dwellings and the capacity to market such skills after reconstruction is complete.

In January 2012 the Ministry of Works of the Government of Haiti launched a Communication Strategy. This is a comprehensive approach to the training of engineers, families, builders, masons etc. in safer construction. Of all the positive indications of progress I observed, this key initiative is a most encouraging sign that the Government, as well as other concerned parties are taking safe reconstruction seriously, and are using training and capacity building as the means to achieve this aim.

“Facilitate home owner-driven reconstruction”

Anshu Sharma, Independent Consultant

- ***Will require continual financial support to the Government of Haiti by International Donors***
- ***Will benefit from technical support from UN-HABITAT and International Finance Institutions***
- ***Will require action by the Government of Haiti***

6.11 FACILITATING THE BUILDING OF RENTAL HOUSING

In order to clear the camps it is essential for there to be a ‘pull factor’ that will encourage the estimated 78% occupants who were formally renters of dwellings to move back into safe new multi-family rentable housing in their original neighbourhoods. Initially financial support will be needed to enable occupants to pay their rent.

“ Projects that have funding and are advancing are not replicable; some housing solutions most needed are not being addressed.....Reconstruction of multifamily rental housing is critical and a separate initiative is needed to target this part of the housing market.”

Priscilla Phelps (2011)

Haiti Interim Recovery Commission Housing Sector Background Report Item 2

- **Will require continual financial support to the Government of Haiti by International Donors**
- **Will benefit from technical support from UN-HABITAT and International Finance Institutions**
- **Will require action by the Government of Haiti**

6.12 PROMOTING URBAN PLANNING AND URBAN IMPROVEMENT

Within each congested low-income settlements there is a need to develop a well integrated reconstruction strategy. This will need to include:

- Rubble clearance
- Community enumeration to clarify legal titles to property
- Community mapping of capacities and gaps
- Urban Planning
- Risk assessment
- Environmental upgrading
- Identifying safe access routes
- Water , sanitation, electrical and telephone services
- Waste collection and disposal
- Ban on plastic bags that block culverts and cause localized flooding
- Local flood protection measures to ravines and water courses

“ Regenerate the city centre:

The heart of Port Au Prince was already run down before the earthquake, with many unused buildings and empty plots. There is a risk that the earthquake damage will accelerate this degeneration process, and along with it, the expansion of the city and alternative areas of growth in the suburbs, with implications for infrastructure and transport. This would be a ‘lose lose scenario’, including the loss of identity of the capital of the country.

The city centre is strategically located with good potential for livelihoods. The clearance of sites since 2010 provides new scope for redevelopment. It could accommodate several times more people than it currently does and particularly low income rental households. This could be a win win scenario.

The regeneration of the city centre needs a vision. It needs to be inclusive, feasible and timely to become a reality. This is a political, economic, social and environmental opportunity not to be missed”.

Maggie Stephenson, UN-HABITAT Haiti

“ Urban Context:

The urban environment in PoP is hugely varied as our analysis and classification of the 16/6 sites shows. Reconstruction provides a unique window of opportunity for providing services, improving drainage, demarking open-spaces, densification, as well improved quality of housing. The terminology of reconstruction and ‘permanent houses’ needs to be replaced by an emphasis on neighbourhood renewal and upgrading (which might have a rural parallel in village renewal and upgrading as distinct from resettlement or new-town/village construction)”

Jo da Silva, Director, International Development, Arup

“ Regenerate the environment:

Haiti is blessed with a year round growing season and plentiful rain that many countries can only envy. Urban and rural areas alike could be green, providing more food, more wood, more shade, cleaner air, stabilising hillsides, securing watersheds. Significant water needs could be met by managing rainwater. A greener Haiti will reduce vulnerability to natural hazards and make the country more resilient. A greener Haiti needs political will and ambitious programmes. Can we find carbon tax investment to plant 10 million trees, one for everyone in the country, one by everyone in the country?”

Maggie Stephenson, UN-HABITAT Haiti

- **Will require continual financial support to the Government of Haiti by International Donors**
- **Will benefit from technical support from International Finance Institutions**
- **Will require action by the Government of Haiti**

7. SUMMARY: THE VISION FOR RECONSTRUCTION

For effective reconstruction to occur in Haiti, to reach the stage of Scenario 4 ‘Development Recovery’ (see item 2) the following are needed:

1. an effective **organisational structure** within Government;
 2. **leadership** in Government with a ‘champion(s)’ to inspire the entire enterprise and provide a public face’ for reconstruction;
 3. sustained cross-party **political support**;
 4. **survivor involvement** and acceptance;
 5. adequate **funding**, with controls in place to avoid corruption;
 6. **long-term commitment** by all supporting groups, to cover both the short-term period when families remain in camps, and to cover long-term rebuilding;
 7. **technical competence** in key fields: architecture/ planning/ engineering/ contract management/ low-income settlement upgrading/ regulatory environment/ environmental planning/ legal concerns;
 8. ‘building back better’ with **disaster resistant construction**, technology and siting ;
 9. land and property **tenure issues** resolved and communicated to land owners and house owners;
 10. adaptable, climatically and culturally appropriate **shelter designs**;
 11. **support from civil society**: (locally based institutions/ academia/ religious bodies/ chambers of commerce/ private sector/ a free press)
 12. **environmentally sustainable**;
 13. a recovery strategy that strengthens **the livelihoods** of survivors and that builds the community’s economic base.
-

FINALLY....

The twelve ‘*actions needed*’ in item 6 and the thirteen ‘*essentials*’ listed above are an exceedingly tough agenda. They would be demanding within a wealthy country, let alone in one as poor as Haiti. This is a reminder that all disaster recovery situations are beset by severe problems. But Haiti seems to have the full range in abundance, and more....political/ social/ educational/ ethical/ legal/ technical/ technological/ environmental/ economic/ financial/ developmental/ governmental/ staffing/ tactical/ strategic etc.

But the situation is far from hopeless, there is a tremendous resilience within the population and the determination of so many people in the large community of ‘assisting groups’ to make recovery ‘work well’, and in the process build a stronger and better Haiti. Thus the need is for visionaries....

“A visionary - regards difficult situations, not just as problems to solve, but as opportunities for creation and collaboration. To present a challenge that calls forth the best in people and brings them together around a shared sense of purpose, leading to a united community aligned around an inspiring goal.”

Anon

